throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`
` Paper No. 7
`Entered: September 24, 2015
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`SOPHOS, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`FINJAN, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2015-01022
`Patent 8,677,494 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`Before JAMES B. ARPIN, ZHENYU YANG, and
`CHARLES J. BOUDREAU, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`BOUDREAU, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
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`Patent 8,677,494 B2
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`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`Sophos, Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) requesting
`inter partes review pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 311 of claims 1, 10, 14, and 18
`of U.S. Patent No. 8,677,494 B2 to Edery et al. (Ex. 1001, “the ’494
`patent”). Pet. 4. Finjan, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary
`Response. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). We review the Petition under
`35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be
`instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner
`would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the
`petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
`For the reasons that follow and on this record, we are not persuaded
`that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing
`the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims on the asserted grounds.
`Accordingly, we deny Petitioner’s request to institute an inter partes review.
`A. The ’494 Patent
`The ’494 patent issued March 18, 2014, from U.S. Patent Application
`No. 13/290,708, filed November 7, 2011. The ’494 patent also claims
`priority from nine earlier applications, of which the earliest-filed is U.S.
`Provisional Application No. 60/030,639, filed November 8, 1996 (Ex. 1005,
`“the ’639 application”). Ex. 1001, [60], [63], col. 1, ll. 7–55.
`The ’494 patent describes protection systems and methods “capable of
`protecting a personal computer (‘PC’) or other persistently or even
`intermittently network accessible devices or processes from harmful,
`undesirable, suspicious or other ‘malicious’ operations that might otherwise
`be effectuated by remotely operable code.” Id. at col. 2, ll. 51–56.
`“[R]emotely operable code that is protectable against can include,” for
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`example, “downloadable application programs, Trojan horses and program
`code groupings, as well as software ‘components’, such as Java™ applets,
`ActiveX™ controls, JavaScript™/Visual Basic scripts, add-ins, etc., among
`others.” Id. at ll. 59–64.
`B. Related Proceedings
`The ’494 patent is the subject of a district court action, Finjan, Inc. v.
`Sophos, Inc., 3:14-cv-01197 (N.D. Cal.), and has also been asserted in two
`other district court actions, Finjan, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 3:14-cv-02998
`(N.D. Cal.), and Finjan, Inc. v. Palo Alto Networks, Inc., 3:14-cv-04908
`(N.D. Cal.). Pet. 2; Paper 5, 1. Petitioner also has filed a petition seeking
`inter partes review of a related patent, U.S. Patent No. 7,613,926 B2 to
`Edery et al. Sophos, Inc. v. Finjan, Inc., Case IPR2015-00907, Paper 1.
`C. Illustrative Claims
`Of the challenged claims, claims 1 and 10 are independent. Each of
`challenged claims 14 and 18 depends directly from claim 10. Independent
`claims 1 and 10 are illustrative and are reproduced below:
`1. A computer-based method, comprising the steps of:
`receiving an incoming Downloadable;
`deriving security profile data for the Downloadable,
`including a list of suspicious computer operations that may be
`attempted by the Downloadable; and
`storing the Downloadable security profile data in a database.
`
`10. A system for managing Downloadables, comprising:
`a receiver for receiving an incoming Downloadable;
`a Downloadable scanner coupled with said receiver, for
`deriving security profile data for the Downloadable, including a
`list of suspicious computer operations that may be attempted by
`the Downloadable; and
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`a database manager coupled with said Downloadable
`scanner, for storing the Downloadable security profile data in a
`database.
`
`Ex. 1001, col. 21, ll. 19–25, col. 22, ll. 7–16.
`
`D. References Relied Upon
`Petitioner relies on the following references:
`
`Exhibit Reference
`
`1006
`
`1008
`
`1009
`
`1010
`
`ThunderBYTE Anti-Virus Utilities User Manual (“TBAV”)
`
`Arnold, US 5,440,723, issued Aug. 8, 1995
`
`Ji, US 5,623,600, issued Apr. 22, 1997 (filed Sept. 26, 1995)
`
`Chen, US 5,951,698, issued Sept. 14, 1999 (filed Oct. 2, 1996)
`
`Petitioner also relies on the Declaration of Dr. Paul C. Clark (Ex. 1002).
`E. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`Petitioner challenges the patentability of the challenged claims on the
`following four grounds:
`
`#
`
`References
`
`1 TBAV and Ji
`
`2 TBAV, Ji, and Chen
`
`3 Arnold, Chen, and Ji
`
`4 Chen, Arnold, and Ji
`
`Basis
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`Claim(s)
`Challenged
`1, 10, 18
`
`14
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`1, 10, 14, 18
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`1, 10, 14, 18
`
`
`
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`
`II. DISCUSSION
`A. Claim Interpretation
`In an inter partes review proceeding, claims of an unexpired patent
`are given their broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification
`of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Office Patent
`Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,766 (Aug. 14, 2012). See also
`In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“We
`conclude that Congress implicitly approved the broadest reasonable
`interpretation standard in enacting the AIA.”). Under this standard, we
`interpret claim terms using “the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in
`their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in
`the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or
`otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in the
`applicant’s specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir.
`1997). We presume that claim terms have their ordinary and customary
`meaning. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
`2007) (“The ordinary and customary meaning is the meaning that the term
`would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question.”) (internal
`quotation marks omitted). A patentee, however, may rebut this presumption
`by acting as his own lexicographer, providing a definition of the term in the
`specification with “reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.” In re
`Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
`Petitioner proposes constructions for four claim terms:
`“Downloadable,” “suspicious program operations,” “database,” and
`“program script.” Pet. 12–14. Patent Owner responds to each of Petitioner’s
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`proposed constructions, offering alternative constructions for
`“Downloadable,” “database,” and “program script.” Prelim. Resp. 8–16.
`1. “Downloadable”
`The term “Downloadable” is recited in each of the challenged claims.
`According to Petitioner, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, this
`term “should be understood to mean ‘an executable application program
`which is downloaded from a source computer and can be run on the
`destination computer,’ as defined in the ’639 application.” Pet. 12 (citing
`Ex. 1005, col. 2, ll. 1–4; Ex. 1002 ¶ 60). Petitioner further contends its
`proposed construction is “consistent with” and is “what one of ordinary skill
`in the art would understand from the specification of the ’494 patent,” and
`“is also consistent with what was agreed upon by Petitioner and Patent
`Owner” in the related district court proceedings. Id. at 12–13 (citing Ex.
`1001, col. 9, ll. 46–52, Ex. 1002 ¶ 60, Ex. 1011, p. 4).
`In response, Patent Owner contends that the proper construction of
`“Downloadable” is instead “an executable application program, which is
`downloaded from a source computer and run on the destination computer.”
`Prelim. Resp. 8–9. Patent Owner points out that this is the definition
`provided in U.S. Patent Nos. 6,804,780 (Ex. 1014) and 6,092,194 (Ex.
`1015), from which the ’494 patent claims priority and which the ’494 patent
`incorporates by reference, and is also the definition agreed to by the
`Petitioner in related litigation. Id. at 9 (citing Ex. 1001, col. 1, ll. 27–39; Ex.
`1014, col. 1, ll. 50–53; Ex. 1015, col. 1, ll. 44–46; Ex. 2001, 2).
`Although the broadest reasonable interpretation may differ from a
`construction agreed upon by the parties to a district court litigation, where
`claim construction is determined according to the different standard set forth
`
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`in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), we
`discern on this record no rationale for Petitioner’s insertion of the phrase
`“can be” into the parties’ previously agreed-upon construction. That is
`particularly the case in view of Petitioner’s assertion (Pet. 12) that its
`proposed construction is “as defined in the ’639 application,” whereas the
`definition recited in the cited portion of the ’639 application is instead
`identical to Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Compare Ex. 1005, col.
`2, ll. 1–4, with Prelim. Resp. 8–9. Indeed, Petitioner recognizes the actually
`recited definition elsewhere in the Petition. See, e.g., Pet. 7 (“A
`Downloadable is described [in the ’639 application] as ‘an executable
`application program which is automatically downloaded from a source
`computer and run on the destination computer.’”) (quoting Ex. 1005, col. 2,
`ll. 1–4).
`We agree with and adopt substantially Patent Owner’s proposed
`construction as the broadest reasonable interpretation of “Downloadable.”
`Accordingly, on this record and for purposes of this Decision, we construe
`“Downloadable” to mean “an executable application program which is
`automatically downloaded from a source computer and run on a destination
`computer.”
`2. “suspicious program operations”
`The term “suspicious computer operations” is recited in claims 1 and
`10 of the ’494 patent. Petitioner asserts that the broadest reasonable
`interpretation of this term is “computer instructions that are deemed to be
`potentially hostile.” Pet. 13. According to Petitioner, this construction is
`consistent both “with the disclosure in the ’639 application regarding
`‘potentially hostile operations’ and ‘suspect commands’” and “with the ’494
`
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`patent, which describes ‘harmful, undesirable, suspicious or other
`“malicious” operations that might otherwise be effectuated by remotely
`operable code.’” Id. (citing Ex. 1005, p. 8, l. 19–p. 9, l. 3, p. 15, l. 19–p. 16,
`l. 2; Ex. 1001, col. 2, ll. 54–56; Ex. 1002 ¶ 62).
`Patent Owner responds that “the term . . . needs no construction and
`the plain and ordinary meaning within the context of the claims should
`apply.” Prelim. Resp. 9. According to Patent Owner,
`Petitioner’s proposed construction should also be rejected
`because computer instructions are not “computer operations
`that may be attempted by the Downloadable.” An instruction is
`a low-level programmatical construct, while an operation is a
`high-level command that the program actually performs. This
`distinction is reinforced by the claim language, which recites
`“computer operations
`that may be attempted by
`the
`Downloadable” as well as the specification, which differentiates
`between “remotely operable code” and
`the “harmful,
`undesirable, suspicious or other ‘malicious’ operations that
`might otherwise be effectuated by remotely operable code.”
`(Ex. 1001 at 2:54–64).
`Id. at 11 (italics and boldface omitted).
`We agree with Patent Owner that that this term requires no explicit
`construction, particularly not a construction that replaces the term
`“operations” with “instructions.” Whereas a suspicious computer operation
`might result from the execution of instructions deemed to be potentially
`hostile, instructions are not operations. And indeed, as Patent Owner
`correctly points out (id. at 10), the portions of the ’639 application and ’494
`patent cited by Petitioner do not mention the term “instruction.” Moreover,
`we cannot discern how construing the phrase “suspicious computer
`operations” would add any clarity to the claim phrase itself in the context of
`
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`claims 1 and 10. Accordingly, we conclude that no explicit construction of
`“suspicious computer operations” is either warranted or necessary.
`3. “database”
`The term “database” is recited in claims 1 and 10 of the ’494 patent.
`Patent Owner argues that, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, this
`term “should be understood to mean ‘any structured store of data.’” Pet. 13.
`Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the
`term “database” to have this meaning, citing a claim construction order in an
`unrelated case, Mangosoft, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., No. 02-545-SM (D.N.H.).
`Id. (citing Ex. 1020, 29). Petitioner also contends that its proposed
`construction is consistent with both the ’639 application and the ’494 patent.
`Id. at 13–14.
`Patent Owner responds that the proper construction of “database” is
`instead “a collection of interrelated data organized according to a database
`schema to serve one or more applications.” Prelim. Resp. 12. As Patent
`Owner points out (id.), this construction has been adopted by the district
`court in related litigation between the parties (see Finjan, Inc. v. Sophos,
`Inc., No. 14-cv-01197 (N.D. Cal.), Claim Construction Order at 7 (Ex. 2003,
`7)). Patent Owner contends that this “[t]his construction stays true to the
`claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the
`invention as well as the well-accepted definition of the term.” Prelim. Resp.
`12 (citing IBM DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING, 165 (10th ed. 1993) (Ex. 2002,
`3)).
`
`We agree with Patent Owner that the district court’s construction in
`the related litigation between the parties represents the broadest reasonable
`construction of “database” in light of the claim language and the
`
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`specification of the ’494 patent. See Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054; see also
`Power Integrations, Inc. v. Lee, ___ F.3d ____, 2015 WL 4757642, at *6
`(Fed. Cir. Aug. 12, 2015) (“The fact that the board is not generally bound by
`a previous judicial interpretation of a disputed claim term does not mean . . .
`that it has no obligation to acknowledge that interpretation or to assess
`whether it is consistent with the broadest reasonable construction of the
`term.”). As explained by the district court, the ’494 patent does not define
`the term “database”; there is no evidence that Patent Owner disavowed the
`full scope of that term either in the Specification or during prosecution; and
`Patent Owner’s definition appears to reflect both the context of the patent, as
`well as a well-accepted definition of the term. Ex. 2003, 5, 7.
`Notably, in contrast, the court in the Mangosoft case cited by
`Petitioner did not construe the term “database,” but rather construed
`“structured store of data” as “data that are organized in some recognized
`fashion (e.g., database files, word processing document files, or Web pages)
`and stored in the volatile and/or non-volatile memory of the various nodes
`participating in the shared memory system.” See Ex. 1020, 23–29.
`Accordingly, on this record and for purposes of this Decision, we
`construe “database” to mean “a collection of interrelated data organized
`according to a database schema to serve one or more applications.”
`4. Other Claim Terms
`For purposes of this Decision, no other claim terms require express
`interpretation. Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361
`(Fed. Cir. 2011) (“claim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent
`necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci.
`& Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).
`
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`
`B. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`1. Obviousness over TBAV and Ji
`Petitioner contends that TBAV, either alone or in combination with Ji,
`would have rendered obvious the subject matter of claims 1, 10, and 18 of
`the ’494 patent. Pet. 23–29. For the reasons that follow, we are not
`persuaded that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it
`would prevail on this ground with respect to any of the challenged claims.
`a. TBAV
`TBAV is a user manual for a set of software programs for protecting
`computer systems against viruses and for recovering those systems from any
`viruses that slip through. Ex. 1006, 6. TBAV describes two virus-scanning
`programs, “TbScan” and “TbScanX,” as well as various utility programs for
`restoration of infected boot sectors and partition tables (“TbUtil”),
`reconstruction and removal of infected files (“TbClean,” “TbDel”),
`definition of new virus signatures (“TbGenSig”), and other computer-
`security measures (e.g., “TbMem,” “TbFile,” “TbDisk”). Ex. 1006, 6–10.
`TbScan, in particular, is described as including both signature
`scanning functionality, for detecting known viruses whose signatures are
`stored in a signature file, and heuristic scanning functionality, for
`disassembling and analyzing files to detect suspicious instruction sequences
`and yet-unknown viruses. Id. at 6–7, 52, 158–160. According to TBAV,
`heuristic scanning allows TbScan to look into a file’s contents and interpret
`program instructions to detect their purpose. Id. at 160. TbScan assigns a
`“heuristic flag” and a score to instruction sequences known to be common in
`viruses but uncommon in “normal” programs. Id. By adding the scores
`associated with the flags, TbScan informs the user whether a file might be,
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`or probably is, infected by an unknown virus. Id. TbScan also provides the
`option to output a list of infected program files, heuristic flags, and file
`pathnames either to a printer or to a log file. Id. at 65. According to TBAV,
`TbScan can be used to scan files stored on disks, fixed drives, and/or
`network drives, and may be run either upon user request or automatically
`(e.g., upon startup). Id. at 52–53, 55–56.
`TbScanX is described by TBAV as “the memory resident version of
`TbScan.” Id. at 7. According to TBAV, “[t]his signature scanner remains
`resident in memory and automatically scans those files that are being
`executed, copied, de-archived, downloaded, etc.” Id. Although at one point
`TBAV also states that “TbScanX is virtually identical to TbScan, with one
`important difference: TbScan is memory-resident” (id. at 89), it appears that
`TbScanX lacks TbScan’s heuristic scanning capability, particularly in view
`of the above-quoted description of the program as a “signature scanner” (id.
`at 7).
`
`b. Ji
`Ji describes a system for detecting and eliminating viruses on a
`computer network, where a File Transfer Protocol (FTP) proxy server is
`used to scan incoming and outgoing files for viruses and to transfer those
`files if they do not contain viruses. Ex. 1009, Abstract.
`c. Discussion
`Petitioner relies on TBAV alone for all elements of claims 1, 10, and
`18, with the exception of “a receiver for receiving an incoming
`Downloadable” recited in claim 10. Pet. 24–29. Petitioner contends that
`that receiver “is at least implicitly taught by TBAV,” but asserts further that,
`“[t]o the extent TBAV does not explicitly describe a receiver, . . . it would
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`have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to apply the teachings of
`a receiver in Ji to the system of TBAV.” Id. at 26–27.
`In response to Petitioner’s contentions, Patent Owner argues, inter
`alia, that the combination of TBAV and Ji fails to disclose “deriving security
`profile data for the Downloadable, including a list of suspicious computer
`operations that may be attempted by the Downloadable,” and “storing the
`Downloadable security profile data in a database,” as recited in independent
`claims 1 and 10. Prelim. Resp. 23–32.
`In view of Patent Owner’s arguments, we are not persuaded that
`Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in
`showing that any of claims 1, 10, and 18 are unpatentable over TBAV and
`Ji.
`
`With respect to the recited “deriving” step, Petitioner asserts that
`TBAV’s TbScan “performs heuristic analysis of files,” which heuristic
`analysis “includes detecting suspicious instruction sequences within a file
`and applying heuristic flags to the file.” Pet. 24. According to Petitioner,
`“[t]he heuristic flags indicate the suspicious instructions.” Id. Although
`heuristic flags reasonably could be termed “security profile data for [a]
`Downloadable,” claims 1 and 10 both require, more particularly, “deriving
`security profile data . . . including a list of suspicious computer operations
`that may be attempted by the Downloadable.” Ex. 1001, claims 1, 10
`(emphasis added). Petitioner does not explain, nor can we discern, how
`TBAV’s heuristic analysis discloses “deriving . . . a list of suspicious
`computer operations that may be attempted by the Downloadable.” As we
`explain in our interpretation of the term “suspicious computer operations” in
`Section II.A.2, supra, Petitioner dos not persuade us that “instructions” are
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`themselves “operations.” Further, notwithstanding Petitioner’s conclusory
`assertion that “the list of heuristic flags in the file is a list of suspicious
`instructions” (Pet. 24), Petitioner does not identify where TBAV discloses
`such a “list of heuristic flags in the file.”
`Additionally, the evidence cited by Petitioner does not demonstrate
`that TBAV and Ji teach or suggest storing security profile data in a
`“database,” as that term is properly construed. Neither the “log file” to
`which Petitioner asserts “TBAV teaches that heuristic analysis results . . .
`can be output” nor the “TBSCAN.SIG file” to which Petitioner asserts
`TBAV’s TbGenSig program adds virus signatures (Pet. 25) is disclosed to
`be a database, and Petitioner provides no persuasive evidence in support of
`its assertion that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art would understand
`either or both of these files could be is [sic] a database containing that
`contains one or more data entries” (id. at 25–26). Indeed, although there is a
`page missing from the copy of TBAV provided by Petitioner, TBAV does
`not appear to disclose that the log file has any particular organization or
`serves any other applications, which, as explained in Section II.A.3, supra,
`are among the hallmarks of a database. Instead, the log file appears instead
`to be a simple output of “infected program files, specifying heuristic flags . .
`. and complete pathnames” either to a printer or to a file that is, by default,
`overwritten by the results of each new scan by the TbScan program. See Ex.
`1006, 65–66; see also Ex. 2003, 7 (“The practical import of adopting the
`IEEE definition or the IBM definition cited by the parties is largely the
`same, as both definitions appear to exclude ‘log files.’ . . . Therefore, I find
`that a log file does not qualify as a database in the context of this patent.”).
`
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`On this record, Petitioner has not identified sufficient evidence that
`TBAV and Ji disclose either “deriving security profile data for the
`Downloadable, including a list of suspicious computer operations that may
`be attempted by the Downloadable,” or “storing the Downloadable security
`profile data in a database,” as recited in independent claims 1 and 10.
`Consequently, we are not persuaded that Petitioner demonstrates a
`reasonable likelihood that it would prevail at trial in showing that either of
`those claims or dependent claim 18 would have been obvious over the
`combination of those references.
`2. Obviousness over TBAV, Ji, and Chen
`Claim 14 depends from claim 10 and further recites the limitation
`“wherein the Downloadable includes program script.” Ex. 1001, claim 14.
`Petitioner contends that TBAV, either alone or in combination with Ji and/or
`Chen, would have rendered the subject matter of claim 14 obvious. Pet. 34–
`36. For essentially the same reasons as set forth in our discussion of asserted
`ground 1 in Section II.B.1, supra, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has
`established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on this ground.
`a. Chen
`Chen describes methods and systems for detecting and removing
`viruses from macros. Ex. 1010, Abstract. In one embodiment, Chen
`discloses computer system 100 that includes central processing unit (CPU)
`104, memory 106, communications unit 112 for facilitating communication
`with other systems, and various other computer components. Id. at col. 4, ll.
`42–59. CPU 104, as directed by instructions received from memory 106,
`provides signals for accessing computer files, determining whether they
`include macros, locating the macros, scanning the macros to determine
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`whether viruses are present, and taking corrective action when viruses are
`detected. Id. at col. 5, ll. 3–9. In a preferred embodiment, memory 106
`includes macro virus detection module 206, which in turn includes macro
`locating and decoding module 302, macro virus scanning module 304,
`macro treating module 306, virus information module 308, file correcting
`module 310, and data buffer 312. Id. at col. 5, ll. 10–14, col. 5, l. 64–col. 6,
`l. 9.
`
`According to Chen, files may be targeted for access by user selection
`or based upon triggering events such as the opening of certain application
`file, system boots, or at periodic intervals, preferably prior to launch of an
`application program that may cause operation of a macro virus. Id. at col. 6,
`ll. 10–30. Macro locating and decoding module 302 examines targeted files
`to determine, among other things, whether they include embedded macros.
`Id. at col. 6, ll. 38–41, col. 12, ll. 4–65. If a macro is present, the macro is
`located and decoded into binary code and stored, so that it can be scanned
`for viruses. Id. at col. 12, ll. 54–57. Macro virus scanning module 304
`includes routines to detect combinations of suspect instructions likely to be
`used by macro viruses, such as the combination of a macro enablement
`instruction, which allows the formatting of a file to be set to indicate that the
`file includes a macro for execution, and a macro reproduction instruction,
`which allows the macro virus to be replicated. Id. at col. 8, ll. 40–53.
`To identify suspect instruction combinations, macro virus scanning
`module 304 accesses comparison data from virus information module 308,
`including sets of instruction identifiers that are used to identify combinations
`of suspect instructions in the decoded macro. Id. at col. 8, ll. 58–63, col. 13,
`ll. 7–32. If it is determined that a macro includes a combination of suspect
`
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`
`16
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`

`
`IPR2015-01022
`Patent 8,677,494 B2
`
`instructions defined and identified by the set of instruction identifiers, the
`macro is deemed to be infected by an unknown virus corresponding to that
`set of data, and macro virus scanning module 304 flags the decoded macro
`as infected and stores information associating the decoded macro to the set
`of instruction identifiers that resulted in a positive unknown virus detection
`in data buffer 312 so that other modules such as macro treating module 306
`can treat the infected macro accordingly. Id. at col. 8, l. 67–col. 9, l. 11.
`b. Discussion
`As explained in Section II.B.1, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s
`argument and evidence that TBAV or TBAV and Ji teach or suggest
`“deriving security profile data for the Downloadable, including a list of
`suspicious computer operations that may be attempted by the
`Downloadable,” or “storing the Downloadable security profile data in a
`database,” as recited in independent claim 10, from which claim 14 depends.
`Petitioner relies on Chen in connection with this asserted ground only for
`Chen’s alleged disclosure of the claim limitation “wherein the
`Downloadable includes program script,” as recited in claim 14 (see Pet. 34–
`36), and does not argue persuasively that Chen remedies the deficiencies of
`TBAV or TBAV and Ji with respect to the elements of claim 10.
`Accordingly, we also are not persuaded that Petitioner demonstrates a
`reasonable likelihood that it would prevail at trial in showing that claim 14 is
`unpatentable over the asserted combinations of TBAV, Ji, and Chen.
`On this record, Petitioner has not identified sufficient evidence that
`TBAV, Ji, and Chen teach or suggest either “deriving security profile data
`for the Downloadable, including a list of suspicious computer operations that
`may be attempted by the Downloadable,” or “storing the Downloadable
`
`
`
`17
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`IPR2015-01022
`Patent 8,677,494 B2
`
`security profile data in a database,” as recited in independent 10.
`Consequently, we are not persuaded that Petitioner demonstrates a
`reasonable likelihood that it would prevail at trial in showing that dependent
`claim 14 would have been obvious over the asserted combinations of those
`references.
`3. Obviousness over Arnold, Chen, and Ji
`Petitioner contends that Arnold, either alone or in combination with
`Chen and Ji, would have rendered obvious the subject matter of claims 1, 10,
`14, and 18 of the ’494 patent. Pet. 39–44. For the reasons that follow, we
`are not persuaded that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that
`it would prevail on this ground with respect to any of the challenged claims.
`a. Arnold
`Arnold describes “methods and apparatus for providing computational
`integrity for digital data processors and networks,” including, inter alia,
`periodically monitoring a data processing system for anomalous behavior
`that may indicate the presence of an undesirable software entity such as a
`computer virus, worm, or Trojan Horse; scanning for occurrences of known
`types of undesirable software entities and taking remedial action if any are
`discovered; capturing samples of unknown types of viruses; identifying
`machine code portions of the captured samples; extracting an identifying
`signature from executable code portions and adding the signature to a
`signature database; and informing neighboring data processing systems on a
`network of an occurrence of the undesirable software entity. Ex. 1008,
`Abstract, col. 1, ll. 15–18, col. 4, ll. 29–56.
`
`
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`18
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`
`Figure 8 of Arnold is reproduced below.
`
`
`
`Figure 8 is a block diagram of a system operable for executing
`Arnold’s method. Id. at col. 3, ll. 44–45. If preliminary evidence of virus-
`like activity is detected, computational resources are devoted to obtaining
`more conclusive evidence of infection. Id. at col. 5, ll. 29–32. With
`reference to Figure 8, anomaly detector 72 detects anomalous behavior of
`CPU 14. Id. at col. 28, ll. 47–49. Upon detection of anomalous behavior,
`scanner 74 compares valid signatures from a signature database (SDB 74a)
`to programs stored in the memory to identify known viruses. Id. at col. 28,
`ll. 56–60. If no known virus is found, the anomaly may be due to an
`unknown virus, and a decoy program is deployed by decoy program unit 76
`to obtain a sample of the unknown virus. Id. at col. 6, ll. 3–7, col. 29, ll. 1–
`17. If a modification to the decoy program is detected, decoy program unit
`76 isolates the undesirable software entity and provides one or more samples
`
`
`
`19
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`to code/data segregator 38 (also termed “invariant code identifier 38”). Id.
`at col. 29, ll. 10–14. Portions of the virus that are likely to vary from one
`instance of the virus are then filtered out, code-data segregation is performed
`to separate non-executable “data” portions from “code” portions
`representing machine instructions, and a viral signature is extracted from
`“probably-invariant” portions of the code. Id. at col. 7, ll. 11–21, col. 7, l.
`59–col. 8, l. 6, col. 9, ll. 13–16. For each virus, one or more candidate
`signatures having the best “scores” are selected to represent the virus. Id. at
`col. 19, ll.

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