`571-272-7822
`
`
`Paper No. 9
`
` Entered: January 28, 2016
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`SOPHOS, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`FINJAN, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2015-01022
`Patent 8,677,494 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`Before JAMES B. ARPIN, ZHENYU YANG, and
`CHARLES J. BOUDREAU, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`BOUDREAU, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Denying Request for Rehearing
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
`
`
`
`
`
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`IPR2015-01022
`Patent 8,677,494 B2
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`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`Sophos, Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) requesting
`inter partes review of claims 1, 10, 14, and 18 of U.S. Patent No.
`8,677,494 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’494 patent”). Finjan, Inc. (Patent Owner”)
`filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Pursuant to
`35 U.S.C. § 314, we denied institution of inter partes review. Paper 7
`(“Dec.”). Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), Petitioner filed a Request for
`Rehearing (Paper 8, “Reh’g Req.”), seeking reconsideration of our Decision
`Denying Institution with respect to two of the four grounds asserted in the
`Petition. For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
`is denied.
`
`II. BACKGROUND
`Petitioner challenged the patentability of claims 1, 10, 14, and 18 of
`the ’494 patent on the following four grounds:
`
`#
`
`References
`
`1 TBAV1 and Ji2
`
`2 TBAV, Ji, and Chen3
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`3 Arnold4, Chen, and Ji
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`4 Chen, Arnold, and Ji
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`Basis
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`Claim(s)
`Challenged
`1, 10, 18
`
`14
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`1, 10, 14, 18
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`1, 10, 14, 18
`
`
`Pet. 4. In our Decision Denying Institution, we concluded that the Petition
`did not establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in
`
`
`1 ThunderBYTE Anti-Virus Utilities User Manual (Ex. 1006)
`2 U.S. Patent No. 5,623,600 (Ex. 1009)
`3 U.S. Patent No. 5,951,698 (Ex. 1010)
`4 U.S. Patent No. 5,440,723 (Ex. 1008)
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`Patent 8,677,494 B2
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`challenging the patentability of any of the challenged claims on the asserted
`grounds, and we, accordingly, denied Petitioner’s request to institute inter
`partes review. Dec. 11–25. In its Request for Rehearing, Petitioner seeks
`reconsideration of our Decision Denying Institution with respect to the first
`two of the asserted grounds set forth above, namely, obviousness of claims
`1, 10, and 18 of the ’494 patent over TBAV and Ji, and obviousness of claim
`14 of the ’494 patent over TBAV, Ji, and Chen. Req. Reh’g 1.
`III. DISCUSSION
`1. Standard for Reconsideration
`
`Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d),
`
`A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a request for
`rehearing, without prior authorization from the Board. The
`burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the
`party challenging the decision. The request must specifically
`identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended
`or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously
`addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.
`
`(emphasis added). When reconsidering a decision on institution, the Board
`reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An
`abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision [i]s based on an erroneous
`conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of
`judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d
`1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988). A request for rehearing is not an opportunity
`merely to disagree with the panel’s assessment of the arguments or weighing
`of the evidence, or to present new arguments or evidence. It is not an abuse
`of discretion to have performed an analysis or reached a conclusion with
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`which Petitioner disagrees, and mere disagreement with the Board’s analysis
`or conclusion is not a proper basis for rehearing.
`2. Overview
`Petitioner asserts two bases for its Request for Rehearing. First,
`Petitioner argues, “the Board abused its discretion by finding that the
`Petition failed to establish that TBAV discloses deriving a ‘list of suspicious
`computer operations’ through its identification in TBAV of suspicious
`instructions that perform suspicious operations.” Reh’g Req. 1. Second,
`Petitioner argues, the Board’s “construction of ‘database’ . . . is legal error
`because it is not the broadest reasonable construction,” and “[u]nder the
`correct broadest reasonable construction, TBAV discloses the storage of
`security profile data in a ‘database.’” Id. at 1–2. For the reasons set forth
`below, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments.
`3. “List of Suspicious Computer Operations”
`Each of claims 1 and 10, the two independent claims among the
`challenged claims, recites, inter alia, “deriving security profile data for [a]
`Downloadable, including a list of suspicious computer operations that may
`be attempted by the Downloadable.” Ex. 1001, 21:21–23, 22:11–13. In our
`Decision Denying Institution, we determined that TBAV discloses
`“detecting suspicious instruction sequences within a file and applying
`heuristic flags to the file,” and that heuristic flags could be termed “security
`profile data for [a] Downloadable.” Dec. 13. We explained, however, that
`“a suspicious computer operation might result from the execution of
`instructions deemed to be potentially hostile,” but that “instructions are not
`operations.” Id. at 8 (emphasis omitted). Petitioner argues in the Request
`for Rehearing that “[t]his is a distinction without a difference, as no
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`operation can take place without execution of instructions, and the
`instructions dictate the operations that take place when the instructions are
`executed.” Reh’g Req. 5. According to Petitioner, “the Board
`misapprehended or overlooked Petitioner’s arguments that establish TBAV’s
`heuristic flags indicate suspicious operations and that TBAV lists heuristic
`flags in a log file.” Id. at 4–5.
`Petitioner’s arguments are not persuasive. Notwithstanding
`Petitioner’s current assertions, Petition argued in the Petition that TBAV’s
`heuristic flags are assigned to suspicious instructions. See, e.g., Pet. 18–19
`(stating that “[TBAV’s] heuristic scanner . . . searches for suspicious
`instruction sequences” and that “[h]euristic flags are assigned to suspicious
`instructions, such as instructions that are common to viruses but uncommon
`to normal programs” (emphases added)). Notably missing from the Petition
`is any argument that TBAV’s heuristic flags derive a list of suspicious
`operations. We cannot have misapprehended or overlooked an argument not
`raised. Although the Petition did use the word “operations” in several
`parenthetical statements paraphrasing TBAV’s descriptions of certain
`heuristic flags, those references also are provided in the context of
`illustrating that the heuristic flags indicate suspicious instructions, and no
`argument is provided that the flags instead indicate operations:
`TBAV discloses that a heuristic flag is a character indicating a
`specific type of suspicious instruction. For example, the flags
`include “# - Decryptor code found” (indicating that the file
`contains instructions that perform self-decryption operations”,
`“A – Suspicious Memory Allocation” (“indicating the program
`contains instructions that perform non-standard memory search
`and/or allocation operations), “B – Back to entry” (indicating
`the program contains instructions that perform endless loop
`operations), . . . among others.
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`Pet. 19 (emphases added) (citations omitted).
`Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown that we
`misapprehended or overlooked argument or supporting evidence, or both,
`presented in the Petition, such that it amounted to an abuse of discretion.
`4. “Storing the Downloadable Security Profile Data in a Database”
`Each of independent claims 1 and 10 recites, inter alia, “storing the
`Downloadable security profile data in a database.” Ex. 1001, 21:24–25,
`22:15–16. In our Decision Denying Institution, we agreed with Patent
`Owner that the broadest reasonable construction of “database” on the
`existing record and for purposes of our Decision is “a collection of
`interrelated data organized according to a database schema to serve one or
`more applications,” which is also the construction adopted by the district
`court in related litigation between the parties. Dec. 9–10; Finjan, Inc. v.
`Sophos, Inc., No. 14-cv-01197 (N.D. Cal.), Claim Construction Order at 7
`(Ex. 2003, 7); see Power Integrations, Inc. v. Lee, 797 F.3d 1318, 1326–27
`(Fed. Cir. 2015).
`In its Request for Rehearing, Petitioner asserts that “the Board
`misapprehended or overlooked Petitioner’s arguments that establish not only
`why the Board’s construction is too narrow, but also how the log file is a
`database storing Downloadable security profile data.” Reh’g Req. 8.
`According to Petitioner, “[w]hile the ’494 patent may not explicitly define
`‘database,’ it clearly evidences that a ‘database’ is broader than ‘a collection
`of interrelated data organized according to a database schema to serve one or
`more applications.’” Id. at 9. Petitioner points, in particular, to portions of
`the Petition referring to U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 60/030,639
`(Ex. 1005, “the ’639 application”), one of several applications from which
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`the ’494 patent purports to claim priority (Ex. 1001, [60]), and argues as
`follows:
`
`As shown in the Petition (Petition at 8 and 10–11), the
`’639 application discloses a security database 240 that “stores
`security policies 305 in a first data storage device 230 portion,
`known Downloadables 307 in a second data storage device 230
`portion and Downloadable Security Profiles (DSPs) data
`corresponding to the known Downloadables 310 in a third-data
`storage device 230 portion.” Ex. 1005 at p. 8, ll. 14–19. Storage
`device 230 is described as a device such as a read only memory
`(ROM) or magnetic disk. Ex. 1005 at p. 7, ll. 14–15. The
`intrinsic evidence thus contemplates a database that is simply
`several separate portions of a storage device, each containing
`different types of data. The plain language of the ’639
`application suggests nothing more than arranging the data in the
`database 240 into separate portions of the ROM or magnetic disc,
`and does not require or suggest a database schema or any type of
`organization.
`Reh’g Req. 9–10.
`We disagree. The fact that a database can be stored in ROM or on a
`magnetic disc does not mean that a database is “simply several separate
`portions of a storage device, each containing different types of data.”
`Moreover, despite Petitioner’s assertions, we do not find any such argument
`in the Petition. Pages 8 and 10–11 of the Petition, cited by Petitioner, do not
`advance any argument concerning construction of the term “database,” but
`are instead directed to a discussion of a process taught by the
`’639 application for examining Downloadables, determining whether they
`are hostile (including determining whether they are known, and, if not,
`disassembling them to look for code containing suspect commands), and
`preventing hostile Downloadables from reaching an inner computer network.
`Pet. 8, 10–11. Indeed, apart from a single statement that “[t]he security
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`database 240 in the data storage device 230 stores Downloadable security
`profiles (DSPs)”—regarding the location, rather than the construction, of
`security database 230 of the ’639 patent—the word “database” does not even
`appear on the cited pages of the Petition. The discussion of the construction
`of “database” appears at pages 13–14 of the Petition and states, in its totality,
`the following:
`3. “database” (claims 1 and 10): Under the BRI, this
`limitation should be understood to mean “any structured store of
`data”. The ’639 application does not define “database”, but one
`of ordinary skill in the art would understand the term “database”
`to have this meaning. See, e.g., Ex. 1020, p. 29 (wherein database
`files are given as examples of structured stores of data). This
`construction is consistent with the disclosure in the ’639
`application of a data storage device 230 that stores a security
`database 240. Ex. 1005, p. 7, ll. 16-20; Ex. 1002 ¶64. This
`construction is also consistent with the ’494 patent, which
`teaches “[a]ny suitable explicit or referencing list, database or
`other storage structure(s) or storage structure configuration(s)
`can also be utilized to implement a suitable user/device based
`protection scheme” Ex. 1001, col. 17, ll. 10-14; Ex. 1002 ¶64.
`Pet. 13–14.
`In our Decision Denying Institution, we addressed and disagreed with
`Petitioner’s unreasonably broad interpretation of “database” as “any
`structured store of data.” Dec. 9–10. As we explained, Petitioner cited as
`evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand “database” to
`have that meaning a claim construction order from an unrelated district court
`action, concerning claims of an unrelated patent, which did not construe the
`term “database” at all. Id.; see also Mangosoft, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., No. 02-
`545-SM (D.N.H.), Claim Construction Order at 29 (Ex. 1020, 29)
`(construing the phrase “structured store of data”). Although that claim
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`construction order provided database files “as examples of structured stores
`of data,” as Petitioner contends (Pet. 13), we discern no basis in Petitioner’s
`cited evidence to conclude that all structured stores of data are, therefore,
`databases. Indeed, the cited claim construction order construed “structured
`store of data” as “data that are organized in some recognized fashion (e.g.,
`database files, word processing document files, or Web pages) and stored in
`the volatile and/or non-volatile memory of the various nodes participating in
`the shared memory system.” Ex. 1020, 29. Thus, if we were to adopt
`Petitioner’s interpretation of database as “any structured store of data,” that
`would lead to the conclusion in view of Petitioner’s cited evidence that a
`database is “any [data that are organized in some recognized fashion (e.g.,
`database files, word processing document files, or Web pages) and stored in
`the volatile and/or non-volatile memory of the various nodes participating in
`the shared memory system].” We are not persuaded that “word processing
`document files” and “Web pages” are databases, although they presumably
`may be “organized in some recognized fashion” and “stored in volatile
`and/or non-volatile memory”; nor would it be helpful to interpret database
`circularly as “any . . . database files.”
`Petitioner’s arguments that its proposed construction is consistent with
`the disclosure in the ’639 application and the ’424 patent are also
`unpersuasive. First, the fact that security database 240 of the ’639
`application is stored in data storage device 230 does not broaden the scope
`of the term “database” beyond its ordinary and customary meaning. Second,
`the reference to “database or other storage structure(s)” in the passage of the
`’494 patent cited by Petitioner does not imply that “any structured store of
`data” is a database.
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`In its Request for Rehearing, Petitioner contends that “Patent Owner’s
`own evidence provides additional reasonable definitions for ‘database’ that
`are broader than the Board’s construction.” Reh’g Req. 10 (citing Ex. 2002,
`3). According to Petitioner, one such definition, “a collection of data
`fundamental to a system,” is the broadest reasonable definition of
`“database.” Id. Petitioner asserts that, by construing “database” as “a
`collection of interrelated data organized according to a database schema to
`serve one or more applications,” the Board misapprehended or overlooked
`the Petitioner’s evidence as laid out in the Petition. Reh’g Req. 13. As
`explained above, however, we could not have misapprehended or
`overlooked evidence that was not presented in the Petition.
`Having considered Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing in its entirety,
`we remain unpersuaded by the evidence cited in the Petition for Petitioner’s
`assertions that TBAV and the combination of TBAV and Ji teach or suggest
`storing security profile data in a database.
`For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has not demonstrated that we
`abused our discretion by not instituting inter partes review of claims 1, 10,
`14, and 18 of the ’494 patent.
`
`IV. ORDER
`
`For the reasons given, it is
`ORDERED that Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing is denied.
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`For PETITIONER:
`
`James Heintz
`Nicholas J. Panno
`DLA PIPER (US) LLP
`Sophos-Finjan-494IPR@dlapiper.com
`
`
`
`For PATENT OWNER:
`
`James Hannah
`Michael H. Lee
`Paul J. Andre
`KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS & FRANKEL LLP
`jhannah@kramerlevin.com
`mhlee@kramerlevin.com
`pandre@kramerlevin.com
`
`
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