throbber
trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2015-00880, Paper No. 24
`July 28, 2016
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`AKERMIN, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`CO2 SOLUTIONS INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2015-00880
`Patent 8,329,458 B2
`____________
`
`Held: June 9, 2016
`____________
`
`
`
`
`
`BEFORE: MICHAEL P. TIERNEY, JON B. TORNQUIST, and
`ELIZABETH M. ROESEL, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Thursday, June
`9, 2016, commencing at 1:32 p.m., at the U.S. Patent and
`Trademark Office, 600 Dulany Street, Alexandria, Virginia.
`
`
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00880
`Patent 8,329,458 B2
`
`APPEARANCES:
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`MARC W. VANDER TUIG, ESQUIRE
`JOHN R. SCHROEDER, ESQUIRE
`Senniger Powers, LLP
`100 North Broadway
`17th Floor
`Saint Louis, Missouri 63102
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`SANDIP H. PATEL, ESQUIRE
`MICHAEL R. WEINER, ESQUIRE
`Marshall Gerstein Borun, LLP
`233 South Wacker Drive
`6300 Willis Tower
`Chicago, Illinois 60606-6357
`
`
`
`
`ON BEHALF OF PATENT OWNER:
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` 2
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00880
`Patent 8,329,458 B2
`
`
`
`
`P R O C E E D I N G S
`- - - - -
`
`JUDGE ROESEL: Good afternoon. Today we'll hear
`argument in case number IPR2015-00880, Akermin versus CO2
`Solutions concerning patent number 8,329,458. Would counsel
`for the parties please introduce yourselves starting with petitioner.
`MR. VANDER TUIG: Yes, Your Honor. Marc Vander
`Tuig, Senniger Powers her on behalf of petitioner, Akermin, Inc.
`With me today is my colleague, John Schroeder.
`MR. PATEL: Thank you, Your Honor. My name is
`Sandip Patel, and I'm here for Marshall, Gerstein & Borun on
`behalf of CO2 Solutions with my colleague, Michael Weiner.
`JUDGE ROESEL: Thank you and welcome to the
`Board. According to our order on June 1, 2016, each side is
`going to have 45 minutes to argue today. The petitioner will
`argue first and may reserve rebuttal time. The patent owner may
`not reserve rebuttal time. And I'll remind the parties that the
`petitioner here bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of
`the evidence on its proposition of unpatentability. I will also
`remind the parties that this hearing is open to the public and a full
`transcript of the hearing will be made and will become part of the
`record.
`
` 3
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`2
`
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00880
`Patent 8,329,458 B2
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`So please, as you are going through your slides, I know
`each side submitted demonstratives for today's hearing, please
`remember to mention the slide number. That helps us to connect
`your argument with the slides as we review the record.
`So if you are ready to begin, we'll start with petitioner.
`MR. VANDER TUIG: Thank you, Your Honor.
`JUDGE ROESEL: Is petitioner going to reserve time?
`MR. VANDER TUIG: Yes, I would like to reserve ten
`minutes, please.
`JUDGE ROESEL: Okay. You may begin.
`MR. VANDER TUIG: Good afternoon. So today we
`are here on four instituted grounds related to the patent at issue.
`Four of the grounds -- I'm sorry, five instituted grounds. Four of
`the grounds relate to the Bonaventura reference. One is an
`anticipation ground. Three are obviousness grounds, two of
`which are directed to specific dependent claims. Then we have a
`separate obviousness ground, 5, with two separate references,
`Dean and Rau. We'll get to all those in a minute.
`The '458 patent at issue is a catalytic reactor. It's owned
`by CO2 Solutions. It was claims priority back to a Canadian
`application in July of 2001. The main claimed features at issue
`today are summarized on this table with the figure here. There's a
`reaction chamber, a biocatalyst seen as 4 in the drawing, which
`are immobilized. There's a liquid inlet and a gas inlet, a liquid
`
` 4
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00880
`Patent 8,329,458 B2
`
`outlet and a gas outlet, and then a filter retention device which is
`hard to see and from where I stand it's number 9 at the bottom.
`That retains the immobilized biocatalyst within the reaction
`chamber.
`Now, the state of the art, and I think this is undisputed
`for the most part, is that tri-phasic, that is gas-liquid-solid-type
`bioreactors were commonly used in a wide variety of industrial
`applications long before the '458 patent application was filed.
`In addition, the use of carbonic anhydrase to catalyze
`the hydration reaction was well known, the hydration reaction of
`carbon dioxide. Immobilizing enzymes was a well-developed
`field as of the time, and in fact, carbonic anhydrase, because of its
`activity, was one of the more highly studied enzymes used in
`immobilization research. And the reactor vessel configurations
`used at the time were unremarkable. And this is illustrated in
`claim 1, which is the bioreactor claim.
`So what I have done here is we've highlighted in green
`the features of the bioreactor itself, which is the physical reaction
`chamber, the inlet, the outlet. So it's undisputed that those are
`well known and in fact, are reflected in the references that we've
`submitted.
`In yellow what we've done is highlighted that portion of
`the claim that requires using carbonic anhydrates entrapped or
`immobilized in the porous substrates in order to catalyze this
`
` 5
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00880
`Patent 8,329,458 B2
`
`reaction. That too is undisputed that that was known in the art.
`So the only dispute here really is whether it was known in the art
`to have these the porous substrates that are entrapping the catalyst
`to be in suspension in a slurry reactor or in a fluidized bioreactor.
`So really that's the only dispute from patent owner's perspective
`as to whether or not that was a known feature in the prior art.
`JUDGE ROESEL: That dispute as to the in suspension
`feature, can that be resolved as a matter of claim construction or
`is it more a question of what the references disclose?
`MR. VANDER TUIG: I'll get to that in a minute, but I
`believe there is no claim construction dispute that will affect that.
`I believe that's just a factual determination as to what the prior art
`shows. There are some undisputed proposed claim constructions
`that we put in the petition. I think these are fairly unremarkable.
`They have not been disputed. To the extent in final written
`decision the Board feels that it's necessary to get into any of these
`elements, we would respectfully request that you adopt our
`proposed constructions which are undisputed.
`There were two semi disputed terms. I say semi
`disputed because the first term here, in suspension, really I don't
`think there's any practical difference between the two terms.
`Here on the slide I have highlighted with underlining the parts of
`the patent owner's proposed construction that we think are
`somewhat vague and too narrow. And that is that the particles
`
` 6
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00880
`Patent 8,329,458 B2
`
`have to be, quote, nonsettling particles and that it's limited to a
`liquid. In italics what I have done is highlighted the language that
`we think is unnecessary language that just further describes the
`particles in the liquid.
`JUDGE ROESEL: Petitioner's position there was
`nonsettling. Petitioner agrees that nonsettled particles would not
`be in suspension; is that right?
`MR. VANDER TUIG: Settled particles?
`JUDGE ROESEL: Let me state the question
`differently. Petitioner would agree that settled particles would
`not be in suspension?
`MR. VANDER TUIG: Correct. This is a quote from
`patent owner's expert, Dr. Fradette, where I clarified that with
`him during cross-examination that he didn't really mean
`nonsettling particles as in like a colloid or something. It's more
`that these particles, when the reactor is functioning, are not
`settled. It doesn't meant that when you turn off the reactors they
`wouldn't settle out of the suspension. But to be in suspension,
`they have to be not settled, correct. So we think that there's little
`ambiguity there about nonsettling particles. So we think it's
`unnecessary.
`And also, we think it's unduly narrow because it's really
`a fluid that the definition supports and not just the liquid. But
`again, I don't think that any of the disputes would turn on whether
`
` 7
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00880
`Patent 8,329,458 B2
`
`you pick one or the other. We just think if you need to construe
`the terms, that ours is clearer and it's more aligned with what one
`skill in the art would understand.
`The one that really matters here, the claim construction,
`and again, from a larger perspective, it really only matters to the
`fifth ground, but there's a dispute about what it means to be
`entrapped in a porous substrate. And first I would like to explore
`the similarities between the two definitions and then we'll get to
`the differences.
`So in Akermin's proposed construction we say it's got to
`be physically trapped -- this is the enzyme. It's got to be
`physically trapped within the structure of the substrate. Patent
`owner agrees that that has to be restricted in movement and that
`it's free in solution. So I think to some extent those are different
`ways of saying the same thing. And then Akermin has proposed
`that the inside has to retain at least some of its activity. The way
`patent owner has phrased it is accessible to reactants, which we
`agree with. It's accessible to reactants and it retains activity.
`What we don't agree with is the underlying portion of
`their proposed construction where they have attempted, and the
`language is, quote, within the interstitial confines of the porous
`substrate lattice network. Here they have tried to further limit
`what the porous substrate is when, in fact, the claim language in
`dispute modifies the enzyme. If we look at slide 11 here, it shows
`
` 8
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00880
`Patent 8,329,458 B2
`
`that claim language at issue, and there's nothing in this claim
`language that we've highlighted here that would require the lattice
`network limitations that patent owner is trying to graft on this
`claim language. It just simply requires that there's porous
`substrates. And it's clear from the claim language on slide 11 that
`the language, entrapped in the porous substrate, modifies the
`carbonic anhydrase and it doesn't further limit the porous
`substrates in which the enzyme resides. So as far as intrinsic
`evidence goes, there's nothing in the claim language that will
`support grafting that limitation.
`If we turn to the specification, we've taken a few
`snippets from the specification here where it's on slide 12 where it
`addresses the entrapped language. So in the first one, it's really
`just comparing entrapped or immobilized versus free enzyme that
`hasn't been immobilized. And later places in the specification it
`uses it broadly to generally characterize a bunch of different
`immobilization techniques.
`JUDGE ROESEL: So going back to slide 12, that
`second snippet, how does that support petitioner's position that
`entrapped includes encapsulation?
`MR. VANDER TUIG: Well, it just supports our
`position that entrapped is just used broadly. There's nothing
`definitional about the word where they wanted to narrow the --
`where patent owner, as drafting this application, tried to apply
`
` 9
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00880
`Patent 8,329,458 B2
`
`some special definition outside of the understanding of one of
`skill in the art. In fact, Dr. Fradette, during his deposition,
`admitted that there was nothing special about the definition that
`was being used. And that's Exhibit 1027 at page 62, lines 15 to
`20.
`
`JUDGE ROESEL: So in that snippet on slide 12 where
`it says the biocatalyst may also be entrapped in a porous
`substrate, is it petitioner's position that porous substrate there
`could be, for example, a semipermeable membrane or a capsule
`around the biocatalyst? Is that accurately characterized?
`MR. VANDER TUIG: Yes, it accurately characterizes
`our petition. And I believe that patent owner agrees that the
`membranes that would encapsulate in a microencapsulation
`situation would also be, quote, porous substrates that would
`qualify to the claim language. Again here, there's nothing
`definitional about how entrapped is used here.
`Now, patent owners argue that based on these two
`dictionary definitions shown on slide 14 that these are
`incompatible definitions and that they are mutual exclusive. We
`disagree. Although there's a connotation in encapsulate that has a
`narrower meaning and that it's encased as if in a capsule, from
`petitioner's perspective, that's just a species, if you will, of
`entrapment. Entrapment broadly describes physically capturing
`the enzyme in some manner to immobilize it. Encapsulate is one
`
` 10
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00880
`Patent 8,329,458 B2
`
`particular method of doing so. It's unremarkable when you have
`one broader definition that would encompass a narrower
`definition.
`JUDGE ROESEL: I'm sorry, counsel, if we could back
`up once more to slide 13, so in this specification excerpt you
`omitted the sentence that comes right before that that talks about
`encapsulation. I wonder if you could comment on patent owner's
`position that that particular part of the specification uses the two
`words to mean two different things.
`MR. VANDER TUIG: Yeah, I would say simply it's
`just like the dictionary situation where you have two separate
`words. Encapsulation is a narrower subset, if you will, of
`entrapment. The fact that both words show up in the
`specification to me is unremarkable and entrapped is still a genus
`that encompasses the narrower term encapsulation. And the
`Whiteout there was just simply so we could see what's going on.
`I don't know if the encapsulation is what shows there, but we
`wanted to make it visually easier to see those things we are
`relying on.
`Going to slide 15, so patent owner has argued in its
`patent owner response that there's nothing in the literature that
`supports the fact that entrapped would encompass encapsulation.
`That's just simply not the case. Here is Exhibit 1024 at page 181
`where it clearly shows the genus species relationship where
`
` 11
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00880
`Patent 8,329,458 B2
`
`there's entrapment which there is physical capturing of the
`enzyme versus binding which is sort of a chemical tying down of
`the enzyme, if will. And microencapsulation, as you can see, is
`one of the species or subsets of entrapped. We see that again on
`slide 16, Exhibit 1028. Again, this represents the broadest
`reasonable interpretation that one skilled in the art at the time of
`2001, the priority date, would have understood entrapment to be a
`physical immobilization of enzymes.
`And this goes to Your Honor's point earlier, that porous
`substrate. So here is a reference that was before the Patent Office
`when the examiner was examining the application. So it's
`intrinsic evidence for purpose of claim construction. And it
`clearly shows that this is a porous microsphere. So it's a
`microencapsulation situation where -- so if we look at Figure 1 on
`the right-hand side, that's the microsphere. Figure 5 below it is a
`blowup of the wall of the microsphere, and it's clearly porous.
`And in fact, that's what's reflected in the title of the patent itself.
`So there's no dispute that these are porous substrates.
`JUDGE ROESEL: So there on slide 17, counsel, what
`is the relationship between the disclosure there and that '545
`patent and the microencapsulation that's discussed in the Dean
`reference?
`MR. VANDER TUIG: What is the relationship
`between the techniques?
`
` 12
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00880
`Patent 8,329,458 B2
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`JUDGE ROESEL: So you have put forth this slide that
`talks about these porous substrates and it shows these
`membranes, but the question we are facing is whether entrapped
`includes this microencapsulation that's disclosed in Dean. So I
`wonder what is the relationship between the porous substrates in
`this '545 patent and the microencapsulation in the Dean reference.
`MR. VANDER TUIG: It a similar situation where it's
`encapsulated and there's a membrane surrounding an internal
`space, I guess sphere, if you will. So it's a similar encapsulation
`technique. This just shows that one of ordinary skill in the art
`would understand that membrane to be a porous substrate. So in
`other words, the limitation that patent owner is trying to graft on
`to the porous substrate that's called out in claim 1 is improper
`because one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that this
`is what porous substrate means. It includes these kind of porous
`membranes that are used in encapsulation techniques.
`If we go to slide 18, so patent owner also said in its
`patent owner response that in none of the prior art that petitioner
`relies on does it suggest that entrapped would include
`encapsulation. And the Badjic reference that we rely on in
`ground 3, in fact, clearly shows that the title of the paper is
`encapsulation. It is an encapsulation technique. It describes the
`proteins as being entrapped at one point, later embedded. These
`are all terms that are used to broadly describe immobilization
`
` 13
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00880
`Patent 8,329,458 B2
`
`techniques. So we would contend that patent owner is incorrect.
`In fact, they accuse us of misleading the Board by using this kind
`of language, and we think that this is consistent with what's
`shown in the prior art.
`Again, here on slide 19, this is the very Dean reference
`that we rely on. A later paper, Exhibit 1029, summarizes what
`Dean was doing and uses both microencapsulation to describe the
`carbonic anhydrates and also calls it the, quote, entrapped
`enzyme. So some scientists summarizing the Dean references
`years after Dean published his paper called it entrapped. So we
`would contend that this is pretty straightforward that entrapped is
`clearly a genus that includes encapsulation. And other scientists
`in the field have described Dean as entrapping the carbonic
`anhydrate.
`JUDGE TIERNEY: Counsel, can you help me
`understand the Perry's Chemical Engineering dictionary basically,
`Exhibit 2006, where it talks about entrapment is one form of
`immobilizing enzyme and then it specifically says encapsulation
`is another means of capture.
`MR. VANDER TUIG: I think in that particular
`reference, I don't have it right in front of me, but I believe that
`that was a reference that used a narrower connotation of
`entrapment to be more of a lattice entrapment. But it certainly
`isn't -- as we've seen with all the other references, it certainly isn't
`
` 14
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00880
`Patent 8,329,458 B2
`
`evidence that one skilled in the art wouldn't automatically
`understand there to be two separate categories. I think the
`terminology, as is often the case, is somewhat loose as far as how
`they describe these things. But it certainly describes a certain
`subspecies.
`If we go back to slide 15, so in Exhibit 1024, we see the
`polymer entrapped is one of the species of entrapment. I believe
`the reference you referred to, Exhibit 2006, I believe that's using
`entrapment in that sense, in the polymer entrapped sense and not
`the broader connotation that would be understood by one skilled
`in the art as the two different types, the bound and entrapped.
`JUDGE ROESEL: Counsel, how do we know that the
`'548 patent is using it in the broader sense and not in that
`narrower sense in your slide?
`MR. VANDER TUIG: Under the broadest reasonable
`interpretation, I believe there's nothing in the specification that
`supports the notion that patent owner tried to limit this to a
`special meaning. There's nothing -- I mean, if we were facing a
`situation where entrapped in a porous substrate was the invention,
`perhaps, and you were distinguishing the prior art on that basis,
`but if we look at the '458 patent, it sort of throws out you can use
`a free enzyme, you could use all these different entrapment
`techniques, encapsulation. These are all known techniques.
`There's nothing special about microencapsulation versus
`
` 15
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00880
`Patent 8,329,458 B2
`
`entrapment. So I think in that sense and given that record, that
`intrinsic record, there's nothing definitional about entrapment that
`would slide it down to this narrower meaning of entrapment. I
`think under the broadest reasonable interpretation, that would be
`improper to narrowly construe in the way patent owner presents.
`JUDGE TIERNEY: Going back to Perry's Chemical
`Engineering Handbook where it says, is another means, does that
`show that the term has different meanings and they are dependent
`upon how you want to use it? As you say, it could be in some
`instances genus species but other people believe it to be separate
`and distinct species altogether?
`MR. VANDER TUIG: No. In fact, Mr. Schroeder just
`handed me the patent owner's slide 4 where it quotes from that
`section where it says encapsulation is another means of capture.
`So if we look at the language, it says the method of
`immobilization -- this is the fourth line down in that paragraph.
`The method of immobilization can be adsorption, covalent
`bonding or entrapment period. Three kinds it introduces. And
`then it goes on to talk about different ways of entrapment,
`semipermeable membranes, gel, other similar materials for
`entrapment. And then encapsulation is another means of capture.
`But to me that's more of another means of entrapment, capture.
`It's not necessarily saying that this is -- if encapsulation was
`considered by the author to truly be a separate means, maybe in
`
` 16
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00880
`Patent 8,329,458 B2
`
`the first sentence that I read from it would include that there. But
`instead it said method of mobilization can be adsorption, covalent
`bonding or entrapment. So I think although there may be
`arguments about what exactly this author meant, I think there's
`nothing in this reference that will support the notion that we need
`to graft that scenario meaning on to the broad claim language.
`JUDGE TIERNEY: At least when I'm looking at
`Perry's, it seems to imply that the term is not as clearly defined as
`you are making it sound here. We can interpret it somewhat your
`way from this or we can interpret it the way that the patent owner
`suggested given this definition because the sentence prior, the
`highlighted sentence says encapsulation is another means of
`capture. The prior sentence reads, polyacrylamide gel, silica gel
`and other similar materials have been used for entrapment in
`biologically active materials, including enzyme. I mean, it seems
`like it's open to interpretation in this reference.
`MR. VANDER TUIG: I disagree. I think that it's clear
`that this is talking about another method. There's gel, there's
`silica gel for entrapping, there's encapsulation as a means of
`capture. I think this extrinsic piece of evidence, although it uses
`the terminology somewhat vaguely, I don't think it justifies then
`pulling this out of one reference in the extrinsic record to
`narrowly construe the claim language before us.
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`
` 17
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00880
`Patent 8,329,458 B2
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`JUDGE TIERNEY: I will point out that at least in
`Perry's it implies that the term is not a well-defined, definitive,
`one-size-fits-all definition, that it can be used in a vague sense.
`MR. VANDER TUIG: I would agree that we've seen
`papers where the terminology is somewhat loose as far as what
`exactly everything means, but the broadest terminology that
`we've been able to find at least is what's shown on slide 15.
`JUDGE TIERNEY: The question I have for you now is
`we have broadest reasonable interpretation, we have Phillips
`construction, is this a case where it will make a difference
`between broadest reasonable and Phillips or do you believe that
`both constructions line up at the same place?
`MR. VANDER TUIG: I think both constructions line
`up at the same place. I think that as Dr. Fradette admitted, the
`patent was not trying to apply some sort of special meaning
`beyond what the common understanding would be. I don't think
`that anything in this extrinsic record, especially the Perry's
`reference they talk about, would justify under Phillips or the
`broadest reasonable interpretation of grafting this limitation.
`JUDGE TIERNEY: You are putting up extrinsic
`evidence yourself to demonstrate what the term entrap means?
`MR. VANDER TUIG: Sure, yeah. We've put up
`extrinsic evidence to try to provide the Board with an
`understanding of what one skilled in the art would apply to this
`
` 18
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00880
`Patent 8,329,458 B2
`
`term. But there's nothing in the intrinsic record which I -- my
`understanding of Phillips is more -- the difference between
`Phillips and broadest reasonable interpretation somewhat escapes
`me, but my understanding is it's more if you have disavowal or
`something like that, it would be more intrinsic record based, in
`my opinion. So if you look at the intrinsic record, there's nothing
`there that would justify under either standard.
`JUDGE TIERNEY: Under the broadest reasonable
`interpretation, are we required to construe to preserve validity?
`MR. VANDER TUIG: To preserve validity? I think
`that -- I have not thought about that, but I don't believe so.
`JUDGE TIERNEY: Wouldn't that be a difference
`between the two where under Phillips you are trying to preserve
`validity whereas, broadest reasonable interpretation you are not
`required to?
`MR. VANDER TUIG: I believe that Phillips actually
`said the idea of preserving validity through construction is not a
`proper basis for claim construction. That's like the final, if you
`can't resolve it on the intrinsic record, there might be a final pinky
`on the scale, but I don't think it was -- it somewhat downgraded
`the importance of that doctrine, in my opinion.
`JUDGE ROESEL: Just one more point on the
`entrapment thing, is it fair to say that the intrinsic record does not
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`
` 19
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00880
`Patent 8,329,458 B2
`
`resolve the dispute here as to the meaning and that we need to
`turn to the extrinsic evidence?
`MR. VANDER TUIG: No. I think that the intrinsic
`record is clear that entrapped is use generally throughout the
`specification. There's nothing special about the different
`immobilization techniques. So I think based on the specification
`it's clear.
`So moving to ground 1, this is the anticipation ground
`based on the Bonaventura. Ground 1 focuses on Figure 6 of
`Bonaventura. Bonaventura discloses a number of different
`inventions, but the invention that's probably the most important
`for our purposes today is the system that was designed to remove
`carbon dioxide from incoming streams.
`So the reaction chamber released in one of the
`embodiment of Figure 6, this is on slide 21, is shown. Just like in
`the patent, we have a reaction chamber, we have immobilized
`biocatalysts, we have all the inlets and outlets for the gases and
`liquids and we have a filter or retention device for making sure
`that the mobilized biocatalysts don't flow out of the reaction
`chamber. So we think that this reference teaches every single one
`of the limitations of the claim.
`It's clear that Bonaventura teaches the entrapped and the
`porous substrate. In fact, it uses that very language here. On
`slide 22, we pull out a portion of the specification that shows that
`
` 20
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00880
`Patent 8,329,458 B2
`
`other immobilization methods such as, quote, entrapment of the
`enzyme in a porous substrate is the exact same language.
`This was cited in the specification itself, so it's possible
`that the drafter was, in fact, looking at Bonaventura when it was
`deciding how to characterize in words what this immobilization
`technique was. So I think that's fairly undisputed.
`It also depicts that these porous substrates are, in fact, in
`suspension. Now, patent owner has taken the position that based
`on the shading of the Figure, the immobilized substrates 24 have
`to be either a solid mass or a packed column. And they pull all
`the shading from the earlier 416 Bonaventura to try to make this
`point. They say the shading is similar. But if you look at the
`shading even in Figure 4 of the '987 patent it's clear that the
`shading is identical from the 24 shown in Figure 6 and the 7
`shown in Figure 4. In the 7, the grains that are marked 7 in
`Figure 4 are described as complex of an oxygen binding
`compound and oxygen. Very small particles. And it describes
`them as streaming through conduit 11, as you see it going down
`there. So it's clear that these particles are in suspension.
`JUDGE ROESEL: Counsel, this Figure 6, I mean, the
`description of that figure talks about different ways of
`immobilizing the enzymes, right, including attaching it to the
`walls and on a solid substrate fixed in the chamber or these gel
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`
` 21
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00880
`Patent 8,329,458 B2
`
`particles flowing. You agree. So Figure 6 is really generic to all
`three of those, would you agree?
`MR. VANDER TUIG: I agree. So it's a depiction that
`would be general enough to encompass all situations.
`JUDGE ROESEL: So in view of that, that it's generic
`to all three of those modes, how much credence should we give to
`the fact that these dots 24 look like they are kind of evenly
`distributed? I mean, it's also supposed to depict enzyme attached
`to the walls. So that's not shown, right?
`MR. VANDER TUIG: That is not shown. So I think
`that the shading one -- and the point I'm making with Figure 4 is
`simply that patent owner's argument that the shading means that it
`must therefore be packed or must therefore be -- I think they
`argue it's attached to the wall, is incorrect, because obviously, the
`same shading is used to show a streaming particle in suspension.
`So from the figure alone you can't tell. But as you
`pointed out, so here however, this is slide 24, however, in the
`event that the support material is small, for example, gel particles
`capable of flowing with water, the means for entrapping the
`substrate such as screens are required. So it's clearly describing
`in words that that drawing includes situations where each of those
`particles is in suspension.
`Now, they also focus on the term hemosponge --
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`
` 22
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00880
`Patent 8,329,458 B2
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`JUDGE ROESEL: Counsel, if we could go back to the
`slide 24, this quote here, gel particles c

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket