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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`_____________________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`_____________________
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`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD;
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.
`Petitioners,
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`v.
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`AFFINITY LABS OF TEXAS, LLC,
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`Patent Owner.
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`_____________________
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`IPR2015-00821
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`PATENT 8,532,641 B2
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`_____________________
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`OPPOSITION TO PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR JOINDER UNDER 35
`U.S.C. § 315(c) AND 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b) AND REQUEST FOR
`SHORTENED RESPONSE TIME FOR PATENT OWNER’S
`PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
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`IPR2015-00821
` Patent 8,532,641 B2
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`First, Petitioners’ motion is procedurally improper because 35 U.S.C. § 315(c)
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`does not permit a party to join a proceeding in which it is already a party. Because
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`joinder is not procedurally proper, the Petition should be denied because Petitioners
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`filed the Petition more than one year after they were served with a complaint alleging
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`infringement of the ’641 patent, the patent sought to be reviewed in the Petition.
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`Second, and if the substantive merits of the motion are considered, the motion
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`for joinder is improper because it is nothing more than a request for reconsideration
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`of substantially the same arguments that the Board has already rejected. The Board
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`has repeatedly denied joinder under similar circumstances where a petitioner used the
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`Board’s institution decision as a roadmap for successive petitions. Finally, joinder
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`would negatively impact the existing schedule of three other consolidated proceedings
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`examining the ’641 patent and would unduly prejudice the Patent Owner. Therefore,
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`the motion for joinder should be denied.
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`II. LEGAL STANDARD
`The Board has discretion to deny joinder of a party to an inter partes review
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`proceeding. § 315. Petitioners have the burden to show that they are entitled to
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`joinder. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). When exercising the discretion to grant or deny joinder,
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`the Board should be mindful that patent trial regulations must “be construed to secure
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`the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b).
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`IPR2015-00821
` Patent 8,532,641 B2
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`A motion for joinder should: (1) set forth the reasons why joinder is appropriate; (2)
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`identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; (3) explain what
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`impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule of the existing proceeding;
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`and (4) address specifically how briefing and discovery may be simplified. See, e.g.,
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`Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (Apr. 24, 2013).
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`III. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE
`Patent Owner disputes Petitioners’ representation that the newly asserted
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`references cure any of the deficiencies identified by the Board in the prior institution
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`decisions. (Paper 3 at 4-6). Further, Patent Owner disputes that Petitioners were not
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`aware of the new reference, Ushiroda, before filing petitions challenging the ’641
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`patent in IPR2014-01181, IPR2014-01182, and IPR2014-01184. Id. at 3.
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`IV. ARGUMENT
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`A. Petitioners’ motion for joinder is procedurally defective
`Petitioners’ motion is procedurally defective because 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) does not
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`permit a party to join a proceeding in which it is already a party. As a consequence,
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`the Petition is barred by the one-year bar under § 315(b) because Petitioners were
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`served with a complaint for infringement more than a year before filing the Petition.
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`In pertinent part, § 315(c) provides: “If the Director institutes an inter partes
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`review, the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes
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`review any person who properly files a petition under section 311.” (emphasis added)
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`IPR2015-00821
` Patent 8,532,641 B2
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`“Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, [the statute’s plain]
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`language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Lee, 2015 U.S.
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`App. LEXIS 2828, 10 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 26, 2015) (citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v.
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`GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)). The meaning of this statute is
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`unambiguous, “a party” may be joined to a proceeding—not “a petition.” See Skyhawk
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`Techs., LLC v. L&H Concepts, LLC, IPR2014-01485, Paper 13 at 3-4 (March 21, 2015)
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`(“A person cannot be joined as a party to a proceeding in which it is already a party.
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`The statute does not refer to the joining of a petition or new patentability challenges
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`presented herein, nor does the statute refer to the joining of a new issue.”). Because
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`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and Samsung Electronics America, Inc. are already
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`parties to IPR2014-01181, -1182, and -1184, they cannot be joined as parties to these
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`proceedings. In other words, it is illogical and contrary to the plain language of the
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`statute to join one’s self to something that one is already a party to.
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`Statutory language must be interpreted to carry out the legislature’s intent. A
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`Committee Report is “the authoritative source for finding the Legislature’s intent.”
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`Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) “Committee Reports are ‘more
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`authoritative’ than comments from the floor.” Id. (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391
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`U.S. 367, 385 (1968); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 169, 187 (1969)). Here, the legislative
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`history supports the plain meaning interpretation that “a party” does not mean a
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`petition or new argument such that “a party” cannot be joined to a proceeding in
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`IPR2015-00821
` Patent 8,532,641 B2
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`which it is already “a party.” The Final Committee Report stated that under § 315(c)
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`and § 325(c), “[t]he Director may allow other petitioners to join an inter partes or post-
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`grant review.” H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt.1 at 76 (2011) (emphasis added). In
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`SkyHawke, the Board relied on this very statement from the Report for determining
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`that “a party” in § 315(c) cannot be one who is already a party to the other
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`proceeding. IPR2014-01485, Paper 13 at 4. This statement clearly evidences the
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`legislature’s intent for § 315(c) to only allow “a party” to be joined to a proceeding,
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`and not the same petitioner who is already a party.
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`Interpreting “a party” to mean a petition or new argument would violate the
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`cardinal canon of statutory construction to avoid surplusage. “[A] statute ought, upon
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`the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word
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`shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)
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`(citing Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112, 115(1879); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter,
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`Cmtys. for Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995)). Section 315(d) grants the Board
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`authority to “determine the manner in which the inter partes review or other
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`proceeding or matter may proceed,” including consolidation of proceedings.
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`Interpreting § 315(c) to provide the same function as § 315(d), joining or
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`consolidating petitions involving the same party, renders § 315(c) unnecessary and
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`redundant. Therefore, such a construction should be avoided.
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`IPR2015-00821
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` Interpreting § 315(c) to provide joinder of new petitions or issues opens a
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`loophole for Petitioners to pursue successive attempts at invalidating a patent. The
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`result allows serial harassment of patent owners, because a petitioner could simply
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`substitute prior art references or correct arguments rejected by the Board in earlier
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`petitions. Inter partes review proceedings were not intended to provide petitioners with
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`a trial-and-error approach to invalidating a patent. Instead, it was intended to be a
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`limited and cost-effective means for challenging the validity of a patent.
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`Section 315(b) bars institution of an inter partes review when the petition is filed
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`more than one year after the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging
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`infringement of the patent. The Petition was filed on February 27, 2015, more than
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`one year after Petitioners were served with a complaint for infringement of the ’641
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`patent, which Petitioners readily admit. (Paper 2 at 7-8). Once a party is time barred
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`under § 315(b), it is always time barred. Only a new party seeking to join a proceeding
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`is not time barred under § 315(b), because the one-year bar does not apply to a
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`request for joinder under § 315(c). Petitioners’ motion for joinder should be denied
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`because the Petition is barred under § 315(b).
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`B. Even if joinder were procedurally permissible under the statue,
`Petitioners should not be given a “second bite at the apple”
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`Petitioners should not be joined, even if Board determines that joinder is
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`permissible under the statute, because “[a] petitioner is not entitled to unlimited
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`challenges against a patent.” Zimmer Holdings et al. v. Bonutti Skeletal Innov., IPR2014-
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`IPR2015-00821
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`01080, Paper 17 at 5 (Oct. 31, 2014). Only certain extraordinary circumstances merit
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`giving a petitioner a second chance. For example, in Ariosa Diagnostics v. Isis Innovation,
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`Ltd., the Board granted joinder when a new product was launched leading to a threat
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`of new assertions of infringement. IPR2013-00250, Paper 25 at 2, 4 (Sept. 8, 2013).
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`The Board also found that joinder may be warranted where a patent owner had
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`asserted additional claims against a petitioner in concurrent district court litigation
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`after the one-year bar had taken effect, and the patent owner did not oppose joinder.
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`Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., IPR2013-00109, Paper 15 at 3 (Feb. 25, 2014). This
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`case does not involve circumstances that merit a second chance for Petitioners.
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`The motion for joinder shows that Petitioners used the institution decision in
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`IPR2014-01181 as a roadmap to correct deficient arguments and prior art
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`combinations according to the Board’s analysis of the earlier petition. For example,
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`Petitioners’ motion states:
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`[T]he Board explained that, “[g]iven the wireless nature of
`Ito, Petitioner has not explained
`sufficiently why
`communicating information over Nokia’s physical interface
`would have been ‘advantageous’ or ‘convenient’ in Ito’s
`phone. . . . We are not persuaded, therefore, that Petitioner
`has presented sufficient articulated reasoning with rational
`underpinning to support combining Nokia’s physical
`interface with the specific wireless telephone device of Ito.”
`IPR2014-01184, Paper 10 at 11-12.
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`IPR2015-00821
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`While Petitioners respectfully disagree, the Ushiroda
`(Ex. 1411) and Bork references (Ex. 1410) relied on in the
`new Petition resolve any concerns that the Board had with
`respect to the combination of Ito and the physical interface
`of Nokia that were expressed in IPR2014-01181.
`. . .
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`Ushiroda and Bork address the Board’s concern that
`Petitioners had failed to demonstrate in IPR2014-01181
`why it would have been beneficial or advantageous to be
`able to communicate information over a physical interface
`on Ito’s wireless telephone, and confirm that a person of
`ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to
`implement the PHS telephone device of Ito with a single
`physical interface that advantageously provides for both
`data communication and recharging the battery.
`(Paper 3 at 5). Petitioners’ failure to assert successful combinations of prior art should
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`not open the door for another petition with the benefits of hindsight and the Board’s
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`analysis from previous institution decisions. “Permitting second chances in cases like
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`this one ties up the Board’s limited resources.” Zimmer Holdings et al. v. Bonutti Skeletal
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`Innov., IPR2014-01080, Paper 17 at 6 (Oct. 31, 2014); see also ZTE Corp. v.
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`ContentGuard Holdings, Inc., IPR2013-00454, Paper 12 at 5-6 (Sept. 25, 2013) (“The
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`Board is concerned about encouraging, unnecessarily, the filing of petitions which are
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`partially inadequate.”). The correct avenue for challenging the Board’s decision on
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`institution is a request for rehearing under 37 C.F.R. 42.71(d), not filing a new petition
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`IPR2015-00821
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`and motion for joinder. Petitioners did not file such request for rehearing because the
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`Board properly rejected the grounds in IPR2014-01181.
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`The Board has repeatedly denied joinder under similar circumstances where a
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`new petition represented a “second bite at the apple.” Indeed, these very Petitioners
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`represented by the same counsel raised this argument in another proceeding, and the
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`motion for joinder was properly denied. See, Samsung Electronics Co. v. Rembrandt
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`Wireless Technologies, LP, IPR2015-00118, Paper 14 at 6-7 (denying joinder because the
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`petition “presents merely ‘the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments,’”
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`and explaining that “[a] petitioner is not entitled to multiple challenges against a
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`patent”); see also Medtronic, Inc. et al. v. Endotach LLC., IPR2014-00695, Paper 18 at 3
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`(Sept. 25, 2014) (“This case represents a ‘second bite at the apple’ for Petitioner, who
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`has received the benefit of seeing our Decision to Institute in the prior case involving
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`the same parties and patent claims.”); Butamax Advanced Biofuels v. Gevo, Inc., IPR2014-
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`00581, Paper 8 at 12-13 (Oct. 14, 2014) (“[T]the obviousness grounds asserted in the
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`present Petition are expressly intended to squarely address[] the alleged deficiencies
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`identified by the Board in the 539 IPR. In other words, the four obviousness grounds
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`are ‘second bites at the apple,’ which use our prior decision to as a roadmap to
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`remedy Butamax’s prior, deficient challenge.”); Zimmer Holdings et al. v. Bonutti Skeletal
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`Innov., IPR2014-01080, Paper 17 at 4 (Oct. 31, 2014) (“To bolster the prior reasoning
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`that we deemed insufficient, Petitioner, in this proceeding, ‘ha[s] more fully articulated
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`IPR2015-00821
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`the reasons why it would have been obvious to combine the references.’ . . . We do
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`not reach the merits of Petitioner’s additional reasoning. … Petitioner is requesting,
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`essentially, a second chance to address claim 43.”); ZTE Corp. v. ContentGuard Holdings,
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`IPR2013-00454, Paper 12 at 6 (Sept. 25, 2013) (“A decision to institute review on
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`some claims should not act as an entry ticket, and a how-to guide, for the same
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`Petitioner who filed an unsuccessful joinder motion, and is outside of the one-year
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`statutory period, for filing a second petition to challenge those claims which it
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`unsuccessfully challenged in the first petition.”); Reloaded Games, Inc. v. Parallel Networks
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`LLC, IPR2014-00950, Paper 12 at 4-5 (October 22, 2014) (“Petitioner seeks a ‘second
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`bite of the apple’” and “has not raised any grounds of unpatentability that could not
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`have been raised when filing the [earlier] Petition”); Standard Innovation Corp. v. Lelo,
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`Inc., IPR2014-00907, Paper 10 (Dec. 1, 2014); Medtronic, Inc. et al. v. Norred, IPR2014-
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`00695, Paper 18 at 3 (Sept. 25, 2014).
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`Under the same line of reasoning, the Board has denied institution under §
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`325(d) where “the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously
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`were presented to the Office.” See e.g., Unilever Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., IPR2014-
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`00506, Paper 17 at 6-8 (July 7, 2014) (“[W]e are persuaded that the instant Petition
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`uses our prior Decision on Institution to bolster challenges that were advanced,
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`unsuccessfully, in the [earlier] Petition. . . . we already have considered the same or
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`substantially the same prior art or arguments in connection with the challenged
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`IPR2015-00821
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`claims.”); Conopco, Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble, IPR2014-00628, Paper 21 at 11 (Oct. 20,
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`2014) (denying institution because “the interests of fairness, economy, and efficiency
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`support declining review – a result that discourages the filing of a first petition that
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`holds back prior art for use in successive attacks should the first petition be denied.”)
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`The same result should occur here, namely denial of the motion.
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`Just like the decisions denying joinder cited above, the Petition is simply a redo
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`for Petitioners. Petitioners originally filed three petitions challenging the validity of the
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`’641 patent in IPR2014-01181, IPR2014-01182, and IPR2014-01184. The Board has
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`already instituted inter partes review on various grounds advanced by Petitioners,
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`including grounds challenging all of the claims in the new Petition. Petitioners admit
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`that the Petition involves the same patent, the same parties, the same counsel,
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`overlapping prior art references including the exact same secondary prior art
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`references, and the same expert for Petitioners as in the already-instituted IPR2014-
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`01181. (See Paper 3.) There are only two differences between the new Petition and the
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`earlier petition in IPR2014-01181: (1) Petitioners add Ushiroda and Bork as the
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`secondary references; and (2) the only claims not challenged in the Petition are those
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`that the Board already instituted review of in IPR2014-01181. The asserted grounds
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`are merely duplicative of the grounds already presented by Petitioners. In IPR2014-
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`01181, Petitioners set forth various combinations of Ito, Haartsen, Nokia, and
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`IPR2015-00821
` Patent 8,532,641 B2
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`Rydbeck. Now they seek another shot at the same arguments, adding the Ushiroda
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`and Bork references. The already instituted grounds include:
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`Instituted
`Proceeding
`IPR2014-01181
`IPR2014-01181
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`IPR2014-01182
`IPR2014-01182
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`IPR2014-01182
`IPR2014-01182
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`IPR2014-01184
`IPR2014-01184
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`Basis Claims
`Challenged
`8, 11, 13, 14
`12
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`§ 103
`§ 103
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`References
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`Ito, Haartsen, Nokia, and Rydbeck
`Ito, Haartsen, Nokia, Rydbeck and
`Galenskey
`Abecassis, Chennakeshu, and Herrod § 103
`Abecassis, Chennakeshu, Herrod,
`§ 103
`and Galensky
`Abecassis and Chennakeshu
`Abecassis, Chennakeshu, and
`Galensky
`Ohmura and Ahn
`Ohmura, Ahn, and Nokia
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`§ 103
`§ 103
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`§ 103
`§ 103
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`1-3, 5, 9, 10, 14
`6, 7
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`8, 11, 13
`12
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`8, 11
`13, 14
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`Review of every challenged claim has been instituted on some ground. But now
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`Petitioners seek to pile on the following additional grounds:
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`New Petitions
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`References
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`IPR2015-00820
`IPR2015-00820
`IPR2015-00820
`IPR2015-00820
`IPR2015-00820
`IPR2015-00820
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`IPR2015-00820
`IPR2015-00821
`IPR2015-00821
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`IPR2015-00821
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`Hu, Ahn, and POSITA
`Hu, Ahn, and Nokia
`Hu, Ahn, Nokia, and POSITA
`Hu, Ahn, Galensky, and POSITA
`Hu, Ahn, Galensky, and Nokia
`Hu, Ahn, Galensky, Nokia, and
`POSITA
`Hu, Ahn, and Galensky
`Ito, Haartsen, Ushiroda, and Bork
`Ito, Haartsen, Nokia, Ushiroda, and
`Bork
`Ito, Haartsen, Rydbeck, Ushiroda, and
`Bork
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`11
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`Basis Claims
`Challenged
`1-3, 5, 9
`1-3, 5, 9, 10
`1-3, 5, 9, 10
`7, 12
`6, 7, 12
`6, 7, 12
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`§ 103
`§ 103
`§ 103
`§ 103
`§ 103
`§ 103
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`§ 103
`§ 103
`§ 103
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`12
`1, 2, 5, 9
`1-3, 5, 9, 10
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`§ 103
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`1, 2, 5, 9
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`IPR2015-00821
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`IPR2015-00821
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`IPR2015-00821
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`IPR2015-00821
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`IPR2015-00821
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`Ito, Haartsen, Nokia, Rydbeck,
`Ushiroda, and Bork
`Ito, Haartsen, Galensky, Ushiroda,
`and Bork
`Ito, Haartsen, Nokia, Galensky,
`Ushiroda, and Bork
`Ito, Haartsen, Rydbeck, Galensky,
`Ushiroda, and Bork
`Ito, Haartsen, Nokia, Rydbeck,
`Galensky, Ushiroda, and Bork
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`IPR2015-00821
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`§ 103
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`1-3, 5, 9, 10
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`§ 103
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`7
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`§ 103
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`6, 7
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`§ 103
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`7
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`§ 103
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`6, 7
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`The motion for joinder states that, “Petitioners were not aware of the Ushiroda
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`reference at the time the earlier IPR2014-01181 petition was filed, and instead located
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`that reference only after the institution decision in IPR2014-01181.” (Paper 3 at 3).
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`Petitioners have not submitted any evidence in support of this assertion. Ushiroda is
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`an easily located and accessible U.S. patent. Petitioners were clearly aware of the Bork
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`reference before filing the petition in IPR2014-01181 because they relied on Bork in
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`other proceedings against the Patent Owner. See IPR2014-00209; IPR2014-00212.
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`There simply is no reasonable explanation for why Petitioners could not have found
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`Ushiroda earlier and made these same arguments in earlier petitions with a search of
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`the prior art. Indeed, Petitioners do not offer any evidence or explanation as to when
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`they began searching for this reference or why the reference was not previously
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`available. As such, the motion must be denied.
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`C.
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`IPR2015-00821
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`Joinder would unduly prejudice Patent Owner and negatively impact
`the existing trial schedule
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`Joining the Petition to the three ongoing and already consolidate proceedings
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`would deprive Patent Owner of a “just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution” and
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`further complicate the proceedings. Petitioners have filed a total of nine petitions
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`challenging three of the Patent Owner’s patents. Along with the Petition subject to
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`this motion, Petitioners have also filed another new petition challenging claims of the
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`’641 patent in IPR2015-00820, and seek to join that petition to IPR2014-01184.
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`Congress described its intention for efficient administration of inter partes review
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`proceedings, explaining:
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`While this amendment is intended to remove current
`disincentives to current administrative processes, the
`changes made by it are not to be used as tools for
`harassment or a means to prevent market entry through
`repeated litigation and administrative attacks on the validity
`of a patent. Doing so would frustrate the purpose of the
`section as providing quick and cost effective alternatives to
`litigation.
`See H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt.1, at 48 (2011). “Allowing similar, serial challenges to the
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`same patent, by the same petitioner, risks harassment of patent owners and frustration
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`of Congress’s intent in enacting the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.” Butamax
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`Advanced Biofuels v. Gevo, Inc., IPR2014-00581, Paper 8 at 13 (Oct. 14, 2014). Joinder of
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`IPR2015-00821
` Patent 8,532,641 B2
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`the Petition would defeat the purpose of inter partes review to provide just, speedy, and
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`inexpensive resolutions to this validity dispute.
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`Petitioners self-servingly suggest a shortened response period for Patent Owner
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`to file a preliminary response. While the new reference and arguments are
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`substantially similar to those previously presented by Petitioners, this is no reason to
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`procedurally prejudice Patent Owner, as Patent Owner may present new arguments as
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`to why the references fail beyond those already accepted by the Board. Patent Owner
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`is entitled to an adequate period of time to analyze the Petition and formulate a
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`sufficient response to protect its valuable patent rights.
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`Furthermore, Petitioners’ proposed schedule for joined proceedings would
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`unfairly prejudice Patent Owner because Patent Owner would bear the brunt of a
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`compressed schedule. Petitioners have already substantially completed briefing for
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`these proceedings by submitting the Petition. Patent Owner on the other hand still
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`needs adequate time to analyze and brief the issues presented in the Petition. The
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`suggested schedule unavoidably complicates the already consolidated proceedings, and
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`joinder would necessarily cause delay and prejudice the Patent Owner.
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`Moreover, Petitioners ignore the increase in complexities regarding briefing and
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`discovery if the Petition is joined to ongoing proceeding. Petitioners’ reply brief is due
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`April 6, 2015. It is unclear when the Board will be able to rule on this Motion. There
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`will likely be only 2-3 weeks between the decision on joinder and the April 30, 2015
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`IPR2015-00821
` Patent 8,532,641 B2
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`due date for the Patent Owner’s Response in IPR2014-01181. By that time, Patent
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`Owner will have completed all discovery in IPR2014-01181, including depositions of
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`Petitioners’ declarants. If the Petition is joined, the parties will have to expend
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`additional time and resources to conduct discovery related to this improper Petition
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`such that there is simply no simplification of briefing or discovery that will be
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`achieved. Thus, the motion should be denied.
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`V. CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners’ Motion to For Joinder Under 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 315(c) And 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b) And Request For Shortened Response Time for
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response should be denied.
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`Dated: April 1, 2015
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/Ryan Schultz /
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`Registration No. 65,143
`Robins Kaplan LLP
`800 LaSalle Avenue
`2800 LaSalle Plaza
`Minneapolis, MN 55402-2015
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`IPR2015-00821
` Patent 8,532,641 B2
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`I hereby certify that on April 1, 2015, a copy of this OPPOSITION TO
`PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR JOINDER UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) AND 37
`C.F.R. § 42.122(b) AND REQUEST FOR SHORTENED RESPONSE TIME FOR
`PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE has been served in its entirety
`by e-mail on Petitioners:
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`For Samsung petitioners:
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`Steven.baughman@ropesgray.com
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`Gabrielle.higgins@ropesgray.com
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`SamsungIPRService@ropesgray.com
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`Dated: April 1, 2015
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/Thomas R. DeSimone /
` Registration No. 60,755
` Robins Kaplan LLP
` One Atlantic Center
` 1201 West Peachtree Street
` Suite 2200
`Atlanta, GA 30309-3453
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