Paper No.
`Filed: December 11, 2015
`
`Naveen Modi
`Paul Hastings LLP
`875 15th Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Telephone: (202) 551-1990
`Facsimile: (202) 551-0490
`E-mail: naveenmodi@paulhastings.com
`
`
`Filed on behalf of: VirnetX Inc.
`By:
`
`Joseph E. Palys
`Paul Hastings LLP
`875 15th Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Telephone: (202) 551-1996
`Facsimile: (202) 551-0496
`E-mail: josephpalys@paulhastings.com
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`APPLE INC.
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`VIRNETX INC.
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2015-00811
`Patent 8,868,705
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Patent Owner’s Response
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

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`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`
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`Case No. IPR2015-00811
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`Table of Contents
`
`Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
`
`Claim Construction .......................................................................................... 2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`“Secure Domain Name” (Claims 3, 10, and 25) ................................... 4
`
`“Encrypted Communications Channel” Phrases (Claims 1, 2, 4-
`7, 9, 11-13, 18, 21, 22, and 26-29) ........................................................ 8
`
`“Provisioning Information” (Claims 1, 2, 9, and 21) .......................... 10
`
`“Intercept[ing] . . . A Request to Look up an Internet Protocol
`(IP) address” (Claims 1 and 21) .......................................................... 13
`
`III. The Cited References Do Not Render Claims 1-34 Unpatentable ................ 15
`
`A.
`
`Aventail In View of RFC 2401 Does Not Render Claims 1-3, 6,
`14, 16-25, 28, 31, 33, and 34 Unpatentable ........................................ 15
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`Aventail’s Disclosure ................................................................ 15
`
`The Cited Portions of Aventail Do Not Disclose the
`Claimed “Determining” ............................................................ 17
`
`The Cited Portions of Aventail Do Not Disclose the
`Claimed “Encrypted Communications Channel Between
`the Client Device and the Target Device” ................................ 23
`
`The Cited Portions of Aventail Do Not Disclose the
`Claimed “In Response to Determining . . . Providing
`Provisioning Information” ........................................................ 25
`
`a)
`
`b)
`
`c)
`
`d)
`
`HOSTENT ...................................................................... 26
`
`TCP Sequence Numbers ................................................. 30
`
`Selection of Encryption Method & Certificate
`Exchange ......................................................................... 31
`
`SOCKS Exchanges ......................................................... 32
`
`i
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`
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`Case No. IPR2015-00811
`
`5.
`
`6.
`
`7.
`
`8.
`
`Aventail In View of RFC 2401 Does Not Disclose the
`Features of Claims 2, 16, and 33 .............................................. 34
`
`Aventail In View of RFC 2401 Does Not Disclose the
`Features of Claims 3 and 25 ...................................................... 36
`
`Aventail In View of RFC 2401 Does Not Disclose the
`Features of Claims 17 and 34 .................................................... 38
`
`Aventail In View of RFC 2401 Does Not Disclose the
`Features of Claims 6, 16, 18-20, 22-24, 28, and 31 .................. 40
`
`B.
`
`Aventail In View of RFC 2401 and RFC 2543 Does Not Render
`Claims 8-10, 12, 15, 30, and 32 Unpatentable .................................... 40
`
`1.
`
`Aventail In View of RFC 2401 and RFC 2543 Does Not
`Disclose the Features of Claims 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 30, and
`32 ............................................................................................... 40
`
`Aventail In View of RFC 2401 and Brand Does Not Render
`Claims 4, 5, 7, 26, 27, and 29 Unpatentable ....................................... 41
`
`Aventail In View of RFC 2401, RFC 2543, and Brand Does Not
`Render Claims 11 and 13 Unpatentable .............................................. 42
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`IV. Petitioner’s Expert Testimony Should be Accorded Little, If Any
`Weight ............................................................................................................ 42
`
`V.
`
`Each of the Instituted Grounds Is Based on At Least One Reference
`That Does Not Qualify As Prior Art .............................................................. 46
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Petitioner Has Not Established that Aventail Qualifies As a
`Printed Publication .............................................................................. 47
`
`Petitioner Has Not Established that RFCs 2401 and 2543
`Qualify As Printed Publications .......................................................... 52
`
`1.
`
`The Evidence Presented with the Petition Cannot
`Establish by a Preponderance of the Evidence that RFCs
`2401 and 2543 Were Publicly Accessible ................................ 52
`
`ii
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`
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`Case No. IPR2015-00811
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`The Board’s Findings Are Insufficient to Esstablish by a
`Preponderance of the Evidence that RFCs 2401 and 2543
`Were Publicly Accessible ......................................................... 55
`
`The Supplemental Information Is Also Insufficient to
`Establish by a Preponderance of the Evidence that RFCs
`2401 and 2543 Were Publicly Accessible ................................ 58
`
`VI. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 60
`
`
`
`iii
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`

`
`
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00811
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Alexsam, Inc. v. IDT Corp.,
`715 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .......................................................................... 45
`
`Apple Inc. v. DSS Technology Management, Inc.,
`IPR2015-00369, Paper No. 9 (June 25, 2015) .................................................... 53
`
`Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc.,
`IPR2014-00237, Paper No. 15 (May 14, 2014) .............................................. 4, 14
`
`Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc.,
`IPR2014-00237, Paper No. 41 (May 11, 2015) .................................................. 11
`
`Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Concepts In Optics, Inc.,
`111 F. App’x 582 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ............................................................... 43, 45
`
`Biogen Idec, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC,
`713 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ............................................................................ 7
`
`Brand v. Miller,
`487 F.3d 862 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ............................................................................ 43
`
`Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc.,
`445 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .......................................................................... 47
`
`Centricut, LLC v. Esab Group, Inc.,
`390 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .......................................................................... 43
`
`In re Cuozzo,
`793 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ............................................................................ 3
`
`Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee,
`No. 15-446, 2015 WL 5895939 (Oct. 6, 2015) .................................................... 3
`
`Cyber Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc.,
`138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ............................................................................ 6
`
`Dish Network L.L.C. v. Dragon Intellectual Property, LLC,
`IPR2015-00499, Paper No. 7 (July 17, 2015) .................................................... 54
`
`iv
`
`

`
`
`Elec. Frontier Found. v. Pers. Audio, LLC,
`IPR2014-00070, Paper No. 21 (Apr. 18, 2014) .............................................. 8, 57
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00811
`
`Finnigan Corp. v. ITC,
`180 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999) .............................................................. 48, 49, 60
`
`Google Inc. v. Art+Com Innovationpool GMBH,
`IPR2015-00788, Paper No. 7 (September 2, 2015) ................................ 53, 54, 56
`
`Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc.,
`IPR2012-00027, Paper No. 26 (June 11, 2013) .................................................... 2
`
`Kinetic Technologies, Inc. v. Skyworks Solutions, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00690, Paper No. 43 (October 19, 2015) ...................................... 46, 60
`
`In re Klopfenstein,
`380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .......................................................................... 46
`
`Koito Mfg. Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech LLC,
`381 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .......................................................................... 43
`
`In re Lister,
`583 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .................................................................... 56, 57
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc.,
`789 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ...................................................................... 7, 12
`
`Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc.,
`536 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .................................................................... 42, 45
`
`Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rembrandt Wireless Techs., LP,
`IPR2014-00514, Paper No. 18 (Sep. 9, 2014) .................................................... 57
`
`Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., Inc.,
`308 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2002) .................................................................... 43, 44
`
`In re Skvorecz,
`580 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ............................................................................ 2
`
`Square Inc. v. Unwired Planet, LLC,
`CBM2014-00156, Paper No. 22 (Feb. 26, 2015) ............................................... 53
`
`v
`
`

`
`
`Straight Path IP Grp., Inc. v. Sipnet EU S.R.O.,
`No. 2015-1212, 2015 WL 7567492 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 25, 2015) ............................ 7
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00811
`
`Symantec Corp. v. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y.,
`IPR2015-00371, Paper No. 13 (July 17, 2015) ................................ 53, 55, 56, 57
`
`Tempo Lighting, Inc. v. Tivoli, LLC,
`742 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .......................................................................... 7, 8
`
`Typeright Keyboard Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`374 F.3d 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .............................................................. 47, 49, 60
`
`VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Sys. Inc.,
`767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .......................................................................... 10
`
`In re Yamamoto,
`740 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ............................................................................ 2
`
`Federal Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 311(b) ................................................................................................... 46
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316(e) ..................................................................................................... 1
`
`Federal Rules
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) ........................................................................................... 59, 60
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) ................................................................................................ 2
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5) .......................................................................................... 54
`
`
`
`vi
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`

`
`
`
`I.
`
`Introduction
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00811
`
`Patent Owner VirnetX Inc. respectfully submits this Response to the Board’s
`
`decision to institute inter partes review (Paper No. 8, the “Decision”) and to the
`
`petition for inter partes review (the “Petition” or “Pet.”) filed by Apple Inc. The
`
`Board instituted review of U.S. Patent No. 8,868,705 (“the ’705 patent”) on the
`
`following grounds: (1) obviousness of claims 1-3, 6, 14, 16-25, 28, 31, 33, and 34
`
`over Aventail and RFC 2401; (2) obviousness of claims 8-10, 12, 15, 30, and 32
`
`over Aventail, RFC 2401, and RFC 2543; (3) obviousness of claims 4, 5, 7, 26, 27,
`
`and 29 over Aventail, RFC 2401, and Brand; and (4) obviousness of claims 11 and
`
`13 over Aventai, RFC 2401, RFC 2543, and Brand. Petitioner has not carried its
`
`“burden of proving . . . unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence” (35
`
`U.S.C. § 316(e)) because the asserted references fail to disclose each of the
`
`claimed features. In addition, Apple has failed to show that Aventail, RFC 2401,
`
`and RFC 2543 are prior art printed publications and Apple’s submitted expert
`
`testimony should also be given little to no weight because it fails to describe how
`
`any of the claim features are taught or suggested in the asserted references.
`
`Accordingly, the Board should enter judgment against Apple and terminate this
`
`proceeding.
`
` 1
`
`
`
`

`
`
`II. Claim Construction
`The Petition identified six terms for construction. In its Preliminary
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00811
`
`Response, Patent Owner addressed Petitioner’s constructions and also addressed an
`
`additional term. The Decision declined to provide constructions for all but the
`
`term “provisioning information,” finding that “neither party has identified any
`
`other term for construction that is dispositive on any of the challenges.” (Decision
`
`at 8.) Patent Owner responds to the Decision’s construction and further construes
`
`the term “encrypted communications channel” below. (See also Ex. 2016 at ¶ 24.)
`
`In inter partes review, claims are to be given their “broadest reasonable
`
`construction in light of the specification.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Although
`
`VirnetX’s constructions represent the broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) of
`
`the claims in light of the specification and prosecution history, the Board should
`
`apply the claim construction standard applied by the courts, especially given the
`
`litigations and prosecution histories of the patents in the same family as the ’705
`
`patent. The BRI standard “is solely an examination expedient, not a rule of claim
`
`construction.” In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 1262, 1267-68 (Fed. Cir. 2009). It is
`
`certainly justified during the examination process because applicant has the
`
`opportunity to amend the claims during prosecution. In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d
`
`1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984). But, as the Board has noted, inter partes review is
`
`not an examination and is “more adjudicatory than examinational, in nature.” Idle
`
`2
`
`

`
`
`Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., IPR2012-00027, Paper No. 26 at 6 (June 11,
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`Case No. IPR2015-00811
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`2013).
`
`The ability to amend claims during inter partes review is so severely
`
`restricted that the rationale underpinning the BRI—the ability to freely amend
`
`claims—does not apply especially given the litigations and prosecution histories of
`
`patents in the same family as the ’705 patent. As a result, to the extent the Board
`
`would have adopted a narrower construction under the courts’ claim construction
`
`standard than it has adopted here, it should adopt the narrower construction
`
`because the BRI standard should not apply to this proceeding.
`
`The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit refused to reconsider en banc
`
`the application of the BRI standard in Board proceedings. In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d
`
`1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015). VirnetX nevertheless respectfully submits that, given “the
`
`adjudicative nature and the limited amendment process of IPRs,” claims in IPR
`
`proceedings should be given their “actual meaning.” Id. at 1299, 1301-02 (Prost,
`
`C.J., dissenting from denial of en banc rehearing). VirnetX preserves this
`
`argument in the event the Supreme Court grants review of the Federal Circuit’s
`
`decision in Cuozzo and instructs that a different standard should be applied. See
`
`Pet’n for a Writ of Certiorari, Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, No. 15-446, 2015
`
`WL 5895939 (Oct. 6, 2015).
`
`3
`
`

`
`A.
`
`“Secure Domain Name” (Claims 3, 10, and 25)‘
`
`Case No. IPR2015-0081 1
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`
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`Patent Owner’s Proposed Apple’s Proposed
`Construction
`Construction
`
`Decision’s Construction
`
`A name that corresponds
`to a secure computer
`network address
`
`No construction proposed
`
`A non-standard domain
`name that corresponds to
`a secure computer
`network address and
`
`cannot be resolved by a
`conventional domain
`
`name service (DNS)
`
`Petitioner’s construction is the same construction the Board adopted in a
`
`related proceeding.
`
`(Pet. at 11.) Apple Inc. v. VirnetXInc., IPR2014-00237, Paper
`
`No. 15 at 12-13. As detailed in Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response and below,
`
`Patent Owner respectfully disagrees with this construction.
`
`(Prelim. Resp. at 35-
`
`38.)
`
`Patent Owner’s construction was agreed to by the parties—including
`
`Petitioner—in the ’417 litigation.
`
`(Ex. 2002, Joint Claim Construction Chart
`
`Pursuant to P.R. 4—5(d) in the ’417 litigation (E_D. Tex. Dec. 21, 2011) at 19-20.)
`
`In addition to this confirmation from multiple parties that
`
`the proposed
`
`construction here is correct, the specification supports the construction.
`
`The specification teaches that a “secure domain name” is “a nonstandard
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`domain name.”
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`(Ex. 1001 at 7:29-31; 50:22-31.) Examples of “a nonstandard
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`1 Patent Owner identifies only the challenged claims that expressly recite the
`
`terms at issue. Claims that depend from the identified claims may also implicitly
`
`contain the terms.
`
`

`
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`domain name” are provided in the specification: .scom, .snet, .sorg, .sedu, .smil,
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`Case No. IPR2015-00811
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`and .sgov. (Id. at 7:39-42.) The specification also explains that a “secure domain
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`name” “corresponds to a secure computer network address,” stating that “SDNS
`
`3313 contains a cross-reference database of secure domain names and
`
`corresponding secure network addresses.” (Id. at 51:6-10; Ex. 2016 at ¶ 16.)
`
`Because a “secure domain name” is “a non-standard domain name,” the
`
`specification explains that “a query to a standard domain name service (DNS) will
`
`return a message indicating that the universal resource locator (URL) is unknown.”
`
`(Ex. 1001 at 50:32-35; Figs. 33, 34.) To obtain the URL for a “secure domain
`
`name,” “a secure domain name service (SDNS)” must be queried. (Id. at 51:35-38;
`
`Figs. 33, 34; Ex. 2016 at ¶ 17.)
`
`Patent Owner also expressly disclaimed Petitioner’s proposed construction
`
`during a now-completed inter partes reexamination of a related patent. There,
`
`Patent Owner stated that the patent “takes pains to explain that a secure domain
`
`name is different from a domain name that just happens to be associated with a
`
`secure computer or just happens to be associated with an address requiring
`
`authorization.” (Ex. 2008 at 5, Response to Office Action in Control No.
`
`95/001,270 (Apr. 19, 2010).) Unlike a domain name that just happens to be
`
`associated with a secure computer or just happens to be associated with an address
`
`requiring authorization, Patent Owner explained that “a secure domain name
`
`5
`
`

`
`
`cannot be resolved by a conventional domain name service.” (Id. at 6.) Explicitly
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`Case No. IPR2015-00811
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`relying on and agreeing with Patent Owner’s statements, the examiner allowed the
`
`claims of the patent:
`
`Patent Owner argues that the ’180 patent clearly
`distinguishes the claimed ‘secure domain name; from a
`domain name that happens to correspond to a secure
`computer. Patent Owner’s argument is persuasive. The
`Examiner agrees that the ’180 patent distinguishes the
`claimed ‘secure domain name.’ For example, the ’180
`patent explains that a secure domain name is a non-
`standard domain name and that querying a convention[al]
`domain name server using a secure domain name will
`result in a return message indicating that the URL is
`
`unknown . . . .
`
`(Ex. 2006 at 4, Right of Appeal Notice in Control No. 95/001,270 (Dec. 3, 2010).)
`
`Given Patent Owner’s statements and the examiner’s reliance on them,
`
`Apple and its co-defendants explained in district court that the patent issued as a
`
`result of Patent Owner’s statements, thus disallowing Patent Owner from taking a
`
`different position with respect to those terms. (See Ex. 2003 at 8:13-10:2,
`
`Markman Hearing Tr. From ’417 Litigation (E.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2012).) A
`
`disclaiming statement is unambiguous when “a competitor would reasonably
`
`believe that the applicant had surrendered the relevant subject matter.” Cyber
`
`6
`
`

`
`
`Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Here, VirnetX’s
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`Case No. IPR2015-00811
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`disclaimer “show[s] reasonable clarity and deliberateness.” Biogen Idec, Inc. v.
`
`GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 713 F.3d 1090, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
`
`In related IPR proceedings, the Board has relied on Tempo Lighting, Inc. v.
`
`Tivoli, LLC, 742 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2014), to dismiss Patent Owner’s prosecution
`
`history arguments. Specifically, the Board has highlighted the Federal Circuit’s
`
`dicta in Tempo Lighting that the Office is not automatically required “to accept a
`
`claim construction proffered as a prosecution history disclaimer,” since the
`
`disclaimer “generally only binds the patent owner.” 742 F.3d at 978. But while a
`
`patent examiner is not bound by a patent owner’s disclaimer when construing
`
`claim terms, an unambiguous disclaimer is nevertheless informative with respect to
`
`the patent’s scope and should be given effect in subsequent IPR proceedings.
`
`Where a “patent has been brought back to the agency for a second review,” the
`
`Board should consult the patent’s prosecution history. Microsoft Corp. v.
`
`Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Straight Path IP Grp., Inc.
`
`v. Sipnet EU S.R.O., No. 2015-1212, 2015 WL 7567492, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 25,
`
`2015) (prosecution history “is to be consulted even in determining a claim’s
`
`broadest reasonable interpretation”).
`
`Despite its statement in Tempo Lighting, the Federal Circuit there applied
`
`prosecution history disclaimer where an examiner requested the patent applicant to
`
`7
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`

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`Case No. IPR20 1 5-0081 1
`
`rewrite its claims to clarify a specific claim tenn, resulting in an applicant’s
`
`disclaiming remarks. 742 F.3d at 977-78. Here too, in the related reexamination
`
`proceeding, the examiner construed “secure domain name” more broadly than the
`
`specification, and VirnetX disclaimed embodiments that included standard domain
`
`names in response to the examiner’s broadening of the claim. (Ex. 2008 at 5.) Just
`
`as in Tempo Lighting, this disclaimer was a “clarification” of the meaning of the
`
`term “secure domain name.” 742 F.3d at 978. The Board should consider and
`
`apply Patent Owner’s prosecution history disclaimer here.
`
`Because each aspect of Patent Owner’s construction of “secure domain
`
`name” is supported by intrinsic and extrinsic evidence and because Patent Owner
`
`expressly disclaimed Petitioner’s proposed construction, precluding it from arguing
`
`for a broader construction, the Board should construe “secure domain name” to be
`
`“a non—standard domain name that corresponds to a secure computer network
`
`address and cannot be resolved by a conventional domain name service (DNS).”
`
`B.
`
`“Encrypted Communications Channel” Phrases (Claims 1, 2, 4-7,
`9, 11-13, 18, 21, 22, and 26-29)
`
`Construction A direct communications No construction proposed No construction proposed
`
`Petitioner’s Proposed
`
`Decision’s Construction
`
`Patent Owner’s Proposed
`Construction
`
`channel that is enc 1- ted
`
`Independent claims 1 and 21 of the ’705 patent recite “an encrypted
`
`communications channel between a client device and a target device.” (Ex. 1001,
`
`

`
`
`claims 1 and 21.) Thus, in the context of the ’705 patent claims, the encrypted
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`Case No. IPR2015-00811
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`communications channel between a client device and a target device is a direct
`
`communications channel that is encrypted.2
`
`The ’705 patent describes encrypted communications that are direct between
`
`a client device and a target device. For instance, in one embodiment, the ’705
`
`patent describes the communication between an originating TARP terminal and a
`
`destination TARP terminal as direct. (See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 9:41-50, Fig. 2; see also
`
`id. at 33:43-51 (describing a variation of the TARP embodiments as including a
`
`direct communication link); 38:6-9 (describing the embodiment of Figure 24 in
`
`which a first computer and second computer are connected directly).) The ’705
`
`patent similarly describes direct encrypted communications in later embodiments
`
`as well. (See, e.g., id. at 40:7-10, 40:66-41:2 (describing a virtual private network
`
`as being direct between a user’s computer and target), 42:6-10, 42:66-43:3
`
`(describing a load balancing example in which a virtual private network is direct
`
`between a first host and a second host), 48:66-49:1, 49:10-22 (describing a secure
`
`communication link that is direct between a first computer and a second computer),
`
`Figs. 24, 26, 28, 29, 33; Ex. 2016 at ¶ 19.)
`
`2 Though the Decision declined to expressly construe this term, the Decision’s
`
`analysis of the term in view of the prior art does not appear to require direct
`
`communication.
`
`9
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`

`
`Case No. IPR2015-0081 1
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`In each of these embodiments, the ’705 patent specification discloses that
`
`the communication traverses a network (or networks) through which it is simply
`
`passed or routed via various network devices such as Internet Service Providers,
`
`firewalls, and routers.
`
`(See, e.g., Ex. 1001 at Figs. 2, 24, 28, 29, 33; Ex. 2016 at 1]
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`20.)
`
`In litigation, Petitioner and its co—defendants recognized that this type of
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`network traversal is a “direct” communication.
`
`(See Ex. 2003 at 2:16-21, 4:17-
`
`5:12, Markman Hearing Transcript in the ’417 litigation (E.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2012);
`
`see also id. at 44:13-45:12 (Petitioner explaining that the claims should be limited
`
`to “direct” communication because the specification teaches direct communication
`
`between the client and target).)
`
`In View of Petitioner’s arguments and the specification, both a district court,
`
`(Ex. 2004 at 8, 13, Memorandum Opinion and Order in the ’4l7 litigation), and the
`
`Federal Circuit construed the related terms “secure communication link” and
`
`“virtual private network” to include “direct” communication. VirnetXInc. v. Cisco
`
`Sys. Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1317 n.1, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Accordingly, under the
`
`applicable broadest reasonable interpretation standard, and in light of the language
`
`of the ’705 patent claims, the Board should construe “encrypted communications
`
`channel” as a “direct communications channel that is encrypted.”
`
`C.
`
`“Provisioning Information” (Claims 1, 2, 9, and 21)
`
`Patent Owner’s Proposed Apple’s Proposed
`
`Construction
`
`Construction
`
`10
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`

`
`
`Information that is used
`to establish an encrypted
`communications channel
`
`
`
`Information that enables
`communication in a virtual
`private network, where the
`virtual private network
`uses encryption
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`Case No. IPR2015-00811
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`Information that is
`provided to enable or aid
`in establishing a secure
`communications channel
`
`The Decision preliminarily construed “provisioning information” to be
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`“information that is provided to enable or aid in establishing a secure
`
`communications channel.” (Decision at 9.) In doing so, it recognized that “[t]he
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`claims do not recite or implicate in any way explicitly a VPN,” contrary to
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`Petitioner’s proposed construction. (Id.) However, the Decision overlooked that
`
`the claims also do not recite a “secure communications channel,” as its
`
`construction states. Rather, the claims repeatedly refer to an “encrypted
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`communications channel.”3 (Ex. 1001, claims 1 and 21 (reciting that the
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`provisioning information is “required to initiate the creation of the encrypted
`
`communications channel”).)
`
`The Decision’s construction
`
`is also unreasonably broad
`
`in
`
`that
`
`it
`
`encompasses any information that “enables or aid[s] in” communication using a
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`secure communications channel, even if that information has nothing to do with
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` For example, it would encompass source and destination
`provisioning.
`
`3 This distinction is significant given the Board’s previous findings in related
`
`proceedings that security does not require encryption. See, e.g., Apple Inc. v.
`
`VirnetX Inc., IPR2014-00237, Paper No. 41 at 5-8 (May 11, 2015).
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`11
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`information for individual packets of data that are traveling over a pre-existing
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`Case No. IPR2015-00811
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`channel. While this type of information may “enable or aid in” communication
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`using an encrypted communications channel, it has no relationship to the
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`traditional notions of provisioning or the portions of the ’705 patent. (Ex. 2016 at
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`¶¶ 21-23.)
`
`As discussed in the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner’s construction is
`
`more consistent with the general notion that provisioning refers to setting up or
`
`establishing a connection or service. As the Decision noted, one dictionary
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`explains that provisioning is “[s]etting up a telecommunications service for a
`
`particular customer,” and
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`that “[c]ommon carriers provision circuits by
`
`programming their computers to switch customer lines into the appropriate
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`networks.” (Decision at 9, citing Ex. 2007 at 6, McGraw-Hill Computer Desktop
`
`Encyclopedia (9th ed. 2001).) Applying these principles to provisioning in the
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`context of the ’705 patent, encrypted communications channel provisioning refers
`
`to setting up or establishing an encrypted communication channel—not merely the
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`sending of any and all information that may “enable or aid in” communication.
`
`Indeed, one of ordinary skill in the art would not have understood a channel to be
`
`provisioned every time a data packet is sent across it, but the Decision’s
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`construction inaccurately encompasses this scenario. (Ex. 2016 at ¶¶ 13, 22, 23);
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`see Microsoft, 789 F.3d at 1298 (explaining that a construction is “unreasonably
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`12
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`

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`Case No. IPR2015-0081 1
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`broad” where it is not “consistent with the one that those skilled in the art would
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`reach”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the broadest reasonable interpretation of
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`“provisioning information” means “information that
`
`is used to establish an
`
`encrypted communications charmel.”
`
`D.
`
`“Intercept[ing] . . . A Request to Look up an Internet Protocol
`(IP) address” (Claims 1 and 21)‘
`
`Patent Owner’s Proposed Apple’s Proposed
`Construction
`Construction
`
`Decision’s Construction
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`No construction proposed
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`a art from resolvin it
`
`No construction
`necessary; alternatively,
`receiving a request to
`look up an intemet
`protocol address and,
`
`Receiving a request
`pertaining to a first entity
`at another entity
`
`4 Step 2 of claims 1 and 21 recites “the request to look up the IP address
`
`transmitted in step (I)’’ instead of “intercepted in step (I)’’ due to a clerical error at
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`the Office.
`
`(Ex. 1001 at 55:53-54, 57:1-2; see Ex. 1002 at 638, 639, 641, 655-56.)
`
`Per the Board’s Order dated December 9, 2015, Patent Owner filed a Request for a
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`Certificate of Correction.
`
`(See Ex. 2017.) Patent Owner notes that this correction
`
`does not change the scope of the claims and is not of “patentable significance” as
`
`the file history made explicit
`
`that
`
`the proper understanding of “IP address
`
`transmitted in step (I)’’ could only be the “IP address intercepted in step (1). All
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`of Patent Owner’s arguments
`
`in this Response are consistent with this
`
`understanding.”
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`13
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`

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`Case No. IPR2015-00811
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`into an address,
`performing an evaluation
`on it related to
`establishing an encrypted
`communications channel
`
`
`Though the Board declined to preliminarily construe this term, if the Board
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`later deems construction necessary, it should adopt Patent Owner’s construction
`
`because Petitioner’s proposed construction does not reflect the appropriate
`
`construction in view of the specification. Petitioner’s proposed construction for
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`the “intercept[ing]” phrase (Pet. at 10) is similar to a construction that the Board
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`adopted in a related proceeding. Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., IPR2014-00237, Paper
`
`No. 15 at 12-13. As explained in Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response, Patent
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`Owner’s alternative construction appropriately captures the notion of performing
`
`an additional evaluation on a request to look up an IP address related to
`
`establishing an encrypted communications channel, beyond conventionally
`
`resolving it and returning the address. (Prelim. Resp. at 30-34; Ex. 2016 at ¶ 24.)
`
`The independent claims support this construction, for example, by reciting that a
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`determination is made whether the request to look up the IP address corresponds to
`
`a device that accepts an encrypted channel connection with the client device, and
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`that “in response to” this determination, provisioning information required to
`
`initiate the encrypted communications channel is provided. (Ex. 1001, claims 1
`
`and 21.) Additionally, dependent claims 16 and 33 expressly specify the
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`14
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`

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`evaluation, reciting that “intercepting” involves “receiving the request to determine
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`Case No. IPR2015-00811
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`whether the target device accepts an encrypted channel connection with t