IPR2015-00806
`U.S. 7,765,482
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`GOOGLE INC., and
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
`Petitioners
`
`v.
`
`SUMMIT 6 LLC,
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`
`Case: IPR2015-00806
`Patent 7,765,482
`
`PETITIONERS’ MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
`
`
`
`
`
`
`7679280V.2
`
`
`U.S. 7,765,482
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`GOOGLE INC., and
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
`Petitioners
`
`v.
`
`SUMMIT 6 LLC,
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`
`Case: IPR2015-00806
`Patent 7,765,482
`
`PETITIONERS’ MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
`
`
`
`
`
`
`7679280V.2
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`IPR2015-00806
`U.S. 7,765,482
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`I.
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`II.
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`Statement of Relief Requested ........................................................................ 1
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`Legal Standards ............................................................................................... 1
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`III. Exhibit 2015 - Market Study, “Image Servers - Early Adopter
`Case Studies,” (Tony Henning and Future Image, Inc., 2001) ....................... 1
`
`IV. Exhibit 2044 – Presentation eBay Picture Services Stats; and
`Exhibit 2045 – Presentation ebay Jeff Jordan Senior Vice
`President, eBay U.S. ........................................................................................ 4
`
`V.
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
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`Exhibits 2050, 2051, and 2058 ........................................................................ 6
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`Exhibit 2050 – Declaration of Scott Lewis ..................................................... 6
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`Exhibit 2051 – Declaration of Sarah Pate ..................................................... 10
`
`Exhibit 2058 – Declaration of Dr. Martin Kaliski ......................................... 12
`
`VI. Exhibit 2073 – Brighton Collectibles, Inc. v. RK Texas Leather
`Mfg., No. 10-cv-419-GPC, Order Denying Motion for
`Summary Judgment; and Exhibit 2074 – Stop Staring! Designs
`v. Tatyana, LLC, No. 09-cv-2014-DSF-AJW, Tentative Order
`re Defendant’s Motions in Limine................................................................. 14
`
`VII. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 15
`
`
`
`
`
`
`7679280V.2
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`
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`IPR2015-00806
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`I. Statement of Relief Requested
`Google Inc. and Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. (“Petitioner”) respectfully
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`request that the Board exclude all or part of Exhibits 2015, 2044, 2045, 2050,
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`2051, 2058, 2073, and 2074.
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`II. Legal Standards
`Pursuant to the AIA Trial Practice Guide, “[a] motion to exclude evidence
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`must: (a) identify where in the record the objection originally was made; (b)
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`identify where in the record the evidence sought to be excluded was relied upon by
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`an opponent; (c) address objections to exhibits in numerical order; and (d) explain
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`each objection.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,767
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`(Aug. 14, 2012).
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`III. Exhibit 2015 - Market Study, “Image Servers - Early Adopter Case
`Studies,” (Tony Henning and Future Image, Inc., 2001)
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`Patent Owner relies on Exhibit 2015 in its Response to the Petition (Paper
`
`28) (“Response”) in support of its alleged Secondary Considerations of Non-
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`Obviousness. See, e.g., Paper 28 at pp. 45, 49-51, 57, and 59. Petitioner Objected
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`to this Exhibit on September 23, 2015. Paper 21 at 10-11 (Fed. R. Evid. 403, 802,
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`1002, and 1006).
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`First, Exhibit 2015 should be excluded under Rule 403 because “its
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`probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of … unfair
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`prejudice [and] confusing the issues.” Exhibit 2015 states at its outset that any data
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`7679280V.2
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`presented is unreliable. Specifically, it states “[n]either Future Image nor these
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`third-party providers represent, or endorse the accuracy of any advice, opinion,
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`statement or other information presented in this report .…” Ex. 2015 at 2. Indeed,
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`Exhibit 2015 includes a disclaimer that “[y]ou rely upon and use this report,
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`including opinion, advice, statements, or any other information presented here, at
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`your own risk ….” Id. Thus, Exhibit 2015 presents data that it admits is unreliable.
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`Furthermore, Summit 6’s witnesses testified that the testimonials discussed in the
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`Exhibit are from iPIX employees. Exs. 1019 at 114:23-25 and 2051 at ¶ 36. These
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`iPIX employees had a vested interest in presenting iPIX and its software in the
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`most favorable light rather than the most accurate light. Thus, any probative value
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`of Exhibit 2015 is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice or confusing the
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`issues.
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`Second, Patent Owner presents Exhibit 2015 for the truth of the information
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`presented in the Exhibit. Exhibit 2015 is hearsay and there is no applicable
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`exception. Patent Owner may argue that Exhibit 2015 qualifies under the business
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`records exception to hearsay under Rule 803(6). However, Patent Owner presents
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`no testimony that this document meets the requirements of the business records
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`exception: (A) that the document “was made at or near the time by — or from
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`information transmitted by — someone with knowledge,” (B) that the document
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`“was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business,” (C) that
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`2
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`“making the record was a regular practice of that activity,” (D) that “all these
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`IPR2015-00806
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`conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified
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`witness,” and (E) that “the opponent does not show that the source of information
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`or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.”
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`Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). Summit 6’s testimony that this document is a true and correct
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`copy is not sufficient to establish that any hearsay exception applies. See Ex. 2051,
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`¶ 36. Further, the last element is plainly unmet, because, as discussed above, the
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`Exhibit states that the information it presents should not be relied upon.
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`Third, in multiple places Exhibit 2015 includes hearsay within hearsay. For
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`example, Exhibit 2015 repeatedly discusses the state of mind of eBay or eBay
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`management. See, e.g., Ex. 2015 at 11 (“eBay management is confident that
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`Rimfire has achieved the key goal of improving the ‘velocity of trade’”). As
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`discussed above, there is no applicable exception for this hearsay within hearsay.
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`Fourth, Exhibit 2015 presents summaries of data, but it does not present any
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`raw data. Rule 1006 requires that a summary, chart, or calculation is permissible
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`only if “the originals or duplicates [are made] available for examination or
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`copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and place.” Patent Owner
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`cannot make this raw data available. See Ex. 2075, Frazier Dep. at 26:14-16 (Q. …
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`[I]f we had the underlying data we would have provided it to you.”). Further, this
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`data is required to fully understand the document. Indeed, Dr. Frazier testified that
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`3
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`he cannot rely on this Exhibit’s characterization of data without reviewing the raw
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`data. Id. at 26:10-13 (“I’ve just found that it’s difficult for me as a marketing
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`expert to rely on other people’s characterization of the data if I don’t have the
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`underlying data.”). See Kenosha Liquor Co. v. Heublein, Inc., 895 F.2d 418, 420
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`(7th Cir. 1990) (“Expert opinions are worthless without data and reasons.”).
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`For each of the foregoing reasons Petitioner respectfully requests that the
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`Board exclude Exhibit 2015.
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`IV. Exhibit 2044 – Presentation eBay Picture Services Stats; and
`Exhibit 2045 – Presentation eBay Jeff Jordan Senior Vice President,
`eBay U.S.
`
`The Board should exclude both of Exhibits 2044 and 2045. Patent Owner
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`relies on these Exhibits in its Response in support of its alleged Secondary
`
`Considerations of Non-Obviousness. See, e.g., Paper 28 at pp. 53 and 55. Petitioner
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`Objected to these Exhibits on September 23, 2015. Paper 31 at 10-11 (Fed. R.
`
`Evid. 403 and 802).
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`First, Exhibits 2044 and 2045 should be excluded under Rule 403 because
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`their “probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of …
`
`unfair prejudice [and] confusing the issues.” Both Exhibits are marketing
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`presentations, and no witness has testified that any data presented in these two
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`presentations is accurate. Indeed, Sarah Pate testified that she did not know
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`whether any of the data presented in Exhibit 2044 was actual data or forecasted
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`4
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`
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`data. See Ex. 1019 at 105:12-106:20. Further, Exhibit 2045 includes no indication
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`of the source of any data presented, and Sarah Pate’s knowledge of this Exhibit is
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`that it is an eBay presentation. See Ex. 1019 at 112:1-3.
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`Second, Patent Owner presents Exhibits 2044 and 2045 for the truth of the
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`information presented in the Exhibits. Thus, both Exhibits are hearsay and there is
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`no applicable exception. Patent Owner may argue that these Exhibits qualify under
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`the business records exception to hearsay under Rule 803(6). However, Patent
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`Owner presents no testimony that either Exhibit meets all the requirements of the
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`business records exception. For example, Patent Owner has not established that
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`these documents (A) “[were] made at or near the time by — or from information
`
`transmitted by — someone with knowledge.” Indeed, with regard to both
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`documents Sarah Pate testified that she had no idea who made the documents. See
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`Ex. 1019 at 105:18-21 (“Q. Who created [Exhibit 2044]? A. I'm not sure. Q. Do
`
`you know when it was created? A. I don't know.”); 112:1-3 (“Q. Who created the
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`presentation [Exhibit 2045]? A. I -- someone -- either Jeff Jordan or someone
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`working for Jeff Jordan. It was an eBay presentation.”). Nor has Patent Owner
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`established that the Exhibits were made as part of a regular practice of the
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`business, as is required by Rule 803(6)(C). In fact, Patent Owner has not identified
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`any business activity for which these two Exhibits were created. Rather, Patent
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`Owner simply states that they were “kept by Summit 6 in the regular course of
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`5
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`business.” Ex. 2051, ¶¶ 32, 34.
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`IPR2015-00806
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`For each of the foregoing reasons Petitioner respectfully requests that the
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`Board exclude Exhibits 2044 and 2045.
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`V. Exhibits 2050, 2051, and 2058
`Petitioner seeks to exclude parts of each of Exhibits 2050, 2051, and 2058.
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`Patent Owner relies on these Exhibits in its Response in support of its alleged
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`Secondary Considerations of Non-Obviousness. See, e.g., Paper 28 at 44-60.
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`Petitioner Objected to these Exhibits on December 16, 2016 as, inter alia,
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`improper expert testimony under Rules 701, 702, and 703 as well as unfair
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`prejudice under Rule 403. Paper 31 at 5-7 and 13.
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`A. Exhibit 2050 – Declaration of Scott Lewis
`The Board should exclude at least paragraphs 11-13, 19, 27-28, 30, 32-33,
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`37-38, and 41-43 of the declaration of Scott Lewis. Mr. Lewis repeatedly provides
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`improper opinion testimony. However, Mr. Lewis testified that his educational
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`background is in industrial design and that he is not a computer programmer.
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`Exhibit 1016 at 11:2-13. Thus, Mr. Lewis is neither a technical nor an economic
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`expert. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 (“[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by
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`knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
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`opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
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`knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
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`6
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`fact in issue ….”). As discussed further below, the Board should exclude Mr.
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`Lewis’s opinion testimony on both technical and economic issues. Similarly, the
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`Board should exclude Mr. Lewis’s testimony on subjects about which he has no
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`first-hand knowledge, e.g., the state of mind of eBay and Realtors. Randolph v.
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`Collectramatic, Inc., 590 F.2d 844, 846 (10th Cir. 1979) (finding that Rule 701
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`does “not permit a lay witness to express an opinion as to matters which are
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`beyond the realm of common experience and which require the special skill and
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`knowledge of an expert witness.”).
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`First, Mr. Lewis provides technical opinions on issues about which he has
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`no knowledge that is helpful to the trier of fact. For example, Mr. Lewis testifies as
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`a technical expert giving his opinions on, e.g., the requirements of webpages, the
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`speed of Internet connections, and the skills and needs of people in the real estate
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`market. See, e.g., Ex. 2050 ¶ 11 (“various websites had specific requirements for
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`file format, resolution, compression, file size, etc. This was because transmitting
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`large digital images over slow Internet connections was not only time consuming,
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`but also error prone, often resulting in failure.”); ¶ 37 (“While we were not the only
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`image hosting website on the Internet, we were the only website with the drag and
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`drop preprocessing functionality offered in Prepare & PostTM.”). This testimony is
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`improper. Mr. Lewis admits that he is not a person of ordinary skill in the art, even
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`under Patent Owner’s own definition. Exhibit 1016 at 11:2-13, c.f., Response at 6-
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`
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`7
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`
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`7. If Mr. Lewis is not a person of ordinary skill in the art, then he certainly is no
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`IPR2015-00806
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`expert in this field. Under Rule 702(a) the Board should exclude any opinion
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`testimony of a witness who is unqualified to give expert opinions.
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`Second, Mr. Lewis bases some of his opinions on two editions of eBay for
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`Dummies (Exs. 2016 and 2025), each of which he refers to as a “treatise.” See,
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`e.g., Ex. 2050, ¶¶ 28, 38, and 43. No person of ordinary skill in the art would refer
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`to a book “for Dummies” as a learned treatise. Indeed, to qualify as a learned
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`treatise, “a proper foundation as to the authoritativeness of the text must be laid by
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`an expert witness.” See, e.g., Tart v. McGann, 697 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1982).
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`Patent Owner has not done so here. Nor can it, because, as is discussed above, Mr.
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`Lewis is not an expert in this field.
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`Third, Mr. Lewis provides economic opinions on issues about which he has
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`no knowledge that is helpful to the trier of fact. For example, Mr. Lewis testifies as
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`an economic expert giving his opinions on, e.g., whether there was a long-felt need
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`for uploading images, the success of pBay, and the value of an acquisition. See,
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`e.g., Ex. 2050, ¶ 27 (“Prior to 1999, there was a long-felt need for a means to
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`upload pre-processed images directly to a website (such as eBay.com) that met the
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`website’s image specifications.”); ¶ 37 (“pBay was launched on April 5, 1999, and
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`was a huge success.”); ¶ 41 (“It is my understanding that the chief asset driving the
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`value of the purchase was the invention embodied in the ’482 and ’515 Patents.”);
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`8
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`¶ 42 (“iPIX’s contract with eBay proved to be very successful both in terms of user
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`IPR2015-00806
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`adoption, and revenue generation.”); ¶ 19 (“we invented a great technology that
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`could solve a glaring need in not only the real estate market, but could change the
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`way people shared photographs in multiple industries.”). Mr. Lewis is not a
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`marketing expert nor an economist. Thus, he is in no position to provide testimony
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`as to the success of a product, the need for a product, or the factors driving value in
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`a transaction. Rambus Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., 254 F.R.D. 597, 604-05
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`(N.D. Cal. 2008) (finding that an electrical engineer lacked “the expertise to
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`explain whether or not advertising, standardization, import laws, contractual
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`relationships, or any of a number of other factors influenced the commercial
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`success of the Manufacturers’ products.”). Further, Mr. Lewis holds a financial
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`interest in the challenged patent. See Ex. 1016 at 18:22 - 19:4 (“Q: So it is your
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`understanding that if the patents were invalidated that that would decrease your
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`compensation from Summit 6? A: Yes, it would…. I can’t say that it would have a
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`direct one-to-one impact, but it could have an impact.”). Thus, his testimony is
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`even less credible, and should be excluded under Rule 403. United States v.
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`Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 58 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[E]ven if the testimony is admissible
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`under Rule 702, it still must pass muster under Rule 403: Its probative value must
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`not be substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.”).
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`Fourth, Mr. Lewis testifies about multiple issues about which he has no
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`9
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`first-hand knowledge. Because Mr. Lewis is not an expert, this testimony is
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`IPR2015-00806
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`improper. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).
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`Further, to the extent Summit 6 argues that Mr. Lewis is a lay witness, this
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`testimony is improper under Rule 701(a) (testimony must be “rationally based on
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`the witness’s perception”). For example, Mr. Lewis routinely testifies about the
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`state of mind of his customers. See, e.g., Ex. 2050, ¶ 32 (“… Mr. Dillabough was
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`amazed.”); ¶ 33 (“Mr. Dillabough was intrigued ….”); ¶ 12 (“Most Realtors did
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`not have the time or patience to go through this process, and many simply did not
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`have the skills to do so.”); ¶ 30 (“… I knew eBay needed our invention to allow
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`users to more easily provide photographs of the items they intended to sell.”). Mr.
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`Lewis could not possibly have reliable personal knowledge of the state of mind of
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`his customer. Thus he should not be permitted to testify as to these topics. United
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`States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 59 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Whenever a court permits a
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`case agent or a fact witness to testify as an expert, there is a significant risk that, if
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`the witness digresses from his expertise, he will be improperly relying upon
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`hearsay evidence and may convey hearsay to the jury.”).
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`For each of the foregoing reasons, the identified paragraphs of Mr. Lewis’s
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`declaration (Ex. 2050) should be excluded.
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`Exhibit 2051 – Declaration of Sarah Pate
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`B.
`The Board should exclude at least paragraphs 16, 24, 29, 31, 33, 38, and 50
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`10
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`of the declaration of Sarah Pate. Ms. Pate repeatedly provides improper opinion
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`IPR2015-00806
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`testimony on economic issues, but testified that her educational background is
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`unrelated to economics. Ms. Pate’s undergraduate degree is in business
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`administration and her Master’s degree is in health education with a concentration
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`in nutrition. Exs. 2051, ¶ 2; 1019 at 16:12-14. Thus, Ms. Pate is clearly not an
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`economic expert. However, she provides improper opinion testimony as to the
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`popularity of pBay, the costs incurred by eBay, and the revenue and success of
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`eBay. See, e.g., Ex. 2051, ¶ 24 (“Once we launched pBay, it was extremely popular
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`among eBay buyers and sellers.”); ¶ 29 (“eBay incurred excessive costs simply to
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`support their customer service department’s efforts to handle customer complaints
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`regarding posting images to its website. I was confident that Rimfire would solve
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`this problem.”); ¶ 31 (“The additional image uploads turned into a major source of
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`direct revenue for eBay.”). Ms. Pate is neither a marketing expert nor an
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`economist. Thus, she is in no position to provide testimony as to the success of a
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`product or the factors driving value in a transaction. Rambus Inc., 254 F.R.D. at
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`604-05.
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`Second, as with Mr. Lewis, Ms. Pate testifies about multiple issues about
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`which she cannot have first-hand knowledge. This includes multiple paragraphs
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`directed to the state of mind of Summit 6’s customers. See, e.g., Ex. 2051, ¶ 38
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`(“eBay determined that the imaging service had become such an integral part of
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`11
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`their business that they required control of all aspects of the system.”); ¶ 50 (“After
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`the U.S.P.T.O. awarded the ’557 Patent, industry analysts published several
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`articles touting its value.”); ¶ 16 (“The audience consisted mostly of realtors and
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`real estate websites, and the response was quite favorable.”). Ms. Pate simply
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`cannot know the state of mind of eBay or other members of an audience. For
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`example, she cannot know that eBay made a business decision because “they
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`required control of all aspects of the system.” Ex. 2051, ¶ 38. Further, Ms. Pate’s
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`testimony on these issues should be struck because she admits that she holds a
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`financial interest in the challenged patent. See Ex. 1019 at 29:1-12 (“Q: What
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`percentage of your income do you derive from Summit 6? A: A hundred percent…
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`Q: Is the revenue that Summit 6 generates dependent on licensing patents? A:
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`Yes.”).
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`For each of the foregoing reasons, the identified paragraphs of Ms. Pate’s
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`declaration (Ex. 2051) should be excluded.
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`C. Exhibit 2058 – Declaration of Dr. Martin Kaliski
`The Board should exclude at least paragraph 185 of Dr. Kaliski’s
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`declaration. In this paragraph Dr. Kaliski testifies that “Summit 6 achieved
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`significant commercial success in developing its products embodying the
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`technology claimed in the ’482 and ’515 Patents ….” Ex. 2058, ¶ 185. This
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`specific paragraph is relied upon throughout Patent Owner’s response. See, e.g.,
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`12
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`Paper 28 at 47, 49, 50. However, during his deposition, Dr. Kaliski testified that
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`his “opinions” were not his own opinions, but rather they were given to him by the
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`attorneys that retained him. Ex. 1017 at 80:25-81:21 (“Okay. The next sentence
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`you say ‘Summit 6 achieved significant commercial success.’ A. Yes. Q. How do
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`you know that? A. I was told that that was the case by the attorneys that I'm
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`working with…. I'm not really in a position to judge what is commercial
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`success.” (emphasis added)). This is the sort of testimony that the Board should
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`exclude under Rule 702 because the expert made clear that it is not his opinion, but
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`rather that of Summit 6’s attorneys. See, e.g., Numatics, Inc. v. Balluff, Inc., 66 F.
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`Supp. 3d 934, 943 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (“Where an expert merely offers his client’s
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`opinion as his own, that opinion may be excluded.”) (citations omitted). Indeed,
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`this testimony should also be excluded under Rule 702 because Dr. Kaliski admits
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`that he is not an expert in this field. See, e.g., Ex. 1017 at 81:9-12 (“A. You,
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`yourself, have pointed out at the beginning of the deposition I have no formal
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`training in economics or business. So I'm not really in a position to judge what is
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`commercial success.”). Paragraph 185 of Dr. Kaliski’s declaration (Ex. 2058)
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`should be excluded.
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`13
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`
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`VI. Exhibit 2073 – Brighton Collectibles, Inc. v. RK Texas Leather Mfg., No.
`10-cv-419-GPC, Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment; and
`Exhibit 2074 – Stop Staring! Designs v. Tatyana, LLC, No. 09-cv-2014-
`DSF-AJW, Tentative Order re Defendant’s Motions in Limine
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`IPR2015-00806
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`Patent Owner introduced these two Exhibits during the deposition of Dr.
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`Gary Frazier. Petitioner objected to these Exhibits at the time of their introduction
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`and again formally on April 5, 2016. Paper 49 at 3 (Fed. R. Evid. 402 and 403).
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`Neither of Exhibits 2073 and 2074 are relevant to any grounds in this
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`proceeding. As an initial matter, both relate to district court proceedings. Further,
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`both of these proceedings are completely unrelated to the grounds at issue here.
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`Indeed, neither is even a patent case. Rather, both of the decisions are related to
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`trade dress. This has no relevance whatsoever to a proceeding before the Board on
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`the invalidity of patents. Thus, both of these Exhibits should be excluded under
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`Rule 402.
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`Further, to the extent there is any relevancy to these exhibits, their
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`“probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of … unfair prejudice.”
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`Fed. R. Evid. 403. Patent Owner has cited both of these Exhibits because, in both,
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`a district court judge excluded a portion of Dr. Frazier’s testimony. However, this
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`ignores the simple fact that in both decisions the same district court considered a
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`large part of Dr. Frazier’s testimony. For example, Exhibit 2074 clearly states that
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`“Frazier’s testimony as to the background issues of trademark and trade dress
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`14
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`development and value (¶¶ 12-25), are unobjectionable. Frazier’s testimony as to
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`the development and value of Plaintiff’s trade dress, (¶¶ 26-36), while somewhat
`
`lacking in methodology, appears to flow naturally from the background trademark
`
`information that Frazier provides.” Similarly, Exhibit 2073 clearly states that “[t]he
`
`Court grants the motion to the extent discussed, but denies it in all other respects.”
`
`Ex. 2073 at 13. The probative value of two decisions addressing unrelated issues
`
`and unrelated subject matter is outweighed by the risk of prejudice by considering
`
`these decisions.
`
`Furthermore, these two decisions ignore that Dr. Frazier has presented
`
`expert opinions numerous times and he has been retained as an expert more than
`
`eighty times since 1985. See Ex. 1018 at 36-42. That a small number of his
`
`opinions have been excluded is both unsurprising and prejudicial. These two
`
`decisions should be excluded under Rule 403.
`
`VII. Conclusion
`For the reasons articulated above and in the Petition, Petitioner respectfully
`
`requests the Board Exclude all or part of Exhibits: 2015, 2044, 2045, 2050, 2051,
`
`2058, 2073, and 2074.
`
`15
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`IPR2015-00806
`U.S. 7,765,482
`
`
`
`By:
`John Alemanni
`Registration No. 47,384
`Lead Counsel for Petitioner Google Inc.
`
`
`
`
`Lead Counsel
`John Alemanni
`Registration No. 47,384
`JAlemanni@kilpatricktownsend.com
`
`Postal and Hand-Delivery Address:
`Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP
`1001 West Fourth Street
`Winston-Salem, NC 27101-2400
`Telephone: (336) 607-7311
`Fax: (336) 607-7500
`
`Back-Up Counsel
`Michael Morlock
`Registration No. 62,245
`MMorlock@kilpatricktownsend.com
`
`Postal and Hand-Delivery Address:
`Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP
`1001 West Fourth Street
`Winston-Salem, NC 27101-2400
`Telephone: (336) 607-7391
`Fax: (336) 607-7500
`
`By: /s/ Brian Erickson
`Registration No. 48,895
`Lead Counsel for Petitioner Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
`
`Lead Counsel
`Brian Erickson
`Reg. No. 48,895
`Samsung_Summit-IPR@dlapiper.com
`Postal and Hand-Delivery Address:
`DLA Piper LLP (US)
`401 Congress Avenue, Suite 2500
`Austin, TX 78701
`(512) 457-7059 (phone)
`(512) 457-7001 (fax)
`
`Back-Up Counsel
`James M. Heintz
`Reg. No. 41,828
`Jim.heintz@dlapiper.com
`Postal and Hand-Delivery Address:
`DLA Piper LLP (US)
`11911 Freedom Drive, Suite 300
`Reston, VA 20190
`(703) 773-4148 (phone)
`(703) 773-5200 (fax)
`
`16
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`IPR2015-00806
`U.S. 7,765,482
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of this PETITIONERS’
`
`MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE has been served via email upon the
`
`following:
`
`Peter J. Ayers
`peter@leehayes.com
`John Shumaker
`jshumaker@leehayes.com
`Brian Mangum
`brianm@leehayes.com
`LEE & HAYES, PLLC
`11501 Alterra Parkway, Suite 450
`Austin, TX 78758
`
`
`
`
`
`Dated: April 6, 2016
`
`
`
`
`
`By:
`John Alemanni
`Registration No. 47,384
`Lead Counsel for Petitioner Google
`Inc.
`
`
`Lead Counsel
`John Alemanni
`Registration No. 47,384
`JAlemanni@kilpatricktownsend.com
`
`Postal and Hand-Delivery Address:
`Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP
`
`Back-Up Counsel
`Michael Morlock
`Registration No. 62,245
`MMorlock@kilpatricktownsend.com
`
`Postal and Hand-Delivery Address:
`Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP
`
`7679280V.2
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2015-00806
`U.S. 7,765,482
`
`1001 West Fourth Street
`Winston-Salem, NC 27101-2400
`Telephone: (336) 607-7311
`Fax: (336) 607-7500
`
`1001 West Fourth Street
`Winston-Salem, NC 27101-2400
`Telephone: (336) 607-7391
`Fax: (336) 607-7500
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Counsel for Petitioner Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
`
`
`Lead Counsel
`Brian Erickson
`Reg. No. 48,895
`Samsung_Summit-IPR@dlapiper.com
`Postal and Hand-Delivery Address:
`DLA Piper LLP (US)
`401 Congress Avenue, Suite 2500
`Austin, TX 78701
`(512) 457-7059 (phone)
`(512) 457-7001 (fax)
`
`Back-Up Counsel
`James M. Heintz
`Reg. No. 41,828
`Jim.heintz@dlapiper.com
`Postal and Hand-Delivery Address:
`DLA Piper LLP (US)
`11911 Freedom Drive, Suite 300
`Reston, VA 20190
`(703) 773-4148 (phone)
`(703) 773-5200 (fax)
`
`
`
`7679280v.2
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