UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`______________
`
`
`FORD MOTOR COMPANY
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`PAICE LLC & ABELL FOUNDATION, INC.
`Patent Owner.
`
`______________
`
`
`U.S. Patent No. 7,237,634 to Severinsky et al.
`
`IPR Case No.: IPR2015-00799
`
`______________
`
`
`
`
`
`REPLY TO PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE TO PETITION
`FOR INTER PARTES REVIEW OF U.S. PATENT NO. 7,237,634
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Table of Authorities ................................................................................................. iii
`
`Updated List of Exhibits ............................................................................................ v
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
`
`The priority applications fail to establish written description support
`for the claimed electrical limitations ............................................................... 2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`2.
`
`The priority applications lack written description support for
`the at least 2.5 ratio limitation .............................................................. 4
`1.
`The priority applications offer no teaching of a ratio of
`voltage to current ........................................................................ 4
`The claimed at least 2.5 ratio is not derivable from the
`priority applications .................................................................... 5
`The priority applications lack written description support for
`the at least 500 volts limitation ............................................................. 7
`1.
`The priority applications fail to disclose even one
`representative species of the at least 500 volts genus
`claim ............................................................................................ 7
`The at least 500 volts limitation is not derivable from the
`priority applications .................................................................... 9
`The priority applications lack written description support for
`the 150 amperes limitation. .................................................................10
`
`2.
`
`III. The lack of written description support in the priority applications is
`not cured by the references to Severinsky ‘970.............................................12
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`2.
`3.
`
`Paice fails to prove that the incorporation by reference language
`incorporates the claimed electrical limitations ....................................12
`1.
`The incorporation language is ambiguous and lacks
`detailed particularity .................................................................12
`Paice’s interpretation contradicts the plain meaning ................14
`Under any reading, the disclosed “differences” preclude
`incorporation of the claimed electrical limitations ...................14
`The remaining “incorporation” language that Paice relies
`on is equally deficient ...............................................................15
`If Severinsky ‘970 is incorporated in its entirety, the
`combination of Severinsky ‘970 and the priority applications
`would still fail to establish that the inventors possessed the
`claimed electrical limitations ..............................................................16
`
`4.
`
`i
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`

`

`
`
`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`The priority applications and Severinsky ‘970 taken
`together lack written description support for the “at least
`2.5 ratio” limitation ..................................................................17
`The priority applications and Severinsky ‘970 taken
`together lack written description support for the “at least
`500 volts” limitation .................................................................19
`The priority applications and Severinsky ‘970 taken
`together lack written description support for the “at least
`150 amperes” limitation ...........................................................21
`
`IV. The ‘866 CIP Application is the first application that reasonably
`conveys possession of the claimed electrical limitations ..............................23
`
`V.
`
`Paice does not attempt to meet its burden of going forward with
`evidence that the priority applications support all limitations of the
`challenged claims ...........................................................................................24
`
`VI. Ground of unpatentability: Claims 81-90, 115-124, 162-171 and 216-
`225 are obvious over the ’455 PCT Publication in view of Severinsky
`’970 .............................................................................................................25
`
`VII. Conclusion .....................................................................................................25
`
`Certificate of Service ...............................................................................................27
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
`
`
`
`
`
`Table of Authorities
`
`Cases
`
`AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & Co., KG v. Janssen Biotech, Inc.,
`
`759 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .................................................................7, 10
`
`Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceuticals Co.,
`
`927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ....................................................................... 5
`
`Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc.,
`
`601 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .....................................................................16
`
`Application of Wertheim,
`
`541 F.2d 257 (CCPA 1976) .................................................................... 11, 21
`
`Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
`
`598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .....................................................................10
`
`Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
`
`560 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .................................................................8, 12
`
`Augustine Med., Inc. v. Gaymar Indus., Inc.,
`
`181 F.3d 129 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ......................................................................... 4
`
`Bilstad v. Wakalopulos,
`
`386 F.3d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ........................................................ 11, 18, 19
`
`Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. National Graphics, Inc.,
`
`800 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .....................................................................24
`
`Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc.,
`
`323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002) .......................................................................11
`
`Harari v. Lee,
`
`656 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2011) .....................................................................14
`
`In re de Seversky,
`
`474 F.2d 671 (CCPA 1973) ............................................................................. 6
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
`
`
`
`Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding, Ins.,
`
` 220 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ...................................................................... 4
`
`Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
`
`119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997) .....................................................................10
`
`Technology Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc.,
`
`454 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2003) .....................................................................24
`
`Zenon Environmental, Inc. v. United States Filter Corp.,
`
`506 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .....................................................................13
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. §102 .........................................................................................................25
`35 U.S.C. §103 ........................................................................................................... 1
`35 U.S.C. §120 ........................................................................................................... 4
`
`Rules
`
`37 C.F.R. § 1.57 ......................................................................................................... 6
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
`
`Updated List of Exhibits
`
`
`
`
`
`Exhibit
`No.
`1961
`1962
`1963
`
`Description
`
`U.S. Patent No. 7,237,634
`Declaration of Dr. Jeffrey L. Stein
`PCT Publication No. WO00/015455
`
`Identifier
`
`’634 Patent
`Stein Decl.
`’455 PCT
`Publication
`Severinsky
`’970
`Ford Letter
`MD Ct.
`Decision
`
`IPR2014-
`00568
`Decision
`’095
`Provisional
`Application
`’296
`Provisional
`Application
`’088 CIP
`Patent
`’866 CIP
`Application
`’817
`Application
`’743
`Application
`’634 File
`History
`’762
`Application
`IPR2014-
`00570
`Decision
`
`1964
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,343,970
`
`1965
`1966
`
`1967
`
`1968
`
`Ford’s letter to Paice dated September 22, 2014
`Paice, LLC et al. v. Ford Motor Co., Case No. 1:14-
`cv-00492, District of MD, Baltimore Div.,
`Memorandum Opinion (Oct. 8, 2014)
`Ford Motor Co v. Paice LLC, Case IPR2014-00568,
`Paper 12 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 8, 2014) (Decision Denying
`Institution of Inter Partes Review)
`U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/100,095
`
`1969
`
`U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/122,296
`
`1970
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,554,088
`
`1971
`
`U.S. Application No. 09/822,866
`
`1972
`
`U.S. Application No. 09/264,817
`
`1973
`
`U.S. Application No. 09/392,743
`
`1974
`
`File History for U.S. Patent No. 7,237,634
`
`1975
`
`U.S. Application No. 11/229,762
`
`1976
`
`Ford Motor Co v. Paice LLC, Case IPR2014-00570,
`Paper 10 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 30, 2014) (Decision
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review)
`
`v
`
`

`

`
`Exhibit
`No.
`1977
`
`1978
`
`1979
`1980
`1981
`
`1982
`1983
`1984
`
`1985
`
`1986
`
`1987
`
`
`1988
`
`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
`
`Description
`
`Kozo Yamaguchi et al., Development of a New
`Hybrid System – Dual System, SAE Technical Paper
`960231 (February 1996).
`http://papers.sae.org/960231/
`General Electric Company, Corp. Research & Dev.,
`Near-Term Hybrid Vehicle Program, Final Report -
`Phase 1 (October 1979).
`http://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19800017707
`U.S. Patent No. 3,888,325
`U.S. Patent No. 4,335,429
`Cimline, Inc. v. Crafco, Inc., No. 2010-1348 (Fed.
`Cir. Opinion March 2, 2011)
`Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Jeffrey L. Stein
`U.S. Patent No. 913,846
`Michael Duoba, Ctr. for Transp. Research, Argonne
`Nat’l Lab., Challenges for the Vehicle Tester in
`Characterizing Hybrid Electric Vehicles, 7th CRC on
`Road Vehicle Emissions Workshop (April 1997).
`http://www.osti.gov/scitech/biblio/516019
`Society of Automotive Engineers Special Publication,
`Technology for Electric and Hybrid Vehicles, SAE
`SP-1331 (February 1998)
`http://www.worldcat.org/title/technology-for-electric-
`and-hybrid-vehicles/oclc/39802642
`Catherine Anderson & Erin Pettit, The Effects of APU
`Characteristics on the Design of Hybrid Control
`Strategies
`for Hybrid Electric Vehicles, SAE
`Technical Paper 950493 (1995).
`http://papers.sae.org/950493/
`L. E. Unnewehr et al., Hybrid Vehicle for Fuel
`Economy, SAE Technical Paper 760121 (1976).
`http://papers.sae.org/760121/
`Ford Motor Co. v. Paice, LLC, Case IPR2014-00568,
`Paper 8, Patent Owner’s [Redacted] Preliminary
`Response to Petition (July 11, 2014)
`
`Identifier
`
`Yamaguchi
`Paper
`
`GE Final
`Report
`
`Reinbeck
`Kawakatsu
`Cimline
`
`Dr. Stein CV
`Pieper
`Duoba
`
`SAE SP-1331
`
`Anderson
`
`Unnewehr
`
`IPR2014-
`00568
`Redacted PO
`Prelim.
`Response
`
`vi
`
`

`

`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
`
`Description
`
`S-10
`Performance Characterization Chevrolet
`Electric, Panasonic Lead-Acid Battery, Southern
`California Edison Electrical Transportation Division
`(December 1999).
`http://avt.inel.gov/pdf/fsev/sce_rpt/s10pbareport.pdf
`Tesla
`Motors
`Website,
`www.teslamotors.com/roadster/specs,
`retrieved
`October 31, 2014.
`GM Press Release, Corvette Stingray: 3.8 seconds
`from 0
`to 60 mph, GM News Website,
`http://media.gm.com/media/us/en/gm/news.detail.htm
`l/content/Pages/news/us/en/2013/Jun/0620-corvette-
`performance.html
`(June 20, 2013),
`retrieved
`November 1, 2014.
`Gene Berdichevsky et al., The Tesla Roadster Battery
`System, Tesla Motors, Inc. (August 16, 2006).
`http://large.stanford.edu/publications/coal/references/
`docs/tesla.pdf
`Will Dron, Roadster 2.5 Sport – Road Test, The
`Charging
`Point
`Website,
`http://www.thechargingpoint.com/manufacturers/tesla
`/roadster-2.5-sport-roadtest.html#roadTest (July 18,
`2011), retrieved November 1, 2014.
`U.S. Patent Application No. 10/382,577
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,209,672
`U.S. Patent No. 6,338,391
`Comparison of ’455 PCT Publication and ’634 Patent
`Descriptions
`
`Ford Motor Co v. Paice LLC, Case IPR2015-00799,
`Paper 11 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 9, 2015) (Decision to
`Institute Inter Partes Review)
`Reply Declaration of Dr. Jeffrey L. Stein
`
`Identifier
`
`S10
`Performance
`Report
`
`Tesla Roadster
`Performance
`Specs
`GM Press
`Release
`
`Tesla Roadster
`Battery
`
`Tesla Roadster
`Road Test
`
`’577
`Application
`’672 Patent
`’391 Patent
`’455/’634
`Description
`Comparison
`IPR2015-
`00799
`Decision
`Reply Decl.
`
`
`Exhibit
`No.
`1989
`
`1990
`
`1991
`
`1992
`
`1993
`
`1994
`
`1995
`1996
`1997
`
`1998
`
`1999
`
`vii
`
`

`

`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
`
`
`I.
`
`Introduction
`
`Inter partes review of claims 81-90, 115-124, 162-171 and 216-225
`
`(“Challenged Claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 7,237,634 (“the ‘634 Patent”) is based
`
`on a single ground, namely, that the challenged claims are unpatentable under 35
`
`U.S.C. §103 as obvious over the combined teachings of PCT International
`
`Publication No. WO 00/15455 (“the ‘455 PCT Publication”) and U.S. Patent No.
`
`5,343,970 (“Severinsky ‘970”).
`
`Paice does not dispute Petitioner’s contentions that (1) it would have been
`
`obvious to combine the ‘455 PCT Publication and Severinsky ‘970 and (2) the
`
`combination satisfies the limitations of the Challenged Claims. Rather, Paice
`
`attempts to argue that the ‘455 PCT Publication is not prior art to the Challenged
`
`Claims. Paice asserts that the claimed electrical limitations are supported by three
`
`applications in the ‘634 Patent’s priority chain that predate the ‘455 PCT
`
`Publication—application No. 60/100,095 (“the ‘095 Provisional Application”),
`
`application No. 09/392,743 (“the ‘743 Application”) and application No.
`
`09/264,817 (“the ‘817 Application”) (collectively, the “priority applications”). To
`
`establish the requisite written description support, Paice tries to piece together
`
`disjointed fragments from the priority applications but fails to prove that the
`
`inventors possessed the claimed electrical limitations at the time they filed the
`
`priority applications.
`
`1
`
`

`

`
`
`Paice argues in the alternative that the ‘455 PCT Publication is not prior art
`
`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
`
`because the priority applications incorporate by reference Severinsky ‘970, which
`
`allegedly provides support for the claimed electrical limitations. As detailed in
`
`section III below, both the incorporation language and subsequent assertions of
`
`incorporating material are vague and lack the requisite particularity to provide
`
`written description support. Further, even if Severinsky ‘970 were incorporated
`
`into the priority applications, written description support for the electrical
`
`limitations is still lacking.
`
`Paice has failed to satisfy its burden that written description support for the
`
`claimed electrical
`
`limitations exists
`
`in any of
`
`the priority applications.
`
`Additionally, Paice makes no effort to show that the remaining limitations of the
`
`challenged claims are supported by the priority applications. Thus, the ‘455 PCT
`
`Publication is prior art to the ‘634 Patent and no other dispute remains. A second
`
`declaration of Dr. Jeffrey L Stein was prepared to address new issues raised by
`
`Paice and is filed as Exhibit 1999 (“Reply Decl.”).
`
`II. The priority applications fail to establish written description
`support for the claimed electrical limitations
`
`The heart of Paice’s argument is its contention that the effective filing date
`
`of the Challenged Claims predates the ‘455 PCT Publication. (Patent Owner
`
`Response (“POR”) at 6-7.) Specifically, Paice argues that the ‘455 PCT
`
`Publication is not prior art because the Challenged Claims are supported by
`
`2
`
`

`

`
`priority applications with filing dates earlier than the March 23, 2000 publication
`
`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
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`date of the ‘455 PCT Publication. Id. As shown in the figure on page 7 of the
`
`Petition, the ‘634 Patent claims the benefit of the ‘743 Application having a filing
`
`date of September 9, 1999, the ‘817 Application having a filing date of March 9,
`
`1999 and the ‘095 Provisional Application having a filing date of September 14,
`
`1998. Paice relies on these priority applications to provide written description
`
`support for the following electrical limitations in the ‘634 Patent (collectively, “the
`
`electrical limitations”):
`
` “a ratio of maximum DC voltage to [maximum current] supplied is at
`
`least 2.5” (the “at least 2.5 ratio” limitation) in claims 81-83, 86-90,
`
`115-117, 120-124, 162, 167-171, 216-218 and 221-225;
`
` “maximum DC voltage . . . is at least approximately 500 volts”
`
`limitation in claims 82, 84, 87, 89, 116, 118, 121, 123, 163, 165, 168,
`
`170, 217, 219, 222, and 224 (the “at least 500 volts” limitation); and
`
` “maximum current . . . is less than approximately 150 amperes”
`
`limitation (the “150 amperes” limitation) in claims 83, 85, 88, 90,
`
`117, 119, 122, 124, 164, 166, 169, 171, 218, 220, 223, and 225.
`
`The test for whether a priority application supports later claimed limitations
`
`is whether the disclosure of the priority application reasonably conveys that the
`
`inventor had possession of the later claimed subject matter at the time the priority
`
`3
`
`

`

`
`application was filed. Augustine Med., Inc. v. Gaymar Indus., Inc., 181 F.3d 1291,
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`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
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`1302 (Fed. Cir. 1999). As detailed below, none of the priority applications convey
`
`that the inventors possessed the electrical limitations later claimed in the ‘634
`
`Patent.
`
`As an initial matter, Paice’s reliance on disclosure found only in the ‘095
`
`Provisional Application is improper. To satisfy the continuity of disclosure
`
`requirement under 35 U.S.C. §120, written description support for the Challenged
`
`Claims must exist in either the ‘817 or ‘743 applications. See Section A(2) below.
`
`A. The priority applications lack written description support
`for the at least 2.5 ratio limitation
`
`1.
`
`The priority applications offer no teaching of a ratio
`of voltage to current
`
`Although Paice relies on the priority applications to provide written
`
`description support for the at least 2.5 ratio limitation—none of the applications
`
`disclose any numerical ratio, let alone a ratio of 2.5. (Reply Decl., Ex. 1999 at
`
`¶12.) Nothing in the disclosure of these applications identifies a ratio of maximum
`
`voltage to maximum current supplied as an “important defining quality” of an
`
`electrical component or “even motivates one to calculate” the ratio. See Purdue
`
`Pharma L.P. v. Faulding, Ins., 220 F.3d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Reply Decl.,
`
`Ex. 1999 at ¶¶13-14. If the relied-on statements do not demonstrate conception—
`
`the formation of a definite and complete idea of the working invention—then they
`
`4
`
`

`

`
`cannot possibly establish the requirement that the inventor must have been in
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`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
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`"possession" of the invention at the time the application was filed, as required to
`
`satisfy
`
`the written-description requirement.
`
` See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai
`
`Pharmaceuticals Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206-09 (Fed. Cir. 1991). It is not until the
`
`continuation-in-part application filed on April 2, 2001, Application No. 09/822,866
`
`(“the ‘866 CIP Application), that applicant provides a “Further Improvements”
`
`section which identifies the purported significance of a numerical ratio of 2.5. (See
`
`Section V below; Reply Decl., Ex. 1999 at ¶¶15-17.)
`
`2.
`
`The claimed at least 2.5 ratio is not derivable from the
`priority applications
`
`As the priority applications fail to teach any voltage to current ratios, Paice
`
`attempts to “derive” the claimed ratios. (POR at 38-39.) But in doing so, Paice
`
`underscores that no single priority disclosure comes close to supporting the at least
`
`2.5 ratio limitation later claimed in the ‘634 Patent. To derive two ratios above the
`
`claimed at least 2.5 ratio, Paice utilizes power and current values from three
`
`different applications. Although a POSA would never do so, Paice relies on power
`
`values from the ‘743 Application and unrelated current values from the ‘817 and
`
`‘095 Provisional Applications to force the desired derivations. (POR at 38-39;
`
`Reply Decl., Ex. 1999 at ¶¶18-20.)
`
`Paice makes no effort to legitimize its mix and match approach. Paice’s
`
`response fails to explain why power values from one application are paired with
`
`5
`
`

`

`
`current values from two different applications to derive the claimed ratio. On this
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`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
`
`point, Paice offers no showing that the disclosures are linked by an incorporation
`
`by reference. Indeed, while the ‘817 Application claims the benefit of the ‘095
`
`Provisional Application, it does not incorporate it by reference as needed. (See In
`
`re de Seversky, which explains the distinction between a mere reference in a claim
`
`of priority versus an incorporation by reference. In re de Seversky, 474 F.2d 671
`
`(CCPA 1973)). And, 37 C.F.R. § 1.57(b) would not apply as 1) the rule went into
`
`effect in 2004, five years after the ‘817 and ‘743 applications were filed; and 2)
`
`Paice failed to satisfy the requirements for “inadvertent omissions” under 37
`
`C.F.R. § 1.57(b). Rather than establishing that the disclosure of at least one
`
`priority application reasonably conveys possession of the at least 2.5 ratio
`
`limitation, Paice improperly bundles disparate current and voltage values from
`
`three different applications to cobble together a set of written description proofs.
`
`Paice’s piecemeal approach is further riddled with contradictions. Paice
`
`relies on the power values disclosed in the ‘743 Application but ignores the
`
`teaching that calls for “higher voltage than conventional . . . e.g. 800-1200V” – as
`
`such voltage values cut against the desired ratio derivations. (POR at 38-39; ‘743
`
`Application, Ex. 1973 at 16.) Similarly, although the ‘634 Patent differentiates the
`
`prior art Toyota Prius 2:1 ratio from the claimed 2.5:1 ratio, Paice points to
`
`“derived” ratios of 0.9321:1 and 1.86425:1 to establish written description support
`
`6
`
`

`

`
`for the at least 2.5 ratio limitation. (POR at 38; ’634 Patent, Ex. 1961, 50:66-
`
`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
`
`51:4.) The other two “derived” ratios of 3.7285:1 and 7.457:1 are based on a 100
`
`amperes value from the ‘095 Provisional Application, which cannot support
`
`Paice’s written description assertion.
`
`Because there are substantial variations across the claimed max voltage-to-
`
`current ratio range of at least 2.5:1 to infinity, even if all of Paice’s “derived” ratios
`
`are considered, they can’t adequately represent the variations from 2.5:1 to higher
`
`ratios of 50:1 or 100:1. (See AbbVie Deutschland, which provides that when there
`
`is substantial variation within the genus, one must describe a sufficient variety of
`
`species to reflect the variation within the genus. AbbVie Deutschland GmbH &
`
`Co., KG v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Reply
`
`Decl., Ex. 1999 at ¶21-24.) Thus, the priority applications fail to provide written
`
`description support for the at least 2.5 ratio limitation. (Id.)
`
`B.
`
`The priority applications lack written description support
`for the at least 500 volts limitation
`
`1.
`
`The priority applications fail to disclose even one
`representative species of the at least 500 volts genus
`claim
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`Paice asserts that the ‘634 Patent’s “ancestor applications—including the
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`‘095 Provisional Application, the ‘817 Application, and the ‘743 Application, each
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`of which pre-dates the ‘455 PCT application—support the ‘at least 500 volts’
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`limitations.” (POR at 23.) In an effort to establish written description support for
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`the at least 500 volts limitation, Paice points to the general discussion in the ’743
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`Case No: IPR2015-00799
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`Application on the value of high voltage and low current and the disclosure of an
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`open-circuit 800-1200 volt range. (POR at 24.)
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`A vague preference for high voltage and low current is inadequate to support
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`a defined maximum voltage range for at least three reasons: 1) it fails to convey
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`that the inventors appreciated that a maximum voltage range was significant; 2) it
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`fails to convey that the inventors possessed a maximum voltage threshold of at
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`least 500 volts; and 3) it lacks clarity. (Reply Decl., Ex. 1999 at ¶¶27-29.) For a
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`disclosure to satisfy the written description requirement, it must “convey with
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`reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or
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`she was in possession of the invention.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560
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`F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009)(emphasis added).
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`And, although it is undisputed that the at least 500 volts limitation refers to
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`voltages under load, Paice relies on the 800-1200 open-circuit voltage range in the
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`‘743 Application for written description support, without any explanation of how
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`the open-circuit voltage values translate to voltages under load. (POR at 24.)
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`Because the conversion of an open circuit voltage value to a closed circuit or
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`“under load” voltage value must take into account several parameters—e.g. the
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`type of battery, internal resistance as a function of current flow, voltage and current
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`losses through the circuit, etc.—which are not disclosed by the ‘743 Application,
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`the required “under load” voltage values cannot be ascertained. (Reply Decl., Ex.
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`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
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`1999 at ¶30.) Similarly, Paice makes no showing of how the 768 volt open-circuit
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`disclosure in the ‘817 Application would be converted to an “under load” value
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`and once converted would support the at least 500 volts limitation. Accordingly,
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`the disclosures in the priority applications fail to provide written description
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`support for the at least 500 volts limitation. (Reply Decl., Ex. 1999 at ¶31.)
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`2.
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`The at least 500 volts limitation is not derivable from
`the priority applications
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`Like the at least 2.5 ratio limitation, Paice tries to derive the 500 volts
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`maximum current limitation using unrelated current and power values from three
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`different applications. (POR at 24-26.) Paice pulls power values from the ‘743
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`Application and then turns to the ‘817 and ‘095 Provisional Applications for two
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`different current values. (Id.) Again, Paice offers no explanation to justify its mix
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`and match approach or any showing that an incorporation by reference allows the
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`disclosures to be integrated. (Id.)
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`
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`Even if the relied-on power and current values existed in a single priority
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`application, the voltage values that Paice derives fail to support the at least 500
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`volts limitation. Through its mix and match approach, Paice ultimately derives
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`four voltage values, 186.42, 372.85, 372.85 and 745.70 V. (POR at 24-26.) Yet,
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`only one of the four “derived” values even arguably supports the at least 500 volts
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`limitation, the other three values are well below the claimed 500 volts threshold.
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`For this open-ended range, one “derived” voltage value of 745.70 is insufficient to
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`Case No: IPR2015-00799
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`support the breadth of the claim limitation. (Reply Decl., Ex. 1999 at ¶36.)
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`The 745.70 derived voltage value, without more, neither informs the claimed
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`minimum threshold of 500 volts nor provides a sufficient “representative number
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`of species” to support the open-ended genus limitation. See, Regents of the
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`University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
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`affirmed in Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
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`2010). To constitute a “representative number of species,” the species must
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`adequately describe and be representative of the entire genus. MPEP 2163,
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`emphasis added. In view of the substantial variation of an electrical component
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`having a voltage of 500 volts, 1500 volts or 5000 volts, one “derived” 745.70 volts
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`example is insufficient to support the “at least 500 volts” genus claim. AbbVie
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`Deutschland, 759 F.3d at 1300; Reply Decl., Ex. 1999 at ¶36.
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`C. The priority applications lack written description support
`for the 150 amperes limitation.
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` In the context of the priority applications, Paice’s response focuses
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`exclusively on the ‘817 Application, arguing that it provides “ample support” for
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`the 150 amperes maximum current limitations. (POR at 33.) Paice argues that the
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`‘817 Application describes a range of upper limits from 30 amperes up to 200
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`amperes.” (POR at 33-34.) But no such teaching exists in the ‘817 Application.
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`Paice improperly combines two disconnected ampere ranges, a “30-50
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`amperes” range and an “up to 200 amperes” range to expand the disclosed range
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`Case No: IPR2015-00799
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`and bolster its argument. (Id.) The 30-50 amperes range is a limit for long-term
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`continuous operation not a range of maximum current values. (Reply Decl., Ex.
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`1999 at ¶38.) And, the “up to 200 amperes” disclosure in the ‘817 Application is
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`inadequate on its own to provide written description support for the 150 amperes
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`maximum current limitation. (Id. at ¶39.) To a POSA, the “up to 200 amperes”
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`disclosure would not reasonably convey possession of a maximum amperes
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`threshold of 150 amperes. (Id.) A 25% disparity between the claimed 150
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`amperes maximum current limitation and the “up to 200 amperes” disclosure is
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`evidence that the inventors failed to possess the 150 amperes limitation when the
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`‘817 Application was filed. (Id.)
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`Paice’s reliance on Bilstad, for the proposition that the “up to 200 amperes”
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`disclosure in the ‘817 Application is sufficient to support the claimed “less than
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`150 amperes” limitation, is misplaced. First, Bilstad never reaches a conclusion as
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`to whether written description support exists, and instead remands the case to the
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`Board for further findings. Bilstad v. Wakalopulos, 386 F.3d 1116, 1125 (Fed. Cir.
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`2004). Second, courts have repeatedly cautioned that written description questions
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`are “intensely factual, and should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, without the
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`application of wooden rules.” Application of Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262 (CCPA
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`1976); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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`Here, nothing suggests that the inventors possessed the claimed upper maximum
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`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
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`limit of 150 amperes.
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`In sum, the language Paice cites in the priority applications “simply cannot
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`bear the weight of the” scope of the claimed electrical limitations. Ariad Pharms.,
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`560 F.3d at 1376.
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`III. The lack of written description support in the priority
`applications is not cured by the references to Severinsky ‘970
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`Because the priority applications alone are insufficient to establish written
`
`description support, Paice tries to remedy the deficiencies by incorporating
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`Severinsky ‘970 into the applications. This effort is deficient for two reasons: 1)
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`the incorporation language is inadequate to incorporate the claimed electrical
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`limitations; and 2) even if incorporated, the Severinsky ‘970 disclosure fails to
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`establish written description support for the claimed electrical limitations.
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`A.
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`Paice fails to prove that the incorporation by reference
`language incorporates the claimed electrical limitations
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`1.
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`The incorporation language is ambiguous and lacks
`detailed particularity
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`To advance its alternative argument, Paice relies on the following
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`“incorporation” language in the ‘817 and ‘743 applications:
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`This application discloses a number of improvements over and
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`enhancements to the hybrid vehicles disclosed