UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`______________
`
`
`
`FORD MOTOR COMPANY
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`PAICE LLC & ABELL FOUNDATION, INC.
`Patent Owner.
`
`______________
`
`
`
`U.S. Patent No. 7,237,634 to Severinsky et al.
`
`IPR Case No. IPR2015-00799
`
`
`
`PETITION FOR INTER PARTES REVIEW
`UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 311 ET SEQ. AND 37 C.F.R. § 42.100 ET SEQ.
`OF CLAIMS 81-90, 115-124, 162-171, AND 216-225
`OF U.S. PATENT NO. 7,237,634
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`EXHIBIT LIST ..................................................................................................................... iii
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1
`
`II. MANDATORY NOTICES UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.8 ........................................ 3
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`
`Real Party-In-Interest – 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(1) ............................................ 3
`Related Matters – 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(2) ...................................................... 3
`Lead and Back-Up Counsel – 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(3).................................. 4
`Service Information – 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(4)............................................... 4
`
`III. GROUNDS FOR STANDING – 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(a) ..................................... 4
`
`IV. OVERVIEW OF CHALLENGE – 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) .................................. 4
`
`V.
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION – 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) ....................................... 5
`
`VI.
`
`PRIORITY DATE OF THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS ................................... 7
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`
`C.
`
`
`The ’634 Patent Family ................................................................................... 7
`The Electrical Limitations in the Challenged Claims Are
`Unsupported Before April 2, 2001 ................................................................ 8
`1.
`The “At Least 2.5” Ratio Is Unsupported Before April 2,
`
`2001 ....................................................................................................... 9
`The “Maximum Voltage” Limitation Is Unsupported
`Before April 2, 2001 .......................................................................... 10
`The “Maximum Current” Limitation Is Unsupported
`Before April 2, 2001 .......................................................................... 11
`An Insolubly Vague Incorporation by Reference Has No
`Impact ............................................................................................................. 12
`
`2.
`
`
`3.
`
`
`VII. THE PERSON OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE RELEVANT
`FIELD AND THE RELEVANT TIMEFRAME ............................................... 15
`
`VIII. STATE OF THE ART ............................................................................................ 16
`
`IX. OVERVIEW OF THE ’634 PATENT ................................................................. 18
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`
`Background .................................................................................................... 18
`Purported Invention ..................................................................................... 19
`1.
`The Claimed Control Methodology, HEV Architecture
`
`and General Electrical Characteristics are Old .............................. 19
`The Claimed Voltage to Current Ratio of “At Least 2.5”
`Is Arbitrary and Old .......................................................................... 20
`
`2.
`
`
`i
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`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
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`3.
`
`
`The Maximum DC Voltage and Maximum Current
`Limitations Are Old ........................................................................... 21
`
`X. GROUND OF UNPATENTABILITY ............................................................... 21
`
`A.
`
`
`B.
`
`
`Claims 81-90, 115-124, 162-171, & 216-225 Are Obvious Over
`the ’455 PCT Publication In View of Severinsky ’970 .............................. 21
`1.
`Non-Challenged Independent Base Claims .................................... 22
`
`a.
`Independent Claim 80 ........................................................... 22
`b.
`Independent Claim 114 ......................................................... 27
`c.
`Independent Claim 161 ......................................................... 29
`d.
`Independent Claim 215 ......................................................... 33
`Challenged Dependent Claims ......................................................... 34
`2.
`
`Rationale to Combine ................................................................................... 48
`
`XI. OBJECTIVE INDICIA OF NONOBVIOUSNESS ......................................... 50
`
`XII. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 51
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................................... 52
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`
`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
`
`Identifier
`
`’634 Patent
`Stein Decl.
`’455 PCT
`Publication
`Severinsky ’970
`Ford Letter
`MD Ct.
`Decision
`
`IPR2014-00568
`Decision
`
`’095 Provisional
`Application
`’296 Provisional
`Application
`’088 CIP Patent
`’866 CIP
`Application
`’817
`Application
`’743
`Application
`’634 File
`History
`’762
`Application
`IPR2014-00570
`Decision
`
`Yamaguchi
`Paper
`
`EXHIBIT LIST
`
`
`
`Exhibit
`No.
`U.S. Patent No. 7,237,634
`1961
`1962 Declaration of Dr. Jeffrey L. Stein
`1963
`PCT Publication No. WO00/015455
`
`Description
`
`1964
`1965
`1966
`
`1967
`
`1968
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,343,970
`Ford’s letter to Paice dated September 22, 2014
`Paice, LLC et al. v. Ford Motor Co., Case No. 1:14-cv-
`00492, District of MD, Baltimore Div., Memorandum
`Opinion (Oct. 8, 2014)
`Ford Motor Co v. Paice LLC, Case IPR2014-00568, Paper
`12 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 8, 2014) (Decision Denying
`Institution of Inter Partes Review)
`U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/100,095
`
`1969
`
`U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/122,296
`
`1970
`1971
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,554,088
`U.S. Application No. 09/822,866
`
`1972
`
`U.S. Application No. 09/264,817
`
`1973
`
`U.S. Application No. 09/392,743
`
`1974
`
`File History for U.S. Patent No. 7,237,634
`
`1975
`
`U.S. Application No. 11/229,762
`
`1976
`
`1977
`
`Ford Motor Co v. Paice LLC, Case IPR2014-00570, Paper
`10 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 30, 2014) (Decision Denying
`Institution of Inter Partes Review)
`Kozo Yamaguchi et al., Development of a New Hybrid
`System – Dual System, SAE Technical Paper 960231
`(February 1996).
`http://papers.sae.org/960231/
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

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`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
`
`Description
`
`1979
`1980
`1981
`
`Exhibit
`No.
`1978 General Electric Company, Corp. Research & Dev.,
`Near-Term Hybrid Vehicle Program, Final Report - Phase 1
`(October 1979).
`http://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19800017707
`U.S. Patent No. 3,888,325
`U.S. Patent No. 4,335,429
`Cimline, Inc. v. Crafco. Inc., No. 2010-1348 (Fed. Cir.
`Opinion March 2, 2011)
`Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Jeffrey L. Stein
`1982
`U.S. Patent No. 913,846
`1983
`1984 Michael Duoba, Ctr. for Transp. Research, Argonne
`Nat’l Lab., Challenges for the Vehicle Tester in Characterizing
`Hybrid Electric Vehicles, 7th CRC on Road Vehicle
`Emissions Workshop (April 1997).
`http://www.osti.gov/scitech/biblio/516019
`Society of Automotive Engineers Special Publication,
`Technology for Electric and Hybrid Vehicles, SAE SP-1331
`(February 1998)
`http://www.worldcat.org/title/technology-for-electric-
`and-hybrid-vehicles/oclc/39802642
`Catherine Anderson & Erin Pettit, The Effects of APU
`Characteristics on the Design of Hybrid Control Strategies for
`Hybrid Electric Vehicles, SAE Technical Paper 950493
`(1995).
`http://papers.sae.org/950493/
`L. E. Unnewehr et al., Hybrid Vehicle for Fuel Economy,
`SAE Technical Paper 760121 (1976).
`http://papers.sae.org/760121/
`Ford Motor Co. v. Paice, LLC, Case IPR2014-00568,
`Paper 8, Patent Owner’s [Redacted] Preliminary
`Response to Petition (July 11, 2014)
`
`1985
`
`1986
`
`1987
`
`
`1988
`
`1989
`
`Performance Characterization Chevrolet S-10 Electric,
`Panasonic Lead-Acid Battery, Southern California
`Edison Electrical Transportation Division (December
`1999).
`http://avt.inel.gov/pdf/fsev/sce_rpt/s10pbareport.pdf
`
`
`iv
`
`Identifier
`
`GE Final
`Report
`
`Reinbeck
`Kawakatsu
`Cimline
`
`Dr. Stein CV
`Pieper
`Duoba
`
`SAE SP-1331
`
`Anderson
`
`Unnewehr
`
`IPR2014-00568
`Redacted PO
`Prelim.
`Response
`S10
`Performance
`Report
`
`

`
`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
`
`Identifier
`
`Tesla Roadster
`Performance
`Specs
`GM Press
`Release
`
`Tesla Roadster
`Battery
`
`Tesla Roadster
`Road Test
`
`’577
`Application
`’672 Patent
`’391 Patent
`’455/’634
`Description
`Comparison
`
`Exhibit
`No.
`1990
`
`Description
`
`Tesla Motors Website,
`www.teslamotors.com/roadster/specs, retrieved
`October 31, 2014.
`1991 GM Press Release, Corvette Stingray: 3.8 seconds from
`0 to 60 mph, GM News Website,
`http://media.gm.com/media/us/en/gm/news.detail.ht
`ml/content/Pages/news/us/en/2013/Jun/0620-
`corvette-performance.html (June 20, 2013), retrieved
`November 1, 2014.
`1992 Gene Berdichevsky et al., The Tesla Roadster Battery
`System, Tesla Motors, Inc. (August 16, 2006).
`http://large.stanford.edu/publications/coal/references
`/docs/tesla.pdf
`1993 Will Dron, Roadster 2.5 Sport – Road Test, The Charging
`Point Website,
`http://www.thechargingpoint.com/manufacturers/tesl
`a/roadster-2.5-sport-roadtest.html#roadTest (July 18,
`2011), retrieved November 1, 2014.
`U.S. Patent Application No. 10/382,577
`
`1994
`
`1995
`1996
`1997
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,209,672
`U.S. Patent No. 6,338,391
`Comparison of ’455 PCT Publication and ’634 Patent
`Descriptions
`
`
`
`v
`
`

`
`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Petitioner (“Ford”) requests IPR of claims 81-90, 115-124, 162-171, and 216-
`
`225 of U.S. Patent No. 7,237,634 (“the ’634 Patent,” Ex. 1961).
`
`The ’634 patent has 306 claims and is one of five patents that Patent Owner
`
`(“Patentee” or “Paice”) has asserted against Ford in litigation. Ford has repeatedly
`
`asked Paice to limit the asserted claims to a reasonable number (Ford Letter, Ex.
`
`1965), but Paice has refused. Due to page limitations and the voluminous number of
`
`dependent claims, Ford is filing several IPR’s to address the ’634 Patent claims and is
`
`trying to group the claims according to claimed subject matter.
`
`This IPR focuses on claims reciting at least one of the following limitations: (1)
`
`“a ratio of maximum DC voltage. . . to [maximum] current supplied. . . is at least 2.5”; (2) “a
`
`maximum DC voltage supplied from said battery is at least approximately 500 volts”
`
`or “energy originating at the battery is supplied to the solid state inverter at a DC voltage having a
`
`peak of at least 500 volts”; and (3) “a maximum current supplied from said battery is
`
`less than approximately 150 amperes” or “energy originating at the battery is supplied to
`
`the solid state inverter at a maximum current of no more than 150 amperes” (collectively,
`
`the “electrical limitations”).
`
`As explained below, and in the Declaration of Dr. Jeffrey L. Stein (“Stein
`
`Decl.,” Ex. 1962), the Challenged Claims of the ’634 Patent are unpatentable over two
`
`prior art references having the same inventor as the ’634 Patent. Because there is no
`
`1
`
`

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`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
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`disclosure of the claimed electrical limitations in the ancestors of the ’634Patent prior
`
`to April 2, 2001, the effective filing date of the Challenged Claims is April 2, 2001 and
`
`does not extend back to the earliest claimed priority date of September 14, 1998. As
`
`such, a PCT application, which published in March 2000 as WO00/15455 (“the ’455
`
`PCT Publication,” Ex. 1963) is intervening art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
`
`As described below, the ’455 PCT Publication discloses all of the limitations of
`
`the Challenged Claims, except the electrical limitations quoted above, and those
`
`limitations are described in U.S. Patent No. 5,343,970 issued to Severinsky
`
`(“Severinsky ’970,” Ex. 1964). The ’455 PCT Publication expressly references
`
`Severinsky ’970, which provides one of multiple reasons to combine the references,
`
`rendering the Challenged Claims obvious. Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail in
`
`showing that at least one of the Challenged Claims is not patentable. Inter partes review
`
`of the ’634 Patent should be instituted.
`
`IPR2015-00758 is also directed to the Challenged Claims, but relies on
`
`Severinsky ’970 as the base reference. This petition relies on intervening art, the ’455
`
`PCT Publication, which expressly discloses both the “first” and “second” electric
`
`motors required by some of the Challenged Claims, while Severinsky ’970 better
`
`discloses the electrical limitations required by all of the Challenged Claims. The Board
`
`routinely institutes review based on multiple grounds, and should in this instance for
`
`the reasons stated above.
`
`2
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`

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`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
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`II. MANDATORY NOTICES UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.8
`
` Real Party-In-Interest – 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(1)
`A.
`
`Petitioner certifies that Ford Motor Company is the real party-in-interest.
`
` Related Matters – 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(2)
`B.
`
`Petitioner identifies the following related judicial matters:
`
`1) Paice, LLC and The Abell Foundation, Inc. v. Ford Motor Company, Case Number
`
`1-14-cv-00492, filed February 19, 2014 in the District of Maryland, Baltimore
`
`Division. The ’634 Patent and four other patents are asserted in this proceeding. The
`
`Maryland District Court issued an order 1) denying the Patent Owner’s motion for a
`
`preliminary injunction to enjoin Ford from filing Petitions concerning the patents-in-
`
`suit, and 2) staying the litigation pending IPRs of those patents. (MD Ct. Decision,
`
`Ex. 1966 at 1, 10-17, 30.)
`
`2) Paice LLC and The Abell Foundation, Inc. v. Hyundai Motor America, et al., Case
`
`Number 1:2012cv00499, filed on February 16, 2012 in the District of Maryland,
`
`Baltimore Division. The ’634 Patent is being asserted in this proceeding.
`
`Ford has filed related petitions in IPR2014-00568, IPR2014-00570, IPR2014-
`
`00571, IPR2014-00579, IPR2014-00852, IPR2014-00875, IPR2014-00884, IPR2014-
`
`00904, IPR2014-01415, IPR2014-01416, IPR2015-00606, IPR2015-00767, IPR2015-
`
`00722, IPR2015-00758, IPR2015-00784, IPR2015-00785, IPR2015-00787, IPR2015-
`
`00790, IPR2015-00791, IPR2015-00792, IPR2015-00794, and IPR2015-00795. Ford is
`
`concurrently filing related petitions: IPR2015-00800 and IPR2015-00801.
`
`3
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`

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`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
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`
`C.
`
`Lead and Back-Up Counsel – 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(3)
`
`Ford appoints Frank A. Angileri (Reg. No. 36,733) of Brooks Kushman P.C. as
`
`lead counsel, and Sangeeta G. Shah (Reg. No. 38,614), Michael D. Cushion (Reg. No.
`
`55,094), and Todd W. Dishman (Reg. No. 70,624) of Brooks Kushman P.C., as well
`
`as Lissi Mojica (Reg. No. 63,421) and Kevin Greenleaf (Reg. No. 64,062) of Dentons
`
`US LLP, as back-up counsel. A Power of Attorney is filed concurrently herewith.
`
`
`D.
`
`Service Information – 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(4)
`
`Service of any documents to lead and back-up counsel can be made via hand-
`
`delivery to Brooks Kushman P.C., 1000 Town Center, Twenty-Second Floor,
`
`Southfield, Michigan 48075 and Dentons US LLP, 233 South Wacker Drive, Suite
`
`7800, Chicago, Illinois 60606-6306. Petitioner consents to service by email at
`
`FPGP0104IPR13@brookskushman.com and iptdocketchi@dentons.com.
`
`III. GROUNDS FOR STANDING – 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(a)
`
`Petitioner certifies that the ’634 Patent is available for inter partes review and that
`
`the Petitioner is not barred or estopped from requesting inter partes review challenging
`
`the claims of the ’634 Patent on the grounds in this Petition.
`
`IV. OVERVIEW OF CHALLENGE – 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)
`
`Inter partes review of the ’634 Patent’s Challenged Claims is requested on the
`
`ground listed below, based on the following prior art:
`
`4
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`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
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`1.
`
`The ’455 PCT Publication (’455 PCT Publ., Ex. 1963), which published
`
`on March 23, 2000, is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). (See page 2; see also IPR 2014-
`
`00568 Decision, Ex. 1967 at 10.) The ’455 PCT Publication published more than one
`
`year before the April 2, 2001 effective filing date of the Challenged Claims. (Id.; See
`
`also Stein Decl., Ex. 1962, ¶¶156-165.)
`
`2. U.S. Patent No. 5,343,970 (Severinsky ’970, Ex. 1964), which issued on
`
`September 6, 1994, is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Although Severinsky ’970
`
`and the ’634 Patent share a common inventor, Severinsky ’970 is not part of the ’634
`
`Patent Family. (See also Stein Decl., Ex. 1962, ¶¶166-167.)
`
`Ground of Unpatentability for U.S. Patent No. 7,237,634
`
`Ground
`
`Reference(s)
`
`Basis
`
`Challenged Claims
`
`1
`
`’455 PCT Publication and
`
`§ 103
`
`81-90, 115-124, 162-171, 216-
`
`Severinsky ’970
`
`225
`
`
`
`V.
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION – 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)
`
`Per the claim construction standard for an inter partes review, Petitioner bases
`
`this petition on the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim language. Solely
`
`for purposes of this proceeding, the following discussion proposes construing one
`
`claim term. Under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, Petitioner
`
`proposes that all claim terms should be entitled to their plain and ordinary meaning,
`
`with the exception of the “maximum DC voltage” limitation in claims 86, 120, 167, and
`
`5
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`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
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`221, which requires clarification based on the context of the claim. Other than the
`
`claims, the term “maximum DC voltage” does not appear in the specification of the ’634
`
`Patent. 1
`
`Claims 86, 120, 167, and 221 each recite “a ratio of maximum DC voltage on
`
`the DC side of at least said first AC-DC converter coupled to said second electric motor to current
`
`supplied from said battery to at least said first AC-DC converter, when maximum current is so
`
`supplied, is at least 2.5.”
`
`Because the claim addresses “a ratio of maximum DC voltage . . . to current
`
`supplied . . . when maximum current is so supplied,” the claimed “maximum DC voltage” is a
`
`voltage under load value as opposed to a nominal, open-circuit voltage. This
`
`construction is also consistent with the ’634 specification, which distinguishes a
`
`nominal voltage from a voltage under load, and then uses the voltage under load
`
`values for the ratio calculations. (’634 Patent, Ex. 1961, 50:51-65 and 51:13-26; Stein
`
`Decl., Ex. 1962, ¶¶95-99.) Accordingly, under the broadest reasonable construction
`
`standard, “maximum DC voltage” should be construed to mean “maximum DC voltage
`
`under load.” This is also consistent with the Board’s determination in IPR 2014-
`
`00568. (IPR2014-00568 Decision, Ex. 1967 at 7.)
`
`
`
` 1
`
` In this Petition, quoted claim language is italicized for ease of reference. Petitioner
`
`will occasionally add boldface or underlining to certain language for emphasis.
`
`6
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`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
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`VI. PRIORITY DATE OF THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS
`
` The ’634 Patent Family
`A.
`
`The ’634 Patent is a divisional in an extensive chain of filings that claims
`
`priority to two separate provisional applications–Provisional Appl. No. 60/100,095
`
`(“the ’095 Provisional Application,” Ex. 1968), filed September 14, 1998, and
`
`Provisional Appl. No. 60/122,296 (“the ’296 Provisional Application,” Ex. 1969),
`
`filed March 1, 1999. The diagram below shows the ’634 Patent (highlighted in green),
`
`its ancestors, and other relevant family members.
`
`
`
`Significant to this Petition, the ’634 Patent’s priority claim extends through,
`
`among other applications, continuation-in-part (“CIP”) U.S. Patent No. 6,554,088
`
`(“the ’088 CIP Patent,” Ex. 1970 (highlighted in yellow)), which issued from CIP
`
`Application No. 09/822,866 (“the ’866 CIP Application,” Ex. 1971). The ’866 CIP
`
`Application is a CIP of two applications, U.S. Application No. 09/264,817 (“the ’817
`
`Application,” Ex. 1972) and U.S. Application No. 09/392,743
`
`(“the
`
`’743
`
`Application,” Ex. 1973). (See Stein Decl., Ex. 1962, ¶¶101-108.)
`
`7
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`

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`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
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` The Electrical Limitations in the Challenged Claims Are
`B.
`Unsupported Before April 2, 2001
`
`The electrical limitations are disclosed for the first time in the ’866 CIP
`
`Application under a section entitled “Further Improvements According to the
`
`Continuation-in-Part” -- a section that includes new matter not disclosed in either
`
`of the ’866 CIP Application’s parents, the ’817 and ’743 Applications. (’866 CIP
`
`Application, Ex. 1971 at 89:18; Stein Decl., Ex. 1962, ¶100.)
`
`Per Patentee’s own admission, these electrical limitations are new matter.
`
`During prosecution of the ’634 Patent, Patentee asserted that new claims 76-85 “have
`
`been added reciting specifics of the preferred ranges of voltage and current, and their
`
`ratio.” (’634 File History, Ex. 1974 at 256-257 and 311.) The Patentee further stated
`
`that support for these claims is found in “pages 89-91 of the application text,” i.e., the
`
`CIP “Further Improvements” section. (’634 File History, Ex. 1974 at 94-96, 311; ’762
`
`Application, Ex. 1975 at 88-90; see also Stein Decl., Ex. 1962, ¶¶109-113.)
`
`The determination of a priority date for claims in a CIP application depends on
`
`when the claimed subject matter first appeared in the chain of patent disclosures.
`
`Augustine v. Gaymar, 181 F.3d 1291, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The test for whether a
`
`priority application supports later claimed limitations is whether the disclosure of the
`
`priority application reasonably conveys that the inventor had possession of the later
`
`claimed subject matter at the time that the priority application was filed. Augustine, 181
`
`F.3d at 1302. A description that merely renders the invention obvious does not satisfy
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`8
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`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
`
`the requirement of adequate support for the claimed invention of the later filed
`
`claims. Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Rather,
`
`the priority application itself must describe the invention. PowerOasis v. T-Mobile, 522
`
`F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
`
`1.
`
` The “At Least 2.5” Ratio Is Unsupported Before
`April 2, 2001
`
`Claims 81-83, 86-90, 115-117, 120-124, 162, 167-171, 216-218, and 221-225 of
`
`the ’634 Patent include a “ratio of maximum DC voltage. . . to [maximum] current supplied”
`
`(the “maximum voltage-to-current ratio”) of “at least 2.5.” This limitation is not
`
`supported by the pre-’866 CIP Application filings. The “at least 2.5” maximum
`
`voltage-to-current ratio is disclosed for the first time in the “Further Improvements
`
`According to the Continuation-in-Part” section of the ’866 CIP Application. (Stein
`
`Decl., Ex. 1962, ¶¶114-121.) Prior to the ’866 CIP Application, there is no suggestion
`
`that the ratio of maximum voltage-to-current supplied is a relevant parameter, let
`
`alone that the ratio should be “at least 2.5.” (Id. at ¶¶122-129.) The ’817 Application’s
`
`vague preference for “relatively high voltage and relatively low current” is insufficient
`
`to lead a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) to the “at least 2.5” ratio. (See
`
`’817 Application, Ex. 1972 at 20:1-4; Stein Decl., Ex. 1962, ¶¶122 and 129.) Such
`
`imprecise language cannot constitute a defined genus. MPEP §2163; In re Lukach, 442
`
`F.2d 967, 969 (CCPA 1971).
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`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
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`As the filings prior to the ’866 CIP Application fail to reasonably convey to a
`
`POSA that the inventor had possession of the “at least 2.5” maximum voltage-to-
`
`current ratio, the above-identified claims are entitled to an April 2, 2001 priority date
`
`– the filing date of the ’866 CIP Application. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598
`
`F.3d 1336, 135 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). This is consistent with the Board’s
`
`determination in IPR2014-00568. (IPR2014-00568 Decision, Ex. 1967 at 10.)
`
`
` The “Maximum Voltage” Limitation Is Unsupported 2.
`Before April 2, 2001
`
`Claims 82, 84, 87, 89, 116, 118, 121, 123, 163, 165, 168, 170, 217, 219, 222, and
`
`224 of the ’634 Patent recite a “maximum DC voltage. . . is at least approximately 500 volts.”
`
`For ease of reference, this limitation will be referred to as the “maximum voltage”
`
`limitation. This limitation is not supported by the pre-’866 CIP Application filings.
`
`Of these claims, claims 82, 87, 89, 116, 121, 123, 168, 170, 217, 222, and 224 depend
`
`from other dependent claims that also recite the “at least 2.5” maximum voltage-to-
`
`current ratio limitation.
`
`Like the “at least 2.5” maximum voltage-to-current ratio limitation, the
`
`maximum voltage limitation is disclosed for the first time in the ’866 CIP Application.
`
`(Stein Decl., Ex. 1962, ¶¶139-142.) In each of the ’817 and ’743 Applications, a single
`
`open-circuit voltage is provided, 768 volts and 800 volts respectively, with no hint of a
`
`maximum voltage threshold or a broader range. (’817 Application, Ex. 1972 at 50:34-
`
`35; ’743 Application, Ex. 1973 at 34:25-28). Thus, nothing in the earliest priority
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`Case No: IPR2015-00799
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`filings conveys that the inventor had possession of the maximum voltage limitation.
`
`(Stein Decl., Ex. 1962, ¶¶130-138 and 143.)
`
`The maximum voltage limitation is new matter introduced in the ’866 CIP
`
`Application under the “Further Improvements According to the Continuation-in-
`
`Part” section. In that CIP section, Patentee introduces the idea that high voltages of
`
`500v for a 3000lb vehicle and 800v for a larger vehicle are required. (’866 CIP
`
`Application, Ex. 1971 at 89:23-90:28, emphasis added.)
`
`From the lack of description of the “at least 500 volts” range and Patentee’s own
`
`admission that the maximum voltage limitation is new matter it is clear that the above-
`
`identified claims of the ’634 Patent are entitled to a priority date no earlier than the
`
`filing date of the ’866 CIP Application - April 2, 2001. This is consistent with the
`
`Board’s determination in IPR2014-00570. (IPR 2014-00570 Decision, Ex. 1976 at 7.)
`
`
` The “Maximum Current” Limitation Is Unsupported 3.
`Before April 2, 2001
`
`Claims 83, 85, 88, 90, 117, 119, 122, 124, 164, 166, 169, 171, 218, 220, 223, and
`
`225 of the ’634 Patent recite “maximum current. . . is less than approximately 150 amperes.”
`
`For ease of reference, this limitation will be referred to as the “maximum current”
`
`limitation. This limitation is not supported by the pre-’866 CIP Application filings. Of
`
`these claims, claims 83, 88, 90, 117, 122, 124, 169, 171, 218, 223, and 225 depend
`
`from other dependent claims that also recite the “at least 2.5” maximum voltage-to-
`
`current ratio limitation.
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`Of the pre-’866 CIP Application filings, only the ’817 Application includes any
`
`description of current conditions. The ’817 Application states that current through the
`
`required components “should be limited to 30-50 amperes.” (’817 Application, Ex.
`
`1972 at 50:22-28.) Nothing in the earliest priority filings conveys that the inventor had
`
`possession of a maximum current limit of “less than approximately 150 amperes.” (Stein
`
`Decl., Ex. 1962, ¶¶144-149.)
`
`Like the other electrical limitations, by Patentee’s own admission, the
`
`maximum current limitation is new matter disclosed for the first time in the “Further
`
`Improvements” section of the ’866 CIP Application. (Stein Decl., Ex. 1962, ¶¶150-
`
`152.) In that CIP section, Patentee introduces the idea that, for a relatively heavy
`
`vehicle, a maximum current of 153 amperes should be produced. (’866 CIP
`
`Application, Ex. 1971 at 90:15-28.) Patentee then relies on this CIP section as support
`
`for its “less than approximately 150 amperes” claim amendment. (’634 File History, Ex.
`
`1974 at 94-96, 256, 311; Stein Decl., Ex. 1962, ¶151.) The lack of disclosure of the
`
`maximum current limitation together with Patentee’s own “new matter” admission
`
`make it clear that the above-identified claims are entitled to a priority date no earlier
`
`than the filing date of the ’866 CIP Application -- April 2, 2001.
`
`
`C.
`
`An Insolubly Vague Incorporation by Reference Has No
`Impact
`
`Despite the lack of support for the electrical limitations, and Patentee’s
`
`admissions to that effect, Patentee may argue that an incorporation by reference
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`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
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`clause allows it to reach back selectively into Severinsky ’970 to fill the void. However,
`
`the incorporation by reference clause is fatally ambiguous and regardless does not fill
`
`the void.
`
`First, to incorporate material by reference, the host document must identify
`
`with detailed particularity what specific material it incorporates, “using the one of
`
`ordinary skill in the art standard.” Zenon Environmental, Inc. v. United States Filter Corp.,
`
`506 F.3rd 1370, 1378-9 (Fed. Cir. 2007, emphasis added).
`
`The relevant language in the ’634 Patent, which is included in each ancestor
`
`application, states:
`
`[1] This application discloses a number of improvements over and
`
`enhancements to the hybrid vehicles disclosed in U.S. Pat. No. 5,343,970
`
`(‘the ’970 Patent’), to one of the present inventors, which is incorporated
`
`herein by this reference. [2] Where differences are not mentioned, it is
`
`to be understood that the specifics of the vehicle design shown in the
`
`’970 Patent are, applicable to the vehicles shown herein as well.
`
`(’634 Patent, Ex. 1961, 10:40-47, reference numerals and emphasis added.)
`
`This seemingly inconsistent, negative provision fails to describe with detailed
`
`particularity the scope of the incorporation. To give meaning to the second, more
`
`specific clause, the incorporation must be limited to exclude any “differences”
`
`between Severinsky ’970 and the ’634 Patent. Because the term “differences” is not
`
`explained, it is impossible for one skilled in the art to ascertain the scope of the
`
`incorporation. (Stein Decl., Ex. 1962, ¶¶153-154.) An
`
`insolubly ambiguous
`
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`Case No: IPR2015-00799
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`incorporation clause is afforded no weight. Hollmer v. Harari, 681 F.3d 1351, 1358
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2012).
`
`Second, even if the entire Severinsky ’970 patent were incorporated into the
`
`ancestor applications of the ’634 Patent, written description support for the electrical
`
`current ratio is still lacking. Nothing in Severinsky ’970 teaches the claimed ratio
`
`boundary of “at least 2.5.” (Stein Decl., Ex. 1962, ¶155.) On the contrary, if a ratio is
`
`calculated from the single set of maximum voltage and maximum current values
`
`supplied in Severinsky ’970, 1400 volts and 50 amperes respectively, that ratio would
`
`be 28:1, which is an order of magnitude from 2.5:1. (Id.) Severinsky ’970 simply lacks
`
`the disclosure required to support the claimed ratio’s lower limit of 2.5, not to
`
`mention a sufficient number of embodiments to support an unbounded range. Ariad
`
`Pharm. 598 F. 3d at 1351; In re Wertheim 541 F. 2d 257, 263–264 (CCPA 1976).
`
`Likewise, the Severinsky ’970 disclosure that “current should be less than 75 amperes
`
`and is preferably in the 30-50 ampere range” (Severinsky ’970, Ex. 1964, 19:39-49)
`
`fails to support the claimed maximum current upper limit of “150 amperes.” Finally,
`
`while Severinsky ’970 teaches that typical maximum voltages are “between 500 and
`
`1500 volts” (Id.), these voltages values do not support an unbounded range, as
`
`required by the claimed “at least approximately 500 volts” limitation. Further, Severinsky
`
`’970 does not state that these “typical maximum” voltages values are under load.
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`Case No: IPR2015-00799
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR13
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`Finally, by Patentee’s own admission, the electrical limitations were deemed
`
`“Further Improvements” in the ’866 CIP Application, filed more than eight years
`
`after the Severinsky ’970 filing date. (Stein Decl., Ex. 1962, ¶113.)
`
`In sum, under any set of arguments, the Challenged Claims are entitled to a
`
`priority date no earlier than April 2, 2001, i.e., the filing date of the ’866 CIP
`
`Application.
`
`VII. THE PERSON OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE RELEVANT FIELD
`AND THE RELEVANT TIMEFRAME
`
`T