UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`FORD MOTOR COMPANY
`Petitioner
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`v.
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`PAICE LLC & THE ABELL FOUNDATION, INC.
`Patent Owner
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`Case IPR2015-00795
`Patent 7,104,347
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response to
`Petition for Inter Partes Review of U.S.
`Patent No. 7,104,347
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`PUBLIC - REDACTED VERSION
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`

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`Patent No. 7,104,347
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
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`Case IPR2015-00795
`Attorney Docket No: 36351-0011IP5
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I. 
`
`II. 
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1 
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`PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ................................................................. 2 
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`III.  THE ’347 PATENT ......................................................................................... 3 
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`A. 
`
`B. 
`
`Background of the ’347 Patent .............................................................. 3 
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`Claim Construction ............................................................................... 6 
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` 
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` 
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`“setpoint (SP)” ............................................................................ 7 
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`“monitor patterns of vehicle operation over time” ................... 12 
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`IV.  ARGUMENT ................................................................................................. 16 
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`A. 
`
`The Board Should Exercise its Discretion to Reject Ford’s Fifth Bite
`at the Apple ......................................................................................... 17 
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` 
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` 
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`The Petition is Ford’s Fifth Bite at the Apple ........................... 20 
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`Estoppel Considerations Support Rejecting Ford’s Petition .... 26 
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`B. 
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`The Petition is Procedurally Improper ................................................ 29 
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` 
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` 
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`The Petition Improperly Incorporates by Reference ................ 29 
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`The Petition Creates an Overly Voluminous Record ............... 33 
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`C. 
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`Ground 1 is Deficient .......................................................................... 34 
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`Ford’s Proposed Grounds Fail to Present a Proper Obviousness
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`Analysis Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) ..................................................... 35 
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`Independent Claim 1 ................................................................. 39 
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`Dependent Claims 2 and 5 ........................................................ 44 
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`D.  Ground 2 is Deficient .......................................................................... 45 
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`E. 
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`F. 
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`Ground 3 is Deficient .......................................................................... 47 
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`Ground 4 is Deficient .......................................................................... 49 
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`G.  Ground 5 is Deficient .......................................................................... 51 
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`H.  Ground 6 is Deficient .......................................................................... 52 
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`I. 
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`Ground 7 is Deficient .......................................................................... 53 
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`V. 
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`CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 54 
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`In re Abbott Diabetes Care Inc.,
`696 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .......................................................................... 11
`
`Apple, Inc., v. ContentGuard Holdings, Inc.,
`IPR2015-00356, Paper 9 (PTAB Jun. 26, 2015) ................................................ 34
`
`Apple Inc. v. ContentGuard Holdings, LLC,
`IPR2015-00448, Paper 9 (PTAB July 10, 2015) ................................................ 39
`
`ASUSTeK Computer Inc. v. Exotablet, Ltd.,
`IPR2015-00041, Paper 6 (PTAB Apr. 23, 2015) ............................................... 19
`
`Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp.,
`554 F.3d 982 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ...................................................................... 36, 43
`
`Butamax Advanced Biofuels LLC v. Gevo, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00581, Paper 8 (PTAB Oct. 14, 2014) .............................. 18, 20, 21, 27
`
`Cisco v. C-Cation Technologies,
`IPR2014-00454, Paper 12 (PTAB Aug. 29, 2014) ............................................. 30
`
`Continental Automotive Sys., Inc. v. Wasica Finance GMBH,
`IPR2014-01454, Paper 14 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2015) .............................................. 25
`
`In re Cortright,
`165 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ...................................................................... 7, 11
`
`In re Cuozzo Speed Tech., LLC,
`778 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g denied, __ F.3d __ (Fed. Cir.
`Jul. 8, 2015) ........................................................................................................... 6
`
`CustomPlay, LLC v. ClearPlay, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00783, Paper 9 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2014) ................................................. 27
`
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`eBay Inc. v. MoneyCat Ltd.,
`CBM2015-00008, Paper 9 (PTAB May 1, 2015) ............................................... 27
`
`Fidelity National v. DataTreasury,
`IPR2014-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB Aug. 13, 2014) ............................................... 30
`
`Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm’n,
`386 F.3d 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .......................................................................... 11
`
`In re Giannelli,
`739 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .......................................................................... 40
`
`Graham v. John Deere Co.,
`383 U.S. 1 (1966) .......................................................................................... 35, 53
`
`Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs.,
`512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ........................................................ 47, 49, 51, 54
`
`Ex Parte James R. Bosserdet Jr.,
`Appeal 2012-001420, 2014 WL 5590704 (PTAB Oct. 9, 2014) ....................... 42
`
`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) ................................................................................ 35, 38, 53
`
`MasterImage 3D, Inc. v. Reald Inc.,
`IPR2015-00033, Paper 12 (PTAB Apr. 22, 2015) ............................................. 50
`
`MaxLinear, Inc. v. Cresta Technology Corp.,
`IPR2015-00591, Paper 9 (PTAB Jun. 15, 2015) ................................................ 24
`
`Micro Motion, Inc. v. Invensys Systems, Inc.,
`IPR2014-0393, Paper 16 (PTAB Aug. 4, 2014) ................................................. 30
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc.,
`No. 2014-1542, 2015 WL 3747257 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 16, 2015) ................... 6, 7, 11
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Enfish, LLC,
`IPR2013-00559, Paper 65 (PTAB Mar. 3, 2015) ............................................... 48
`
`In re Nilssen,
`837 F.2d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1987) .......................................................................... 52
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`In re NTP, Inc.,
`654 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ...................................................................... 7, 11
`
`Salesforce.com, Inc. v. VirtualAgility, Inc.,
`CBM2013-00024, Paper 16 (PTAB Nov. 19, 2013) .......................................... 48
`
`Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rembrandt Wireless Technologies, LP,
`IPR2015-00555, Paper 20 (PTAB Jun. 19, 2015) ........................................ 19, 27
`
`Shaw Indus. Grp. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc.,
`IPR2013-00132 & IPR2013-00584, Paper 44 (PTAB Jul. 24, 2014) ................ 41
`
`Shaw Industries Group, Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc.,
`IPR2013-00584, Paper 16 (PTAB Dec. 21, 2013) ............................................. 30
`
`Spansion Inc. v. Macronix Int’l Co., Ltd.,
`IPR2014-01116, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 22, 2014) ............................................. 41
`
`In re Suitco Surface, Inc.,
`603 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ........................................................................ 6, 7
`
`Tempur Sealy Int’l Inc. v. Select Comfort Corp.,
`IPR2014-01419, Paper 7 (PTAB Feb. 17, 2015) ................................................ 30
`
`Texas Instruments v. United States ITC,
`988 F.2d 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1993) .......................................................................... 42
`
`Travelocity.com L.P. v. Cronos Techs. LLC,
`CBM2014-00082, Paper 10 (PTAB Sept. 15, 2014) .......................................... 36
`
`Unified Patents, Inc. v. PersonalWeb, LLC,
`IPR2014-00702, Paper 13 (PTAB Jul. 24, 2014) ............................................... 29
`
`Unilever, Inc., v. The Proctor & Gamble Co.,
`IPR2014-00506, Paper 17 (PTAB Jul. 7, 2014) ................................................. 27
`
`Unilever v. Procter & Gamble Company,
`IPR2014-00628, Paper 23 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2015) ................................. 19, 20, 27
`
`In re Vaidyanathan,
`381 Fed. Appx. 985 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .................................................................. 11
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`ZTE Corp. v. ContentGuard Holdings, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00454, Paper 12 (PTAB Sept. 25, 2013) ............................................. 23
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`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103 ........................................................................................................ 35
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`35 U.S.C. § 313 .......................................................................................................... 1
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`35 U.S.C. § 315 ............................................................................................ 20, 26, 28
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`35 U.S.C. § 316 ........................................................................................................ 33
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`35 U.S.C. § 322 .................................................................................................. 35, 37
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`35 U.S.C. § 325 .................................................................................................. passim
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`Other Authorities
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.1 ........................................................................................... 19, 23, 33
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.6 ................................................................................................. 29, 30
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.22 ......................................................................................... 29, 35, 37
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.100 ................................................................................................. 2, 6
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.104 ............................................................................................. 31, 33
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.107 ..................................................................................................... 1
`
`157 Cong. Rec. S952 (2011) .................................................................................... 18
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`77 Fed. Reg. 48756, 48763 (Aug. 4, 2012) ............................................................. 33
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`H.R. Rep. No. 112-98 (2011) ....................................................................... 18, 24, 33
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`EXHIBITS
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`Exhibit Number
`Ex. 2301
`Ex. 2302
`Ex. 2303
`Ex. 2304
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`Exhibit Name
`Table of Ford’s IPR Petitions
`Gregory Davis Deposition Transcript (Feb. 25, 2015)
`The Oxford Essential Dictionary, American Ed.
`(1998) (excerpt)
`Appendix A (Jan. 15, 2014)
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`Patent No. 7,104,347
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Case IPR2015-00795
`Attorney Docket No: 36351-0011IP5
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`In accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 313 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.107, Paice LLC and
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`The Abell Foundation, Inc. (“Patent Owner” or collectively referred to as “Paice”)
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`respectfully submit this Preliminary Response to the Petition for Inter Partes
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`Review (“the Petition” or “Pet.”) of U.S. Patent No. 7,104,347 (Ex. 1301) (“the
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`’347 patent”) filed by Ford Motor Company (“Ford” or “Petitioner”).
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`In its fifth petition for inter partes review (IPR) of the ’347 patent, Ford
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`asserts that claims 1-5, 14, 16, 19, 20, and 22 are obvious in view of U.S. Patent
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`No. 5,789,882 to Ibaraki et al. (Ex. 1303) (“Ibaraki ’882”), either alone or in
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`combination with U.S. Patent No. 4,335,429 to Kawakatsu (Ex. 1305)
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`(“Kawakatsu ’429”), U.S. Patent No. 5,823,280 to Lateur et al. (Ex. 1307)
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`(“Lateur”), U.S. Patent No. 5,934,395 to Koide et al. (Ex. 1317) (“Koide”), U.S.
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`Patent No. 6,116,363 to Frank (Ex. 1318) (“Frank”), U.S. Patent No. 5,865,263 to
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`Yamaguchi et al. (Ex. 1321) (“Yamaguchi”), U.S. Patent No. 6,003,626 to Ibaraki
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`et al. (Ex. 1322) (“Ibaraki ’626”), Fiat Conceptual Approach to Hybrid Cars
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`Design, Vittone (Ex. 1320) (“Vittone”), and “the knowledge of a POSA.”
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`Paice requests that the Board deny institution for at least the following
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`reasons: (1) the Petition relies on substantially the same prior art and arguments
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`that it has previously presented, representing Ford’s fifth shot at the ’347 patent,
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`and part of an overall strategy designed to drive up costs and overburden Paice
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`with twenty-five petitions for IPR based on serial grounds of obviousness; (2) the
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`Petition is procedurally improper, containing improper incorporation by reference,
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`and creating an excessively voluminous record; and (3) the Petition is defective
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`and deficient because Ford fails to address adequately a motivation to combine the
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`alleged prior art references and (even if combined) to allege adequately that the
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`proposed combinations render the challenged claims obvious.
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`Because Ford’s Petition is abusive and duplicative and fails to establish a
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`reasonable likelihood that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable, the
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`Board should reject the petition and decline to institute a fifth proceeding regarding
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`the ’347 patent.
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`II.
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`PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
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`On April 4, 2014, Ford filed two petitions for IPR against the ’347 patent:
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`IPR2014-00571 challenged claims 1, 6, 7, 9, 15, 21, 23, and 36, while IPR2014-
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`00579 challenged claims 1, 7, 8, 18, 21, 23, and 37. The Board instituted IPR of
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`those claims on September 30, 2014. On July 1, 2015, the Board heard oral
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`arguments on the petitions, and is expected to issue a final written decision no later
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`than September 30, 2015. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(c). On June 5, 2014, Ford filed
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`a third petition (IPR2014-00884) for IPR against claims 1, 7, 10, 21, 23, and 24 of
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`the ’347 patent. On December 11, 2014, the Board instituted review of the
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`challenged claims, and is expected to issue a final written decision prior to
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`December 11, 2015.
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`Ford filed a petition (IPR2015-00794) for IPR against claims 23, 24, 25, 26,
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`27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 39, 40, and 41 of the ’347 patent on February 23, 2015, and filed
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`the instant Petition against claims 1-5, 14, 16, 19, 20, and 22 the same day, in its
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`twenty-first and twenty-second of twenty-five petitions for IPR, and its fourth and
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`fifth petitions regarding the ’347 patent. Armed with Paice’s response to its first
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`two petitions and Paice’s preliminary response to its third petition, along with the
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`Board’s institution decisions, Ford concocted yet another challenge to the ’347
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`patent relying on substantially the same arguments.
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`III. THE ’347 PATENT
`A. Background of the ’347 Patent
`The ’347 patent, entitled “Hybrid Vehicles,” issued on September 12, 2006,
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`from an application with a priority date of September 14, 1998. The ’347 patent
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`discloses embodiments of a hybrid electric vehicle, with an internal combustion
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`engine and two motors. One or both of the motors may be used to recharge the
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`battery. Additionally, a microprocessor is employed to select different operating
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`modes based on the vehicle’s instantaneous torque requirements, the state of
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`charge of the battery bank, and other variables. See, e.g., Ex. 1301 at Abstract.
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`An embodiment of the hybrid vehicle disclosed in the ’347 patent is shown
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`in Figure 3, reproduced below:
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`Id. at Fig. 3. As shown, a traction motor 25 is connected to the road wheels 34
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`through a differential 32. A starter motor 21 is connected to the internal
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`combustion engine 40. The motors 21 and 25 are functional as either motors or
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`generators, depending on the operation of the corresponding inverter/charger units
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`23 and 27, which connect the motors to the battery bank 22. See id. at 26:13-24.
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`These components are controlled by a microprocessor 48 or any controller
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`capable of examining input parameters and signals and controlling the mode of
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`operation of the vehicle. See, e.g., id. at 26:25-27:20. For example, control of
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`engine 40 is accomplished by way of control signals provided by the
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`microprocessor to the electronic fuel injection (EFI) unit 56 and electronic engine
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`management (EEM) unit 55. Control of (1) starting of the engine 40; (2) use of
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`motors 21 and 25 to provide propulsive torque; or (3) use of motors as generators
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`to provide regenerative recharging of battery bank 22, is accomplished through
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`control signals provided by the microprocessor to the inverter/charger units 23 and
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`27. See, e.g., id. at 26:59-27:20, 28:38-49.
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`The hybrid vehicle may be operated in a number of modes based on the
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`vehicle’s instantaneous torque requirements, the engine’s maximum torque output,
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`the state of charge of the battery, and other operating parameters. In an
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`implementation of the ’347 patent, the microprocessor causes the vehicle to
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`operate in various operating modes pursuant to its control strategy.
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`For example, in mode I, the hybrid vehicle is operated as an electric car,
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`with the traction motor providing all torque to propel the vehicle. Id. at 37:26-35.
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`As the vehicle continues to be propelled in electric only mode, the state of charge
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`of the battery may become depleted, and need to be recharged. In this case, the
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`hybrid vehicle may transition to mode II to recharge the battery, in which case the
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`vehicle operates as in mode I, with the addition of the engine running the
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`starter/generator motor to provide electrical energy to operate the traction motor
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`and recharge the battery. Id. at 37:35-39. When the internal combustion engine
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`can operate in its fuel efficient range, the hybrid vehicle operates in mode IV, with
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`the engine providing torque to propel the vehicle. Id. at 37:45-47, 38:55-65. If the
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`vehicle requires additional torque, such as for acceleration or hill-climbing, the
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`vehicle may enter mode V, where the traction motor provides additional torque to
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`propel the vehicle beyond that provided by engine 40. Id. at 38:4-11.
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`B. Claim Construction
`Ford construes two claims: “road load,” and “setpoint.” Pet. at 5-7. At this
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`stage, Paice addresses only Ford’s construction of “setpoint.” Paice also proposes
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`a construction of “monitor[s] patterns of vehicle operation over time,” because
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`Ford’s analysis demonstrates that it interprets the phrase in an unreasonably broad
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`manner.
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`In IPR proceedings, the Board applies the “broadest reasonable
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`interpretation” standard, which mandates that “[a] claim in an unexpired patent
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`shall be given its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of
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`the patent in which it appears.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see also In re Cuozzo
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`Speed Tech., LLC, 778 F.3d 1271, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g denied, __ F.3d __
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`(Fed. Cir. Jul. 8, 2015). The Federal Circuit has recognized, however, that that
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`standard requires that the claims must be read in light of the specification as it
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`would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Suitco Surface, Inc.,
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`603 F.3d 1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010). In Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., the
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`Federal Circuit explained that the broadest reasonable interpretation does not mean
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`that “the Board may construe the claims during IPR so broadly that its
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`constructions are unreasonable under general claim constructions principles,” and
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`that the construction must not be “divorced from the specification and the record
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`evidence” and inconsistent with “the one that those skilled in the art would reach.”
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`No. 2014-1542, 2015 WL 3747257, at *3 (Fed. Cir. June 16, 2015) (quoting In re
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`NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353,
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`1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). “A construction that is ‘unreasonably broad’ and which
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`does not ‘reasonably reflect the plain language and disclosure’ will not pass
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`muster.” Microsoft, No. 2014-1542, 2015 WL 3747257, at *3 (quoting Suitco, 603
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`F.3d at 1260).
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`“setpoint (SP)”
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`Paice respectfully requests that the Board construe “setpoint” as “a definite,
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`but potentially variable value at which a transition between operating modes may
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`occur,” 1 and reject Ford’s proposed construction—a “predetermined torque
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`1 As an initial matter, Paice notes that the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
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`District of Texas and the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland both have
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`construed the term “setpoint (SP)” to mean “a definite, but potentially variable
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`value at which a transition between operating modes may occur.” See Paice LLC
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`v. Toyota Motor Corp., Case No. 2:07-cv-180 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2008) (Ex. 1313
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`at 204); Paice LLC v. Hyundai Motor Corp., Case No. 2:12-cv-499 (D. Md. Jul.
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`value”—because it is unreasonably broad and does not reasonably reflect the
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`disclosure of the ’347 patent.
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` The claims and the specification of the ’347 patent make clear that a
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`“setpoint” is not simply a numerical value divorced from the context of the rest of
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`the control system. Rather, “setpoint” serves the crucial function of marking the
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`transition from one claimed mode to another, and in particular, the transition from
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`propelling the vehicle with the motor to propelling the vehicle with the engine.
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`See, e.g., Ex. 1301 at 40:50-55.
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`First, the claims are clear that a “setpoint” marks a point at which the vehicle
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`may transition between two modes. For example, in claims 1, 7, 23, and 28, the
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`“setpoint” marks the transition between a mode in which only the motor propels
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`the vehicle, to modes in which the engine also can be used to propel the vehicle or
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`charge the battery. See id. at claims 1, 7, 23, 28. Dependent claim 3 similarly
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`requires that the “controller monitors the road load (RL) on the vehicle over time,
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`and controls transition between propulsion of said vehicle by said motor(s) to
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`24, 2014) (Ex. 1314 at 103) (“The Plaintiffs’ proposed construction of ‘setpoint’ as
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`‘a definite, but potentially variable value at which a transition between operating
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`modes may occur,’ is consistent with the language of the claims and the intrinsic
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`evidence.”).
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`propulsion by said engine responsive to RL reaching SP.” Id. at claim 3 (emphasis
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`added). Claim 25 recites similar language.
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`Additionally, the specification unambiguously defines “setpoint” as
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`synonymous with a “transition point” between modes:
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`[I]n the example of the inventive control strategy discussed above, it is
`repeatedly stated that the transition from low-speed operation to
`highway cruising occurs when road load is equal to 30% of MTO. This
`setpoint, referred to in the appended claims as “SP”, and sometimes
`hereinafter as the transition point (i.e., between operation in modes I
`and IV) is obviously arbitrary and can vary substantially, e.g., between
`30-50% of MTO, within the scope of the invention.
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`Id. at 40:47-55 (emphasis added); see also id. at 40:22-31 (“[T]he microprocessor
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`tests sensed and calculated values for system variables, such as the vehicle’s
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`instantaneous torque requirement, i.e., the ‘road load’ RL . . . against setpoints, and
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`uses the results of the comparisons to control the mode of vehicle operation.”),
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`41:2-4 (“For example, in response to recognition of a regular pattern as above, the
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`transition point might be adjusted to 60% of MTO; . . . .”), 41:10-14 (“It is also
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`within the scope of the invention to make the setpoint SP to which the road load is
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`compared to control the transition from mode I to mode IV somewhat ‘fuzzy’, [sic]
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`so that SP may vary from one comparison of road load to MTO to the next
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`depending on other variables.”), 41:66-42:2 (“FIG. 9 thus shows the main decision
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`points of the control program run by the microprocessor, with the transition point
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`between mode I, low-speed operation, and mode IV highway cruising, set at a road
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`load equal to 30% of MTO.”), 44:32-39 (“Further, as noted above the transition
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`points between modes I, IV, and V in particular may vary in accordance with the
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`operator’s commands, . . . .”).
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`The “setpoint” marks the amount of “road load” at which the claimed
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`control system actively changes the vehicle from one mode to another (e.g. from
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`motor propulsion to engine propulsion). The challenged patent recognizes the
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`significant efficiencies to be gained by transitioning between motor propulsion to
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`engine propulsion in response to “road load.” See, e.g., id. at 13:39-46 (“By
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`comparison . . . the vehicle’s operating mode—that is, the selection of the source
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`of torque needed to propel the vehicle—is determined based on the amount of
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`torque actually required. In this way the proper combination of engine, traction
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`motor, and starting motor is always available. This apparently simple point has
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`evidently been missed entirely by the art.”), 39:47-65 (noting that prior art
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`references using vehicle speed to transition between modes “inherently operate the
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`engine under less efficient conditions”).
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`Ford’s construction of “setpoint” as a “predetermined torque value,” see Pet.
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`at 6, is incorrect and unreasonably broad because it fails to recognize that
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`“setpoint” represents a point at which a transition between different operating
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`modes may occur. The broadening construction is “divorced from the
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`specification and the record evidence” and inconsistent with “the one that those
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`skilled in the art would reach.” See Microsoft, No. 2014-1542, 2015 WL 3747257,
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`at *3 (quoting NTP, 654 F.3d at 1288; Cortright, 165 F.3d at 1358).
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`In essence, Ford asks the Board to construe the claims as broadly covering
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`hybrid vehicle systems where transitions between modes never occur—a clear
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`error that is fundamentally contrary to the specification of the ’347 patent. See
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`Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm’n, 386 F.3d 1095, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
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`(claim should not be given overly broad construction that is inconsistent with how
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`claim term is used in the specification). The Board’s “broadest reasonable
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`interpretation” must be reasonable, and must be in conformity with the invention
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`as described in the specification. In re Vaidyanathan, 381 Fed. Appx. 985, 995-96
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`(Fed. Cir. 2010). Because Ford’s proposed construction fails to consider the
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`entirety of the claims and specification, it is improper and should be rejected. See,
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`e.g., In re Abbott Diabetes Care Inc., 696 F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
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`(holding that Board’s construction of “electrochemical sensor” was “unreasonable
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`and inconsistent with the language of the claims and the specification”).
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`Ford’s construction is also incorrect because it impermissibly limits
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`“setpoint” to a torque value while the specification makes clear that a setpoint is
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`not limited to a torque value and in fact could also be a measure of the state of
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`charge of the battery.
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`[T]he microprocessor tests sensed and calculated values for system
`variables, such as the vehicle's instantaneous torque requirement, i.e.,
`the “road load” RL, the engine's instantaneous torque output ITO, both
`being expressed as a percentage of the engine's maximum torque output
`MTO, and the state of charge of the battery bank BSC, expressed as a
`percentage of its full charge, against setpoints, and uses the results of
`the comparisons to control the mode of vehicle operation.
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`Ex. 1301 at 40:22-31 (emphasis added). Ford’s construction ignores the language
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`regarding state of charge of the battery, and, in this regard, impermissibly narrows
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`the broadest reasonable interpretation of setpoint as used in the specification.
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`Therefore, Paice respectfully requests that the Board reject Ford’s
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`construction and adopt Paice’s construction of “setpoint” to make clear that it is a
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`value “at which a transition between operating modes may occur.”
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`“monitor patterns of vehicle operation over time”
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`The Board should construe “monitor patterns of vehicle operation over time”
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`to mean “track and record the driver’s repeated driving operations over time.”
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`Dependent claims 2 and 24 of the ’347 patent require that the controller
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`“monitor[s] patterns of vehicle operation over time and var[ies] said setpoint SP
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`accordingly.” Ford and Dr. Davis misapply this claim language to Ibaraki ’882, as
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`discussed below. In order to clarify the scope of this claim in light of this
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`misapplication, and for the purposes of this IPR only, Paice respectfully requests
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`that the Board give the phrase “monitor patterns of vehicle operation over time” its
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`broadest reasonable interpretation, which is: “track and record the driver’s repeated
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`driving operations over time.”
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`The specification makes clear that the claimed control system can be altered
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`based on “patterns of vehicle operation over time,” which refers to how the
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`operator actually drives the car over some period of time, i.e., changing variables
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`according to how the driver actually uses the car on a day to day basis. See Ex.
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`1301 at 35:47-58 (“Examples of this practice—amounting in many circumstances
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`to modifying certain specific values depending on other data items not discussed in
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`detail, or by monitoring the vehicle’s actual usage patterns over time—are given
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`below.” (emphasis added)). For example, the specification describes an
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`embodiment of this claim where the setpoint is adjusted based on the driver’s daily
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`commute from home to work. See id. at 40:56-41:9. After analyzing the driver’s
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`“daily patterns,” such as “driv[ing] the same route fr