UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`FORD MOTOR COMPANY
`Petitioner
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`v.
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`PAICE LLC & THE ABELL FOUNDATION, INC.
`Patent Owner
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`Case IPR2015-00792
`Patent 8,214,097
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response to
`Petition for Inter Partes Review of U.S.
`Patent No. 8,214,097
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`Patent No. 8,214,097
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
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`Case IPR2015-00792
`Attorney Docket No: 36351-0013IP3
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I. 
`
`II. 
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1 
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`PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ................................................................. 4 
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`A. 
`
`B. 
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`C. 
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`Ford’s First Petition ............................................................................... 4 
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`Ford’s Second Petition .......................................................................... 5 
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`The Instant Petition ............................................................................... 6 
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`III.  THE ’097 PATENT ......................................................................................... 7 
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`A. 
`
`B. 
`
`Background of the ’097 Patent .............................................................. 7 
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`Claim Construction ............................................................................. 10 
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`1. 
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`2. 
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`“setpoint (SP)” .......................................................................... 12 
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`“abnormal and transient conditions” ......................................... 17 
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`IV.  ARGUMENT ................................................................................................. 19 
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`A. 
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`The Board Should Exercise its Discretion to Reject Ford’s Third Bite
`at the Apple ......................................................................................... 20 
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`1. 
`
`The Instant Petition is Ford’s Third Bite at the Apple .............. 23 
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`Ford Advances the Exact Same Prior Art and Substantially the
`2. 
`Same Arguments ................................................................................. 29 
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`3. 
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`Estoppel Considerations Support Rejecting Ford’s Petition .... 33 
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`B. 
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`The Petition is Procedurally Improper ................................................ 37 
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`1. 
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`2. 
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`The Petition Improperly Incorporates by Reference ................ 37 
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`The Petition Creates an Overly Voluminous Record ............... 41 
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
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`Attorney Docket No: 36351-0013IP3
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`C. 
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`Ground 1 is Deficient—The Proposed Combination of Severinksy and
`Takaoka Does Not Render Claims 1, 7, 9, 11, 17, 19, 21, 27, 28, 30,
`37, or 38 Obvious ................................................................................ 42 
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`The Proposed Combination of Severinksy and Takaoka Does
`1. 
`Not Disclose A Setpoint ...................................................................... 43 
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`The Proposed Combination of Severinsky and Takaoka Fails to
`2. 
`Render Dependent Claims 7, 9, 17, 19, 27, 28, 37, or 38 Obvious .... 47 
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`The Petition Fails to Address Adequately a Reason to Combine
`3. 
`Severinsky with Takaoka .................................................................... 49 
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`D.  Ground 2 is Deficient—The Proposed Combination of Severinksy,
`Takaoka, and Yamaguchi Does Not Render Claims 3, 4, 13, 14, 23,
`24, 32, or 33 Obvious .......................................................................... 50 
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`V. 
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`CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 51 
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`Patent No. 8,214,097
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`In re Abbott Diabetes Care Inc.,
`696 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .......................................................................... 16
`
`Apple, Inc., v. ContentGuard Holdings, Inc.,
`IPR2015-00356, Paper 9 (PTAB Jun. 26, 2015) ................................................ 42
`
`Apple Inc. v. ContentGuard Holdings, LLC,
`IPR2015-00448, Paper 9 (PTAB Jul. 10, 2015) ................................................. 40
`
`ASUSTeK Computer Inc. v. Exotablet, Ltd.,
`IPR2015-00041, Paper 6 (PTAB Apr. 23, 2015) ............................................... 22
`
`Butamax Advanced Biofuels LLC v. Gevo, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00581, Paper 8 (PTAB Oct. 14, 2014) ................................................ 21
`
`Cisco v. C-Cation Technologies,
`IPR2014-00454, Paper 12 (PTAB Aug. 29, 2014) ............................................. 38
`
`Conopco, Inc. dba Unilever v. Procter & Gamble Company,
`IPR2014-00628, Paper 23 (PTAB March 20, 2015) .................................... 22, 23
`
`In re Cortright,
`165 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999) .................................................................... 11, 15
`
`In re Cuozzo Speed Tech., LLC,
`778 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g denied, __ F.3d __ (Fed. Cir.
`Jul. 8, 2015) ......................................................................................................... 11
`
`CustomPlay, LLC v. ClearPlay, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00783, Paper 9 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2014) ................................................. 34
`
`eBay Inc. v. MoneyCat Ltd.,
`CBM2015-00008, Paper 9 (PTAB May 1, 2015) ............................................... 34
`
`Fidelity National v. DataTreasury,
`IPR2014-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB Aug. 13, 2014) ............................................... 37
`
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`Ford Motor Company v. Paice LLC & The Abell Foundation, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00570, Paper 10 (PTAB Sept. 30, 2014) ............................................... 5
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`Ford Motor Company v. Paice LLC & The Abell Foundation, Inc.,
`IPR2014-01415, Paper 10 (PTAB Mar. 12, 2015) ............................................... 5
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`Ford Motor Company v. Paice LLC & The Abell Foundation, Inc.,
`IPR2015-00767, Paper 2 (PTAB Feb. 19, 2015) ................................................ 24
`
`Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm’n,
`386 F.3d 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .......................................................................... 15
`
`Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs.,
`512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .......................................................................... 49
`
`MaxLinear, Inc. v. Cresta Technology Corp.,
`IPR2015-00591, Paper 9 (PTAB Jun. 15, 2015) ................................................ 27
`
`Micro Motion, Inc. v. Invensys Systems, Inc.,
`IPR2014-0393, Paper 16 (PTAB Aug. 4, 2014) ................................................. 38
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc.
`No. 2014-1542, 2015 WL 3747257 (Fed. Cir. June 16, 2015) ............... 11, 15, 18
`
`Microsoft Corporation v. Enfish, LLC,
`IPR2013-00559, Paper 65 (PTAB Mar. 3, 2015) ............................................... 49
`
`In re NTP, Inc.,
`654 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2011) .................................................................... 11, 15
`
`Salesforce.com, Inc. v. VirtualAgility, Inc.,
`CBM201300024, Paper 16 (PTAB Nov. 19, 2013) ........................................... 50
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`Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rembrandt Wireless Technologies, LP,
`IPR2015-00555, Paper 20 (PTAB Jun. 19, 2015) .............................................. 22
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`Shaw Industries Group, Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc.,
`IPR2013-00584, Paper 16 (PTAB Dec. 21, 2013) ............................................. 38
`
`In re Suitco Surface, Inc.,
`603 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .................................................................... 11, 17
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`Tempo Lighting Inc. v. Tivoli LLC,
`742 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................................................................ 18
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`Tempur Sealy Int’l Inc. v. Select Comfort Corp.,
`IPR2014-01419, Paper 7 (PTAB Feb. 17, 2015) ................................................ 37
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`Travelocity.com L.P. v. Cronos Techs., LLC,
`CBM2015-00047, Paper 7 (PTAB Jun. 15, 2015) ............................................. 28
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`Unified Patents, Inc. v. PersonalWeb, LLC,
`IPR2014-00702, Paper 13 (PTAB Jul. 24, 2014) ............................................... 36
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`Unilever, Inc., v. The Proctor & Gamble Co.,
`IPR2014-00506, Paper 17 (PTAB Jul. 7, 2014) ................................................. 34
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`In re Vaidyanathan,
`381 Fed. Appx. 985 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .................................................................. 16
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`ZTE Corp. v. ContentGuard Holdings, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00454, Paper 12 (PTAB Sept. 25, 2013) ............................................. 29
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`Statutes
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`35 U.S.C. § 313 .......................................................................................................... 1
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`35 U.S.C. § 315 ........................................................................................ 3, 23, 33, 35
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`35 U.S.C. § 316 ........................................................................................................ 41
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`35 U.S.C. § 325 .................................................................................................. passim
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`Other Authorities
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.1 ........................................................................................... 22, 29, 41
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.22 ..................................................................................................... 37
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.100 ............................................................................................... 5, 11
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.104 ................................................................................................... 38
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.105 ..................................................................................................... 1
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.107 ..................................................................................................... 1
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.6 ................................................................................................... 1, 37
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`37 C.F.R § 42.65 ...................................................................................................... 48
`
`157 Cong. Rec. S952 (2011) .................................................................................... 20
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`77 Fed. Reg. 48756 (Aug. 4, 2012).......................................................................... 41
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`H.R. Rep. No. 112-98 (2011) ................................................................. 21, 23, 26, 41
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`EXHIBITS
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`Exhibit Number
`Ex. 2201
`Ex. 2202
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`Ex. 2203
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`Ex. 2204
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`Exhibit Name
`Table of Ford’s IPR Petitions
`Jeffery L. Stein, Deposition Tr. (IPR2014-00875)
`(Mar. 3, 2015)
`Jeffery L. Stein, Deposition Tr. (IPR2014-00875)
`(May 29, 2015)
`Jeffery L. Stein, Deposition Tr. (IPR2014-00570)
`(May 8, 2015)
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`Patent No. 8,214,097
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Case IPR2015-00792
`Attorney Docket No: 36351-0013IP3
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`In accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 313 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.107, Paice LLC and
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`The Abell Foundation, Inc. (“Patent Owner” or collectively referred to as “Paice”)
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`respectfully submit this Preliminary Response to the Petition for Inter Partes
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`Review (“the Petition” or “Pet.”) of U.S. Patent No. 8,214,097 (Ex. 1201) (“the
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`’097 patent”) filed by Ford Motor Company (“Ford” or “Petitioner”).
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`In its now third petition for inter partes review (IPR) of the ’097 patent,
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`Ford asserts that claims 1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 17, 19, 21, 23, 24, 27, 28, 30, 32,
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`33, 37 and 38 are obvious in view of various combinations of alleged prior art that
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`the Board is already considering in two separate and pending IPR proceedings
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`regarding the ’097 patent (IPR2014-00570 and IPR2014-01415), including Paice’s
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`own U.S. Patent No. 5,343,970 (“Severinsky”) as well as Toshifumi Takaoka et al.,
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`A High-Expansion Ratio Gasoline Engine for the Toyota Hybrid System, Toyota
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`Technical Review Vol. 47, No. 2 (Ex. 1206) (“Takaoka”) and Kozo Yamaguchi et
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`al., Development of a New Hybrid System – Dual System, SAE Technical Paper
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`960231 (Ex. 1227) (“Yamaguchi”).
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`Paice requests that the Board deny institution of the IPR because: (1) the
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`Petition relies on substantially the same arguments that Ford has already presented
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`to the Board, representing Ford’s third bite at the apple with respect to the ’097
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`patent, and part of an overall strategy designed to drive up costs and overburden
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`Paice with twenty-five petitions for IPR based on serial grounds of obviousness;
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`(2) the Petition is procedurally improper, containing improper incorporation by
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`reference, and creating an excessively voluminous record; and (3) the Petition is
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`defective and deficient because Ford fails to address adequately a motivation to
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`combine the alleged prior art references and (even if combined) the proposed
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`combinations do not render the claimed invention obvious.
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`First, this Petition is a prime example of why the Board has discretion under
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`35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to deny institution of petitions that burden patent owners and
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`the Board by advancing “the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments
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`[that] previously were presented to the Office.” The Board should exercise that
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`discretion and deny institution to prevent Ford from using this Petition to take its
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`third bite at the apple. Here, Ford challenges twenty claims of the ’097 patent,
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`sixteen of which it previously challenged in either IPR2014-00570 or IPR2014-
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`01415, or both, based on three alleged prior art references, each of which it
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`previously addressed in one or both of its prior petitions. The Petition, thus,
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`advances the same exact prior art that Ford previously presented to the Board, and
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`advances arguments that are substantially the same as those that Ford previously
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`presented to the Board—this time relying primarily on Takaoka instead of
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`Catherine Anderson & Erin Pettit, The Effects of APU Characteristics on the
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`Design of Hybrid Control Strategies for Hybrid Electric Vehicles, SAE 950493
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`(“Anderson”). Paice should not have to bear the burden of defending the same
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`claims of the ’097 patent based on the same prior art references in three separate
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`proceedings so that Ford can mix and match different combinations of the same
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`references. This is particularly true where, as here, the Board has instituted two
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`other IPR proceedings with respect to fifteen of the twenty challenged claims
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`(having declined to institute review of one of the sixteen serially-challenged
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`claims) and will issue a final written decision in those proceedings many months
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`before any final written decision would be due with respect to the Petition. For
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`each of those claims, Ford will be estopped from “maintain[ing] a proceeding
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`before the Office with respect to [the claims] on any ground that the petitioner
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`raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review.” 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 315(e)(1).
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`Second, the Petition is procedurally improper. Ford incorporates by
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`reference many paragraphs from the declaration of Dr. Stein and substitutes
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`analysis with conclusory declaration citations. The Petition also creates an
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`excessively voluminous record that is far from the concise, well-organized, easy-
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`to-follow arguments supported by readily identifiable evidence of record required
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`by the rules. See 77 Fed. Reg. 48756, 48763 (Aug. 4, 2012) (“Thus, parties should
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`avoid submitting a repository of all the information that a judge could possibly
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`consider, and instead focus on concise, well-organized, easy-to-follow arguments
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`supported by readily identifiable evidence of record.”).
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`Third, the Petition is substantively deficient because it fails to adequately
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`address a motivation to combine the alleged prior art references, and is based on
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`unreasonably broad claim constructions. For example, Ford’s arguments are based
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`on an overbroad construction of “setpoint.” When properly construed, the
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`deficiencies in the prior art are readily apparent. Moreover, the proposed
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`combinations do not render the claimed invention obvious even under Ford’s
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`unreasonably broad constructions.
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`Because Ford’s instant Petition is duplicative of petitions already before the
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`Board and fails to establish a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the
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`challenged claims is unpatentable, the Board should reject the petition and decline
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`to institute a third proceeding regarding the ’097 patent.
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`II.
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`PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
`A.
`On April 4, 2014, Ford filed a first petition (IPR2014-00570) against claims
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`Ford’s First Petition
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`30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 38, and 39 of the ’097 patent. On September 30, 2014, the
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`Board declined to institute review of claim 38 of the ’097 patent, but instituted
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`review of the remaining challenged claims based on various combinations of, inter
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`alia, Severinsky, Yamaguchi, and Anderson. Ford Motor Company v. Paice LLC
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`& The Abell Foundation, Inc., IPR2014-00570, Paper 10 (PTAB Sept. 30, 2014).
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`On January 21, 2015, Paice filed a response to Ford’s first petition, pointing out the
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`deficiencies in its proposed grounds for invalidity, and, on July 1, 2015, the Board
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`heard oral arguments on the petition. The Board is expected to issue a final written
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`decision no later than September 30, 2015. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(c).
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`Ford’s Second Petition
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`B.
`On August 30, 2014, Ford filed a second petition (IPR2014-01415) for IPR
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`against claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
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`24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, and 34 of the ’097 patent. On March 30, 2014, the Board
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`instituted review of the challenged claims based on various combinations of
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`Severinsky, Yamaguchi, Takaoka, and Anderson. Ford Motor Company v. Paice
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`LLC & The Abell Foundation, Inc., IPR2014-01415, Paper 10 (PTAB Mar. 12,
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`2015). On June 17, 2015, Paice filed a response to Ford’s second petition, pointing
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`out the deficiencies in its proposed grounds for invalidity. The Board is expected
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`to issue a final written decision regarding IPR2014-01415 prior to March 30, 2015.
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`Patent No. 8,214,097
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`C. The Instant Petition
`Ford filed the instant Petition regarding claims 1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 17,
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`19, 21, 23, 24, 27, 28, 30, 32, 33, 37 and 38 of the ’097 patent on February 23,
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`2015, which is its third petition regarding the ’097 patent, and part of an overall
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`total of twenty-five petitions for IPR. Armed with Paice’s response to its first
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`petition and Paice’s preliminary response to its second petition, along with the
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`Board’s decision not to institute review of claim 38 in IPR2014-00570, Ford now
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`attempts (unsuccessfully) to remedy the deficiencies in its first two petitions
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`regarding the ’097 patent.
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`Specifically, Ford admits that it swapped out Anderson for Takaoka in the
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`instant Petition “as an alternative ground for previously challenged claims to
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`render moot Paice’s argument on the scope of [Anderson],” despite the fact that it
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`previously advanced Takaoka in IPR2014-01415. Pet. at 2. Although Ford
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`disingenuously suggests that the Petition “focuses on claims that include the
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`‘abnormal and transient’ limitation,” only four of the twenty challenged claims
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`include an “abnormal and transient” limitation. See Ex. 1201 at claims 7, 17, 27,
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`and 37 (the only claims involving “operat[ing] the engine at torque output levels
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`less than SP under abnormal and transient conditions”). The remaining sixteen
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`claims have already been challenged in previous IPRs.
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`Patent No. 8,214,097
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`III. THE ’097 PATENT
`A. Background of the ’097 Patent
`The ’097 patent describes a hybrid vehicle featuring a hybrid control
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`strategy that reduces emissions during start and operation of the hybrid vehicle.
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`Ex. 1201 at 1:24-32, 29:63-30:12. For example, the ’097 patent describes a hybrid
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`control strategy that allows for starting the engine at a substantially stoichiometric
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`air-fuel ratio. The ’097 patent also describes a hybrid control strategy for limiting
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`the rate of increase of the engine’s output torque such that the combustion of fuel
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`occurs at a substantially stoichiometric air-fuel ratio and using the electric motor to
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`meet any shortfall in torque required to operate the vehicle in response to the
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`operator’s command. See, e.g., id. at 27:31-35, 29:63-30:12, 37:2-6, 37:39-42,
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`38:62-39:14. This reduces emissions and improves fuel economy.
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`During operation of conventional engines, when the operator depresses the
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`accelerator, additional fuel is injected and thus results in a non-stoichiometric and
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`inefficient combustion. See, e.g., id. at 39:1-14. By contrast, the ’097 patent’s
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`hybrid control strategy uses the electric traction motor to limit the rate of increase
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`of engine output torque during operation, thereby reducing emissions. See, e.g., id.
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`at 37:39-42, Fig. 7(a).
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`An example of the hybrid control strategy disclosed by the ’097 patent is
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`illustrated in Figure 7(a):
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`Id. at Fig. 7(a) (annotated). The solid line of the graph in Figure 7(a) depicts the
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`vehicle’s instantaneous torque requirement (road load), whereas the dashed line of
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`the graph depicts the engine’s instantaneous output torque. See, e.g., id. at 37:51-
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`63. As the figure illustrates, starting at point D, the rate of increase of the engine’s
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`output torque is limited so as to maintain substantially stoichiometric combustion.
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`See, e.g., id. at 38:62-65. When this occurs, the engine’s output torque does not
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`meet the road load, and the electric traction motor provides the balance of the
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`torque to propel the vehicle, as illustrated in the red, cross-hatched annotation in
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`Fig. 7(a).
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`During the prosecution of the ’097 patent, the patentee explained that, while
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`substantially stoichiometric combustion is to be maintained, “drivability—that is,
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`rapid increase in the torque provided to the wheels in response to the operator’s
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`command—is nonetheless essential to a commercially viable vehicle.” Ex. 1210 at
`8
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`232-33. The patentee further stated that the “electric ‘traction’ motor of the hybrid
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`vehicle is . . . employed to provide a rapid increase in torque to be provided to the
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`wheels of the vehicle” instead of forcing the engine into non-stoichiometric
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`combustion, providing drivability while maintaining efficient operation. Id. at 233.
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`The patentee also noted that “the rate of increase of torque output by the ICE
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`[internal combustion engine] is limited by the controller to less than the inherent
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`maximum rate of increase in output torque of the ICE, and any shortfall in the
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`torque required to meet the operator’s requirements—that is, to provide
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`drivability—is supplied by torque from the traction motor.” Id. at 234.
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`The ’097 patent also describes operating the vehicle in different operating
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`modes responsive to the road load, transitioning between modes at various setpoint
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`values. See, e.g., id. at 35:14-60, 37:39-38:52, 39:52-59, 41:1-42:33, Figs. 6, 8, 9.
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`The hybrid controller may also comprise operating the internal combustion engine
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`at torque output levels less than the setpoint transition under “abnormal and
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`transient conditions.” See id. at claims 7, 17, 27, 37. During the prosecution of the
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`’097 patent, the patentee distinguished “abnormal and transient conditions” from
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`“city traffic and reverse operation,” which are normal conditions, and instead
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`described “abnormal and transient conditions” as including “such conditions as
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`Patent No. 8,214,097
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
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`Case IPR2015-00792
`Attorney Docket No: 36351-0013IP3
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`starting the engine, during which operation it must necessarily be operated at less
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`than SP [setpoint] for a short time.” Ex. 1210 at 238.
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`The ’097 patent also describes an efficient high-speed engine startup process
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`that allows the combustion of fuel to occur at a substantially stoichiometric air-fuel
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`ratio. See, e.g., Ex. 1201 at 27:13-41. By contrast, during the engine startup
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`process of conventional engines, a rich air-fuel mixture on the order of six to seven
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`times the stoichiometric amount of fuel is provided to ensure that some fraction of
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`the fuel is in the vapor phase, since only fuel in the vapor phase can be ignited by a
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`spark. See, e.g., Ex. 1201 at 29:64-67. Most of the excess fuel condenses as liquid
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`on the cold cylinder walls and is emitted unburned. See, e.g., id. at 29:67-30:3.
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`The hybrid control strategy described by the ’097 patent allows for starting the
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`engine at high speeds, creating turbulence in the combustion chamber that is
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`sufficient to ensure the presence of vapor so that a near-stoichiometric air-fuel
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`mixture can be provided to the engine during the startup phase. See, e.g., id. at
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`30:3-12.
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`B. Claim Construction
`Ford construes three claims: (1) “road load,” (2) “set point,” and (3)
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`“abnormal and transient conditions.” Pet. at 12-16. At this stage, Paice addresses
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`only Ford’s constructions of “setpoint” and “abnormal and transient conditions.”
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
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`Case IPR2015-00792
`Attorney Docket No: 36351-0013IP3
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`In IPR proceedings, the Board applies the “broadest reasonable
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`interpretation” standard, which mandates that “[a] claim in an unexpired patent
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`shall be given its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of
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`the patent in which it appears.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see also In re Cuozzo
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`Speed Tech., LLC, 778 F.3d 1271, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g denied, __ F.3d __
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`(Fed. Cir. Jul. 8, 2015). The Federal Circuit has recognized, however, that that
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`standard requires that the claims must be read in light of the specification as it
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`would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Suitco Surface, Inc.,
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`603 F.3d 1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010). In Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., the
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`Federal Circuit explained that the broadest reasonable interpretation does not mean
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`that “the Board may construe the claims during IPR so broadly that its
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`constructions are unreasonable under general claim constructions principles,” and
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`that the construction must not be “divorced from the specification and the record
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`evidence” and inconsistent with “the one that those skilled in the art would reach.”
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`No. 2014-1542, 2015 WL 3747257, at *3 (Fed. Cir. June 16, 2015) (quoting In re
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`NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353,
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`1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). “A construction that is ‘unreasonably broad’ and which
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`does not ‘reasonably reflect the plain language and disclosure’ will not pass
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`muster.” Microsoft, No. 2014-1542, 2015 WL 3747257, at *3 (quoting Suitco, 603
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`F.3d at 1260).
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`“setpoint (SP)”
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`1.
`Paice respectfully requests that the Board construe “setpoint” as “a definite,
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`but potentially variable value at which a transition between operating modes may
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`occur,” 1 and reject Ford’s proposed construction—a “predetermined torque
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`value”—because it is unreasonably broad and does not reasonably reflect the
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`disclosure of the ’097 patent.
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`1 As an initial matter, Patent Owner notes that the U.S. District Court for the
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`Eastern District of Texas and the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland
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`both have construed the term “setpoint (SP)” to mean “a definite, but potentially
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`variable value at which a transition between operating modes may occur.” See
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`Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., Case No. 2:07-cv-180 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2008)
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`(Ex. 1213 at 13); Paice LLC v. Hyundai Motor Corp., Case No. 2:12-cv-499 (D.
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`Md. Jul. 24, 2014) (Ex. 1214 at 22) (“The Plaintiffs’ proposed construction of
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`‘setpoint’ as ‘a definite, but potentially variable value at which a transition between
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`operating modes may occur,’ is consistent with the language of the claims and the
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`intrinsic evidence.”).
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`Patent No. 8,214,097
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
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`Case IPR2015-00792
`Attorney Docket No: 36351-0013IP3
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` The claims and the specification of the ’097 patent make clear that a
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`“setpoint” is not simply a numerical value divorced from the context of the rest of
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`the control system. Rather, “setpoint” serves the crucial function of marking the
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`transition from one claimed mode to another, and in particular, the transition from
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`propelling the vehicle with the motor to propelling the vehicle with the engine.
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`See, e.g., Ex. 1201 at 39:55-59.
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`First, the claims are clear that a “setpoint” marks a point at which the vehicle
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`may transition between two modes. For example, in claims 1, 11, and 21, the
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`“setpoint” marks the transition between a mode in which only the motor propels
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`the vehicle, to modes in which the engine also can be used to propel the vehicle or
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`charge the battery. See id. at claims 1 (“operating the at least one electric motor to
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`provide torque to the hybrid vehicle when the torque required to operate the hybrid
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`vehicle is less than SP”), 11 (same), 21 (“operating at least one electric motor to
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`propel the hybrid vehicle when RL is less than a setpoint (SP)”). Additionally, the
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`specification unambiguously defines “setpoint” as synonymous with a “transition
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`point” between modes:
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`[I]n the example of the inventive control strategy discussed above, it is
`repeatedly stated that the transition from low-speed operation to
`highway cruising occurs when road load is equal to 30% of MTO. This
`setpoint, referred to in the appended claims as “SP”, and sometimes
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`hereinafter as the transition point (i.e., between operation in modes I
`and IV) is obviously arbitrary and can vary substantially, e.g., between
`30-50% of MTO, within the scope of the invention.
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`Id. at 39:52-59; see also id. at 39:29-37 (“the microprocessor tests sensed and
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`calculated values for system variables, such as the vehicle’s instantaneous torque
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`requirement, i.e., the ‘road load’ RL . . . against setpoints, and uses the results of
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`the comparisons to control the mode of vehicle operation.”); 40:6-8 (“For example,
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`in response to recognition of a regular pattern as above, the transition point might
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`be adjusted to 60% of MTO; . . . .”), 40:13-17 (“It is also within the scope of the
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`invention to make the setpoint SP to which the road load is compared to control the
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`transition from mode I to mode IV somewhat ‘fuzzy’, [sic] so that SP may vary
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`from one comparison of road load to MTO to the next depending on other
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`variables.”), 41:1-4 (“FIG. 9 thus shows the main decision points of the control
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`program run by the microprocessor, with the transition point between mode I, low-
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`speed operation, and mode IV highway cruising, set at a road load equal to