UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`______________
`
`
`
`FORD MOTOR COMPANY
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`PAICE LLC & ABELL FOUNDATION, INC.
`Patent Owner.
`
`______________
`
`
`
`U.S. Patent No. 7,237,634 to Severinsky et al.
`
`IPR Case No.: IPR2015-00791
`
`______________
`
`
`
`PETITION FOR INTER PARTES REVIEW
`UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 311 ET SEQ. AND 37 C.F.R. §42.100 ET SEQ.
`(CLAIMS 33, 37, 39, 40, 41, 80, 93, 94, 96, 99, 106, 107, 108, 113, 114, 127, 128, 132,
`139, 140, 141, 146, 215, 229, AND 231 OF U.S. PATENT NO. 7,237,634)
`
`
`
`
`

`
`Case No: IPR2015-00791
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR11
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`EXHIBIT LIST ..................................................................................................................... iii
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1
`
`II. MANDATORY NOTICES UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.8 ........................................ 2
`
`A.
`B.
`C.
`D.
`
`Real Party-In-Interest - 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(1) ............................................ 2
`Related Matters - 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(2) ....................................................... 2
`Lead and Back-Up Counsel - 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(3) .................................. 2
`Service Information - 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(4) ............................................... 3
`
`III. REQUIREMENTS UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.104 .................................................. 3
`
`A. Grounds for Standing - 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(a) ............................................. 3
`B.
`Challenged Claims - 37 C.F.R. §42.104(b)(1) ............................................... 3
`C. Grounds of Challenge - 37 C.F.R. §42.104(b)(2) ........................................ 3
`
`IV. OVERVIEW OF THE ’634 PATENT ................................................................... 5
`
`A.
`B.
`
`Prosecution History of the ’634 Patent ........................................................ 5
`Independent Claims 33, 161 and 215 ............................................................ 5
`
`V.
`
`PERSON OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART (POSA) ............................... 6
`
`VI.
`
`STATE OF THE ART .............................................................................................. 7
`
`VII. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION — 37 C.F.R. § 42.104 (B)(3) ................................... 8
`
`A.
`B.
`C.
`
`D.
`
`road load (RL) and RL ...................................................................................... 9
`setpoint (SP) and SP ......................................................................................... 10
`“mode I,” “low-load operation mode I,” “highway cruising operation mode
`IV,” “acceleration operation mode V” ................................................................ 11
`“abnormal and transient conditions” (Claims 55 and 239) ............................... 12
`
`VIII. UNPATENTABILITY GROUNDS .................................................................... 12
`
`A. Ground 1 – Claims 33, 37, 215 and 229 are Obvious under 35
`U.S.C. § 103 Over Ibaraki ’882 and the General Knowledge of a
`POSA .............................................................................................................. 13
`1.
`Independent Claim 33 ....................................................................... 13
`2.
`Dependent Claim 37 .......................................................................... 34
`3.
`Independent Claim 215 ..................................................................... 38
`4.
`Dependent Claim 229 ........................................................................ 39
`Ground 2 – Claims 39, 40, 80, 93, 94, 96, 99, 106, 107, 108, 114,
`127, 128, 132, 139, 140, and 141 are Obvious in view of Ibaraki
`’882, Frank and the General Knowledge of a POSA ................................ 40
`
`B.
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`Case No: IPR2015-00791
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR11
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`Reason to Combine ........................................................................... 40
`1.
`Dependent Claims 39 ........................................................................ 42
`2.
`Dependent Claim 40 .......................................................................... 43
`3.
`Independent Claim 80 ....................................................................... 45
`4.
`Dependent Claim 93 .......................................................................... 46
`5.
`Dependent Claim 94 .......................................................................... 47
`6.
`Dependent Claim 96 .......................................................................... 47
`7.
`Dependent Claim 99 .......................................................................... 47
`8.
`Dependent Claim 106 ........................................................................ 49
`9.
`10. Dependent Claim 107 ........................................................................ 50
`11. Dependent Claim 108 ........................................................................ 51
`12.
`Independent Claim 114 ..................................................................... 51
`13. Dependent Claims 127 ...................................................................... 52
`14. Dependent Claim 128 ........................................................................ 53
`15. Dependent Claim 132 ........................................................................ 53
`16. Dependent Claim 139 ........................................................................ 53
`17. Dependent Claim 140 ........................................................................ 54
`18. Dependent Claim 141 ........................................................................ 54
`C. Ground 3 – Claims 113 and 146 are obvious under 35 U.S.C. §103
`in view of Ibaraki ’882, Frank, Suga and the General Knowledge
`of a POSA ...................................................................................................... 54
`1.
`Motivation to Combine ..................................................................... 54
`2.
`Dependent Claims 113 and 146 ....................................................... 55
`D. Ground 4 – Claims 41 and 231 are obvious in view of Ibaraki
`’882, Jurgen, Lateur and the General Knowledge of a POSA ................. 56
`1.
`Motivation to Combine ..................................................................... 56
`2.
`Claim 231 ............................................................................................ 59
`
`IX. OBJECTIVE INDICIA OF NONOBVIOUSNESS ......................................... 59
`
`X.
`
`CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 60
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................................... 61
`
`
`
`
`
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`Case No: IPR2015-00791
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR11
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`EXHIBIT LIST
`
`
`
`Exhibit
`No.
`1450
`1451
`1452
`1453
`1454
`1455
`1456
`1457
`1458
`
`1459
`
`1460
`
`1461
`1462
`
`1463
`1464
`
`1465
`1466
`
`1467
`
`1468
`
`1469
`
`1470
`
`1471
`1472
`
`Description
`U.S. Patent No. 7,237,634
`Ford Letter to Paice
`US Patent 5,789,882
`US Patent 6,003,626
`US Patent 5,623,104
`Declaration of Gregory Davis
`Toyota Litigations
`Hyundai Litigation
`PTAB Decisions & Preliminary
`Response in 2014-00571
`7,237,634 File History (certified)
`
`Excerpt of USPN 7,104,347 File
`History
`US Patent 7,104,347
`Fundamentals of Vehicle
`Dynamics (Gillespie)
`SAE 760121 (Unnewehr-1976)
`Microprocessor Design for HEV
`(Bumby-1988)
`SAE SP-1331 (1998)
`Innovations in Design: 1993 Ford
`Hybrid Electric Vehicle Challenge
`1996 & 1997 Future Car
`Challenge
`Introduction to Automotive
`Powertrain (Davis)
`US Application 60-100095
`
`History of Hybrid Electric
`Vehicle (Wakefield-1998)
`SAE 920447 (Burke-1992)
`Vehicle Tester for HEV (Duoba-
`1997)
`
`Date
`July 3, 2007
`Sept. 2014
`Aug. 4, 1998
`Dec. 21, 1999
`Apr. 22, 1997
`
`2005
`2013-2014
`
`
`n/a
`
`n/a
`
`Identifier
`’634 Patent
`
`Ibaraki ’882
`Ibaraki ’626
`Suga
`Davis Dec.
`Toyota Litigation
`Hyundai Litigation
`Ford IPRs
`
`’634 Patent File
`History
`‘347 File History
`
`Sept. 12, 2006
`1992
`
`‘347 Patent
`Gillespie
`
`Feb. 1, 1976
`Sept. 1, 1988
`
`Feb. 1998
`Feb. 1994
`
`Feb. 1997 &
`Feb. 1998
`
`
`Filed Sept. 11,
`1998
`1998
`
`Unnewehr
`Bumby/Masding
`1988
`SAE SP-1331
`
`
`
`
`Davis Textbook
`
`‘095 Provisional
`
`Wakefield
`
`Feb. 1, 1992
`Aug. 1, 1997
`
`Burke 1992
`Duoba 1997
`
`iii
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`Case No: IPR2015-00791
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`Exhibit
`No.
`1473
`
`Date
`Description
`DOE Report to Congress (1994) April 1995
`
`1474
`1475
`
`SAE SP-1156 (1996)
`DOE HEV Assessment (1979)
`
`Feb. 1996
`Sept. 30, 1979
`
`1476
`
`EPA HEV Final Study (1971)
`
`June 1, 1971
`
`WO 9323263A1 (Field)
`Toyota Prius (Yamaguchi-1998)
`
`Nov. 25, 1998
`Jan. 1998
`
`1477
`1478
`
`1479
`1480
`
`1481
`
`1482
`
`1483
`1484
`
`1485
`
`1486
`1487
`1488
`1489
`1490
`1491
`
`1492
`
`1493
`1494
`
`
`Identifier
`1994 Report to
`Congress
`SAE SP-1156
`HEV Assessment
`1979
`EPA HEV Final
`Study
`9323263
`Toyota Prius
`Yamaguchi 1998
`‘672 Patent
`IEEE Eshani 1996
`
`April 3, 2001
`1996
`
`Feb. 1997
`
`IEEE Eshani 1997
`
`Oct. 1996
`
`Bosch Handbook
`
`Feb. 1995
`Aug. 11, 1998
`
`SAE SP-1089
`An 1998
`
`May 14-18, 1973
`
`
`
`
`
`Oct. 4, 1983
`Sept. 12, 2000
`Oct. 20, 1998
`1995
`
`
`
`Kawakatsu
`Frank
`Lateur
`Jurgen
`
`Nov. 1987
`
`Bumby II
`
`Sept. 6, 1994
`Feb. 25, 2014
`
`Severinsky ‘970
`
`
`US Patent 6,209,672
`Propulsion System for Design for
`EV (Ehsani-1996)
`Propulsion System Design for
`HEV (Ehsani-1997)
`Bosch Automotive Handbook
`(1996)
`SAE SP-1089 (Anderson-1995)
`Critical Issues in Quantifying
`HEV Emissions (An 1998)
`1973 Development of the Federal
`Urban Driving Schedule (SAE
`730553)
`Gregory Davis Resume
`Gregory Davis Data
`US Patent 4,407,132
`US Patent 6,116,363
`US Patent 5,823,280
`Automotive Electronics
`Handbook (Jurgen)
`Bumby, J.R. et al. “Optimisation
`and control of a hybrid electric
`car” - IEE Proc. A 1987, 134(6)
`US Patent 5,343,970
`Paice Complaint
`
`iv
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`

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`Case No: IPR2015-00791
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR11
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Petitioner Ford Motor Company (“Petitioner”) requests review of claims 33,
`
`37, 39-41, 80, 93, 94, 96, 99, 106, 107, 108, 113, 114, 127, 128, 132, 139, 140, 141, 146,
`
`215, 229 and 231 of U.S. Patent No. 7,237,634 (“the ’634 Patent,” Ex. 1450.)
`
`The ’634 patent is one of five patents that Patent Owner (“Patentee” or
`
`“Paice”) has asserted against Ford in litigation. Paice contends that these patents teach
`
`an allegedly “fundamental” method of “mode control using road load” and “engine
`
`control under which engine torque is above a setpoint.” (Ex. 1494 [Paice Complaint],
`
`p. 15, ¶43, served on 2/25/13 (p.1).) Paice’s methods of using “road load” and an
`
`engine torque “setpoint” were actually well known before Paice’s earliest priority date.
`
`(Ex. 1455 [Davis], ¶¶ 488-501.) U.S. Patent No. 5,789,882 (“Ibaraki ’882”), Paice’s
`
`U.S. Patent No. 5,343,970 (“Severinsky ’970”), and prior publications by Bumby (Ex.
`
`1493, 1452, 1492) all disclose Paice’s use of “road load” and “setpoint.” (Id.)
`
`Paice’s patent claims start with this well-known control strategy and then add
`
`other common features. The ’634 patent has 306 such claims. Ford has repeatedly
`
`asked Paice to limit the asserted claims to a reasonable number (Ex. 1451), but Paice
`
`has refused. Accordingly, Ford is filing several IPR’s to address the ’634 Patent claims
`
`and is trying to group the claims according to claimed subject matter. Due to page
`
`limitations, and the voluminous number of dependent claims, Ford addresses
`
`independent claims in multiple petitions. Ford relies on Ibaraki ’882 in this petition,
`
`but may rely on Severinsky ’970 or Bumby in other petitions because they address
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`other dependent claims directed toward different subject matter.
`
`II. MANDATORY NOTICES UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.8
`
`A. Real Party-In-Interest - 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(1)
`
`Petitioner certifies that Ford is the real party-in-interest.
`
`B. Related Matters - 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(2)
`
`The ’634 Patent is being asserted in Paice, LLC and the Abell Foundation, Inc. v.
`
`Ford Motor Company, Case No. 1-14-cv-00492 and Paice LLC and The Abell Foundation,
`
`Inc. v. Hyundai Motor America et. al. Case No. 1:2012-cv-00499. Ford has filed petitions
`
`concerning the ’634 Patent in IPR2014-00904, IPR2014-01416 and IPR2015-00606
`
`and has filed petitions concerning other asserted patents in IPR2014-00568, IPR2014-
`
`00570, IPR2014-00571, IPR2014-00579, IPR2014-00852, IPR2014-00875, IPR2014-
`
`00884 andIPR2014-01415. Petitioner is concurrently filing related petition: IPR2015-
`
`00758, IPR2015-00722, IPR2015-00785, and IPR2015-00784. This Petition is not
`
`redundant to any previously or concurrently filed petitions.
`
`C.
`
`Lead and Back-Up Counsel - 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(3)
`
`Petitioner appoints Frank A. Angileri (Reg. No. 36,733) of Brooks Kushman
`
`P.C. as lead counsel, and appoints John P. Rondini (Reg. No. 64,949), Erin K. Bowles
`
`(Reg. No. 64,705) and Michael N. MacCallum (Reg. No. 63,108) of Brooks Kushman
`
`P.C., as well as Lissi Mojica (Reg. No. 63,421) and Kevin Greenleaf (Reg. No. 64,062)
`
`of Dentons US LLP, as back-up counsel. An appropriate Power of Attorney is filed
`
`concurrently herewith.
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`D.
`
`Service Information - 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(4)
`
`Service of any documents to lead and back-up counsel can be made via hand-
`
`delivery to Brooks Kushman P.C., 1000 Town Center, Twenty-Second Floor,
`
`Southfield, Michigan 48075 and Dentons US LLP, 233 South Wacker Drive, Suite
`
`7800, Chicago, IL 60606-6306. Petitioner consents to service by email at
`
`FPGP0104IPR11@brookskushman.com and iptdocketchi@dentons.com.
`
`III. REQUIREMENTS UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.104
`
`A. Grounds for Standing - 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(a)
`
`Petitioner certifies that the ’634 Patent is available for IPR and that Petitioner is
`
`not barred or estopped from challenging the patent claims on the grounds in this
`
`Petition.
`
`B.
`
`Challenged Claims - 37 C.F.R. §42.104(b)(1)
`
`Petitioner requests IPR of the ’634 Patent claims 33, 37, 39-41, 80, 93, 94, 96,
`
`99, 106, 107, 108, 113, 114, 127, 128, 132, 139, 140, 141, 146, 215, 229, and 231 and
`
`requests that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) cancel those claims as
`
`unpatentable.
`
`C. Grounds of Challenge - 37 C.F.R. §42.104(b)(2)
`
`Petitioner relies on the following prior art:
`
`(i)
`
`Ibaraki ’882 – U.S. Patent No. 5,789,882 to Ibaraki et al. (hereinafter “Ibaraki
`
`’882”) was filed on July 22, 1996, issued on August 4, 1998, and qualifies as prior art
`
`under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) & (e). (Ex. 1452 [Ibaraki ’882].)
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`(ii)
`
`Suga – U.S. patent No. 5,623,104 to Hiroshi Suga (hereinafter “Suga”) was
`
`filed on Jan. 30, 1996, issued on April 22, 1997, and qualifies as prior art under U.S.C.
`
`§ 102(b). (Ex. 1454 [Suga].)
`
`(iii) Frank – U.S. Patent No. 6,116,363 to Andrew Frank (hereinafter “Frank”) was
`
`filed on April 21, 1998 and issued on September 12, 2000 and qualifies as prior art
`
`under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). (Ex. 1489 [Frank].)
`
`(iv) Lateur – U.S. Patent No. 5,823,280 to Lateur et al. (hereinafter “Lateur”) was
`
`filed on January 12, 1995 and issued on October 20, 1998 and qualifies as prior art
`
`under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). (Ex. 1490 [Lateur].)
`
`(v)
`
`Jurgen – “Automotive Electronics Handbook” (hereinafter “Jurgen”) is a 1995
`
`textbook authored by Ronald Jurgen, and qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 102(b). (Ex. 1491 [Jurgen].)
`
`The grounds of unpatentability presented in this petition are as follows:
`
`References
`Ground Basis
`1
`§ 103 Ibaraki ’882 and the general
`
`Claims
`Independent claims 33 and 215;
`
`knowledge of a POSA
`§ 103 Ibaraki ’882, Frank and the
`
`Dependent claims 37, 229
`Claims 39, 40, 80, 93, 94, 96, 99,
`
`2
`
`general knowledge of a
`
`106, 107, 108, 114, 127, 128, 132,
`
`POSA
`
`139, 140, and 141
`
`3
`
`§ 103 Ibaraki ’882, Suga and the
`
`Dependent claims 113 and 146
`
`general knowledge of a POSA
`
`4
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`Case No: IPR2015-00791
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`References
`Ground Basis
`4
`§ 103 Ibaraki ’882, Jurgen, Lateur
`
`Claims
`Dependent claims 41 and 231
`
`and the general knowledge of
`
`a POSA
`
`The unpatentability grounds set forth in this Petition are confirmed and
`
`supported by the declaration of Dr. Gregory W. Davis (hereinafter “Davis Dec.”).
`
`(“Davis” at Ex. 1455.)
`
`IV. OVERVIEW OF THE ’634 PATENT
`
`A.
`
`Prosecution History of the ’634 Patent
`
`The ’634 Patent was accorded a filing date of January 13, 2006. (’634 File
`
`History, Ex. 1459 at 159.) As filed, the ’634 Patent included 16 claims. Id. at 126-
`
`131. On May 5, 2006, the Patentee filed a preliminary amendment cancelling originally
`
`filed claims 1-16 and adding new claims 17-75. Id. at 166-182. On October 24, 2006,
`
`the patentee responded to a non-final office action by cancelling some of the
`
`previously submitted claims and adding 261 new claims. Id. at 350. On February 8,
`
`2007, the Examiner issued a notice of allowance. Id. at 493.
`
`B.
`
`Independent Claims 33, 161 and 215
`
`Independent claims 33, 80, 114 and 215 recite a “method for controlling a
`
`hybrid vehicle” using an engine and a single electric motor. These independent claims
`
`include significant overlap and generally recite: (1) “monitoring road load [RL] over time;”
`
`(2) operating “at least one electric motor” when RL < a “setpoint (SP)”; (3) operating the
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`engine when SP < RL < engine’s maximum torque output (MTO); and (4) operating
`
`both the engine and electric motor when RL > MTO.
`
`Claim 33 further requires monitoring a pattern of vehicle operation over time and
`
`adjusting the setpoint accordingly.
`
`Claim 80 and 114 incorporate time delays between switching to propulsion by
`
`either the engine or motor. Claim 80 further requires that the engine is used to propel
`
`the vehicle only when: (1) RL> the SP for at least a predetermined time OR. (2) RL>a
`
`second setpoint (SP2), wherein the SP2 is a larger percentage of the MTO than the SP. Claim 114,
`
`on the other hand, requires that the motor is used to propel the vehicle only when:
`
`RL<the SP for at least a predetermined amount of time.
`
`Claim 215 further requires regeneratively charging the battery using the engine
`
`or during braking.
`
`V.
`
`PERSON OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART (POSA)
`
`The level of ordinary skill in the art is evidenced by the references. See In re
`
`GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). A POSA would have either: (1) a
`
`graduate degree in mechanical, electrical or automotive engineering with experience in
`
`the design and control of combustion engines, electric or hybrid electric propulsion
`
`systems, or automotive transmissions, or (2) a bachelor’s degree in mechanical,
`
`electrical or automotive engineering with at least five years of experience in the design
`
`and control of combustion engines, electric or hybrid electric propulsion systems, or
`
`automotive transmissions. (Ex. 1455 [Davis] ¶¶41-42, see also ¶¶5-37.)
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`VI. STATE OF THE ART
`
`Hybrid vehicles date back over 100 years to the infancy of the automobile. (Ex.
`
`1455 [Davis] ¶¶43-47.) Over this time span, numerous hybrid architectures had been
`
`examined to achieve design “goals” that included efficient engine operation, improved
`
`fuel economy and reduced emissions. (Ex. 1455 [Davis] ¶48.)
`
`By September 1998, the development of the hybrid vehicle had advanced to a
`
`state where numerous different hybrid vehicle architectures were generally known and
`
`had even been successfully built and tested on public roads. (Ex. 1455 [Davis] ¶¶49-
`
`60.) These hybrid vehicle architectures typically employed electric motors to maintain
`
`operation of the internal combustion engine within the engine’s most efficient
`
`operating region, commonly referred as the engine’s “sweet spot.” (Ex. 1455 [Davis]
`
`¶¶59, 108-133.) Some hybrid vehicles could accomplish efficient engine operation by
`
`employing “one-motor” architectures while other designs found operational benefits
`
`by employing “two-motor” architectures. (Ex. 1455 [Davis], see discussion regarding
`
`“series” hybrid vehicles at ¶¶61-69; “parallel” hybrid vehicles at ¶¶70-86; and “series-
`
`parallel” hybrid vehicles ¶¶87-107.)
`
`It was known before September 1998 that engines in conventional vehicles
`
`operate inefficiently at low torque loads and vehicle speeds. (Ex. 1455 [Davis] ¶¶108-
`
`123, 125-126.) Hybrid vehicles could overcome the inefficiency of conventional
`
`vehicles by including an electric motor (i.e., “traction motor”) with sufficient power to
`
`propel the vehicle at low speeds and low loads. (Ex. 1455 [Davis] ¶¶108-123.) By
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`using a powerful enough motor, hybrid vehicles could restrict engine operation solely
`
`to areas of high efficiency. (Ex. 1455 [Davis] ¶¶59, 108-123.) As the vehicle speed
`
`and load increased, operation of the engine was permitted when the speed and load
`
`were determined to be in a region where engine torque is most efficiently produced—
`
`i.e., the engine’s “sweet spot.” (Ex. 1455 [Davis] ¶¶59, 109-133.)
`
`For hybrid vehicles it was further known prior to September 1998 that engine
`
`operation could be restricted to its “sweet spot” using a control strategy that typically
`
`included: (1) an all-electric mode where only the motor propels the vehicle when
`
`engine operation is inefficient (i.e., at low loads or vehicle speeds); (2) an engine-only
`
`mode where the engine propels the vehicle when engine operation is efficient, such as
`
`highway cruising at higher loads and speeds; and (3) an acceleration mode where the
`
`both engine and motor are used to propel the vehicle when the demand is beyond the
`
`maximum torque capabilities of the engine, such as during acceleration, passing, hill-
`
`climbing. (Ex. 1455 [Davis] ¶¶84, 124-131.)
`
`VII. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION — 37 C.F.R. § 42.104 (B)(3)
`
`For purposes of this IPR, a claim is interpreted by applying its “broadest
`
`reasonable construction.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b).
`
`Certain terms in the claims of the ’634 Patent were argued by the patentee with
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`respect to the ’634 Patent and other patents in the ’634 Patent family, and construed
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`by the Eastern District of Texas court in Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp. et al., Case
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`No. 2:04-cv-211 and Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp. et al., Case No. 2:07-cv-180,
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`Case No: IPR2015-00791
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR11
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`(“Toyota Litigation,” Ex. 1456.)
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`Certain terms recited in the claims of the ’634 Patent were also argued by the
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`patentee and construed by a Maryland district court in Paice LLC v. Hyundai Motor
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`Corp. et al., Case No. 2:12-cv-0499, on July 24, 2014. (“Hyundai Litigation,” Ex. 1457.)
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`Certain terms that are related to terms recited in the claims of the ’634 Patent
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`were also discussed in prior institution decisions. (“Ford IPRs,” Ex. 1458.)
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`Petitioner proposes the following constructions for the purposes of this IPR
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`only. But for some of these terms, based on the specification, prosecution history, and
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`patentee admissions, Petitioner contends that the construction under the applicable
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`district court standards is narrower, and reserves the right to present a narrower
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`construction in district court litigation.
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`A. road load (RL) and RL
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`The Eastern District of Texas and the District of Maryland courts have
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`construed the terms “road load,” “RL,” and “road load (RL)” as “the instantaneous
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`torque required for propulsion of the vehicle, which may be positive or negative in
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`value.” (Ex. 1456 at 205-206; Ex. 1457 at 16, 96-97.)
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`For this proceeding, Petitioner proposes that “road load” be construed as “the
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`amount of instantaneous torque required to propel the vehicle, be it positive or
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`negative.” This is consistent with a prior PTAB construction. (See Ford v. Paice IPR
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`Decisions, Ex. 1458 at 20, 38, 51, 70, 84.) Petitioner contends the construction may
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`be narrower under district court standards.
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`Case No: IPR2015-00791
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR11
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`B. setpoint (SP) and SP
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`The Texas and Maryland courts construed “setpoint (SP)” as being “a definite,
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`but potentially variable value at which a transition between operating modes may
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`occur” (Ex. 1456 at 204, Ex. 1457 at 104), and Patent Owner maintains this as being
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`the correct construction. (Ford IPRs, Ex. 1458 at 109-113.) Petitioner disagrees that
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`Patent Owner’s proposed construction is the broadest reasonable construction.
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`The ’634 Patent claims, specification, and file history define “setpoint” as a
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`“predetermined torque value.” All claims recite a “setpoint” or “SP” value being
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`compared to either: (1) an engine torque value (e.g., claim 1); or (2) a torque-based
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`“road load” value (e.g., claim 33). No claims recite a “setpoint” or “SP” in comparison
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`to any other system variable. Likewise, the specification says “the microprocessor tests
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`sensed and calculated values for system variables, such as the vehicle’s instantaneous
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`torque requirement, i.e., the ‘road load’ RL . . . against setpoints, and uses the results
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`of the comparisons to control the mode of vehicle operation.” (’634 Patent, Ex. 1450,
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`40:16-26, emphasis added.) To do so (e.g., whether “RL < SP”), the “setpoint” would
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`have to be in the same measurement units as the “road load.”
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`During prosecution of the ’347 Patent (see “’347 File History”, Ex. 1460) – the
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`parent of the ’634 Patent – patentee added the following limitation to pending claims
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`1 and 82 to overcome a prior art rejection: “wherein the torque produced by said
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`engine when operated at said setpoint (SP) is substantially less than the maximum
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`torque output (MTO) of said engine.” (’347 File History, Ex. 1460 at 8-20.) Patentee
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`then argued the engine was operated only “when it is loaded . . . in excess of SP
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`[setpoint], which is now defined to be ‘substantially less than the maximum torque
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`output (MTO) of said engine.’” (Id. at 21.)
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`This proposed construction is consistent with recent PTAB constructions.
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`(Ford IPRs, Ex. 1458 at 21, 40, 72, 86.) Accordingly the broadest reasonable
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`construction of “setpoint (SP)” and “SP” as used in the challenged claims is a
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`“predetermined torque value.”
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`C. “mode I,” “low-load operation mode I,” “highway cruising
`operation mode IV,” “acceleration operation mode V”
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`During the Toyota Litigation, the court construed terms of the parent ’347
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`Patent as follows: (1) low-load mode I as “the mode of operation in which energy from
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`the battery bank flows to the traction motor and torque (rotary force) flows from the
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`traction motor to the road wheels;” (2) highway cruising mode IV as “the mode of
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`operation in which energy flows from the fuel tank into the engine and torque (rotary
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`force) flows from the engine to the road wheels;” (3) acceleration mode V as “the mode
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`of operation in which energy flows from the fuel tank to the engine and from the
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`battery bank to at least one motor and torque (rotary force) flows from the engine and
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`at least one motor to the road wheels.” (Ex. 1456 at 219.) Petitioner agrees with these
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`constructions for this IPR but reserves right to offer narrower constructions in
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`litigation, for the reasons stated above.
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`Case No: IPR2015-00791
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR11
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`D. “abnormal and transient conditions” (Claims 55 and 239)
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`Claims 55 and 239 require “operating the engine at torque output levels less than the SP
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`under abnormal and transient conditions to satisfy driveability and/or safety considerations.” The
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`’634 Patent does not describe “abnormal and transient conditions,” nor otherwise
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`“inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable
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`certainty.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. ____ (2014).
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`Paice defined “abnormal and transient conditions” in claim 22 of the ’347 Patent,
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`the parent of the ’634 Patent. Claim 22 of the ’347 Patent defines abnormal and
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`transient conditions as “comprising starting and stopping of the engine and provision
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`of torque to satisfy drivability or safety considerations.” (’347 Patent, Ex. 1461, Claim
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`22.) While the full scope of “abnormal and transient conditions” is unclear, Petitioner
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`proposes for purposes of this proceeding only that “abnormal and transient conditions”
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`includes this scope, and Petitioner does not admit that the ’634 Patent’s disclosure of
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`“abnormal and transient conditions” satisfies 35 U.S.C. §112.
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`VIII. UNPATENTABILITY GROUNDS
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`The references below render the claimed subject matter invalid under 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 103 and the Petitioner therefore has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing as to each
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`of the following grounds of unpatentability. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); 37 C.F.R. §
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`42.104(b)(4).
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`Case No: IPR2015-00791
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR11
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`A. Ground 1 – Claims 33, 37, 215 and 229 are Obvious under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 103 Over Ibaraki ’882 and the General Knowledge of a POSA
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`1.
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`Independent Claim 33
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`… [33.0] A method for controlling a hybrid vehicle, comprising:
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`Ibaraki ’882 states that the “present invention” pertains to a “drive control
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`apparatus” for controlling a “hybrid vehicle” that may be propelled by an internal
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`combustion (IC) engine and an electric motor. (Ex. 1452 [Ibaraki ’882] at 1:9-14; Ex.
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`1455 [Davis] at ¶¶137-138.) As illustrated below, Ibaraki ’882 discloses a hybrid
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`vehicle including a “controller 128” that is used to control an “internal combustion
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`engine 112” and an “electric motor 114.” (Ex. 1452 [Ibaraki ’882] at 19:55-20:9.)
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`Ex. 1452 [Ibaraki ’882] at Fig. 8
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`
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`Ibaraki ’882 discloses that the hybrid vehicle implements control strategies that
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`operate the IC engine and electric motor to “effective[ly] reduc[e]. . . the fuel
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`consumption amount or exhaust gas amount of the engine.” (Ex. 1452 [Ibaraki ’882]
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`at 2:52-56, 3:15-53, 6:14-23, 25:62-26:8; Ex. 1455 [Davis] at ¶¶152-154, 158-159.) For
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`Case No: IPR2015-00791
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`instance, Fig. 10 below illustrates a control routine that is implemented by the
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`controller to select: 1) a MOTOR DRIVE mode (step “Q12”) where the electric
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`motor propels the vehicle; (2) an ENGINE DRIVE mode (step “Q11”) where the
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`engine propels the vehicle; and (3) an ENGINE-MOTOR DRIVE mode (step
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`“Q10”) where both the electric motor and engine propel the vehicle. (Ex. 1452
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`[Ibaraki ’882] at 11:58-67, 20:43-49, 26:25-33; Ex. 1455 [Davis] at ¶157-159.)
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`Ex. 1452 [Ibaraki ’882] at Fig. 10
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`
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`To select the MOTOR DRIVE mode, ENGINE DRIVE mode, or ENGINE-
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`MOTOR DRIVE mode, a data map (as exemplified by Fig. 11) is used. As annotated
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`below, the data map determines the three operating modes as a function of
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`“VEHICLE DRIVE TORQUE,” and “VEHICLE SPEED.” (Ex. 1452 [Ibaraki ’882]
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`at 20:38-21:2; Ex. 1455 [Davis] at ¶¶154-156, 160-163.)
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`Case No: IPR2015-00791
`Attorney Docket No. FPGP0104IPR11
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`Ex. 1452 [Ibaraki ’882] at Fig. 11 (Annotated)
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`
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`… [33.1] determining instantaneous road load (RL) required to
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`propel the hybrid vehicle responsive to an operator command;
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`The disclosed “controller 128” is stated as including a “drive source selecting
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`means 160 illustrated in the block diagram of FIG. 9.” (Ex. 1452 [Ibaraki ’882] at
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`20:38-39.) This “drive source selecting means” is “adapted to select one or both of the
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`engine 112 and the motor 114 as the drive power source or sources, according to a
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`drive source selecting data map stored in memory means 162.” (Id. at 20:39-43,
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`emphasis added.) Again, the “data map” (e.g., Id. Fig. 11 annotated above) is used to
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`select one of the three operating modes as a function of “VEHICLE DRIVE
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`TORQUE,” and “VEHICLE SPEED.”
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`In order to determine which drive mode to operate in, Ibaraki ’882 states that a
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`point corresponding to the current “vehicle running condition” is plotted onto the
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`data map of Fig. 11. (Id. at 20:58-21:1; Ex. 1455 [Davis] at ¶¶165-169.) This point
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`Case No: IPR2015-00