`571-272-7822
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`
`Paper 35
`Entered: October 21, 2016
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`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`PAICE LLC & THE ABELL FOUNDATION, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2015-00787
`Patent 7,237,634 B2
`____________
`
`
`Before SALLY C. MEDLEY, KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, and
`CARL M. DeFRANCO, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`MEDLEY, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`
`We have jurisdiction to hear this inter partes review under 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 6. This Final Written Decision is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a)
`
`and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the inter
`
`partes review with respect to claim 215 and determine that Petitioner has
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`shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 238, 241, 252–256,
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`Case IPR2015-00787
`Patent 7,237,634 B2
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`259, 261, 262, 267, 281, 282, 285, 287, and 288 of U.S. Patent
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`No. 7,237,634 B2 are unpatentable.
`
`A. Procedural History
`
`Petitioner, Ford Motor Company, filed a Petition requesting an inter
`
`partes review of claims 33, 34, 35, 38, 53, 54, 215, 238, 241, 252–256, 259,
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`261, 262, 267, 281, 282, 285, 287, and 288 of U.S. Patent No. 7,237,634 B2
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`(Ex. 1750, “the ’634 patent”). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). Patent Owner, Paice LLC &
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`The Abell Foundation, Inc., filed a Preliminary Response in both unredacted
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`and redacted forms. Papers 9, 10 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Upon consideration of
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`the Petition and Preliminary Response, on October 26, 2015, we instituted
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`an inter partes review of claims 215, 238, 241, 252–256, 259, 261, 262, 267,
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`281, 282, 285, 287, and 288, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314. Paper 12
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`(“Dec.”).
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`Subsequent to institution, Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner
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`Response (Paper 17 (“PO Resp.”)) and Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 25
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`(“Pet. Reply”)).1 An oral hearing was held on June 28, 2016, and a
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`transcript of the hearing is included in the record (Paper 34 (“Tr.”)).
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`B. Related Proceedings
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`The ’634 patent is involved in Paice LLC v. Ford Motor Co., No.
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`1-14-cv-00492, filed on February 19, 2014, in the United States District
`
`Court for the District of Maryland. Pet. 2. Petitioner twice filed an earlier
`
`Petition for inter partes review of the ’634 patent, and we instituted trial in
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`
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`1 In addition, Patent Owner filed a Motion for Observation on Cross-
`Examination (Paper 27) and Petitioner filed a Response to Motion for
`Observation on Cross-Examination (Paper 30), both of which have been
`considered.
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`2
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`Patent 7,237,634 B2
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`both proceedings and subsequently entered final written decisions. Ford
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`Motor Co. v. Paice LLC & The Abell Foundation, Inc., Case IPR2014-00904
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`(Papers 13 and 41), and Ford Motor Co. v. Paice LLC & The Abell
`
`Foundation, Inc., Case IPR2014-01416 (Papers 9 and 26). The ’634 patent
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`also is involved in the following inter partes review proceedings: IPR2015-
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`00606, IPR2015-00722, IPR2015-00758, IPR2015-00784, IPR2015-00785,
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`IPR2015-00790, IPR2015-00791, IPR2015-00799, IPR2015-00800, and
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`IPR2015-00801.
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`C. The ’634 Patent (Ex. 1750)
`
`The ’634 patent describes a hybrid vehicle with an internal
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`combustion engine, at least one electric motor, and a battery bank, all
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`controlled by a microprocessor that directs torque transfer between the
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`engine, the motor, and the drive wheels of the vehicle. Ex. 1750, 17:17–56,
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`Fig. 4. The microprocessor compares the vehicle’s torque requirements and
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`the engine’s torque output against a predefined setpoint and uses the results
`
`of the comparison to control the vehicle’s mode of operation, e.g., straight-
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`electric, engine-only, or hybrid. Id. at 40:16–49. The microprocessor
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`utilizes a hybrid control strategy that operates the engine only in a range of
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`high fuel efficiency, which occurs when the instantaneous torque required to
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`drive the vehicle, or road load (RL), reaches a setpoint (SP) of
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`approximately 30% of the engine’s maximum torque output (MTO). Id. at
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`20:61–67; see also id. at 13:64–65 (“the engine is never operated at less than
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`30% of MTO, and is thus never operated inefficiently”). Operating the
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`engine in a range above the setpoint but substantially less than the maximum
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`torque output maximizes fuel efficiency and reduces pollutant emissions of
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`the vehicle. Id. at 15:55–58.
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`3
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`D. Illustrative Claims
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`Petitioner challenges independent claim 215 and dependent claim 238,
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`which depends directly from claim 215. Petitioner also challenges
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`independent claim 241 and dependent claims 252–256, 259, 261, and 262,
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`which depend either directly or indirectly from claim 241. Petitioner also
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`challenges independent claim 267 and dependent claims 281, 282, 285, 287,
`
`and 288, which depend either directly or indirectly from claim 267.
`
`Claims 215 and 241 are reproduced below:
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`215. A method for controlling a hybrid vehicle,
`
`comprising:
`
`determining instantaneous road load (RL) required to
`propel the hybrid vehicle responsive to an operator command;
`
`operating at least one electric motor to propel the hybrid
`vehicle when the RL required to do so is less than a setpoint
`(SP);
`operating an internal combustion engine of the hybrid
`
`vehicle to propel the hybrid vehicle when the RL required to do
`so is between the SP and a maximum torque output (MTO) of
`the engine, wherein the engine is operable to efficiently produce
`torque above the SP, and wherein the SP is substantially less
`than the MTO; and
`
`operating both the at least one electric motor and the
`engine to propel the hybrid vehicle when the torque RL
`required to do so is more than the MTO; and
`
`regeneratively charging a battery of the hybrid vehicle
`when instantaneous torque output of the engine>the RL, when
`the RL is negative, and/or when braking is initiated by an
`operator of the hybrid vehicle.
`
`4
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`
`
`Ex. 1750, 79:10–31.
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`241. A method for controlling a hybrid vehicle, comprising:
`
`determining instantaneous road load (RL) required to
`propel the hybrid vehicle responsive to an operator command;
`
`operating at least one electric motor to propel the hybrid
`vehicle when the RL required to do so is less than a setpoint
`(SP);
`operating an internal combustion engine of the hybrid
`
`vehicle to propel the hybrid vehicle when the RL required to do
`so is between the SP and a maximum torque output (MTO) of
`the engine, wherein the engine is operable to efficiently produce
`torque above the SP, and wherein the SP is substantially less
`than the MTO; and
`
`operating both the at least one electric motor and the
`engine to propel the hybrid vehicle when the torque RL
`required to do so is more than the MTO; and
`
`controlling said engine such that combustion of fuel
`within the engine occurs substantially at a stoichiometric ratio,
`wherein said controlling the engine comprises limiting a rate of
`change of torque output of the engine; and
`if the engine is incapable of supplying instantaneous
`torque required to propel the hybrid vehicle, supplying
`additional torque from the at least one electric motor.
`
`
`
`Id. at 81:33–58.
`
`Independent claim 267 is similar in scope to claim 215 except it does
`
`not include the “regeneratively charging a battery of the hybrid vehicle”
`
`language. Instead, that claim adds “rotating the engine before starting the
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`engine such that its cylinders are heated by compression of air therein.” Id.
`
`at 84:10–11.
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`
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`5
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`E. Grounds of Unpatentability
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`We instituted an inter partes review of claims 215, 238, 241, 252–
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`256, 259, 261, 262, 267, 281, 282, 285, 287, and 288 on the following
`
`grounds:
`
`Reference[s]
`
`Ibaraki ’882 2 and the general
`knowledge of a POSA
`Ibaraki ’882, Vittone3, and the
`general knowledge of a POSA
`Ibaraki ’882, Yamaguchi4, and the
`general knowledge of a POSA
`
`
`Basis Challenged Claim(s)
`
`§ 103
`
`§ 103
`
`§ 103
`
`215
`
`241, 252–256, 259,
`261, and 262
`238, 267, 281, 282,
`285, 287, and 288
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`
`A. Petitioner Estoppel
`
`
`
`On March 10, 2016, we rendered a final written decision of claim 215
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`of the ’634 patent in IPR2014-01416. Ford Motor Co. v. Paice LLC & The
`
`Abell Foundation, Inc., Case IPR2014-01416 (PTAB March 10, 2016)
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`(Paper 26). Patent Owner argues that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1),
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`Petitioner may not maintain its challenge of claim 215. PO Resp. 17.
`
`Petitioner responds that it is not estopped because it was necessary for it to
`
`file multiple petitions to address the ’634 patent’s many dependent claims,
`
`
`
`2 U.S. Patent No. 5,789,882, issued Aug. 4, 1998 (Ex. 1752) (“Ibaraki
`’882”).
`3 Oreste Vittone, Fiat Conceptual Approach to Hybrid Car Design, The 12th
`International Electric Vehicle Symposium (EVS-12), Vol. 2, pp. 458–469
`(1994) (Ex. 1753) (“Vittone”).
`4 U.S. Patent No. 5,865,263, issued Feb. 2, 1999 (Ex. 1754) (“Yamaguchi”).
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`6
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`such as dependent claim 238, which depends from independent claim 215.
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`Pet. Reply 4.
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`Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1), a petitioner who has obtained a final
`
`written decision on a patent claim in an inter partes review may not
`
`maintain a subsequent proceeding with respect to that same claim on a
`
`ground that it “reasonably could have raised” in the original proceeding.
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`Specifically, section 315(e)(1) provides:
`
`(e) Estoppel.—
`(1) Proceedings before the office.—The petitioner in
`an inter partes review of a claim in a patent under this
`chapter that results in a final written decision under section
`318(a) . . . may not request or maintain a proceeding before
`the Office with respect to that claim on any ground that the
`petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that
`inter partes review.
`
`
`
`On March 10, 2016, a final written decision was entered in IPR2014-
`
`01416, in which we determined that claim 215 of the ’634 patent is
`
`unpatentable. Petitioner in this proceeding is the same Petitioner in
`
`IPR2014-01416. The grounds raised by Petitioner in IPR2014-01416
`
`against claim 215 is not the same as the ground raised against claim 215 in
`
`this proceeding. Nonetheless, Ibaraki ’882 was cited during prosecution that
`
`led to the ’634 patent and is listed on the face of the ’634 patent. Ex. 1750.
`
`Petitioner does not argue that it reasonably could not have raised its
`
`challenge to claim 215 based on Ibaraki ’882 in IPR2014-01416. Pet. Reply
`
`4. We determine that Petitioner reasonably could have raised this challenge
`
`in IPR2014-01416. Accordingly, Petitioner is estopped under 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 315(e)(1) from maintaining the ground based on Ibaraki ’882 against claim
`
`215. We dismiss the inter partes review with respect to claim 215.
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`7
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`Although we determine it is necessary to address the parties’
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`contentions with respect to independent claim 215 because claim 238
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`depends from claim 215, we do not otherwise provide a final written
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`decision on the merits with respect to claim 215, or again hold that claim to
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`be unpatentable.
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`B. Claim Construction
`
`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are given
`
`their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the
`
`patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under the broadest
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`reasonable construction standard, claim terms are generally given their
`
`ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary
`
`skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech.,
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`Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Any special definition for a
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`claim term must be set forth with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and
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`precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
`
`Petitioner proposes a construction for “road load” or RL. Pet. 10. In
`
`our Decision to Institute, we interpreted road load (RL). Dec. 9–10. We
`
`also interpreted the terms “mode I,” “low-load operation mode I,” “high-way
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`cruising operation mode IV,” “acceleration operation mode V,” and
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`“abnormal and transient conditions.” Id. at 12–14. Neither party has
`
`indicated that our interpretations of any of these terms were improper and
`
`we do not perceive any reason or evidence that now compels any deviation
`
`from our initial interpretations. Accordingly, the following constructions
`
`apply to this Decision:
`
`Claim Term
`
`Construction
`
`road load or RL
`
`the amount of instantaneous torque
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`8
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`mode I or low-load operation mode
`I
`
`high-way cruising operation mode
`IV
`
`acceleration operation mode V
`
`required to propel the vehicle, be it
`positive or negative
`a mode of operation of the vehicle,
`in which all torque provided to the
`wheels is supplied by an electric
`motor
`a mode of operation in which all
`torque provided to the wheels is
`supplied by the internal combustion
`engine
`a mode of operation in which torque
`provided to the wheels is supplied
`by the internal combustion engine
`and at least one electric motor
`
`
`
`For purposes of this decision, we find it necessary to construe
`
`“setpoint” and the “operating limitations” found in claims 215, 241, and 267.
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`Setpoint (SP)
`
`
`
`The term “setpoint” or “SP” is recited in independent claims 215, 241,
`
`and 267. Petitioner proposes that “setpoint” or “SP” be construed, in the
`
`context of these claims, as “predetermined torque value.” Pet. 10–11.
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`Patent Owner argues that “setpoint” or “SP” be construed as “a definite, but
`
`potential variable value at which a transition between operating modes may
`
`occur.” PO Resp. 7.5
`
`We agree with Petitioner that the claims compare the setpoint either to
`
`an engine torque value or a torque based “road load” value. Pet. 10–11.
`
`
`
`5 In our Decision to Institute, and upon taking into consideration the parties’
`arguments and supporting evidence, we interpreted “setpoint” or “SP” to
`mean “predetermined torque value that may or may not be reset.” Dec. 12.
`Petitioner agrees with that interpretation, while Patent Owner does not. Pet.
`Reply 2; PO Resp. 7–11.
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`9
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`Each of claims 215, 241, and 267 recites a condition “when the RL required
`
`to do so is less than a setpoint (SP).” Ex. 1750, 79:16–17, 81:39–40, 83:66–
`
`67. Each of claims 215, 241, and 267 further recites a range established by
`
`the setpoint at one end, and the maximum torque output of the engine at the
`
`other end, by the language “when the RL required to do so is between the SP
`
`and a maximum torque output (MTO) of the engine.” Id. at 79:19–21,
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`81:42–44, 84:2–4.
`
`Nothing in the Specification precludes a setpoint from being reset,
`
`after it has been set. A setpoint for however short a period of time still is a
`
`setpoint. Accordingly, we construe “setpoint” and “SP” as “predetermined
`
`torque value that may or may not be reset.”
`
`
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`Patent Owner argues that the claims and the Specification of the ’634
`
`patent “make clear that a ‘setpoint’ is not simply a numerical value divorced
`
`from the context of the control system,” and that “‘setpoint’ serves the
`
`crucial function of marking the transition from one claimed mode to another,
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`and in particular, the transition from propelling the vehicle with the motor to
`
`propelling the vehicle with the engine.” PO Resp. 8. This argument is
`
`misplaced. Although such use of a setpoint is described by other language
`
`in the Specification, it is not an intrinsic property of a setpoint and is not a
`
`necessary and required use of all setpoints. In that regard, we further note
`
`the following passage in the Specification of the ’634 patent, which supports
`
`not reading a mode switching requirement (i.e., transition requirement) into
`
`the term “setpoint”:
`
`the values of the sensed parameters in response to which the
`operating mode is selected may vary . . ., so that the operating
`mode is not repetitively switched simply because one of the
`sensed parameters fluctuates around a defined setpoint.
`
`10
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`Ex. 1750, 19:67–20:6 (emphasis added).
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`It is improper to add an extraneous limitation into a claim, i.e., one
`
`that is added wholly apart from any need for the addition to accord meaning
`
`to a claim term. See, e.g., Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948,
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`950 (Fed. Cir. 1993); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum
`
`Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1988). It is important not to import into
`
`a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim. Superguide Corp. v.
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`DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004). For
`
`example, a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may
`
`not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the
`
`embodiment. Id.; see also In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir.
`
`1993). That is no different even if the patent specification describes only a
`
`single embodiment. Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad Inc., 358 F.3d 898,
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`906 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
`
`Patent Owner brings to our attention that the U.S. District Court for
`
`the Eastern District of Texas and the U.S. District Court for the District of
`
`Maryland both have construed “setpoint” to mean “a definite, but potentially
`
`variable value at which a transition between operating modes may occur.”
`
`PO Resp. 7 n.1. We note that that construction also does not require that an
`
`operating mode be changed at a setpoint, as Patent Owner urges. Instead,
`
`the construction of the district courts sets forth that a transition between
`
`operating modes “may occur” at a setpoint, which is consistent with our
`
`construction here.
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`Patent Owner additionally argues that “setpoint” should not be limited
`
`to a torque value, because the Specification makes clear that it also can be
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`the state of charge of a battery. PO. Resp. 10–11. Patent Owner cites to the
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`following passage in the Specification:
`
`[T]he microprocessor tests sensed and calculated values for
`system variables, such as the vehicle’s instantaneous torque
`requirement, i.e., the “road load” RL, the engine’s instantaneous
`torque output ITO, both being expressed as a percentage of the
`engine’s maximum torque output MTO, and the state of charge
`of the battery bank BSC, expressed as a percentage of its full
`charge, against setpoints, and uses the results of the comparisons
`to control the mode of vehicle operation.
`
`Ex. 1750, 40:18–26 (emphasis added). This argument also is misplaced. As
`
`we noted above, independent claims 215, 241, and 267 require a comparison
`
`of the setpoint either to an engine torque value or a torque based “road load”
`
`value. Thus, in the context of these claims, and claims dependent therefrom,
`
`a setpoint must be a torque value, and not some state of charge of a battery.
`
`
`
`For reasons discussed above, we construe “setpoint” and “SP” as
`
`“predetermined torque value that may or may not be reset.”
`
`The “operating” limitations
`
`Patent Owner asserts that the challenged claims require a comparison
`
`of road load (RL) to setpoint (SP) and also to maximum torque output
`
`(MTO). PO Resp. 11–16. The assertion is based on the requirements in
`
`claim 215 of (1) operating at least one electric motor to propel the hybrid
`
`vehicle “when the RL required to do so is less than a setpoint (SP),”
`
`(2) operating an internal combustion engine of the hybrid vehicle to propel
`
`the hybrid vehicle “when the RL required to do so is between the SP and a
`
`maximum torque output (MTO) of the engine,” and (3) operating both the at
`
`least one electric motor and the engine to propel the hybrid vehicle “when
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`the torque RL required to do so is more than the MTO.” Claims 241 and
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`267 include essentially the same recitations.
`
`In the above discussion of the construction of setpoint, we already
`
`noted that claims 215, 241, and 267 each require a comparison of road load
`
`to a setpoint because of the claim recitations “when the RL required to do so
`
`is less than a setpoint (SP)” and “when the RL required to do so is between
`
`the SP and a maximum torques output (MTO) of the engine.” For similar
`
`reasons, claims 215, 241, and 267 each require a comparison of road load to
`
`a maximum torque output (MTO) because of the recitation “when the torque
`
`RL required to do so is more than the MTO.” Petitioner has not advanced
`
`any cogent reasoning why no such comparison is required by the claims.
`
`We determine that the claims require a comparison of road load (RL) to a
`
`setpoint (SP) and also to a maximum torque output (MTO). That, however,
`
`does not mean the claims exclude the comparison of other parameters.
`
`C. Principles of Law
`
`A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the
`
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that
`
`the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the
`
`invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
`
`subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
`
`(2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
`
`factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art;
`
`(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art;
`
`(3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of
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`nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
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`In that regard, an obviousness analysis “need not seek out precise
`
`teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for
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`a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of
`
`ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; see
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`Translogic, 504 F.3d at 1259.
`
`The level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of
`
`record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
`
`In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich,
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`579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).
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`D. Claim 215
`
`As discussed above, we dismiss the inter partes review with respect to
`
`claim 215. Claim 238, however, depends from claim 215 and necessarily
`
`includes all of the limitations of claim 215. Accordingly, we first address
`
`the contentions made by Petitioner as to how Ibaraki ’882 renders obvious
`
`claim 215.
`
`Petitioner contends that claim 215 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 103(a) as obvious over Ibaraki ’882 and the general knowledge of a person
`
`of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 12–35, 37. To support its contentions,
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`Petitioner provides detailed explanations as to how the prior art meets each
`
`claim limitation of claim 215. Id. Petitioner also relies upon a Declaration
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`of Dr. Gregory W. Davis, who has been retained as an expert witness by
`
`Petitioner for the instant proceeding. Ex. 1755. For the reasons that follow,
`
`and notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments, which we address below,
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`we are persuaded by Petitioner’s showing, which we adopt as our own, that
`
`claim 215 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Ibaraki
`
`’882 and the general knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art.
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`Ibaraki ’882
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`Ibaraki ’882 describes a drive control apparatus and method for a
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`hybrid vehicle equipped with two drive power sources consisting of an
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`electric motor and engine such as an internal combustion engine. Ex. 1752,
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`1:9–14. Drive control apparatus includes controller 128 that includes a drive
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`source selecting means 160. Drive source selecting means is adapted to
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`select one or both of engine 112 and motor 114 as the drive power source or
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`sources according to a drive source selecting data map stored in memory
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`means 162. Id. at 20:38–43, Figs. 8 and 9. In particular, controller 128 has
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`a MOTOR DRIVE mode in which motor 114 is selected as the drive power
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`source, an ENGINE DRIVE mode in which the engine 112 is selected as the
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`drive power mode source, and an ENGINE-MOTOR DRIVE mode in which
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`both the engine 112 and the motor 114 are selected as the drive power
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`sources. Id. at 20:43–49.
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`Figure 11, reproduced below, depicts a graph which represents a
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`predetermined relationship between the vehicle drive torque and running
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`speed V and the three drive modes. Id. at 20:50–53.
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`Figure 11 shows a graph which represents a predetermined relationship
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`between the vehicle drive torque and running speed.
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`Drive source selecting means 160 (Fig. 9) selects the MOTOR
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`DRIVE mode when the vehicle running condition as represented by the
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`current vehicle drive torque and speed V is held within the range below the
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`first boundary line B. When the vehicle running condition is held within the
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`range between the first and second boundary lines B and C, the drive source
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`selecting means 160 selects the ENGINE DRIVE mode. When the vehicle
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`running condition is in the range above the second boundary line C, the
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`drive source selecting means 160 selects the ENGINE[-MOTOR] DRIVE
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`mode. Id. at 20:59–21:1. Ibaraki ’882 describes that the boundary line B
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`may be adjusted from B1 to B2 so as to enlarge the range in which the
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`MOTOR DRIVE mode is selected. Id. at 21:2–4. Ibaraki ’882 further
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`describes an ELECTRICITY GENERATING DRIVE mode where the
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`engine provides surplus power that is greater than the vehicle drive torque.
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`The surplus power from the engine is used to operate the electric motor as a
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`generator to regeneratively charge the battery. Id. at 23:1–30.
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`Claim 215
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`Claim 215 recites a method for controlling a hybrid vehicle.
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`Petitioner contends that Ibaraki ’882 describes a drive control apparatus for
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`controlling a hybrid vehicle that may be propelled by an internal engine and
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`electric motor. Pet. 12, 37; Ex. 1752, 1:9–14; Ex. 1755 ¶¶ 148–150. We are
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`persuaded by Petitioner’s showing, and adopt it as our own, that Ibaraki ’882
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`describes a method for controlling a hybrid vehicle.
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`Claim 215 recites “determining instantaneous road load (RL) required
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`to propel the hybrid vehicle responsive to an operator command.” Petitioner
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`contends, with supporting evidence, that a person having ordinary skill in the
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`art would have understood that the “vehicle drive torque” values described
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`in Ibaraki ’882 represent instantaneous road load (torque) required to propel
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`the vehicle responsive to operator command (accelerator pedal operating
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`amount and rate of change of accelerator pedal operating amount). Pet. 17,
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`38; Ex. 1755 ¶¶ 168–173. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s showing, and
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`adopt it as our own, that Ibaraki ’882 describes this limitation.
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`Claim 215 recites “operating at least one electric motor to propel the
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`hybrid vehicle when the RL required to do so is less than a setpoint (SP).”
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`Petitioner relies on annotated graphs, along with Dr. Davis’ testimony,
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`explaining that Ibaraki ’882 describes different operating modes, where the
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`vehicle is operated by motor alone (MOTOR DRIVE mode), when the road
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`load (RL) is less than the setpoint (SP) along boundary B. Pet. 18–20, 37;
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`Ex. 1752, 19:55–20:9, 20:43–62; Ex. 1755 ¶¶ 180–188. We are persuaded
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`by Petitioner’s showing, and adopt it as our own, that Ibaraki ’882 describes
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`operating at least one electric motor to propel the hybrid vehicle when the
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`road load required to do so is less than a setpoint (SP).
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`Claim 215 recites “operating an internal combustion engine of the
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`hybrid vehicle to propel the hybrid vehicle when the RL required to do so is
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`between the SP and a maximum torque output (MTO) of the engine.”
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`Petitioner contends that Ibaraki ’882 describes an internal combustion
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`engine (engine 112 in Fig. 8) that may be operated to propel the hybrid
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`vehicle during an ENGINE DRIVE mode in which engine 112 is selected as
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`the drive power source. Pet. 20; Ex. 1752, 20:43–53; 19:18–27; Ex. 1755
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`¶¶ 194–197. Petitioner contends, with respect to Ibaraki ’882 Figure 11, that
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`the engine drive mode lies between the two boundary lines B and C. Ibaraki
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`’882 describes that the controller uses the data map of Figure 11 to select
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`ENGINE DRIVE mode when the vehicle running condition as represented
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`by the current vehicle drive torque and speed V is held within the range
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`between boundary lines B and C. Ex. 1752, 20:49–58. In support of its
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`contentions, Petitioner relies on the following annotated Ibaraki ’882 Figure
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`11, reproduced below. Pet. 22.
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`Ibaraki ’882 Figure 11 as annotated in the Petition (Pet. 22)
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`Petitioner explains, with supporting evidence, that at a given vehicle
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`speed (annotated as V1), a given setpoint (annotated as SP from) along
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`boundary B is known, and that the setpoint marks the transition between the
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`MOTOR DRIVE mode and the ENGINE DRIVE mode. As long as the
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`current vehicle drive torque are below torque point C1, Petitioner contends
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`the vehicle will operate in the ENGINE DRIVE mode. Pet. 22–23; Ex.
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`1752, 20:55–62; 23:66–24:30; Ex. 1755 ¶¶ 200–203.
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`With respect to the maximum torque output limitation, Petitioner
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`contends, with supporting evidence, that a person having ordinary skill in the
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`art would have recognized that an IC engine, like that described in
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`Ibaraki ’882, necessarily has a maximum torque output (MTO), above which
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`the IC engine cannot produce additional torque. Pet. 22–23; Ex. 1755 ¶ 202.
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`Petitioner further contends that because the range of torque setpoints along
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`boundary B represents the lower-bound of the ENGINE DRIVE mode, a
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`person having ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the
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`maximum torque output must be greater than any setpoint along boundary
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`line B and that the MTO would be equal to or greater than torque point C1.
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`Id. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s showing, and adopt it as our own,
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`based on the relevant knowledge at the time of the invention that Ibaraki
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`’882, based on the relevant knowledge at the time of the invention, describes
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`operating an internal combustion engine of the hybrid vehicle to propel the
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`hybrid vehicle when the RL required to do so is between the SP and a
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`maximum torque output (MTO) of the engine.
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`Claim 215 further recites “wherein the engine is operable to
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`efficiently produce torque above the SP.” Petitioner contends, with
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`supporting evidence, that at the time of the invention, it was known that for
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`hybrid vehicles, a key point is to operate the IC engine at more efficient
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`operating points. Pet. 23; Ex. 1762, 12; Ex. 1755 ¶¶ 128–130. Petitioner
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`also points out that Ibaraki ’882 itself describes that an object of its
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`invention is to provide a drive control apparatus for a hybrid vehicle which
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`permits effective reduction in the fuel consumption amount or exhaust gas
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`amount of the engine, and in the context of the ENGINE DRIVE mode.
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`Pet. 23–24; Ex. 1752, 2:52–56, 25:1–10. Petitioner contends that a person
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`having ordinary skill in the art would have known that reduced fuel
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`consumption is characteristic of improved IC engine efficiency. Pet. 24;
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`Ex. 1755 ¶¶ 128–130, 208; Ex. 1763, 2. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s
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`showing, and adopt it as our own, that Ibaraki ’882, based on the relevant
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`knowledge at the time of the invention, meets the recitation that the engine is
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`operable to efficiently produce torque above the SP.
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`Claim 215 recites “wherein the SP is substantially less than the
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`MTO.” Petitioner asserts that, based on a description in the ’634 patent
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`(claim 15), “substantially less than the MTO” includes a SP which is less
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`Case IPR2015-0