UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`FORD MOTOR COMPANY
`Petitioner
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`v.
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`PAICE LLC & THE ABELL FOUNDATION, INC.
`Patent Owner
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`Case IPR2015-00785
`Patent 7,237,634
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response to
`Petition for Inter Partes Review of U.S.
`Patent No. 7,237,634
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`PUBLIC - REDACTED VERSION
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`Patent No. 7,237,634
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
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`Case IPR2015-00785
`Attorney Docket No: 36351-0015IP6
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I. 
`
`II. 
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1 
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`PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ................................................................. 2 
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`III.  THE ’634 PATENT ......................................................................................... 4 
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`A. 
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`B. 
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`Background of the ’634 Patent .............................................................. 4 
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`Claim Construction ............................................................................... 7 
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`1. 
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`2. 
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`“setpoint (SP)” ............................................................................ 8 
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`“abnormal and transient conditions” ......................................... 13 
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`IV.  ARGUMENT ................................................................................................. 15 
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`A. 
`
`The Board Should Exercise its Discretion to Reject Ford’s Seventh
`Shot at the ’634 Patent ........................................................................ 16 
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`1. 
`
`2. 
`
`The Petition is Ford’s Seventh Shot at the ’634 Patent ............ 19 
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`Estoppel Considerations Support Rejecting Ford’s Petition .... 25 
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`B. 
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`The Petition is Procedurally Improper ................................................ 28 
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`1. 
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`2. 
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`The Petition Improperly Incorporates by Reference ................ 28 
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`The Petition Creates an Overly Voluminous Record ............... 32 
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`C. 
`
`Grounds 1-5 Are Deficient Because Severinsky, Alone or in
`Combination with the Other References of Record, Does Not Render
`Obvious the Challenged Claims .......................................................... 33 
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`Ford’s Proposed Grounds Fail to Provide a Proper Obviousness
`1. 
`Analysis Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) ..................................................... 34 
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`The Proposed Combinations Based on Severinsky Do Not
`2. 
`Disclose A Setpoint ............................................................................. 40 
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`The Proposed Combination of Severinsky and Frank Fails to
`3. 
`Disclose or Render Obvious the Road Load-Based Hysteresis Claim
`Limitations ........................................................................................... 44 
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`V. 
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`CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 49 
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`In re Abbott Diabetes Care Inc.,
`696 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .......................................................................... 12
`
`Apple, Inc., v. Contentguard Holdings, Inc.,
`IPR2015-00356, Paper 9 (PTAB Jun. 26, 2015) ................................................ 33
`
`Apple Inc. v. ContentGuard Holdings, LLC,
`IPR2015-00448, Paper 9 (PTAB Jul. 10, 2015) ................................................. 31
`
`ASUSTeK Computer Inc. v. Exotablet, Ltd.,
`IPR2015-00041, Paper 6 (PTAB Apr. 23, 2015) ............................................... 18
`
`Bettcher Indus., Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc.,
`661 F.3d 629 (Fed.Cir.2011) .............................................................................. 36
`
`Butamax Advanced Biofuels LLC v. Gevo, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00581, Paper 8 (PTAB Oct. 14, 2014) .......................................... 17, 26
`
`Cisco v. C-Cation Technologies,
`IPR2014-00454, Paper 12 (PTAB Aug. 29, 2014) ............................................. 29
`
`Conopco, Inc. dba Unilever v. Procter & Gamble Company,
`IPR2014-00628, Paper 23 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2015) ....................................... 19, 26
`
`In re Cortright,
`165 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ...................................................................... 8, 12
`
`In re Cuozzo Speed Tech., LLC,
`778 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g denied, __ F.3d __ (Fed. Cir.
`Jul. 8, 2015) ........................................................................................................... 7
`
`CustomPlay, LLC v. ClearPlay, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00783, Paper 9 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2014) ................................................. 26
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`eBay Inc. v. MoneyCat Ltd.,
`CBM2015-00008, Paper 9 (PTAB May 1, 2015) ............................................... 26
`
`Ex parte Clapp, 227 U.S.P.Q. 972, 973 (BPAI 1985) ............................................. 49
`
`Ex parte Gunasekar, et al.,
`Appeal 2009-008345, 2011 WL 3872007 (BPAI Aug. 29, 2011) ..................... 48
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`Fidelity National v. DataTreasury,
`IPR2014-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB Aug. 13, 2014) ............................................... 29
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`Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm’n,
`386 F.3d 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .......................................................................... 12
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`Graham v. John Deere Co.,
`383 U.S. 1 (1966) .............................................................................. 34, 36, 38, 39
`
`In re Kahn,
`441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ...................................................................... 38, 48
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`KSR lnt’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) ................................................................................ 34, 38, 48
`
`MaxLinear, Inc. v. Cresta Technology Corp.,
`IPR2015-00591, Paper 9 (PTAB Jun. 15, 2015) ................................................ 23
`
`Micro Motion, Inc. v. Invensys Systems, Inc.,
`IPR2014-0393, Paper 16 (PTAB Aug. 4, 2014) ................................................. 29
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc.,
`No. 2014-1542, 2015 WL 3747257 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 16, 2015) ............. 7, 8, 12, 14
`
`In re NTP, Inc.,
`654 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ...................................................................... 8, 12
`
`In re Oelrich,
`666 F.2d 578 (CCPA 1981) ................................................................................ 36
`
`Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rembrandt Wireless Technologies, LP,
`IPR2015-00555, Paper 20 (PTAB Jun. 19, 2015) ........................................ 18, 26
`
`Shaw Industries Group, Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc.,
`IPR2013-00584, Paper 16 (PTAB Dec. 21, 2013) ............................................. 29
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`In re Suitco Surface, Inc.,
`603 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .................................................................. 7, 8, 14
`
`Tempo Lighting Inc. v. Tivoli LLC,
`742 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................................................................ 14
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`Tempur Sealy Int’l Inc. v. Select Comfort Corp.,
`IPR2014-01419, Paper 7 (PTAB Feb. 17, 2015) ................................................ 29
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`Travelocity.com L.P. v. Cronos Techs., LLC,
`CBM2015-00047, Paper 7 (PTAB Jun. 15, 2015) ............................................. 24
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`Travelocity.com L.P. v. Cronos Techs. LLC,
`CBM2014-00082, Paper 10 (PTAB Sept. 15, 2014) .......................................... 36
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`Unified Patents, Inc. v. PersonalWeb, LLC,
`IPR2014-00702, Paper 13 (PTAB Jul. 24, 2014) ............................................... 28
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`Unilever, Inc., v. The Proctor & Gamble Co.,
`IPR2014-00506, Paper 17 (PTAB Jul. 7, 2014) ................................................. 26
`
`In re Vaidyanathan,
`381 Fed. Appx. 985 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .................................................................. 12
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`Whole Space Indus., Ltd. v. Zipshade Indus. (B.V.I.) Corp.,
`IPR2015-00488, Paper 14 (PTAB Jul. 24, 2015) ......................................... 38, 48
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`Statutes
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`35 U.S.C. § 103 .................................................................................................. passim
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`35 U.S.C. § 313 .......................................................................................................... 1
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`35 U.S.C. § 315 .................................................................................................. 19, 27
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`35 U.S.C. § 316 ........................................................................................................ 32
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`35 U.S.C. § 322 ............................................................................................ 34, 37, 39
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`35 U.S.C. § 325 .................................................................................................. passim
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`Other Authorities
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.1 ................................................................................................. 18, 32
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.6 ..................................................................................... 28, 29, 31, 35
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.22 ................................................................................... 28, 34, 37, 39
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.100 ................................................................................................. 2, 7
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.104 ............................................................................................. 30, 31
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.107 ..................................................................................................... 1
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`157 Cong. Rec. S952 (2011) .................................................................................... 17
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`77 Fed. Reg. 48756 (Aug. 4, 2012).......................................................................... 32
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`H.R. Rep. No. 112-98 (2011) ................................................................. 17, 20, 23, 32
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`EXHIBITS
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`Exhibit Number
`Ex. 2301
`Ex. 2302
`Ex. 2303
`Ex. 2304
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`Ex. 2305
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`Ex. 2306
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`Exhibit Name
`U.S. Patent No. 8,214,097 File History
`Table of Ford’s IPR Petitions
`Appendix A (January 15, 2014)
`Jeffery L. Stein, Deposition Tr. (IPR2014-00570)
`(May 8, 2015)
`Jeffery L. Stein, Deposition Tr. (IPR2014-00875)
`(Mar. 3, 2015)
`Jeffery L. Stein, Deposition Tr. (IPR2014-00875)
`(May 29, 2015)
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`Patent No. 7,237,634
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`In accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 313 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.107, Paice LLC and
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`the The Abell Foundation, Inc. (“Patent Owner” or collectively referred to as
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`“Paice”) respectfully submit this Preliminary Response to the Petition for Inter
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`Partes Review (“the Petition” or “Pet.”) of U.S. Patent No. 7,237,634 (Ex. 1351)
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`(“the ’634 patent”) filed by Ford Motor Company (“Ford” or “Petitioner”).
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`In now its seventh petition for inter partes review (IPR) of the ’634 patent,
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`Ford asserts that claims 80, 91, 92, 97, 99, 107, 108, 110, 112, 114, 125, 126, 130,
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`132, 140, 141, 143, 145, 241, 252-254, 256-263 and 265 (“the Challenged
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`Claims”) are obvious in view of U.S. Patent No. 5,343,970 (“Severinsky”) either
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`alone or in combination with other various prior art. As the Board is well aware,
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`Severinsky is the subject of two IPRs regarding the ’634 patent that the Board is
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`already considering (IPR2014-00904 and IPR2014-01416).
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`Paice requests that the Board not institute IPR based on the Petition because:
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`(1) the Petition is Ford’s seventh shot (out of thirteen) at the ’634 patent and
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`includes numerous serial claim challenges that are a part of a larger strategy
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`designed to drive up costs and overburden Paice with twenty-five petitions for IPR
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`based on serial grounds of obviousness; (2) the Petition is procedurally improper,
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`containing improper incorporation by reference, and creating an excessively
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`voluminous record; and (3) the Petition is substantively defective because Ford
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`fails to provide an adequate obviousness analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) and
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`Severinsky, alone or in combination with any one of Anderson or Frank, fails to
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`disclose or render obvious the “setpoint” and road load-based hysteresis
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`limitations.
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`Because Ford’s Petition is duplicative of petitions already before the Board
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`and fails to establish a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the challenged
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`claims is unpatentable, the Board should reject the Petition and decline to institute
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`a seventh proceeding (out of a total thirteen requested IPRs) regarding the ’634
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`patent.
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`II.
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`PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
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`On June 5, 2014, Ford filed a first petition (IPR2014-00904) against claims
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`1, 14, 16, 18, and 24 of the ’634 patent. On December 11, 2014, the Board
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`instituted review of those claims, and on July 1, 2015, the Board heard oral
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`arguments on the petition. The Board is expected to issue a final written decision
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`no later than December 11, 2015. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(c). On August 29, 2014,
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`Ford filed a second petition (IPR2014-01416) for IPR against claims 80, 93, 98,
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`99, 102, 109, 114, 127, 131, 132, 135, 139, 142, 161, 215, 228, 232, 233, 235, 236,
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`and 237. On March 12, 2015, the Board instituted review of those claims, and is
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`expected to issue a final written decision before March 12, 2016.
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`In a transparent effort to continue its abusive tactics and exert pressure on
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`Paice, Ford filed eleven additional petitions for IPR regarding the ’634 patent
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`between January 28, 2015 and February 24, 2015 (IPR2015-00606, IPR2015-
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`00722, IPR2015-00758, IPR2015-00784, IPR2015-00785, IPR2015-00787,
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`IPR2015-00790, IPR2015-00791, IPR2015-00799, IPR2015-00800, IPR2015-
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`00801), including serial claim challenges to many claims.
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`The Petition is one of thirteen petitions for IPR that Ford has filed against
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`the ’634 patent. Ford states that it “is filing several IPR’s to address the ’634
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`Patent claims and is trying to group the claims according to claimed subject
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`matter.” Pet. at 1. However, Ford has filed serial claim challenges against the
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`majority of the claims challenged in the Petition. For example, Ford has
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`challenged independent claims 80, 114, and 215 in a total of six1 petitions,
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`dependent claims 99 and 132 in a total of four2 other petitions, and independent
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`claim 241 in a total of three3 petitions. Moreover, dependent claims 91, 92, 107,
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`1 See IPR2014-01416, IPR2015-00758, IPR2015-00791, IPR2015-00800,
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`IPR2015-00801.
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`2 See IPR2014-01416, IPR2015-00791, IPR2015-00800.
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`3 See IPR2015-00787 and IPR2015-00801.
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`108, 125, 126, 140, 141, 252-254, 256, and 259-262 have all been challenged in
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`other petitions.4
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`III. THE ’634 PATENT
`A. Background of the ’634 Patent
`The ’634 patent (Ex. 1351), entitled “Hybrid Vehicles,” issued on July 3,
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`2007, from an application with a priority date of September 14, 1998. The ’634
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`patent discloses embodiments of a hybrid electric vehicle, with an internal
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`combustion engine, two electric motors and a battery bank. A microprocessor is
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`employed to control the internal combustion engine, the two electric motors, and
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`the battery bank based on the hybrid vehicle’s instantaneous torque requirements
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`such that the internal combustion engine is only run under high efficiency
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`conditions. See, e.g., Ex. 1351 at Abstract.
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`An embodiment of the hybrid vehicle disclosed in the ’634 patent is shown
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`in Figure 3, reproduced below:
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`4 See IPR2015-00787, IPR2015-00791, IPR2015-00791, IPR2015-00800.
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`4
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`Ex. 1351 at Fig. 3. As shown, a traction motor 25 is connected to the road wheels
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`34 through a differential 32. A starter motor 21 is connected to the internal
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`combustion engine 40. The motors 21 and 25 are functional as either motors or
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`generators, depending on the operation of the corresponding inverter/charger units
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`23 and 27, which connect the motors to the battery bank 22. See Ex. 1351 at
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`26:19-30.
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`These components are controlled by a microprocessor 48 or any controller
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`capable of examining input parameters and signals and controlling the mode of
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`operation of the vehicle. See, e.g., Ex. 1351 at 26:31-27:25. For example, control
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`of engine 40 is accomplished by way of control signals provided by the
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`microprocessor to the electronic fuel injection (EFI) unit 56 and electronic engine
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`management (EEM) unit 55. Control of (1) starting of the engine 40; (2) use of
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`motors 21 and 25 to provide propulsive torque; or (3) use of motors as generators
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`to provide regenerative recharging of battery bank 22, is accomplished through
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`control signals provided by the microprocessor to the inverter/charger units 23 and
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`27. See, e.g., Ex. 1351 at 26:64-27:25; 28:42-52.
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`The hybrid vehicle may be operated in a number of modes based on the
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`vehicle’s instantaneous torque requirements, the engine’s maximum torque output,
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`the state of charge of the battery, and other operating parameters. In an
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`implementation of the ’634 patent, the microprocessor employs a hybrid system
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`control strategy based on sensed and calculated values for system variables that are
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`evaluated against setpoints and causes the vehicle to operate in various operating
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`modes pursuant to this control strategy. See, e.g., Ex. 1351 at 40:16-26.
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`For example, in mode I, the hybrid vehicle is operated as an electric car,
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`with the traction motor providing all torque to propel the vehicle. Ex. 1351 at
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`37:24-32. As the vehicle continues to be propelled in electric only mode, the state
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`of charge of the battery may become depleted, and need to be recharged. In this
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`case, the hybrid vehicle may transition to mode II to recharge the battery, in which
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`the vehicle operates as in mode I, with the addition of the engine running the
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`starter/generator motor to provide electrical energy to operate the traction motor
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`and recharge the battery. See, e.g., Ex. 1351 at 37:32-36. When the internal
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`combustion engine can be operated in its fuel efficient range to propel the vehicle,
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`the hybrid vehicle operates in mode IV, with the engine providing torque to propel
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`the vehicle. Ex. 1351 at 37:42-44; 38:51-61. If the vehicle requires additional
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`torque, such as for acceleration or hill-climbing, the vehicle may enter mode V,
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`where the traction motor provides additional torque to propel the vehicle beyond
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`that provided by engine 40. Ex. 1351 at 38:1-8.
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`B. Claim Construction
`At this stage, Paice addresses only Ford’s constructions of “setpoint” and
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`“abnormal and transient conditions.” In IPR proceedings, the Board applies the
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`“broadest reasonable interpretation” standard, which mandates that “[a] claim in an
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`unexpired patent shall be given its broadest reasonable construction in light of the
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`specification of the patent in which it appears.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see also In
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`re Cuozzo Speed Tech., LLC, 778 F.3d 1271, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g denied,
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`__ F.3d __ (Fed. Cir. Jul. 8, 2015). The Federal Circuit has recognized, however,
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`that that standard requires that the claims must be read in light of the specification
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`as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Suitco Surface,
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`Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010). In Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc.,
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`the Federal Circuit explained that the broadest reasonable interpretation does not
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`mean that “the Board may construe the claims during IPR so broadly that its
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`constructions are unreasonable under general claim constructions principles,” and
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`that the construction must not be “divorced from the specification and the record
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`evidence” and inconsistent with “the one that those skilled in the art would reach.”
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`No. 2014-1542, 2015 WL 3747257, at *3 (Fed. Cir. June 16, 2015) (quoting In re
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`NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353,
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`1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). “A construction that is ‘unreasonably broad’ and which
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`does not ‘reasonably reflect the plain language and disclosure’ will not pass
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`muster.” Microsoft, No. 2014-1542, 2015 WL 3747257, at *3 (quoting Suitco, 603
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`F.3d at 1260).
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`“setpoint (SP)”
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`1.
`Paice respectfully requests that the Board construe “setpoint” as “a definite,
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`but potentially variable value at which a transition between operating modes may
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`occur,” 5 and reject Ford’s proposed construction—a “predetermined torque
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`5 As an initial matter, Patent Owner notes that the U.S. District Court for the
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`Eastern District of Texas and the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland
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`both have construed the term “setpoint (SP)” to mean “a definite, but potentially
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`variable value at which a transition between operating modes may occur.” See
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`Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., Case No. 2:07-cv-180 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2008)
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`(Ex. 1361 at 204); Paice LLC v. Hyundai Motor Corp., Case No. 2:12-cv-499 (D.
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`Md. Jul. 24, 2014) (Ex. 1362 at 103) (“The Plaintiffs’ proposed construction of
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`value”—because it is unreasonably broad and does not reasonably reflect the
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`disclosure of the ’634 patent.
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` The claims and the specification of the ’634 patent make clear that a
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`“setpoint” is not simply a numerical value divorced from the context of the rest of
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`the control system. Rather, “setpoint” serves the crucial function of marking the
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`transition from one claimed mode to another, and in particular, the transition from
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`propelling the vehicle with the motor to propelling the vehicle with the engine.
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`See, e.g., Ex. 1351 at 40:41-49.
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`For example, in claims 1 and 16, the “setpoint” marks the transition between
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`a mode in which only the motor propels the vehicle, to modes in which the engine
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`also can be used to propel the vehicle or charge the battery. See Ex. 1351 at claims
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`1 and 16. Dependent claim 6 similarly recites “…wherein the controller is further
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`operable to: monitor road load (RL) on the hybrid vehicle over time; and control
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`transition between propulsion of the hybrid vehicle by the first and/or the second
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`‘setpoint’ as ‘a definite, but potentially variable value at which a transition between
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`operating modes may occur,’ is consistent with the language of the claims and the
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`intrinsic evidence.”).
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`electric motors to propulsion by the engine responsive to the RL reaching the
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`SP…” See Ex. 1351 at claim 6 (emphasis added); see also id. at claims 8, 11, 19.
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`Additionally, the specification unambiguously defines “setpoint” as
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`synonymous with a “transition point” between modes:
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`[I]n the example of the inventive control strategy discussed above, it is
`repeatedly stated that the transition from low-speed operation to
`highway cruising occurs when road load is equal to 30% of MTO. This
`setpoint, referred to in the appended claims as “SP”, and sometimes
`hereinafter as the transition point (i.e., between operation in modes I
`and IV) is obviously arbitrary and can vary substantially, e.g., between
`30-50% of MTO, within the scope of the invention.
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`Id. at 40:41-49; see also id. at 40:16-26 (“the microprocessor tests sensed and
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`calculated values for system variables, such as the vehicle’s instantaneous torque
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`requirement, i.e., the ‘road load’ RL . . . against setpoints, and uses the results of
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`the comparisons to control the mode of vehicle operation.”); 40:63-65 (“For
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`example, in response to recognition of a regular pattern as above, the transition
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`point might be adjusted to 60% of MTO”); 41:4-8 (“It is also within the scope of
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`the invention to make the setpoint SP to which the road load is compared to control
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`the transition from mode I to mode IV somewhat "fuzzy" [sic], so that SP may vary
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`from one comparison of road load to MTO to the next depending on other
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`variables”); 41:59-63 (“FIG. 9 thus shows the main decision points of the control
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`program run by the microprocessor, with the transition point between mode I, low-
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`speed operation, and mode IV highway cruising, set at a road load equal to 30% of
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`MTO”); 44:24-31 (“Further, as noted above the transition points between modes I,
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`IV, and V in particular may vary in accordance with the operator's commands…”).
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`The “setpoint” marks the amount of “road load” at which the claimed
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`control system actively changes the vehicle from one mode to another (e.g. from
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`motor propulsion to engine propulsion). The challenged patent recognizes the
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`significant efficiencies to be gained by transitioning between motor propulsion to
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`engine propulsion in response to “road load.” See, e.g., Ex. 1351 at 13: 44-51 (“By
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`comparison . . . the vehicle’s operating mode—that is, the selection of the source
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`of torque needed to propel the vehicle—is determined based on the amount of
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`torque actually required. In this way the proper combination of engine, traction
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`motor, and starting motor is always available. This apparently simple point has
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`evidently been missed entirely by the art.”), 13:52 – 14:2 (noting that prior art
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`references using vehicle speed to transition between modes “inherently operate the
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`engine under less efficient conditions”).
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`Ford’s construction of “setpoint” as a “predetermined torque value,” see Pet.
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`at 8, is incorrect and unreasonably broad because it fails to recognize that
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`“setpoint” represents a point at which a transition between different operating
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`modes may occur. The broadening construction is “divorced from the
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`specification and the record evidence” and inconsistent with “the one that those
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`skilled in the art would reach.” See Microsoft, slip op. at 7 (quoting NTP, 654 F.3d
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`at 1288; Cortright, 165 F.3d at 1358).
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`In essence, Ford asks the Board to construe the claims as broadly covering
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`hybrid vehicle systems where transitions between modes never occur—a clear
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`error that is fundamentally contrary to the specification of the ’634 patent. See
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`Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm’n, 386 F.3d 1095, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
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`(claim should not be given overly broad construction that is inconsistent with how
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`claim term is used in the specification). The Board’s “broadest reasonable
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`interpretation” must be reasonable, and must be in conformity with the invention
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`as described in the specification. In re Vaidyanathan, 381 Fed. Appx. 985, 995-96
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`(Fed. Cir. 2010). Because Ford’s proposed construction fails to consider the
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`entirety of the claims and specification, it is improper and should be rejected. See,
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`e.g., In re Abbott Diabetes Care Inc., 696 F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
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`(holding that Board’s construction of “electrochemical sensor” was “unreasonable
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`and inconsistent with the language of the claims and the specification”).
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`Ford’s construction is also incorrect because it impermissibly limits
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`“setpoint” to a torque value while the specification makes clear that a setpoint is
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`not limited to a torque value and in fact could also be a measure of the state of
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`charge of the battery.
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`[T]he microprocessor tests sensed and calculated values for system
`variables, such as the vehicle's instantaneous torque requirement, i.e.,
`the “road load” RL, the engine's instantaneous torque output ITO, both
`being expressed as a percentage of the engine's maximum torque output
`MTO, and the state of charge of the battery bank BSC, expressed as a
`percentage of its full charge, against setpoints, and uses the results of
`the comparisons to control the mode of vehicle operation.
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`Ex. 1351 at 40:16-26 (emphasis added). Ford quotes the above excerpt in the
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`Petition at pg. 10 but deliberately removes the language regarding state of charge
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`of the battery. Thus, Ford’s construction, in this regard, impermissibly narrows the
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`broadest reasonable interpretation of setpoint as used in the specification.
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`Therefore, Paice respectfully requests that the Board reject Ford’s
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`construction of setpoint and adopt Paice’s construction of “setpoint” to make clear
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`that it is a value “at which a transition between operating modes may occur.”
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`“abnormal and transient conditions”
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`2.
`Ford construes “abnormal and transient conditions” as “comprising ‘starting
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`and stopping of the engine and provision of torque to satisfy drivability or safety
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`considerations.’” Pet. at 11-12 (emphasis added). The Board should reject Ford’s
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`attempt to broaden the scope of the claim with the word “comprising.”
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`Although Paice agrees that “abnormal and transient conditions” may
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`“compris[e] starting and stopping of the engine and provision of torque to satisfy
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`drivability or safety considerations,” see Ex. 1364 (U.S. Patent No. 7,104,347) at
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`claim 22, Ford’s analysis demonstrates that it uses the open-ended “comprising” to
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`unreasonably broaden the meaning of the claim. See Suitco Surface, 603 F.3d at
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`1260 (“The broadest construction rubric coupled with the term ‘comprising’ does
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`not give the PTO an unfettered license to interpret claims to embrace anything
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`remotely related to the claimed invention.”). Ford’s analysis demonstrates that its
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`“comprising” construction risks encompassing conditions that the patentee
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`distinguished from “abnormal and transient conditions” during prosecution of the
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`related patent U.S. Patent No. 8,214,097 (“the ’097 patent”). See Microsoft, No.
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`2014-1542, 2015 WL 3747257, at *3 (“The PTO should also consult the patent’s
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`prosecution history in proceedings in which the patent has been brought back to the
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`agency for a second review.” (citing Tempo Lighting Inc. v. Tivoli LLC, 742 F.3d
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`973, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Specifically, during the prosecution of the ’097 patent,
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`the patentee distinguished “abnormal and