UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`FORD MOTOR COMPANY
`Petitioner
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`v.
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`PAICE LLC & THE ABELL FOUNDATION, INC.
`Patent Owner
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`Case IPR2015-00785
`Patent 7,237,634
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`PATENT OWNER’S
`RESPONSE TO PETITION
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`

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`Patent No. 7,237,634
`Patent Owner’s Response
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`Case IPR2015-00785
`Attorney Docket No: 36351-0015IP6
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I. 
`
`II. 
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1 
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`THE ’634 PATENT ......................................................................................... 2 
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`A. 
`
`B. 
`
`Background of the ’634 Patent .............................................................. 2 
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`Claim Construction ............................................................................... 4 
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`1. 
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`“setpoint (SP)” ............................................................................ 4 
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`The Challenged Claims Require a Comparison of Road Load to
`2. 
`Setpoint and MTO ................................................................................. 7 
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`3. 
`
`“abnormal and transient conditions” ........................................... 9 
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`III.  ARGUMENT ................................................................................................. 10 
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`A. 
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`B. 
`
`C. 
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`Ford’s Conclusory Petition is Deficient Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) ... 10 
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`Ford Will Be Estopped from Maintaining Challenges to Claims 80 and
`114 ....................................................................................................... 12 
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`Grounds 1-5 Should Be Denied—the Prior Art of Record Fails to
`Disclose Using Road Load to Determine When to Operate the Engine
` ............................................................................................................. 13 
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`1. 
`
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`Severinsky Uses Speed to Determine When to Use the Engine
`14 
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`The Passages of Severinsky on Which Ford Relies Are
`2. 
`Inapposite—Severinsky Does Not Use Road Load to Determine When
`to Operate the Engine .......................................................................... 17 
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`D.  Grounds 1-5 Should Be Denied—the Prior Art of Record Fails to
`Disclose a Setpoint .............................................................................. 26 
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`1. 
`
`Severinsky’s Sweet Spot Is Not a Setpoint ............................... 27 
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`E. 
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`F. 
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`2. 
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`Ford’s Focus on Output Torque Is Flawed ............................... 34 
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`Severinsky Does Not Disclose the “Abnormal and Transient
`3. 
`Conditions” Limitations ...................................................................... 36 
`
`Ford’s Reliance on the ’634 Patent’s Discussion of Severinsky is
`Flawed and Improper........................................................................... 38 
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`Grounds 1 and 4 Should Be Denied—the Prior Art of Record Fails to
`Disclose Limiting a Rate of Change of Torque Output of the Engine to
`Achieve Stoichiometry ........................................................................ 43 
`
`Anderson Does Not Disclose Limiting a Rate of Change of
`1. 
`Torque Output of the Engine ............................................................... 43 
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`Neither Anderson nor Severinsky Discloses Using the Electric
`2. 
`Motor to Supply Additional Torque to Limit a Rate of Change of
`Engine Torque Output ......................................................................... 46 
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`Neither Anderson nor Severinsky Discloses the ’634 Patent’s
`3. 
`Stoichiometry Limitations ................................................................... 47 
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`4. 
`
`Ford Fails to Establish a Rationale to Combine ....................... 50 
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`G.  Grounds 2 and 5 Should Be Denied—Lateur’s Cruise Control Is Not a
`Road-Load-Based Control Strategy .................................................... 53 
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`H.  Grounds 3-5 Should Be Denied—the Prior Art of Record Fails to
`Disclose Road-Load-Based Hysteresis ............................................... 54 
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`Neither Severinsky nor Frank Discloses Road-Load-Based
`1. 
`Hysteresis ............................................................................................ 55 
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`2. 
`
`Ford Fails to Establish a Rationale to Combine ....................... 58 
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`IV.  CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 60 
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`In re Abbott Diabetes Care Inc.,
`696 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ............................................................................ 6
`
`Bettcher Indus., Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc.,
`661 F.3d 629 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ............................................................................ 12
`
`Clearwater Sys. Corp. v. Evapco, Inc.
`394 F. App'x 699 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ...................................................................... 41
`
`In re Cortright,
`165 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ............................................................................ 6
`
`In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC,
`793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ............................................................................ 4
`
`Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. Co.,
`192 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ............................................................................ 41
`
`Ex parte Clapp, 227 U.S.P.Q. 972 (BPAI 1985) ..................................................... 60
`
`Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm’n,
`386 F.3d 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ............................................................................ 6
`
`Graham v. John Deere Co.,
`383 U.S. 1 (1966) .......................................................................................... 11, 12
`
`Ex parte Gunasekar, et al.,
`Appeal 2009-008345, 2011 WL 3872007 (BPAI Aug. 29, 2011) ............... 59, 60
`
`In re Gurley,
`27 F.3d 551 (Fed. Cir. 1994) .............................................................................. 50
`
`Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs.,
`512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .......................................................................... 54
`
`In re Kahn,
`441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ...................................................................... 57, 59
`
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`KSR lnt’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) ................................................................................ 11, 57, 59
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc.,
`789 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .............................................................. 4, 6, 9, 14
`
`In re NTP, Inc.,
`654 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ........................................................................ 6, 9
`
`In re Oelrich,
`666 F.2d 578 (CCPA 1981) ................................................................................ 12
`
`PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc.,
`491 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .......................................................................... 42
`
`In re Suitco Surface, Inc.,
`603 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ............................................................................ 4
`
`In re Vaidyanathan,
`381 Fed. Appx. 985 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .................................................................... 6
`
`Whole Space Indus., Ltd. v. Zipshade Indus. (B.V.I.) Corp.,
`IPR2015-00488, Paper 14 (PTAB Jul. 24, 2015) ............................................... 59
`
`Statutes
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`35 U.S.C. § 103 ........................................................................................ 1, 10, 11, 58
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`35 U.S.C. § 311 .......................................................................................................... 1
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`35 U.S.C. § 315 ........................................................................................................ 12
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`35 U.S.C. § 322 ........................................................................................................ 10
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`Other Authorities
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.22 ..................................................................................................... 10
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.100 ........................................................................................... 1, 4, 13
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.120 ..................................................................................................... 1
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`Exhibit Number
`Ex. 2301
`Ex. 2302
`Ex. 2303
`Ex. 2304
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`Ex. 2305
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`Ex. 2306
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`Ex. 2307
`Ex. 2308
`Ex. 2309
`Ex. 2310
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`Ex. 2311
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`Ex. 2312
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`Ex. 2313
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`Ex. 2314
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`Ex. 2315
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`Ex. 2316
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`Ex. 2317
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`Ex. 2318
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`EXHIBITS
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`Exhibit Name
`U.S. Patent No. 8,214,097 File History
`Table of Ford’s IPR Petitions
`Appendix A (January 15, 2014)
`Jeffery L. Stein, Deposition Tr. (IPR2014-00570)
`(May 8, 2015)
`Jeffery L. Stein, Deposition Tr. (IPR2014-00875)
`(Mar. 3, 2015)
`Jeffery L. Stein, Deposition Tr. (IPR2014-00875)
`(May 29, 2015)
`Declaration of Daniel A. Tishman in Support of Patent
`Owners’ Motion for Pro Hac Vice Admission
`Declaration of Neil Hannemann
`Neil Hannemann CV
`Gregory W. Davis Deposition Tr. (IPR2014-00571 &
`IPR2014-00579) (Jan. 13, 2015)
`Gregory W. Davis Deposition Tr. (IPR2014-01416)
`(June 3, 2015)
`Gregory W. Davis Deposition Tr. (IPR2014-00571)
`(May 8, 2015)
`Excerpts from Neil Hannemann Deposition Tr.
`(IPR2014-00571) (April 7, 2015)
`Jeffery L. Stein, Deposition Tr. (IPR2014-00570) (Jan.
`12, 2015)
`Jeffery L. Stein, Deposition Tr. (IPR2014-01415)
`(May 29, 2015)
`Integrated Microprocessor Control of a Hybrid i.c.
`Engine/Battery-Electric Automotive Power Train,”
`P.W. Masding, J.R. Bumby, Jan. 1990
`Masding, Philip Wilson (1988) “Some drive train
`control problems in hybrid i.c engine/battery electric
`vehicles,” Durham theses, Durham University
`Excerpt from McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific
`and Technical Terms, Sixth Ed., 2003.
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`Patent No. 7,237,634
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`Case IPR2015-00785
`Attorney Docket No: 36351-0015IP6
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`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.120 and the Decision to Institute (“Institution
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`Decision” or “Inst. Dec.”), Patent Owners Paice LLC and the The Abell Foundation,
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`Inc. (collectively, “Paice”) hereby submit this Response to the Petition for Inter
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`Partes Review of U.S. Patent. No. 7,237,634 Under 35 U.S.C. § 311 et seq., and 37
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`C.F.R. § 42.100 et seq. (“Petition” or “Pet.”) filed by Ford Motor Company (“Ford”).
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`U.S. Patent. No. 7,237,634 (“the ’634 patent”), which is the subject of the
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`present Petition, claims an inventive and novel method of control for a hybrid
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`electric vehicle that uses road load, setpoint, and the maximum torque output of an
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`internal combustion engine to determine when to transition between various
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`operating modes in which the vehicle is propelled by an electric motor, an internal
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`combustion engine, or both. Ford’s Petition challenges claims 80, 91, 92, 97, 99,
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`107, 108, 110, 112, 114, 125, 126, 130, 132, 140, 141, 143, 145, 241, 252-254, 256-
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`263 and 265 of the ’634 patent (“the challenged claims”) as obvious under 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 103. Following Paice’s preliminary response, filed on August 10, 2015, the Board
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`instituted review of each of the challenged claims, except for claims 99 and 132,
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`based on five proposed grounds of obviousness over U.S. Patent No. 5,343,970
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`(“Severinsky”) in combination with one or more of U.S. Patent No. 5,823,280
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`(“Lateur”), The Effects of APU Characteristics on the Design of Hybrid Control
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`Strategies for Hybrid Electric Vehicles, SAE 950493 (“Anderson”), and U.S. Patent
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`No. 5,842,534 (“Frank”). See Inst. Dec. at 32-33. All challenged claims are
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`patentable over the cited grounds for the reasons set forth herein.
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`Ford’s arguments with regard to the ’634 patent are fundamentally flawed.
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`The ’634 patent’s innovative control strategy, using road load and setpoint to decide
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`when to move between operating modes to maximize efficiency, is absent in the
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`cited references. Moreover, none of the cited references discloses using road-load-
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`based hysteresis in determining when to turn the engine on and off, as claimed by
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`claims 80 and 114 and their dependent claims, or limiting the rate of change of torque
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`output of the engine, as required by claim 241 and its dependent claims. Therefore,
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`for the reasons detailed more fully herein, the Board should affirm the patentability
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`of claims 80, 91, 92, 97, 107, 108, 110, 112, 114, 125, 126, 130, 140, 141, 143, 145,
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`241, 252-254, 256-263 and 265 of the ’634 patent.
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`II. THE ’634 PATENT
`A. Background of the ’634 Patent
`The ’634 patent (Ex. 1351), entitled “Hybrid Vehicles,” issued on July 3,
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`2007, from an application with a priority date of September 14, 1998. The ’634
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`patent discloses embodiments of a hybrid electric vehicle, with an internal
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`combustion engine, two electric motors and a battery bank. A microprocessor is
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`employed to control the internal combustion engine, the two electric motors, and the
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`battery bank based on the hybrid vehicle’s instantaneous torque requirements such
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`that the internal combustion engine is only run under high efficiency conditions.
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`See, e.g., Ex. 1351 at Abstract.
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`The hybrid vehicle may be operated in a number of modes based on the
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`vehicle’s instantaneous torque requirements, the engine’s maximum torque output,
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`the state of charge of the battery, and other operating parameters. In an
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`implementation of the ’634 patent, the microprocessor employs a hybrid system
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`control strategy based on sensed and calculated values for system variables that are
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`evaluated against setpoints and causes the vehicle to operate in various operating
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`modes pursuant to this control strategy. See, e.g., id. at 40:16-26.
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`For example, in mode I, the hybrid vehicle is operated as an electric car, with
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`the traction motor providing all torque to propel the vehicle. Id. at 37:24-32. As the
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`vehicle continues to be propelled in electric only mode, the state of charge of the
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`battery may become depleted, and need to be recharged. In this case, the hybrid
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`vehicle may transition to mode II to recharge the battery, in which the vehicle
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`operates as in mode I, with the addition of the engine running the starter/generator
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`motor to provide electrical energy to operate the traction motor and recharge the
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`battery. See, e.g., id. at 37:32-36. When the internal combustion engine can be
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`operated in its fuel efficient range to propel the vehicle, the hybrid vehicle operates
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`in mode IV, with the engine providing torque to propel the vehicle. Id. at 37:42-44;
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`38:51-61. If the vehicle requires additional torque, such as for acceleration or hill-
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`climbing, the vehicle may enter mode V, where the traction motor provides
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`additional propulsion torque beyond that provided by the engine. Id. at 38:1-8.
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`B. Claim Construction
`In IPR proceedings, the Board applies the “broadest reasonable interpretation”
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`standard, which mandates that “[a] claim in an unexpired patent shall be given its
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`broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which
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`it appears.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see also In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793
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`F.3d 1268, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The Federal Circuit has recognized that that
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`standard requires that claims must be read in light of the specification as it would be
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`interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d
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`1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d
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`1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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`“setpoint (SP)”
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`1.
`A “setpoint” is “a definite, but potentially variable value at which a transition
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`between operating modes may occur.” In its Institution Decision, the Board
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`construed “setpoint” as a “predetermined torque value that may or may not be reset.”
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`Paice respectfully requests that the Board reconsider its construction as it is
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`unreasonably broad and does not reasonably reflect the disclosure of the ’634 patent.
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`Instead, the Board should adopt Paice’s construction (“a definite, but potentially
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`variable value at which a transition between operating modes may occur”).
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` The claims and specification of the ’634 patent make clear that a SP is not
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`simply a numerical value divorced from the context of the rest of the control system.
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`Rather, “setpoint” serves the crucial function of marking the transition from one
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`mode to another, and in particular, the transition from propelling the vehicle with
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`the motor to propelling the vehicle with the engine. See, e.g., Ex. 1351 at 40:41-49.
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`For example, in claims 1 and 16, the “setpoint” marks the transition between
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`a mode in which only the motor propels the vehicle, to modes in which the engine
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`also can be used to propel the vehicle or charge the battery. See Ex. 1351 at claims
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`1 and 16. Dependent claim 6 similarly recites “…wherein the controller is further
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`operable to: monitor road load (RL) on the hybrid vehicle over time; and control
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`transition between propulsion of the hybrid vehicle by the first and/or the second
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`electric motors to propulsion by the engine responsive to the RL reaching the SP . .
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`. .” Ex. 1351 at claim 6 (emphasis added); see also id. at claims 8, 11, 19.
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`Additionally,
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`the specification unambiguously defines “setpoint” as
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`synonymous with a “transition point” between modes:
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`[I]n the example of the inventive control strategy discussed above, it is
`repeatedly stated that the transition from low-speed operation to
`highway cruising occurs when road load is equal to 30% of MTO. This
`setpoint, referred to in the appended claims as “SP”, and sometimes
`hereinafter as the transition point (i.e., between operation in modes I
`and IV) is obviously arbitrary and can vary substantially, e.g., between
`30-50% of MTO, within the scope of the invention.
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`Id. at 39:52-59; see also id. at 39:27-37; 40:7-12, 40:13-23; 41:1-4; 43:29-36.
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` The Board’s initial construction of “setpoint” as a “predetermined torque
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`value that may or may not be reset,” see Inst. Dec. at 11, is incorrect and
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`unreasonably broad because it fails to recognize that “setpoint” represents a point at
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`which a transition between different operating modes may occur. The broadening
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`construction is “divorced from the specification and the record evidence” and
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`inconsistent with “the one that those skilled in the art would reach.” See Microsoft,
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`789 F.3d at 1298 (quoting NTP, 654 F.3d at 1288; Cortright, 165 F.3d at 1358). In
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`essence, the construction covers hybrid vehicle systems where transitions between
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`modes never occur—a clear error that is fundamentally contrary to the specification
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`of the ’634 patent. See Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm’n, 386 F.3d 1095,
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`1098 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (claim should not be given overly broad construction that is
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`inconsistent with how claim term is used in the specification). The Board’s
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`“broadest reasonable interpretation” must be reasonable, and must be in conformity
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`with the invention as described in the specification. In re Vaidyanathan, 381 Fed.
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`Appx. 985, 995-96 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also In re Abbott Diabetes Care Inc., 696
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`F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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`Additionally, as set forth in Paice’s preliminary response, “setpoint” should
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`not be limited to a torque value—the specification makes clear that a setpoint is not
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`limited to a torque value and in fact could also be a measure of the state of charge of
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`the battery.
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`[T]he microprocessor tests sensed and calculated values for system
`variables, such as the vehicle's instantaneous torque requirement, i.e.,
`the “road load” RL, the engine's instantaneous torque output ITO, both
`being expressed as a percentage of the engine's maximum torque output
`MTO, and the state of charge of the battery bank BSC, expressed as a
`percentage of its full charge, against setpoints, and uses the results of
`the comparisons to control the mode of vehicle operation.
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`Ex. 1351 at 40:16-26 (emphasis added).
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`Therefore, Paice respectfully requests that the Board reconsider its
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`construction and adopt Paice’s construction of “setpoint” to make clear that it is a
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`value “at which a transition between operating modes may occur.”
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`2.
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`The Challenged Claims Require a Comparison of Road Load
`to Setpoint and MTO
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`Each of the challenged claims as properly construed require a comparison of
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`road load to setpoint and MTO. See Ex. 1351 at claim 80 (“operating at least one
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`electric motor to propel the hybrid vehicle when the RL required to do so is less than
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`a setpoint (SP); operating an internal combustion engine of the hybrid vehicle to
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`propel the hybrid vehicle when the RL required to do so is between the SP and a
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`maximum torque output (MTO) of the engine, … operating both the at least one
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`electric motor and the engine to propel the hybrid vehicle when the torque RL
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`required to do so is more than the MTO”); see also claims 114 and 241. Because
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`Ford appears intent on interpreting these limitations in an unreasonably broad
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`manner to remove the comparison requirement and essentially capture any system
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`where a torque value is above/below a threshold either by coincidence or otherwise,
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`the Board should construe these limitations to make clear that the claimed controller
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`(or method) selects operating modes based on a comparison of RL to SP or MTO.
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`Specifically, the Board should construe “operating at least one electric motor
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`to propel the hybrid vehicle when the RL required to do so is less than a setpoint
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`(SP)” as “operating at least one electric motor to propel the hybrid vehicle when a
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`comparison of the RL to a setpoint (SP) results in a determination that the RL
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`required to do so is less than a SP.” Second, the Board should construe “operating
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`an internal combustion engine of the hybrid vehicle to propel the hybrid vehicle
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`when the RL required to do so is between the SP and a MTO” as “operating an
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`internal combustion engine of the hybrid vehicle to propel the hybrid vehicle when
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`a comparison of the RL to a SP and a MTO results in a determination that the RL
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`required to do so is between the SP and a MTO of the engine.” Third, the Board
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`should construe “operating both the at least one electric motor and the engine to
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`propel the hybrid vehicle when the torque RL required to do so is more than the
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`MTO” as “operating both the at least one electric motor and the engine to propel the
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`hybrid vehicle when a comparison of the RL to a SP and a MTO results in a
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`determination that the torque RL required to do so is more than the MTO.” The
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`intrinsic evidence makes clear that the invention is directed to a control algorithm
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`for selecting operating modes based on the comparison of road load to SP and MTO
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`(see Section II.B.1.) such that any other construction would be “divorced from the
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`specification and the record evidence” and inconsistent with “the one that those
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`skilled in the art would reach.” Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292,
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`1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting NTP, 654 F.3d at 1288.
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`“abnormal and transient conditions”
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`3.
`The Board should construe “abnormal and transient conditions” as “starting
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`and stopping of the engine and provision of torque to satisfy drivability or safety
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`considerations,” to make clear that it does not include “city traffic and reverse
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`operation.” During prosecution of the ’097 patent, the patentee distinguished
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`“abnormal and transient conditions” from “city traffic and reverse operation:”
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`[T]he Examiner interprets “abnormal and transient conditions” wherein
`the engine can be run at output levels less than SP, the minimum power
`output of the engine under normal circumstances, as “in traffic or city
`driv[ing] too many traffic light so too many stops and reverse
`operation.” In fact, city traffic and reverse operation are normal
`conditions and are explicitly provided for. In both, the vehicle typically
`operates as an electric car, with the traction motor providing the torque
`necessary to propel the vehicle, and with the ICE operated to charge the
`battery when it is discharged. The “abnormal and transient conditions”
`referred to are such conditions as starting the engine, during which
`operation it must necessarily be operated at less than SP for a short time.
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`Ex. 2301 at 238. However, Ford improperly interprets “abnormal and transient”
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`conditions broadly as comprising operation in traffic. See Pet. at 37-38.
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`The Board should construe “abnormal and transient conditions” as “starting
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`and stopping of the engine and provision of torque to satisfy drivability or safety
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`considerations.” At a minimum, the Board should reject Ford’s construction and
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`adopt a construction that does not encompass “city traffic and reverse operation.”
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`III. ARGUMENT
`Each of the five instituted grounds of unpatentability should be denied
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`because the claimed invention is novel and nonobvious. In particular, Ford fails to
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`provide an adequate obviousness analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Moreover,
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`Severinsky in combination with any or all of Anderson, Lateur, and Frank fails to
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`disclose or render obvious the “road load,” “setpoint,” road load-based hysteresis,
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`and “limiting a rate of change of torque output of the engine” limitations.
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`Ford’s Conclusory Petition is Deficient Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
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`A.
`As a preliminary matter, the Petition in its entirety is improper inasmuch as it
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`does not perform an adequate obviousness analysis, thus falling short of the
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`requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), 35 U.S.C. § 322, and 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a).
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`Taking Ground 1 as an example, Ford fails to identify the differences between
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`Severinsky and independent claim 241. As a result, Ground 1 fails to establish that
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`“the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art
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`are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
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`invention was made to a person of ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter
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`pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103(a); see also KSR lnt’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
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`406 (2007) (explaining that “the scope and content of the prior art are to be
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`determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be
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`ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved” (quoting
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`Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966))).
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`Specifically, with respect to Ground 1, Ford claims to be performing an
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`obviousness analysis, but for several claim elements does not indicate whether
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`Severinsky actually discloses or merely renders obvious that claim element. Instead,
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`Ford seems to argue that Severinsky discloses each of these claim elements but
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`curiously concludes each assertion with a statement that a person of ordinary skill in
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`the art (“POSA”) would have “understood” that those claim elements are present.
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`See Pet. at 14 (“A POSA would have understood that the microprocessor can deliver
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`‘all torque required,’ or determine that ‘torque in excess’ of engine capabilities is
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`“required” only by ‘determining [the] instantaneous road load (RL) required to
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`propel the hybrid vehicle.’” (citing Ex. 1352 ¶¶ 131-34)); id. at 17 (“Based on this
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`disclosure, a POSA would have understood that Severinsky ’970 describes
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`limitations [241.2] and [241.3][a].”); id. at 18 (“A POSA would have also
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`understood that Severinsky ’970 discloses limitation [241.2], i.e., ‘operating at least
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`one electric motor to propel the hybrid vehicle when the RL required to do so is less
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`than a setpoint (SP).’” (citing Ex. 1352 ¶¶ 154-56, 158)).
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`As a result, it is entirely unclear whether Ford is advancing anticipation
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`arguments (e.g., through the doctrine of inherency) or obviousness arguments for
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`each of these claim elements. If the former, Ford fails to explain why each particular
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`claim element is necessarily present. Bettcher Indus., Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., 661
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`F.3d 629, 639 (Fed.Cir.2011) (“Inherency . . . may not be established by probabilities
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`or possibilities.” (quoting In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (CCPA 1981))). If the
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`latter, Ford fails to provide the requisite Graham v. John Deere analysis by failing
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`to, among other things, identify the differences between the claimed subject matter
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`and the prior art and identify why those differences would have been obvious to a
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`POSA. Ford’s conclusory Petition is insufficient to establish obviousness.
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`B.
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`Ford Will Be Estopped from Maintaining Challenges to Claims 80
`and 114
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`Ford will be estopped from maintaining its challenges to claims 80 and 114,
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`pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1). Under section 315(e)(1), upon a “final written
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`decision” Ford “may not request or maintain a proceeding before the Office with
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`respect to that claim on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could
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`have raised during that inter partes review.” Specifically, the Board will enter a
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`final written decision in IPR2014-01416 with respect to claims 80 and 114 in the
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`Petition prior to March 12, 2016, well before the deadline for a final written decision
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`in this case. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(c). Thus, the Board should dismiss the Petition
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`with respect to those claims.
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`C. Grounds 1-5 Should Be Denied—the Prior Art of Record Fails to
`Disclose Using Road Load to Determine When to Operate the
`Engine
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`Grounds 1 through 5 should be denied because the prior art on which Ford
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`relies does not disclose or render obvious using road load to determine when to select
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`operating modes. For example, all of the challenged claims require using road load
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`to determine when to operate the internal combustion engine to propel the hybrid
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`vehicle and when to operate one or more electric motors. See, e.g., Ex. 1351 at
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`claims 80 (“operating an internal combustion engine of the hybrid vehicle to propel
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`the hybrid vehicle when the RL required to do so is between the SP and a maximum
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`torque output (MTO) of the engine”), 114, 241. More specifically, as properly
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`construed (see Section II.B.2), the claims require the comparison of road load to a
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`setpoint. Ford relies entirely on Severinsky as allegedly disclosing a road-load-
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`based control strategy; however, Severinsky not once discloses using road load and
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`setpoint to make mode selection decisions, let alone comparing road load to a
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`setpoint. Severinsky uses speed, not road load, to select operating modes, for
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`example, to determine when to turn the engine on and when to turn the engine off
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`(and operating the motor to propel the vehicle).
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`Patent No. 7,237,634
`Patent Owner’s Response
`1.
`Severinsky determines when to use the internal combustion engine based on
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`Case IPR2015-00785
`Attorney Docket No: 36351-0015I