throbber
Petitioner’s Reply in Support of Petition
`IPR2015-00740
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`WHATSAPP, INC. AND FACEBOOK, INC.
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`TRIPLAY, INC.
`Patent Owner
`
`Inter Partes Review No. 2015-00740
`U.S. Patent No. 8,332,475
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`PETITIONERS’ REPLY
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`Table of Contents
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`Page
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`I.
`II.
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`
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`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1
`COULOMBE RENDERS OBVIOUS CLAIMS 1, 12, 23, 37, 39
`AND 41…………………………………………………………………….. 3
`A.
`Claim 1 Does Not Require Selection from a Fixed Set
`of Choices…………………………………………………………… 3
`B. A Narrow Construction Does Not Distinguish Coulombe .................. 9
`III. COULOMBE IN VIEW OF DRUYAN AND TITTEL RENDER OBVIOUS
`CLAIMS 6, 9, 17, 18, 28, 40 AND 42…………………………………..…11
`A.
`“Template” ......................................................................................... 11
`B.
`“Predefined Layout” ........................................................................... 14
`
`i. The Patent Owner’s Interpretation is Incorrect ........................... 14
`
`ii. The Prior Art Renders Obvious the “Predefined Template” ...... 16
`
`The Prior Art Is Properly Combinable ............................................... 18
`i. Messaging vs. Web Browsing Technologies .............................. 19
`ii. XSLT vs. CSS Style Sheets in Combination with
`Coulombe ........................................................................................... 21
`IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 25
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`C.
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`-i-
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`Petitioner’s Reply in Support of Petition
`IPR2015-00740
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`List of Exhibits
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`Exhibit No.
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`1013
`1014
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`1015
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`1016
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`1017
`1018
`1019
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`1020
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`1021
`1022
`1023
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`1024
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`Title of Document
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`Reply Declaration of David Klausner
`Transcript of the Deposition of Rajeev Surati, Ph.D. (taken on
`March 22, 2016)
`The New Oxford American Dictionary, Oxford University Press,
`(2d ed. 2005), p. 1536
`Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 2001), p.
`1734
`Webster’s II New College Dictionary (1999), p. 1000
`U.S. Patent No. 8,181,104 to Russ Helfand et al.
`Ken Slovak, Absolute Beginner’s Guide to MicroSoft Office 2003
`(2004), pp. 20-21, 68-70
`U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2002/0116415 to Rabindranath Dutta et
`al.
`U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2005/0257142 to Cheng-Shing Lai et al.
`Hans Bergsten, JavaServer Pages (3d ed. 2004), pp. 3-10
`Duane K. Fields, et al., Web Development with JavaServer Pages
`(2d ed. 2002), pp. 483-485
`U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2005/0050454 to Aidon Jennery et al.
`
`ii
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`Petitioner’s Reply in Support of Petition
`IPR2015-00740
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`The patent owner’s opposition presents only a limited challenge to the
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`instituted grounds of review. With respect to representative claim 1, the patent
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`owner’s sole argument is that Coulombe does not disclose a media block
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`“configured to select, before transmitting, at least one message format and message
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`layout.” The patent owner’s argument rests on a narrow construction of the term
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`“select” that would require that the message format and layout be chosen “from a
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`fixed set of choices.” As explained in detail in Part II.A below, the patent owner’s
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`argument is unsupported by the plain claim language and refuted by the intrinsic
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`record. The patent owner’s construction, in fact, would exclude embodiments in
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`the specification in which format and layout are dynamically chosen based on
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`instructions in the message itself, rather than from a fixed set of choices built-in to
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`the messaging system.
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`With respect to representative claim 6, the patent owner does not dispute that
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`the prior art discloses each limitation with the exception of the “template” and
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`“predefined layout” limitations, for which the patent owner relies on impermissibly
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`narrow constructions. As explained in Part III.A below, however, the style sheets
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`in Druyan and Tittel meet the “template” limitation because they define the user
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`interface (including the layout and appearance) for presenting the content.
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`Contrary to the patent owner’s arguments, the claimed “template” need not contain
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`Petitioner’s Reply in Support of Petition
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`the actual content of the message nor a visually displayed interface.
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`With respect to the “predefined layout” limitation, the patent owner argues
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`that the layout must be defined before the message is received. But reminiscent of
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`its argument about the term “select,” the patent owner’s argument cannot be
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`reconciled with the intrinsic record. The specification expressly discloses that the
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`message layout may be predefined based on information received with the message
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`itself, thus refuting the patent owner’s position. A “predefined layout” must
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`simply be defined before it is used. Thus, the patent owner’s argument fails.
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`Finally, the patent owner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art
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`would not have combined Coulombe with the style sheet teachings of Druyan and
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`Tittel because, according to the patent owner, the former pertains to messaging and
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`the latter to web browsing. However, the patent owner’s argument ignores the fact
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`that HTML and style sheets are not “web” technologies at all—they are generic
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`technologies for organizing and presenting content through HTML documents.
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`These technologies exist separate and apart from the web, and as the patent
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`owner’s expert conceded, HTML documents can be transmitted through e-mail or
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`other types of messaging systems. The patent owner’s “web vs. messaging”
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`distinction is therefore without merit. For all of the reasons set forth below, and in
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`the original Petition, all challenged claims should be found unpatentable.
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`Petitioner’s Reply in Support of Petition
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`II. COULOMBE RENDERS OBVIOUS CLAIMS 1, 12, 23, 37, 39, AND 41
`The patent owner treats claim 1 as representative of claims 12, 23, 37, 39,
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`and 41, and thus, relies only on its arguments pertaining to claim 1. (Resp. at 55-
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`56; see also Pet. at 9-10.) The patent owner relies on only one argument with
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`respect to these claims. Specifically, the patent owner asserts that Coulombe fails
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`to disclose or render obvious a media block “configured to select, before
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`transmitting, at least one message format and message layout . . . .” (Id. at 33
`
`(emphasis in original); see also id. at 34.) The patent owner rests this argument
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`entirely on a narrow interpretation of the word “select.” According to the patent
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`owner, “this limitation requires that the media block be configured to select a
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`format and layout from a fixed set of layout and format choices.” (Id. at 33
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`(emphasis added); see also id. at 25-29.) As shown below, the patent owner’s
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`argument fails for two reasons. First, the proper construction of “select” does not
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`require a fixed set of layout and format choices. Second, even if the Board were to
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`adopt the patent owner’s construction, it would not distinguish Coulombe.
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`A. Claim 1 Does Not Require Selection from a Fixed Set of Choices
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`It is well-settled that claim terms should normally not be interpreted “in a
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`way that excludes embodiments disclosed in the specification.” Oatey Co. v. IPS
`
`Corp., 514 F.3d 1271, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008). But that is exactly what the patent
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`owner’s proposed construction would do. As explained below, the specification
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`expressly discloses an embodiment in which the messaging system selects the
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`message format and layout dynamically based on information provided with the
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`message—instead of from a “fixed set of format and layout choices.” This
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`embodiment would be excluded under the patent owner’s proposed construction of
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`“select.” The term “select” as recited in claim 1 is therefore synonymous with
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`“decide” or “determine,” and does not require selection from a fixed set of choices.
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`In particular, the specification explains that the messaging system 16 makes
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`a “delivery decision” on how a received message should be handled before
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`delivery to the destination. (’475, Ex. 1001, 16:51-63; see also id. Fig. 6.) The
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`claimed selection of the message format and layout is encompassed within this
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`“delivery decision.” As the specification explains:
`
`The delivery decision comprises delivery instructions with regard to
`destination device(s) and/or content and/or format and/or layout of the
`message to be delivered. The delivery instructions or parts thereof
`may be received with the message (e.g. contained in the metadata),
`extracted and provided accordingly, and/or may be predefined in the
`system (e.g. in a form of a lookup table providing matching between
`originating device and/or destination device and format and/or layout
`of the message to be converted for delivery).
`
`(’475, 16:63-17:4 (underlining added).) This passage discloses at least two
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`alternative techniques for selecting a format and layout for a received message: (1)
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`relying on instructions “received with the message (e.g. contained in the
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`metadata),” “or” (2) using instructions “predefined in the system” such as a lookup
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`table for matching an intended destination device to appropriate format and layout.
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`(Id.) The first way (1), in which format and layout may be selected based on
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`information carried in the message itself, is clearly not selection “from a fixed set
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`of layout and format choices.” Because the possible choices of format and layout
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`“predefined in the system” may be augmented—even replaced—by instructions or
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`metadata received with the message, the messaging system is clearly not restricted
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`to selecting from a set of formats and layouts predefined, built-in, or otherwise
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`“fixed” by the messaging system. (Klausner Reply Decl., Ex. 1013, ¶ 8.) In fact,
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`the messaging system could select a new format and layout that it first learns about
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`upon receipt of the message. (Id.) One of ordinary skill in the art would therefore
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`have understood that the set of formats and layouts the messaging system selects
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`from can contain any number of format and layout options. The ’475 patent places
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`no limits on the type of delivery instructions that “may be received with the
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`message (e.g. contained in the metadata), extracted and provided accordingly.”
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`(’475, 17:66-17:1; see also Klausner Reply Decl., ¶ 9.)
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`By requiring selection of format and layout from a “fixed set of choices,” the
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`patent owner’s construction would exclude all embodiments involving format and
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`layout options not pre-programmed into the messaging system, including
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`embodiments in which the format and layout are selected based on information
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`received with the message itself. See Canon Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC,
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`Case No. IPR2014-00631, Paper 50 (Final Written Decision), at 12-14 (PTAB
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`Aug. 19, 2015) (citing Oatey Co. and declining to adopt the patent owner’s
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`proposed narrower construction of “selecting” where it would exclude certain
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`embodiments disclosed in the specification).
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`The patent owner relies on the second embodiment (2) in which the format
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`and layout may be predefined and identified through a lookup table. But this is
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`just one embodiment and not a claim limitation. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
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`415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[A]lthough the specification
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`often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly
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`warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”). Nothing in the
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`claims, specification, or prosecution history suggests that the applicant intended to
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`limit the claims to the “lookup table” embodiment. A person of ordinary skill in
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`the art would
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`therefore
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`interpret claim 1 under
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`its broadest reasonable
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`interpretation to cover selection from both the fixed choices in a lookup table
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`predefined in the messaging system, and the selecting format and layout
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`dynamically based on instructions or metadata provided with the incoming
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`message itself. (Klausner Reply Decl., Ex. 1013, ¶ 11.)
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`The dictionary definitions cited by the patent owner do not prove otherwise.
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`(Resp. at 26.) Although they suggest a choice from among alternatives, they fall
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`short of requiring that the alternatives be predefined, static, or otherwise “fixed” in
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`any way. The patent owner has also ignored other definitions of “select” that
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`simply mean “to choose” or “make a choice.” (See Klausner Reply Decl. ¶ 12
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`(citing Ex 1015, at 1536; Ex 1016, at 1734; Ex 1017, at 1000).)
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`In any event, the intrinsic evidence is far more valuable here than dictionary
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`definitions for ascertaining what it means to “select” a format and layout under
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`claim 1. See, e.g., Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Lear Corp., 516 F.3d 1331, 1335
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Intrinsic evidence, that is the claims, written description, and the
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`prosecution history of the patent, is a more reliable guide to the meaning of a claim
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`term than are extrinsic sources like technical dictionaries, treatises, and expert
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`testimony.”). As explained above, the specification equates the claimed selection
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`with a “delivery decision,” and makes clear that the decision can be based either on
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`dynamic information carried with the received message itself, or a predefined set
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`of choices. (’475, 16:63-17:4.) In either case, the word “select” as used in the
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`claim is synonymous with “decide” or “determine,” which both connote making a
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`choice or decision about the format and layout to use for the message.
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`Moreover,
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`the
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`’475 patent describes a
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`template-based messaging
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`embodiment that confirms that the layout of a message may be selected based on
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`information that is not fixed or predefined in the messaging system:
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`Accordingly, for template-based messaging the delivery instructions
`with regard to layout of the message are based on predefined layout of
`message matching to template unique identifier and capabilities of
`destination device. The
`layout may be further predefined
`in
`accordance with information to be obtained with regard to certain
`filled field, format of selected media items, etc.
`(’475, 21:1-8 (underlining added).) As the patent owner’s expert confirmed, the
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`underlined text above refers to information (such as the content of fields that were
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`filled in or the format of media items accompanying the message) that is provided
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`with an incoming message, and therefore, unknown by the messaging system until
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`receipt of the message. (Surati Depo., Ex. 1014, at 60:23-62:11.) Because this
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`embodiment would be excluded, the patent owner’s proposed construction of
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`“select” cannot be the broadest reasonable interpretation.
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`Finally, the definition proposed by the Petitioner is supported by the way in
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`which the word “select” is used in other parts of claim 1. For example, a
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`subsequent limitation in claim 1 recites conversion of the message “in accordance
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`with at least one criterion selected from a group comprising,” followed by three
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`identified criteria. (’475, 23:23-34 (emphasis added).) This language would have
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`indicated to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the applicant knew how to use
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`the verb “select” in the narrower context of choosing from a limited set of options.
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`(Klausner Reply Decl., ¶ 17.)
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`B. A Narrow Construction Does Not Distinguish Coulombe
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`Even assuming that the term “select” were construed to require a fixed set of
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`choices, it would not distinguish Coulombe. The patent owner contends that a
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`fixed set of format and layout choices “would be contrary to” Coulombe because,
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`according to the patent owner, Coulombe provides a “flexible design in which
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`format and layout adaption can encompass any incoming message characteristics,
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`any destination device characteristics, and user preferences.” (Resp. at 34.)
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`But this conclusion derives from the false premise that a Coulombe system
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`would be capable of an infinite variety of format and layout adaptations. (Klausner
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`Reply Decl., ¶ 20.) To the contrary, Coulombe teaches a computer-based system,
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`and as such, the messaging system can only carry out the operations it is
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`programmed to perform, and the system must provide software (or equivalent
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`functionality) to carry out each adaptation described. (Id.; see also Coulombe, ¶¶
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`0081, 0092, 0093.) Unlike the ’475 patent, Coulombe does not suggest that
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`instructions provided by system software for selecting format and layout may be
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`augmented by instructions provided with the received message. Thus, the
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`available choices of adaptations in a Coulombe system are necessarily “fixed” and
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`limited to those enabled by system software, and accordingly, the system is not so
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`“flexible,” as the patent owner claims, so as to enable format and layout adaptation
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`for “any incoming message characteristics, any destination device characteristics,
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`and user preferences.” (Klausner Reply Decl., ¶ 21.) Coulombe itself expressly
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`recognizes the existence of limitations to adaptation choices by acknowledging that
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`there may be situations in which the “[t]he Message Adaptation Engine returns . . .
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`the original message” because adaptation was unsuccessful. (Coulombe, ¶ 0083.)
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`In fact, the format and layout choices in Coulombe are more “fixed” than
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`those in the ’475 patent because, as discussed above, the ’475 patent allows format
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`and layout to be selected based at least in part on instructions and metadata
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`provided with the received message itself. (Klausner Reply Decl., ¶ 22.) This
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`obviates the need to rely on fixed formats or layouts built-in to the messaging
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`system. (Id.) Moreover, in light of the broad definitions in the ’475 specification,
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`Coulombe cannot be said to be any more “flexible” than the ’475 patent with
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`respect to incoming message characteristics, destination device characteristics, or
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`user preferences. (See ’475, 10:43-55 (a message can be “any kind of
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`communication objects capable to be exchanged between communication devices”
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`and media items can be “in any available formats”); 10:27-42 (supported devices);
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`15:7-14 (support for “sender’s and/or receivers’ preferences, if any, related to
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`destination device, message layout and/or format, etc.”) (emphases added).)
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`Accordingly, a narrow construction of “select” would not distinguish
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`Coulombe from claim 1. For the reasons stated in the Petition, therefore, claims 1,
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`12, 23, 37, 39, and 41 would have been obvious over Coulombe.
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`III. COULOMBE IN VIEW OF DRUYAN AND TITTEL RENDER OBVIOUS CLAIMS 6,
`9, 17, 18, 28, 40 AND 42
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`As noted, the patent owner treats claim 6 as representative of claims 9, 17,
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`18, 28, 40 and 42, and thus, limits its arguments solely to those raised for claim 6.
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`(Resp. at 56; see also Pet. at 9-11.) The patent owner takes issue with only two
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`limitations in claim 6—“template” and “predefined layout.” (Resp. at 35-39.) The
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`patent owner also contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have
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`been motivated to combine Coulombe with either Tittel or Druyan. (Id. at 39-55.)
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`The patent owner’s arguments on these issues are without merit.
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`A.
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`“Template”
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`According to the patent owner, the style sheets in Druyan and Tittel are not
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`“templates” because neither qualifies as a “predefined user interface.” (Resp. at
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`36.) However, it is undisputed that a style sheet specifies the appearance of an
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`HTML document, including its style and layout. (Ex. 1002, ¶¶ 88-89, 92, 100.)
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`As the patent owner’s expert conceded, a style sheet can specify, among other
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`things, how elements are arranged on the screen, the color, size and fonts
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`associated with those elements, the screen background and foreground colors, and
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`a number of other visual properties. (Surati Depo., at 28:17-29:17.) A style sheet
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`can even be used to prevent objects from being shown when the HTML document
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`is displayed. (Id. at 29:18-30:3.) These are clearly “user interface” properties
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`because they affect how the information will be presented to the user. (Klausner
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`Reply Decl., ¶ 26.) The style sheet, in other words, defines the user interface for
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`presenting the content and/or layout in the underlying HTML document to the user.
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`(Id.) A style sheet therefore qualifies as a “template.” (Id.)
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`The patent owner relies on a narrow interpretation of the phrase “predefined
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`user interface” in its attempt to exclude style sheets from the definition of
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`“templates.” According to the patent owner, “a ‘predefined user interface,’ . . . has
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`to include a visually displayed interface consisting of actual data elements of
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`interest and not just the fonts or colors to apply to the elements in an HTML
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`document.” (Resp. at 36-37.) The only statement from the specification the patent
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`owner cites in support is: “Typically the template comprises a pre-existing text,
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`and/or spaces to be filled and/or media items and/or menu elements.” (Id. (quoting
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`’475, 11:11-14) (emphasis added).) But this statement just describes one example
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`and expressly qualifies itself by the word “typically,” indicating an exemplary
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`rather than a limiting description. Further, the requirement that the “template”
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`contain actual content (“has to include . . . actual data elements of interest”)
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`contradicts the patent’s express definition of “template” that makes clear that a
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`template may relate to only layout and need not include the underlying content.
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`(’475, 11:8-11 (“. . . related to content and/or layout . . .”) (emphasis added).)
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`Moreover, even if there were some merit to the patent owner’s assertion that
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`the term “template” requires a “visually displayed interface” employed to create
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`the content or layout information, it would not alter the ultimate conclusion of
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`obviousness. (Klausner Reply Decl., ¶ 29.) Figure 2 in Coulombe clearly
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`discloses a user interface showing the content of an initial message. (Surati Depo.,
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`at 86:2-13; see also Coulombe, Ex. 1003, ¶ 0094 (“The original message is shown
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`on the left.”).) One of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the
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`content shown in this user interface (to the left of Figure 2) can be created using a
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`“visually displayed interface” of the sending terminal. (Klausner Reply Decl., ¶
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`29.) It was also well-known to persons of ordinary skill in art prior to 2005 that a
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`created message akin to what is shown to the left of Figure 2 can be formatted as
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`an HTML document having a layout defined using CSS. (Id. (citing U.S. App.
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`Pub. No. 2005/0257142 (filed May 13, 2004), Ex. 1021).)
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`Prior to 2005, it was also well-known that a software program commonly
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`referred to as a text editor could have been used to create CSS files. (Klausner
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`Reply Decl., ¶ 30; Surati Depo., Ex. 1014, at 83:6-84.) Text editing software
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`included programs with graphical user interfaces, including word processors (e.g.
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`Microsoft Word) and more rudimentary text editors (such as Microsoft Notepad).
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`(Id.) It would have been common knowledge and apparent to a person of ordinary
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`skill in the art that the style sheets in Tittel and Druyan (which disclose the
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`“template” in claim 6) could have been created through a text editor program that
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`provides a user interface for typing in and/or editing style sheet text. (Id. (citing
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,181,104 (filed Aug. 31, 2004), Ex. 1018).) Thus, the prior art
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`discloses and renders obvious the “template” limitation in claim 6.
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`B.
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`“Predefined Layout”
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`The patent owner next contends that the prior art does not disclose “at least
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`one predefined layout,” as recited in claim 6, because the term “predefined layout,”
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`according to the patent owner, requires the layout to be “created prior to the
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`incoming message being received.” (Resp. at 37; see also id. at 29.) As shown
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`below, the patent owner’s arguments are based on an impermissibly narrow
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`interpretation of “predefined layout.” And even if such an interpretation were
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`adopted, the prior art would still render obvious the claimed “predefined layout.”
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`i.
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`The Patent Owner’s Interpretation is Incorrect
`
`The problems with the patent owner’s interpretation of “predefined layout”
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`mirror the patent owner’s flawed logic with respect to the term “select” from claim
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`1. As with the term “select,” the specification makes clear that a “predefined
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`layout” does not need to be defined before receipt of the message by the messaging
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`system. This is because the layout may be “predefined” based on information
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`received with the incoming message itself:
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`Accordingly, for template-based messaging the delivery instructions
`with regard to layout of the message are based on predefined layout of
`message matching to template unique identifier and capabilities of
`destination decide. The
`layout may be further predefined
`in
`accordance with information to be obtained with regard to certain
`filled field, format of selected media items, etc.
`
`(’475, 21:1-8 (underlining added).) As confirmed by the patent owner’s expert, the
`
`“information to be obtained with regard to certain filled field,” as well as “selected
`
`media items,” is transmitted along with the message that is received by the
`
`messaging system. (Surati Depo., Ex. 1014, at 61:2-18, 62:1-11.) Because this
`
`passage makes clear that the layout may be predefined by information first
`
`obtained by the messaging system after receipt of the message, the patent owner’s
`
`definition of “predefined layout” is too narrow. See Oatey Co., supra, 514 F.3d at
`
`1276 (“We normally do not interpret claim terms in a way that excludes
`
`embodiments disclosed in the specification.”). The correct interpretation of
`
`“predefined layout,” in light of the specification, is a layout that is created or
`
`defined prior to being used. (Ex. 1002, ¶¶ 118, 119.)
`
`The patent owner cites the specification’s description of “look up tables”
`
`used to select the applicable layout (Resp. at 29-30), but as explained above in
`
`connection with the term “select,” this is just one embodiment. There is no basis in
`
`the intrinsic record to limit the claim to the look up table embodiment. See
`
`
`
`15
`
`

`
`Petitioner’s Reply in Support of Petition
`IPR2015-00740
`
`Phillips, supra, 415 F.3d at 1323 (“[W]e have repeatedly warned against confining
`
`the claims to those embodiments.”).
`
`The patent owner further contends that “a construction of ‘predefined
`
`layout’ allowing for the layout to be generated ‘on the fly’ would improperly
`
`render the word ‘predefined’ superfluous.” (Id. at 29). But it would not. As noted
`
`above, the specification clearly discloses that “[t]he layout may be further
`
`predefined” based on information first received with the incoming message.
`
`(’475, 21:1-8 (underlining added).) This confirms that creating a layout after
`
`receipt of the message is entirely consistent with the “predefined layout.”
`
`Moreover, other language in claims 1 and 6 indicates that the inventors knew
`
`how to draft claim limitations having a “before” temporal requirement. Claims 1
`
`and 6, for example, recites that the media block is “configured to select, before
`
`transmitting, at least one message format and a message layout.” Had the
`
`inventors intended to require that the layout be defined before receipt of the
`
`message, they certainly could have specified in the claim language.
`
`ii.
`
`The Prior Art Renders Obvious the “Predefined Template”
`
`Moreover, the patent owner’s narrow definition of “predefined layout,” even
`
`if adopted, would not alter the obviousness analysis. Druyan specifically discloses
`
`that a derivative style sheet may be created “manually” (Druyan, 3:37-41), which
`
`as the patent owner’s expert acknowledged, would occur before the receipt of a
`
`
`
`16
`
`

`
`Petitioner’s Reply in Support of Petition
`IPR2015-00740
`
`request for the web page. (Surati Depo. at 72:3-73:11.) Indeed, it would make no
`
`sense to manually create a derivative style sheet “on the fly” in response to a web
`
`page request. (Klausner Reply Decl. ¶ 36.)
`
`Moreover, it would have been obvious to create the derivative style sheet in
`
`Druyan (the “predefined layout”) by the messaging system prior to receiving an
`
`incoming message because the messaging system in Coulombe can “pre-register”
`
`information about the capabilities of the destination device prior to receipt.
`
`(Klausner Reply Decl., ¶ 35; see also Coulombe, ¶ 0117.) If the system knows the
`
`capabilities of the destination device and the type of content it will receive, as the
`
`patent owner’s expert acknowledged, it could pre-create the derivative style sheet.
`
`(Surati Depo. at 77:8-15.) This would be particularly useful for the HTML
`
`spreadsheet documents in Druyan, which have consistent and predictable
`
`“spreadsheet” format with well-defined columns carrying particular types of
`
`information. (Druyan, Ex. 1004, Figs. 1, 5A, 5B, 5C; Klausner Reply Decl., ¶ 35.)
`
`Druyan could therefore reuse the derivative style sheet upon receipt of an HTML
`
`document containing new data for the spreadsheet. (Klausner Reply Decl., ¶ 35.)
`
`The patent owner claims that “[t]he derivative style sheets in Druyan are
`
`generated at the time of the device user’s request for the web page” (Resp. at 22-
`
`23), but the actual statement in Druyan is: “In Step 610, in response to receiving a
`
`request to restyle the web page, first derivative XSLT style sheet file 310 . . . is
`
`
`
`17
`
`

`
`Petitioner’s Reply in Support of Petition
`IPR2015-00740
`
`generated.” (Druyan, 5:43-46.) A “request to restyle the web page” is not
`
`synonymous with a web browser request for the page. (Klausner Reply Decl., ¶
`
`37.) And a request to restyle a web page could happen before or after a request for
`
`the particular web page has been received. (Surati Depo., at 73:18-74:14.)
`
`In addition, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have assigned no
`
`particular significance in the timing of the creation of a derivative style sheet. For
`
`example, the system in Druyan could “cache” a previously-created style sheet and
`
`then reuse that previously-created style sheet as a “predetermined style sheet” for a
`
`subsequent request. (Surati Depo. at 102:2-103:11.) The use of such caching
`
`techniques, including creating and retrieving web page files, was well-known to
`
`persons of ordinary skill in the art prior to 2005. (Id. at 103:21-23.) In fact,
`
`Coulombe specifically describes a caching technique for the purpose of reusing
`
`capabilities information obtained from a destination device for “future messages.”
`
`(Coulombe, ¶ 0082; see also id. ¶ 0117.) Therefore, the timing of the creation of
`
`the derivative style sheets to be used for a particular request would have been
`
`regarded as a trivial implementation detail. (Klausner Reply Decl., ¶ 38.)
`
`C.
`
`The Prior Art Is Properly Combinable
`
`The patent owner presents a series of arguments challenging whether a
`
`person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a motivation to combine
`
`Coulombe with Druyan and Tittel. (Resp. at 39-55.) These arguments lack merit.
`
`
`
`18
`
`

`
`Petitioner’s Reply in Support of Petition
`IPR2015-00740
`
`
`i. Messaging vs. Web Browsing Technologies
`
`One of the recurrent themes and arguments articulated by the patent owner is
`
`that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not be motivated to combine (a) a
`
`messaging system such as Coulombe with (b) a system concerned with web
`
`browsing, such as Druyan, because messaging and web browsing allegedly present

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