Footnotes begin on page 24.
`
`A Bitter Pill to Swallow:
`The Rise and Fall
`of the Tablet Computer
`Paul Atkinson
`
`Tablet computers (or tablet PCs) are a form of mobile personal
`computer with large, touch-sensitive screens operated using a pen,
`stylus, or finger; and the ability to recognize a user’s handwriting—a
`process known as “pen computing.”
`The first of these devices, which appeared at the end of the
`1980s, generated a huge amount of interest in the computer industry,
`and serious amounts of investment money from venture capitalists.
`Pen computing was seen as the next wave of the silicon revolution,
`and the tablet computer was seen as a device everyone would want
`to use. It was reported in 1991 that “Nearly every major maker of
`computers has some type of pen-based machine in the works.” 1
`Yet in the space of just a few years, the tablet computer and
`the notion of pen computing sank almost without a trace.2 Following
`a series of disastrous product launches and the failure of a number
`of promising start-up companies, the tablet computer was discred-
`ited as an unfulfilled promise. It no longer represented the future
`of mobile computing, but instead was derided as an expensive
`folly—an irrelevant sideline in the history of the computer.
`This article traces the early development of pen comput-
`ing, the appearance, proliferation, and disappearance of the tablet
`computer, and explores possible reasons for the demise of this partic-
`ular class of product.
`
`Product Failures in the History of Computing
`This article is concerned with the design, production, and consump-
`tion of artifacts, and the numerous factors which can affect their
`success or failure in the marketplace. For any company bringing a
`product to market, the amount of time and money invested in the
`research, design, and development of the product itself and in the
`market research, promotion, packaging, distribution, and retailing of
`a product means that an unsuccessful product launch is an extremely
`serious but unfortunately all too real prospect. The risk perhaps is
`understandably more common when the artifacts are complex tech-
`nological products in a fiercely competitive field, and where the
`technology itself is still relatively young, not yet stable, and in a
`constant state of flux. Consequently, the historical development of
`the personal computer is (quite literally) littered with examples of
`products that have failed in the marketplace.
`
`© 2008 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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`Occasionally, because of poor manufacture, misdirected
`marketing or promotion, and software not meeting consumer expec-
`tations, some of these products could be said to have “deserved”
`to fail. However, advances in production technologies and qual-
`ity control in recent years have reduced manufacturing failures
`(notwithstanding some very well publicized events such as the poor
`battery life of earlier “iPods,” the cracked screens of the first iPod
`“Nano,” and exploding batteries in some Sony laptops3). But despite
`advances in manufacturing quality, there still are numerous exam-
`ples of well-designed products (often winning design awards) which
`were heavily promoted and performed as promised, yet still failed
`in the marketplace. Obviously, merely solving pragmatic problems
`is no guarantee of success.
`
`Product Failures and Theories of Technological Change
`A great deal has been written from a number of different perspec-
`tives about why technological products fail in the marketplace.
`These include economic and business analyses, marketing critiques,
`design critiques, and sociological enquiries. This body of work is
`far too large to describe in any depth here, but concludes that there
`are multiple reasons in each case for product failure in the market-
`place.
`
`In The Invisible Computer, Donald A. Norman refers to the
`notion of “disruptive technologies”—technologies which have the
`ability to change people’s lives and the entire course of the indus-
`try.4 It is Norman’s contention that this ability to disrupt inherently
`produces products to which there initially is a large amount of resis-
`tance. Norman also believes that company attitudes, including inter-
`nal politics, the preference for an existing, tried and tested market
`over the need to develop a new one, and the need to produce profits
`quickly rather than investing in new products which may take a
`number of years to reach maturity means that new technologies are
`not taken seriously enough.5
`Norman’s argument is that, in order to be accepted in the
`marketplace, three factors have to be right: the technology, the
`marketing, and user experience. As an example, he quotes the
`well-known story of the Xerox “Star” computer designed at Xerox
`PARC in the early 1980s. The Star was a product well ahead of its
`time, having the first commercially available graphical user inter-
`face (GUI), and a design philosophy of user interaction that set the
`standard for an entire generation of PCs. Unfortunately, it was a
`consumer product before the consumer existed. The product had
`not gone through the process of exposure to the marketplace, which
`normally occurs when a new technology appears, is accepted by
`“early adopters” of technology, and then is refined for the mass
`market. The same thing happened a few years later when Apple
`introduced the “Lisa”—a larger, more expensive precursor to the
`Macintosh. In both cases, the technology wasn’t quite ready. They
`
`4
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`both were painfully slow, had limited functionality because no one
`had written applications for them, and were extremely expensive.
`Therefore, there was no benefit for “early adopters” of technology
`in using these products, despite the novelty of the GUI , as the lack
`of application software meant that they didn’t do anything other
`computers couldn’t already do. The fate of the Star and the Lisa
`would have been shared by the Macintosh, had it not been saved
`by the advent of a “killer application,” making it indispensable
`to specific groups of users. This was desktop publishing software
`and the invention of the laser printer.6 Norman’s view is that the
`Star and the Lisa both had superb user experiences, but insufficient
`technology and marketing.7 Not having all three was the reason for
`failure.
`This underscores the fact that the reasons for failure in the
`marketplace of any product are more complex than at first might be
`imagined. We will explore this notion in other theories that address
`the same issues.
`The theory of the social construction of technology takes the
`view that a complex range of factors are involved in the success
`of products, and that social factors have precedence in the process.
`As a counterpoint to a physical reality affecting outcomes (i.e., the
`technology itself), social constructionists see a web of relationships
`between people and between institutions that share beliefs and
`meanings as a collective product of a society, and that these relation-
`ships are the basis for subjective interpretations rather than physical
`or objective facts. The notion of the “truth” of a socially constructed
`interpretation or piece of knowledge is irrelevant—it remains merely
`an interpretation.8 It is an interpretation, though, which has signifi-
`cant agency.
`This is in direct contrast to the theory of technological deter-
`minism—the view that technology and technological change are
`independent factors, impacting on society from the outside of that
`society—and that technology changes as a matter of course, follow-
`ing its own path, and in doing so changes the society on which it
`impacts. (A good example is the notion of “Moore’s Law,” which
`states that the power of a microchip doubles every year as if it were
`a “natural” phenomenon). There is an element of truth contained
`within this, in that technological products do affect and can change
`our lives, but it is simplistic to imagine that other factors are not
`at play. Put more simply as “interpretive flexibility,” the argument
`of social constructionism is that different groups of people (i.e.,
`different relevant social groups of users) can have differing views
`and understandings of a technology and its characteristics, and so
`will have different views on whether or not a particular technology
`“works” for them. Thus, it is not enough for a manufacturer to speak
`of a product that “works”: it may or may not work, depending on
`the perspective of the user.9
`
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`The above arguments on social constructionism perhaps have
`been most widely promoted by the sociologists Trevor Pinch and
`Wiebe Bijker,10 who use examples such as the developmental history
`of the bicycle to show how a linear, technological history fails to
`show the reasons for the success or failure of different models, and
`that a more complex, relational social model is required.
`A slightly different view is held by others, such as the
`historian of technology Thomas Hughes, who sees technological,
`social, economic, and political factors as parts of an interconnected
`“system.” In this instance, different but interconnected elements of
`products, the institutions by or in which they are created, and the
`environments in which they operate or are consumed are seen as a
`complete, interdependent network. However, a technological system
`remains a socially constructed one: “Because they are invented and
`developed by system builders and their associates, the components
`of technological systems are socially constructed artifacts.” 11 There
`still is a distinction here between the human and nonhuman compo-
`nents of a system: “Inventors, industrial scientists, engineers, manag-
`ers, financiers, and workers are components of but not artefacts in
`the system.” 12
`By comparison, Actor Network Theory, associated with the
`sociologists Bruno Latour, John Law, and Michael Callon, breaks
`down “the distinction between human actors and natural phenom-
`ena. Both are treated as elements in “actor networks.” 13 In Actor
`Network Theory (ANT), all parts of a system or network are equally
`empowered as actors having an influence on technology—there is no
`distinction between small or large elements, animate or inanimate,
`or real or virtual. Technology is conceived of as a growing system
`or network. The actors (and the relationships between the actors)
`“shape and support the technical object.” 14 An important aspect of
`the theory is that:
`The actor network is reducible neither to an actor or
`a network alone nor to a network. Like networks it is
`composed of a series of heterogeneous elements, animate
`and inanimate, that have been linked to one another for
`a certain period of time. The actor network can thus be
`distinguished from the traditional actors of sociology, a
`category generally excluding any nonhuman component
`and whose internal structure should not, on the other hand,
`be confused with a network linking in some predictable
`fashion elements that are perfectly well defined and stable,
`for the entities it is composed of, whether natural or social,
`could at any moment redefine their identity and mutual
`relationships in some new way and bring new elements
`into the network. An actor network is simultaneously an
`actor whose activity is networking heterogeneous elements
`and a network that is able to redefine and transform what it
`is made of.15
`
`6
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`In other words, the role of any particular actor in a network is not
`fixed, but indeterminate and changeable, being at times dominant
`or, at other times, insignificant in its agency.
`These theories are useful in the analysis of the introduction of
`complex new technologies, and the tablet computer is an excellent
`case in point, having a particular level of complexity. As a product,
`the tablet computer brought together a number of discrete techno-
`logical advances, each having its own history of development: pen
`interfaces, handwriting recognition, and touchscreen technology.
`
`The History of Pen Computing:
`Early Developments in Pen Interfaces
`The principle of using a pen device rather than a keyboard to inter-
`act with a computer may appear to be a relatively recent develop-
`ment. As a matter of fact, pens were one of the earliest devices to be
`used in this way, many years before the invention of the computer
`mouse. Light pens (or light guns) were used in the experimental
`“Whirlwind” computer built at MIT between 1946 and 1949, when
`it became operational, for analyzing aircraft stability for the U.S.
`Navy. In this system, a light pen pointed at a symbol of an aircraft
`on a display screen produced identifying text about that aircraft.
`This machine formed the basis of the later TX-0 machine started
`in 1953 and the SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment) air
`defense system (Figure 1) started in 1958; both developed at MIT’s
`Lincoln Laboratories. In the SAGE system, the light gun was used to
`convert the “blip” on a cathode ray tube (CRT) showing the location
`of an aircraft or missile into X-Y coordinates. When a blip appeared,
`a “light gun” was pointed at that point on the screen, and an inter-
`
`Design Issues: Volume 24, Number 4 Autumn 2008
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`7
`
`Figure 1
`The SAGE Air Defense System of 1961 used
`a light pen on a radar display screen to regis-
`ter the position of aircraft and missiles.
`Image courtesy of Computer History Museum.
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`

`Figure 2
`Ivan Sutherland’s 1963 “Sketchpad” software
`was the first computer drawing package, and
`used a light pen as the principal input/output
`device. Courtesy of Ivan Sutherland.
`
`Figure 3
`A RAND Tablet being used to interpret
`handwritten commands.
`Image courtesy of Computer History Museum.
`
`nal photocell registered the blip. Since the time taken for the screen
`display to be refreshed was a known quantity, the time difference
`between the start of the screen refresh and the light gun registering
`a blip could be translated into an accurate X-Y position, and a trajec-
`tory then could be predicted.
`The TX-0 machine was the first in a series of experimental
`digital computers built at MIT, which included the 1958 TX-2—
`notably used by Ivan Sutherland in 1963 to develop “Sketchpad”—
`the first computer drawing software, in which a light pen was used
`as the principal input/output device, initiating the “direct manipula-
`tion” of computer data (Figure 2). The abstract for Ivan Sutherland’s
`Ph.D. thesis describes the use of a pen to interact with a computer:
`The Sketchpad system uses drawing as a novel communica-
`tion medium for a computer. The system contains input,
`output, and computation programs which enable it to inter-
`pret information drawn directly on a computer display. …
`A Sketchpad user sketches directly on a computer display
`with a light pen. The light pen is used both to position
`parts of the drawing on the display and to point to them
`to change them. A set of push buttons control the changes
`to be made such as erase, or move. Except for legends, no
`written language is used.16
`
`The Development of Handwriting Recognition
`Concurrent with Sutherland’s development of the technology needed
`to draw items directly on a computer screen, others had been work-
`ing on methods to enable computer users to directly write commands
`that could be interpreted by the computer as instructions. An early
`example of a device which could read stylus movements accurately
`enough to interpret handwriting was the RAND Tablet (Figure 3).
`After years of development, a 1964 memorandum booklet titled “The
`RAND Tablet: A Man-Machine Graphical Communication Device”
`prepared by the RAND Corporation for the Advanced Research
`Projects Agency (ARPA) stated:
`Early in the development of man-machine studies at
`RAND, it was felt that exploration of man’s existent dexter-
`ity with a free, pen-like instrument on a horizontal surface,
`like a pad of paper, would be fruitful. The concept of
`generating hand-directed, two-dimensional information on
`a surface not coincident with the display device (versus a
`“light pen”) is not new and has been examined by others
`in the field. It is felt, however, that the stylus-tablet device
`developed at RAND is a highly practical instrument, allow-
`ing further investigation of new freedoms of expression in
`direct communications with computers.17
`
`8
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`An example of an actual RAND Tablet in the archives of the
`Computer History Museum in Mountain View, California is, accom-
`panied by an entry which reads:
`The Rand Corporation produced one of the first devices
`permitting the input of freehand drawings. Also called
`the Grafacon, the original Rand Tablet cost $18,000. The
`attached stylus sensed electrical pulses relayed through
`a fine grid of conductors housed beneath the drawing
`surface, fixing its position to within one one-hundredth
`of an inch. Many experimental systems were developed
`to recognize handwritten letters or gestures drawn on
`the tablet, such as Tom Ellis’ GRAphic Input Language
`(GRAIL) method of programming by drawing flowcharts.18
`
`Tom Ellis was the author of a number of RAND reports describing
`the development, beginning with Ivan Sutherland’s “Sketchpad”
`research, of a system in which an operator could write instructional
`commands for a computer directly on the RAND Tablet:
`One fundamental facility of the man-computer interface is
`automatic recognition of appropriate symbols. The GRAIL
`system allows the man to print text and draw flowchart
`symbols naturally; the system recognizes them accurately in
`real-time. The recognizable symbol set includes the upper-
`case English alphabet, the numerals, seventeen special
`symbols, a scrubbing motion [a hand-drawn squiggle] used
`as an erasure and six flowchart symbols—circle, rectangle,
`triangle, trapezoid, ellipse, and lozenge.19
`
`Ellis’s GRAIL system was the beginning of handwriting recognition
`technology. Not only that, but since the system also contained text-
`editing facilities such as “character placement and replacement, char-
`acter-string insertions, line insertions, character and character-string
`deletions, and line deletions” it formed the basis of word processing
`technology without the use of a keyboard.20
`
`Touchscreen Technology
`Touchscreen technology was first developed by Dr. Samuel Hurst
`while on leave from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory to teach at
`the University of Kentucky.21 His initial idea came in 1969, when he
`was looking for a way to digitize large sets of strip charts. Hurst and
`a graduate student (Jim Parks) made a two-dimensional digitizer by
`using two sheets of electrically conductive paper with a sheet of ordi-
`nary paper between as an insulator to create a sensor. By connecting
`two voltmeters—one to each conductor—a needle prick through the
`strip chart and the sensor supplied an x-coordinate to one voltmeter
`and, independently, a y-coordinate to the other. This initial invention
`became the “Elograph,” patented in 1972 (Figures 4 and 5). Returning
`to Oak Ridge and founding the company “Elographics” in 1971,
`
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`Hurst went on to lead the development of transparent touchscreens,
`with the first produced in 1978, and five-wire resistive technology,
`the most commonly used form of touchscreen technology.22
`The first instruments were intended for the scientific
`market, and it was not a significant product because the
`“digital online” era had arrived and there was not a
`need for strip charts. It is amazing, in retrospect, that we
`survived long enough to take a poor product for the wrong
`market to an excellent product for a good (consumer)
`market. In a discussion with our patent agent, Martin
`Skinner, the idea emerged of a transparent touch screen for
`use with computers, and we were stimulated by Siemens
`when they paid some of the development costs for early
`units, but we did not have the insight to think that the
`touchscreen market would become so important.23
`
`Although they had some way to go until they were suitable for
`use in consumer products, these cutting-edge advances in human/
`computer interaction meant that, by the end of the 1970s, all of the
`relevant technologies were in place and thoroughly documented to
`enable the development of the “tablet computer.” It actually took
`almost a decade until the appearance of the first tablet computer,
`although this requires some clarification of the definition of the prod-
`uct, as well as the acceptance of various streams of parallel develop-
`ment.
`
`Figure 4
`The “Elograph” electronic graphing device,
`1971. Courtesy of Tyco Electronics,
`Elo TouchSystems.
`
`Figure 5
`A later version of the “Elograph” being used
`to analyze strip chart data, circa 1973.
`Courtesy of Tyco Electronics, Elo
`TouchSystems.
`
`10
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`

`Tablet Computers
`Tablet computers as revolutionary new products experienced a rapid
`rise in popularity and were the center of industry attention for a few
`years in the early 1990s. Even though their popularity then under-
`went a massive decline, they did not disappear altogether, and still
`are manufactured today in limited quantities. Over the years, they
`have appeared in a number of forms but can be grouped into some
`general categories.
`Tablet computers that essentially are a large touchscreen
`covering a processor unit are referred to as “slates.” The input is
`purely through the screen via a stylus or finger, although external
`keyboards may be attached. The onboard processor allows a full
`range of computing capabilities. Where portability is a key concern,
`wireless versions with no onboard processors (called “thin-client
`slates”) also are available. These utilize applications stored on remote
`servers. The lack of keyboard input is associated with the main use of
`these tablets in specialized, “vertical” markets such as the healthcare
`industry or in sales and insurance field work, where the tendency
`is for standardized forms to be filled in rather than entering large
`amounts of text.
`“Convertibles” attempt to achieve the best features of tablet
`computers and laptop computers. The large touchscreens are
`movable, so that they can either act as a normal laptop with the
`keyboard in front of the screen, or be arranged so that the screen
`covers the keyboard completely, only allowing pen input. These have
`been more successful than slates, yet they remain a compromised
`product. The keyboard means that they inevitably are thicker and
`heavier than slates, and the touchscreen capability means they are
`more expensive than normal laptops. There also is a more expensive
`subset of convertibles known as “hybrids,” which have keyboards
`that can be completely detached, restoring the thin cross-section of
`slates. In this instance, the “tablet” part of the computer is the screen
`and processing unit, and the detachable keyboard can be seen as a
`peripheral component. The distinction might be an important one
`because, to be termed a true “tablet computer,” the screen input (the
`“tablet”) and processing unit (the computer), it could be argued,
`have to be contained within the same product rather than being a
`portable computer which, through an additional component, has
`screen-based input capability.
`So for clarification, the defining characteristics of the tablet PC
`are taken here as being a self-contained personal computer having a
`large, touch-sensitive screen and handwriting recognition capabili-
`ties to allow input by a stylus. With respect to size, tablet PCs have
`a screen size large enough to allow significant pen input (usually
`approaching that of a piece of A4 paper), and require both hands to
`operate if not rested on a stable surface. Although tablets may have
`the same organizational capabilities of “personal digital assistants”
`
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`(PDAs), they have computing capabilities similar to desktop comput-
`ers. The use of organizing software such as electronic calendars and
`alarms is not their primary function.
`The quote cited earlier in this article—that “Nearly every
`major maker of computers has some type of pen-based machine
`in the works.”—points to a serious problem for historians of the
`technology of this period, and requires the inclusion of a caveat.
`Researching the exact chronology of product releases in the field of
`portable computing from the late 1970s to early 1990s is fraught with
`difficulties, and not just because of the sheer amount of competing
`products that were available. Many products, especially those from
`smaller start-up companies (which in many cases essentially were
`one-man bands), were not promoted as widely as those from major
`manufacturers, and information concerning them is hard to find and
`even harder to accurately verify. In addition, major manufacturers in
`desperate competition at a time of rapid technological progress raced
`to launch short-lived products to such an extent that many of them
`were outdated as soon as they hit the market—and almost imme-
`diately replaced by updated versions. Moreover, in an attempt to
`gain a head start on competitors, products were routinely announced
`and promoted sometimes up to a year before their launch, by which
`time many already had been dropped in favor of a more advanced
`model, or failed to materialize because of technical, financial,
`or other problems. These products are known in the industry as
`“vaporware”—intended products that may have been prototyped
`but never actually were sold. There also is the issue of parallel devel-
`opment to take into account. Many of the features of these products
`were first developed in isolation at research institutes and universi-
`ties, and widely disseminated as actual or theoretical possibilities
`that then were simultaneously adopted by different companies in
`their product development. So the issue who was “first” is a compli-
`cated one. Finally, many of the accounts of this period, as in this
`article, include oral histories from the individuals involved at the
`time. These individuals more often than not were simultaneously
`involved in numerous projects and, because of the fluidity of the
`market, often changed employers or started new companies without
`keeping detailed records. (They are, after all, largely engineers and
`entrepreneurs—not academics and historians.) It is quite common
`to discuss the same issues of product chronology and attribution
`with different people who were involved with the same project, at
`the same time, and obtain completely different versions of events.
`As Friedrich von Hayek said:
`The knowledge of the circumstances of which we must
`make use never exists in concentrated or integrated
`form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and
`frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate
`individuals possess.24
`
`12
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`

`For all the above reasons, it is practically impossible to be absolutely
`certain of all details, so the accuracy of dates and the completeness
`of chronologies of these products often are questionable. Therefore,
`the following chronology includes many of the key products, but
`certainly not all that appeared, especially if there was little difference
`between competing products launched simultaneously.
`
`Early Products
`Historically, the conceptual roots of the portable tablet computer as
`a discrete product are the same as those for the laptop computer,
`both arising from original interactive computer concepts proposed
`by Alan Kay as part of his doctoral thesis,25 and later developed by
`the Learning Research Group as the “Dynabook” at the Xerox Palo
`Alto Research Center (PARC) in the early 1970s (Figure 6).
`In 1968, while studying at Utah, Kay conceptualized a
`computer which brought together his work on interactive comput-
`ing, the emerging technologies of flat-screen displays and handwrit-
`ing recognition, and programming developments aimed at children.
`Kay explains:
`Ed Cheadle and I had been working on a desktop personal
`computer (the FLEX machine) since early 1967, and in the
`summer of 1968 I gave a presentation of this machine and
`software at the first ARPA grad students conference. One of
`the highlights was a visit to Don Bitzer’s lab where the first
`plasma panel flat screen display was being invented (with
`Owens Illinois). We saw a one-inch-square display that
`could light up a few pixels. Flat-screen displays were not a
`new idea either in fiction, semi-fiction (like Popular Science
`mag), and in the real technological world. Still, it was galva-
`nizing to actually see the start of one!
`
`Design Issues: Volume 24, Number 4 Autumn 2008
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`13
`
`Figure 6
`Alan Kay’s “Dynabook” concept model, 1968.
`Courtesy of Palo Alto Research Center, Inc.
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`SCEA Ex. 1016 Page 11
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`We knew the transistor count in the FLEX machine and
`some of the grad students and I sat around one afternoon
`estimating when those transistors could be put on the back
`of a big enough plasma panel. (Moore had announced the
`first version of his law in 1965.) Our estimate was about ten
`years.… At the same time, Peter Brodie at Westinghouse
`was also working on a flat panel using liquid crystals.26
`
`Later the same summer, Kay visited researchers working on comput-
`ers for nonprofessional users, including RAND, where Tom Ellis had
`developed his GRAIL system, and Seymour Papert (a pioneer in
`artificial intelligence) at a school in Lexington, where he was using
`his LOGO programming language developed for children.
`This was a transformative experience and on the plane
`back to Utah I started to think about making a computer for
`children that could combine some of the LOGO ideas, those
`of the FLEX machine, and the GRAIL tablet-based system.
`The ten-years-out problem became a non-problem because I
`realized there was at least ten years worth of user interface,
`software, and curriculum development that would have to
`be done.
`
`When I got to Utah I made a cardboard model of what such
`a machine would be like. (It was made hollow so we could
`load it up with lead pellets to see how heavy it could be
`made before it became a pain, etc.) It had slots on the side
`for the removable memory and the stylus.27
`
`This concept became one of the most radical product proposals of
`the time. In a paper produced by the Learning Research Group, Alan
`Kay and Adele Goldberg promoted the concept of the Dynabook as
`“A Dynamic Medium for Creative Thought”:
`Imagine having your own self-contained knowledge
`manipulator in a portable package the size and shape of
`an ordinary notebook. Suppose it had enough power to
`outrace your senses of sight and hearing, enough capacity
`to store for later retrieval thousands of page-equivalents of
`reference materials, poems, letters, recipes, records, draw-
`ings, animations, musical scores, waveforms, dynamic
`simulations, and anything else you would like to remember
`and change. We envision a device as small and portable as
`possible which could both take in and give out information
`in quantities approaching that of human sensory systems.28
`
`Quite clearly, such a computer was not technically possible at
`the time (Kay still thinks this is true 29), and yet his vision of the
`Dynabook was so powerful that it drove the development of comput-
`ing technology inexorably towards truly portable computing. Even
`
`14
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`Design Issues: Volume 24, Number 4 Autumn 2008
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`SCEA Ex. 1016 Page 12
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`

`

`the name has been inspirational and much emulated. A company
`called “Dynabook Technologies” was set up in 1987 to develop such
`a computer, and gained $37 million in financial backing yet never
`managed to overcome technical problems and went bankrupt in
`1990,30 and Toshiba appropriated the name for its early pen tablets,
`marketed as “Dynapads.” 31
`A number of products have laid claim to being or have been
`hailed as “the first tablet computer.” However, with respect to the
`definition laid out above, many of these have one or another charac-
`teristic missing. Some products had character recognition rather than
`full handwriting recognition; while others were not self-contained
`products, but had to be connected either d