`Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822 Entered: September 26, 2016
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`PAICE LLC & THE ABELL FOUNDATION, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2015-00722
`Patent 7,237,634 B2
`____________
`
`
`Before SALLY C. MEDLEY, KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, and
`CARL M. DeFRANCO, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`MEDLEY, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`We have jurisdiction to hear this inter partes review under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 6(c). This Final Written Decision is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a)
`and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the inter
`partes review with respect to claims 161, 215, 228, 233, 235, 236, and 237,
`and determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence
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`that claims 173, 239, and 240 of U.S. Patent No. 7,237,634 B2 are
`unpatentable.
`
`A. Procedural History
`Petitioner, Ford Motor Company, filed a Petition requesting an inter
`partes review of claims 33, 36, 42–44, 46, 50–52, 55, 78, 161, 173, 215,
`228, 233, 235–237, 239, and 240 of U.S. Patent No. 7,237,634 B2
`(Ex. 1260, “the ’634 patent”). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). Patent Owner, Paice LLC &
`The Abell Foundation, Inc., filed a Preliminary Response in both unredacted
`and redacted forms. Papers 10, 11 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Upon consideration of
`the Petition and Preliminary Response, on October 26, 2015, we instituted
`an inter partes review of claims 161, 173, 215, 228, 233, 235–237, 239, and
`240, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314. Paper 13 (“Dec.”).
`Subsequent to institution, Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner
`Response (Paper 18 (“PO Resp.”)) and Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 26
`(“Pet. Reply”)).1 An oral hearing was held on June 28, 2016, and a
`transcript of the hearing is included in the record (Paper 35 (“Tr.”)).
`B. Related Proceedings
`The ’634 patent is involved in Paice LLC v. Ford Motor Co., No.
`1-14-cv-00492, filed on February 19, 2014, in the United States District
`Court for the District of Maryland. Pet. 2. Petitioner twice filed an earlier
`Petition for inter partes review of the ’634 patent, and we instituted trial in
`both proceedings and subsequently entered final written decisions. Ford
`
`1 In addition, Patent Owner filed a Motion for Observation on Cross-
`Examination (Paper 28) and Petitioner filed a Response to Motion for
`Observation on Cross-Examination (Paper 31), both of which have been
`considered.
`
`2
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`Motor Co. v. Paice LLC & The Abell Foundation, Inc., Case IPR2014-00904
`(Papers 13 and 41), and Ford Motor Co. v. Paice LLC & The Abell
`Foundation, Inc., Case IPR2014-01416 (Papers 9 and 26). The ’634 patent
`also is involved in the following inter partes review proceedings: IPR2015-
`00606, IPR2015-00758, IPR2015-00784, IPR2015-00785, IPR2015-00787,
`IPR2015-00790, IPR2015-00791, IPR2015-00799, IPR2015-00800, and
`IPR2015-00801.
`
`C. The ’634 Patent (Ex. 1260)
`The ’634 patent describes a hybrid vehicle with an internal
`combustion engine, at least one electric motor, and a battery bank, all
`controlled by a microprocessor that directs torque transfer between the
`engine, the motor, and the drive wheels of the vehicle. Ex. 1260, 17:17–56,
`Fig. 4. The microprocessor compares the vehicle’s torque requirements and
`the engine’s torque output against a predefined setpoint and uses the results
`of the comparison to control the vehicle’s mode of operation, e.g., straight-
`electric, engine-only, or hybrid. Id. at 40:16–49. The microprocessor
`utilizes a hybrid control strategy that operates the engine only in a range of
`high fuel efficiency, which occurs when the instantaneous torque required to
`drive the vehicle, or road load (RL), reaches a setpoint (SP) of
`approximately 30% of the engine’s maximum torque output (MTO). Id. at
`20:61–67; see also id. at 13:64–65 (“the engine is never operated at less than
`30% of MTO, and is thus never operated inefficiently”). Operating the
`engine in a range above the setpoint but substantially less than the maximum
`torque output maximizes fuel efficiency and reduces pollutant emissions of
`the vehicle. Id. at 15:55–58.
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`D. Illustrative Claims
`Petitioner challenges independent claim 161 and dependent claim 173,
`which depends directly from claim 161. Petitioner also challenges
`independent claim 215 and dependent claims 228, 233, 235–237, 239, and
`240, which depend directly or indirectly from claim 215.
`Claims 161 and 215 are reproduced below:
`161. A method for controlling a hybrid vehicle, comprising:
`
`determining instantaneous road load (RL) required to
`propel the hybrid vehicle responsive to an operator command;
`
`wherein the hybrid vehicle is operated in a plurality of
`operating modes corresponding to values for the RL and
`setpoint (SP);
`operating at least one first electric motor to propel the
`hybrid vehicle when the RL required to do so is less than a the
`SP;
`
`wherein said operating the at least one first electric motor
`to drive the hybrid vehicle composes a low-load operation
`mode I;
`
`operating an internal combustion engine of the hybrid
`vehicle to propel the hybrid vehicle when the RL required to do
`so is between the SP and a maximum torque output (MTO) of
`the engine, wherein the engine is operable to efficiently produce
`torque above the SP, and wherein the SP is substantially less
`than the MTO;
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`wherein said operating the internal combustion engine of
`
`the hybrid vehicle to propel the hybrid vehicle composes a
`high-way cruising operation mode IV;
`operating both the at least one electric motor and the
`engine to propel the hybrid vehicle when the torque RL
`required to do so is more than the MTO;
`wherein said operating both the at least one first electric
`motor and the engine to propel the hybrid vehicle composes an
`acceleration operation mode V;
`
`receiving operator input specifying a change in required
`torque to be applied to wheels of the hybrid vehicle; and
`if the received operator input specifies a rapid increase in
`the required torque, changing operation from operating mode I
`directly to operating mode V.
`Ex. 1260, 73:42–74:9.
`
`215. A method for controlling a hybrid vehicle,
`comprising:
`
`determining instantaneous road load (RL) required to
`propel the hybrid vehicle responsive to an operator command;
`
`operating at least one electric motor to propel the hybrid
`vehicle when the RL required to do so is less than a setpoint
`(SP);
`operating an internal combustion engine of the hybrid
`
`vehicle to propel the hybrid vehicle when the RL required to do
`so is between the SP and a maximum torque output (MTO) of
`the engine, wherein the engine is operable to efficiently produce
`torque above the SP, and wherein the SP is substantially less
`than the MTO; and
`
`operating both the at least one electric motor and the
`engine to propel the hybrid vehicle when the torque RL
`required to do so is more than the MTO; and
`
`regeneratively charging a battery of the hybrid vehicle
`when instantaneous torque output of the engine>the RL, when
`the RL is negative, and/or when braking is initiated by an
`operator of the hybrid vehicle.
`Id. at 79:10–31.
`
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`Basis Challenged Claim(s)
`
`§ 103
`
`161, 215, 228, 233,
`and 235–237
`
`§ 103
`
`§ 103
`
`239
`
`173 and 240
`
`E. Grounds of Unpatentability
`We instituted an inter partes review of claims 161, 173, 215, 228,
`233, 235–237, 239, and 240 on the following grounds:
`
`Reference[s]
`Ibaraki ’882 2 and the general
`knowledge of a person of ordinary
`skill in the art (“POSA”)
`Ibaraki ’882, Ibaraki ’626 3, and the
`general knowledge of a POSA
`Ibaraki ’882, Suga 4, and the general
`knowledge of a POSA
`
`
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`A. Petitioner Estoppel
`On March 10, 2016, we rendered a final written decision of claims
`
`161, 215, 228, 233, and 235–237 of the ’634 patent in IPR2014-01416.
`Ford Motor Co. v. Paice LLC & The Abell Foundation, Inc., Case IPR2014-
`01416 (PTAB March 10, 2016) (Paper 26). Patent Owner argues that,
`pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1), Petitioner may not maintain its challenge
`of claims 161, 215, 228, 233, and 235–237. PO Resp. 17–18. Petitioner
`responds that it is not estopped because it was necessary for it to file
`
`
`2 U.S. Patent No. 5,789,882, issued Aug. 4, 1998 (Ex. 1262) (“Ibaraki
`’882”).
`3 U.S. Patent No. 6,003,626, issued Dec. 21, 1999 (Ex. 1263) (“Ibaraki
`’626”).
`4 U.S. Patent No. 5,623,104, issued Apr. 22, 1997 (Ex. 1264) (“Suga”).
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`multiple petitions to address dependent claims 173, 239, and 240. Pet.
`Reply 4.
`Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1), a petitioner who has obtained a final
`written decision on a patent claim in an inter partes review may not
`maintain a subsequent proceeding with respect to that same claim on a
`ground that it “reasonably could have raised” in the original proceeding.
`Specifically, section 315(e)(1) provides:
`(e) Estoppel.—
`(1) Proceedings before the office.—The petitioner in
`an inter partes review of a claim in a patent under this
`chapter that results in a final written decision under section
`318(a) . . . may not request or maintain a proceeding before
`the Office with respect to that claim on any ground that the
`petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that
`inter partes review.
`
`
`
`On March 10, 2016, a final written decision was entered in IPR2014-
`01416, in which we determined that claims 161, 215, 228, 233, and 235–237
`of the ’634 patent are unpatentable. Petitioner in this proceeding is the same
`Petitioner in IPR2014-01416. The grounds raised by Petitioner in IPR2014-
`01416 against claims 161, 215, 228, 233, and 235–237 were not the same as
`the grounds raised against those claims in this proceeding. Nonetheless,
`Ibaraki ’882 was cited during prosecution that led to the ’634 patent and is
`listed on the face of the ’634 patent. Ex. 1260. Petitioner does not argue
`that it reasonably could not have raised its challenge to claims 161, 215, 228,
`233, and 235–237 based on Ibaraki ’882 in IPR2014-01416. Pet. Reply 4.
`We determine that Petitioner reasonably could have raised this challenge in
`IPR2014-01416. Accordingly, Petitioner is estopped under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 315(e)(1) from maintaining the grounds based on Ibaraki ’882 against
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`claims 161, 215, 228, 233, and 235–237. We dismiss the inter partes review
`with respect to claims 161, 215, 228, 233, and 235–237.
`Although we determine it is necessary to address the parties’
`contentions with respect to independent claims 161 and 215 because claim
`173 depends from claim 161 and claims 239 and 240 depend from claim
`215, we do not otherwise provide a final written decision on the merits with
`respect to claims 161, 215, 228, 233, and 235–237, or again hold those
`claims to be unpatentable.
`B. Claim Construction
`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are given
`their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the
`patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under the broadest
`reasonable construction standard, claim terms are generally given their
`ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary
`skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech.,
`Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Any special definition for a
`claim term must be set forth with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and
`precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
`Petitioner proposes constructions for the following claim terms: “road
`load,” “mode I,” “low-load operation mode I,” “high-way cruising operation
`mode IV,” “acceleration operation mode V,” and “abnormal and transient
`conditions.” Pet. 10, 12–13. In our Decision to Institute, we interpreted
`these terms. Dec. 9, 11–15. Neither party has indicated that our
`interpretations were improper and we do not perceive any reason or evidence
`that now compels any deviation from our initial interpretations.
`Accordingly, the following constructions apply to this Decision:
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`Claim Term
`road load or RL
`
`mode I or low-load operation mode
`I
`
`high-way cruising operation mode
`IV
`
`acceleration operation mode V
`
`abnormal and transient conditions
`
`Construction
`the amount of instantaneous torque
`required to propel the vehicle, be it
`positive or negative
`a mode of operation of the vehicle,
`in which all torque provided to the
`wheels is supplied by an electric
`motor
`a mode of operation in which all
`torque provided to the wheels is
`supplied by the internal combustion
`engine
`a mode of operation in which torque
`provided to the wheels is supplied
`by the internal combustion engine
`and at least one electric motor
`include starting the engine and
`stopping the engine
`
`
`For purposes of this decision, we find it necessary to construe
`“setpoint” and the “operating limitations” found in claims 173, 239, and 240.
`Setpoint (SP)
`The term “setpoint” or “SP” is recited in independent claims 161 and
`
`215, and, thus, necessarily is included in dependent claims 173, 239, and
`240. Petitioner proposes that “setpoint” or “SP” be construed, in the context
`of these claims, as “predetermined torque value.” Pet. 10–12. Patent Owner
`argues that “setpoint” or “SP” be construed as “a definite, but potential
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`variable value at which a transition between operating modes may occur.”
`PO Resp. 8.5
`We agree with Petitioner that the claims compare the setpoint either to
`an engine torque value or a torque based “road load” value. Pet. 10–12.
`Each of claims 161 and 215 recites a condition “when the RL required to do
`so is less than a setpoint (SP).” Ex. 1260, 73:51–52, 79:16–17. Each of
`claims 161 and 215 further recites a range established by the setpoint at one
`end, and the maximum torque output of the engine at the other end, by the
`language “when the RL required to do so is between the SP and a maximum
`torque output (MTO) of the engine.” Id. at 73:57–59, 79:19–21.
`Nothing in the Specification precludes a setpoint from being reset,
`after it has been set. A setpoint for however short a period of time still is a
`setpoint. Accordingly, we construe “setpoint” and “SP” as “predetermined
`torque value that may or may not be reset.”
`
`Patent Owner argues that the claims and the Specification of the ’634
`patent “make clear that a ‘setpoint’ is not simply a numerical value divorced
`from the context of the rest of the control system,” and that “‘setpoint’
`serves the crucial function of marking the transition from one claimed mode
`to another, and in particular, the transition from propelling the vehicle with
`the motor to propelling the vehicle with the engine.” PO Resp. 8. The
`argument is misplaced. Although such use of a setpoint is described by
`
`
`5 In our Decision to Institute, and upon taking into consideration the parties’
`arguments and supporting evidence, we interpreted “setpoint” or “SP” to
`mean “predetermined torque value that may or may not be reset.” Dec. 11.
`Petitioner agrees with that interpretation, while Patent Owner does not. Pet.
`Reply 2–3; PO Resp. 7–11.
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`other language in the Specification, it is not an intrinsic property of a
`setpoint and is not a necessary and required use of all setpoints. In that
`regard, we further note the following passage in the Specification of the ’634
`patent, which supports not reading a mode switching requirement (i.e.,
`transition requirement) into the term “setpoint”:
`the values of the sensed parameters in response to which the
`operating mode is selected may vary . . ., so that the operating
`mode is not repetitively switched simply because one of the
`sensed parameters fluctuates around a defined setpoint.
`Ex. 1260, 19:67–20:6 (emphasis added).
`It is improper to add an extraneous limitation into a claim, i.e., one
`that is added wholly apart from any need for the addition to accord meaning
`to a claim term. See, e.g., Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948,
`950 (Fed. Cir. 1993); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum
`Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1988). It is important not to import into
`a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim. Superguide Corp. v.
`DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004). For
`example, a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may
`not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the
`embodiment. Id.; see also In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir.
`1993). That is no different even if the patent specification describes only a
`single embodiment. Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad Inc., 358 F.3d 898,
`906 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
`Patent Owner brings to our attention that the U.S. District Court for
`the Eastern District of Texas and the U.S. District Court for the District of
`Maryland both have construed “setpoint” to mean “a definite, but potentially
`variable value at which a transition between operating modes may occur.”
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`PO Resp. 7 n.1. We note that that construction also does not require that an
`operating mode be changed at a setpoint, as Patent Owner urges. Instead,
`the construction of the district courts sets forth that a transition between
`operating modes “may occur” at a setpoint, which is consistent with our
`construction here.
`Patent Owner additionally argues that “setpoint” should not be limited
`to a torque value, because the Specification makes clear that it also can be
`the state of charge of a battery. PO. Resp. 10–11. Patent Owner cites to the
`following passage in the Specification:
`[T]he microprocessor tests sensed and calculated values for
`system variables, such as the vehicle’s instantaneous torque
`requirement, i.e., the “road load” RL, the engine’s instantaneous
`torque output ITO, both being expressed as a percentage of the
`engine’s maximum torque output MTO, and the state of charge
`of the battery bank BSC, expressed as a percentage of its full
`charge, against setpoints, and uses the results of the comparisons
`to control the mode of vehicle operation.
`Ex. 1260, 40:18–26 (emphasis added). This argument also is misplaced. As
`we noted above, each independent claim 161 and 215 requires a comparison
`of the setpoint either to an engine torque value or a torque based “road load”
`value. Thus, in the context of these claims, and claims dependent therefrom,
`a setpoint must be a torque value, and not some state of charge of a battery.
`
`For reasons discussed above, we construe “setpoint” and “SP” as
`“predetermined torque value that may or may not be reset.”
`The “operating” limitations
`
`Patent Owner asserts that the challenged claims require a comparison
`of road load (RL) to setpoint (SP) and also to maximum torque output
`(MTO). PO Resp. 11–17. The assertion is based on the requirements in
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`claim 161 of (1) operating at least one first electric motor to propel the
`hybrid vehicle “when the RL required to do so is less than the SP,”
`(2) operating an internal combustion engine of the hybrid vehicle to propel
`the hybrid vehicle “when the RL required to do so is between the SP and a
`maximum torque output (MTO) of the engine,” and (3) operating both the at
`least one first electric motor and the engine to propel the hybrid vehicle
`“when the torque RL required to do so is more than the MTO.” Claim 215
`includes essentially the same recitations.
`In the above discussion of the construction of setpoint, we already
`noted that claims 161 and 215 each require a comparison of road load to a
`setpoint because of the claim recitations “when the RL required to do so is
`less than the SP” and “when the RL required to do so is between the SP and
`a maximum torques output (MTO) of the engine.” For similar reasons,
`claims 161 and 215 each require a comparison of road load to a maximum
`torque output (MTO) because of the recitation “when the torque RL required
`to do so is more than the MTO.” Petitioner has not advanced any cogent
`reasoning why no such comparison is required by the claims. We determine
`that the claims require a comparison of road load (RL) to a setpoint (SP) and
`also to a maximum torque output (MTO). That, however, does not mean the
`claims exclude the comparison of other parameters.
`
`C. Principles of Law
`A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that
`the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the
`invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
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`subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
`(2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
`factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art;
`(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art;
`(3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of
`nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
`In that regard, an obviousness analysis “need not seek out precise
`teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for
`a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of
`ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; see
`Translogic, 504 F.3d at 1259.
`The level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of
`record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
`In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich,
`579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).
`D. Claims 161 and 215
`As discussed above, we dismiss the inter partes review with respect to
`claims 161, 215, 228, 233, and 235–237. Only dependent claims 173, 239,
`and 240 are before us. Each of claims 239 and 240, however, depends from
`claim 215 and necessarily includes all of the limitations of claim 215.
`Similarly, claim 173 depends from claim 161 and necessarily includes all of
`the limitations of claim 161. Accordingly, we first address the contentions
`made by Petitioner as to how Ibaraki ’882 renders obvious claims 161 and
`215.
`
`Petitioner contends that claims 161 and 215 are unpatentable under
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Ibaraki ’882 and the general knowledge
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`of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 45–48. To support its
`contentions, Petitioner provides detailed explanations as to how the prior art
`meets each claim limitation of claims 161 and 215. Id. Petitioner also relies
`upon a Declaration of Dr. Gregory W. Davis, who has been retained as an
`expert witness by Petitioner for the instant proceeding. Ex. 1265. For the
`reasons that follow, and notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments, which
`we address below, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s showing, which we
`adopt as our own, that claims 161 and 215 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 103(a) as obvious over Ibaraki ’882 and the general knowledge of a person
`of ordinary skill in the art.
`
`Ibaraki ’882
`Ibaraki ’882 describes a drive control apparatus and method for a
`hybrid vehicle equipped with two drive power sources consisting of an
`electric motor and engine such as an internal combustion engine. Ex. 1262,
`1:9–14. Drive control apparatus includes controller 128 that includes a drive
`source selecting means 160. Drive source selecting means is adapted to
`select one or both of engine 112 and motor 114 as the drive power source or
`sources according to a drive source selecting data map stored in memory
`means 162. Id. at 20:38–43, Figs. 8 and 9. In particular, controller 128 has
`a MOTOR DRIVE mode in which motor 114 is selected as the drive power
`source, an ENGINE DRIVE mode in which the engine 112 is selected as the
`drive power mode source, and an ENGINE-MOTOR DRIVE mode in which
`both the engine 112 and the motor 114 are selected as the drive power
`sources. Id. at 20:43–49.
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`Figure 11, reproduced below, depicts a graph which represents a
`predetermined relationship between the vehicle drive torque and running
`speed V and the three drive modes. Id. at 20:50–53.
`
`
`Figure 11 shows a graph which represents a predetermined relationship
`between the vehicle drive torque and running speed.
`Drive source selecting means 160 (Fig. 9) selects the MOTOR
`DRIVE mode when the vehicle running condition as represented by the
`current vehicle drive torque and speed V is held within the range below the
`first boundary line B. When the vehicle running condition is held within the
`range between the first and second boundary lines B and C, the drive source
`selecting means 160 selects the ENGINE DRIVE mode. When the vehicle
`running condition is in the range above the second boundary line C, the
`drive source selecting means 160 selects the ENGINE[-MOTOR] DRIVE
`mode. Id. at 20:59–21:1. Ibaraki ’882 describes that the boundary line B
`may be adjusted from B1 to B2 so as to enlarge the range in which the
`MOTOR DRIVE mode is selected. Id. at 21:2–4. Ibaraki ’882 further
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`describes an ELECTRICITY GENERATING DRIVE mode where the
`engine provides surplus power that is greater than the vehicle drive torque.
`The surplus power from the engine is used to operate the electric motor as a
`generator to regeneratively charge the battery. Id. at 23:1–30.
`Claim 161
`Claim 161 recites a method for controlling a hybrid vehicle.
`Petitioner contends that Ibaraki ’882 describes a drive control apparatus for
`controlling a hybrid vehicle that may be propelled by an internal engine and
`electric motor. Pet. 14, 46; Ex. 1262, 1:9–14; Ex. 1265 ¶¶ 148–160, 383.
`We are persuaded by Petitioner’s showing, and adopt it as our own, that
`Ibaraki ’882 describes this limitation.
`Claim 161 recites “determining instantaneous road load (RL) required
`to propel the hybrid vehicle responsive to an operator command.” Petitioner
`contends, with supporting evidence, that a person having ordinary skill in the
`art would have understood that the “vehicle drive torque” values described
`in Ibaraki ’882 represent instantaneous road load (torque) required to propel
`the vehicle responsive to operator command (accelerator pedal operating
`amount and rate of change of accelerator pedal operating amount). Pet. 18,
`46; Ex. 1265 ¶¶ 384, 161–173. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s showing,
`and adopt it as our own, that Ibaraki ’882 describes this limitation.
`Claim 161 further recites that the hybrid vehicle is operated in a
`plurality of operating modes corresponding to values for the RL and a
`setpoint (SP). For that recitation, Petitioner contends that Ibaraki ’882
`describes a plurality of operating modes based on the vehicle running
`condition as represented by current vehicle drive torque and speed. Pet. 38,
`46. Petitioner further contends, with supporting evidence, that a person
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`having ordinary skill in the art would have understood that a setpoint value
`would have been known at a given vehicle speed along boundary line B
`from Figure 11. Directing attention to an annotated Figure 11 from
`Ibaraki ’882, Petitioner further contends that the vehicle operates in a
`plurality of operating modes corresponding to values based on the current
`vehicle drive torque (TL1, TL2, TL3), or road load, and a setpoint. Figure 11,
`annotated by Petitioner, is reproduced below, and explained by Dr. Davis.
`Pet. 38; Ex. 1265 ¶¶ 305–306.
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`Ibaraki ’882 Figure 11 as annotated in the Petition
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`Dr. Davis explains that a torque setpoint along boundary B would
`have been known at the current vehicle speed and this setpoint marks a
`transition between the MOTOR DRIVE mode and the ENGINE DRIVE
`MODE. Ex. 1265 ¶ 305. Dr. Davis further explains that Ibaraki ’882 uses
`the exemplary data map of Figure 11 to determine when to operate the
`vehicle in a plurality of operating modes and that the operating modes are
`based on the determined road load (corresponding to TL1, TL2, TL3) and the
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`setpoint SP along boundary line B. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s
`showing, and adopt it as our own, that Ibaraki ’882 describes that the hybrid
`vehicle is operated in a plurality of operating modes corresponding to values
`for the RL and the setpoint (SP).
`Claim 161 recites “operating at least one first electric motor to propel
`the hybrid vehicle when the RL required to do so is less than the SP.”
`Petitioner relies on annotated graphs similar to the one above, for example,
`along with Dr. Davis’ testimony, explaining that Ibaraki ’882 describes
`different operating modes, where the vehicle is operated by motor alone
`(MOTOR DRIVE mode), when the road load (RL) is less than the setpoint
`(SP) along boundary B. Pet. 19–21, 46; Ex. 1262, 19:55–20:9, 20:43–62;
`Ex. 1265 ¶¶ 386, 177–188. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s showing, and
`adopt it as our own, that Ibaraki ’882 describes operating at least one first
`electric motor to propel the hybrid vehicle when the road load required to do
`so is less than the set point.
`Claim 161 recites “wherein said operating the at least one first electric
`motor to drive the hybrid vehicle composes a low-load operation mode I.”
`For that recitation, Petitioner cites to Ibaraki ’882, and also Dr. Davis’
`declaration, explaining that the MOTOR DRIVE mode of Iabaraki ’882 is
`used when the determined road load (vehicle drive torque) at a given speed
`is below the setpoint along boundary line B. Pet. 38, 46; Ex. 1262, 24:21–
`24, 24:6–12, 20:39–45; Ex. 1265 ¶¶ 387, 308–312. We have construed
`“mode I” as “a mode of operation of the vehicle, in which all torque
`provided to the wheels are supplied by an electric motor.” We are persuaded
`by Petitioner’s showing, and adopt it as our own, that Ibaraki ’882 describes
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`wherein said operating the at least one first electric motor to drive the hybrid
`vehicle composes a low-load operation mode I.
`Claim 161 recites “operating an internal combustion engine of the
`hybrid vehicle to propel the hybrid vehicle when the RL required to do so is
`between the SP and a maximum torque output (MTO) of the engine.”
`Petitioner contends that Ibaraki ’882 describes an internal combustion
`engine (engine 112 in Fig. 8) that may be operated to propel the hybrid
`vehicle during an ENGINE DRIVE mode in which engine 112 is selected as
`the drive power source. Pet. 21; Ex. 1262, 20:43–53; 19:18–27; Ex. 1265
`¶¶ 194–197. As illustrated in the annotated Figure 11 reproduced above, the
`engine drive mode lies between the two boundary lines B and C. Ibaraki
`’882 describes that the controller uses the data map of Figure 11 to select
`ENGINE DRIVE mode when the vehicle running condition as represented
`by the current vehicle drive torque and speed V is held within the range
`between boundary lines B and C. Petitioner explains, with supporting
`evidence, that at a given vehicle speed (annotated as V1 from above), a given
`setpoint (annotated as SP from above) along boundary B is known, and that
`the setpoint marks the transition between the MOTOR DRIVE mode and the
`ENGINE DRIVE mode. As long as the current vehicle drive torque and
`vehicle speed are below torque point C1 (annotated above), Petitioner
`contends, the vehicle will operate in the ENGINE DRIVE mode. Pet. 22–
`23; Ex. 1262, 20:55–62; 23:66–24:30; Ex. 1265 ¶¶ 200–201