Case 7:14-cv-00014-O Document 265 Filed 03/21/15 Page 1 of 58 PageID 16045
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WICHITA FALLS DIVISION
`
`Civil Action No. 7:14-cv-00014-O
`
`Civil Action No. 7:14-cv-00106-O
`
`§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§
`
`SUMMIT 6 LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`HTC CORPORATION et al.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`SUMMIT 6 LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`APPLE INC.
`
`Defendant.
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER
`
`Before the Court are Plaintiff Summit 6, LLC’s (“Summit 6” or “Plaintiff”) Opening Claim
`
`Construction Brief and Appendix in Support (ECF Nos. 217–18), filed December 29, 2014;
`
`Defendants Apple Inc. (“Apple”), HTC Corporation, HTC America, Inc. (“HTC”), LG Electronics
`
`Inc., LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc., LG Electronics MobileComm, U.S.A., Inc. (“LG”), Motorola
`
`Mobility LLC (“Motorola”), and Twitter, Inc.’s (“Twitter”) (collectively, “Defendants”) Opening
`
`Claim Construction Brief (ECF No. 219), filed December 30, 2014; Plaintiff’s Responsive Claim
`
`Construction Brief and Appendix in Support (ECF Nos. 227–28), filed January 20, 2015;
`
`Defendants’ Responsive Claim Construction Brief and Appendix in Support (ECF No. 229), filed
`
`Exhibit 2030
`Apple Inc. and Twitter, Inc. v. Summit 6 LLC
`IPR2015-00686, Summit 6 LLC
`
`

`

`Case 7:14-cv-00014-O Document 265 Filed 03/21/15 Page 2 of 58 PageID 16046
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`January 20, 2015; Defendants’ Reply Brief (ECF No. 234), filed February 3, 2015; and Plaintiff’s
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`Sur-Reply Brief (ECF No. 235), filed February 6, 2015. A hearing was held on this matter on March
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`4, 2015. See Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 259.
`
`I.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`Plaintiff is the current owner of three Patents-in-Suit: United States Patent Number 6,895,557
`
`(the “’557 patent”), United States Patent Number 7,765,482 (the “’482 patent”), and United States
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`Patent Number 8,612,515 (the “’515 patent”).
`
`The parties seek construction of nine sets of terms appearing in the Patents-in-Suit: (1) “pre-
`
`processing”; (2) “server device,” “host server,” “remote device,” “remote server,” “a device separate
`
`from said client device,” and “distributing party”; (3) terms relating to the receipt, provision, or
`
`transmission of pre-processing parameters; (4) terms relating to the preambles of the ’482 and ’515
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`patents; (5) “distributing,” “distribution”; (6) “said identification”; (7) “said client device”; (8)
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`“media object identifier”; and (9) “code means . . . for enabling a receipt of an identification of one
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`or more image files, video files or audio files to associate with said account.”
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`II.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
`
`Patent infringement is the unauthorized making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing
`
`into the United States of any patented invention during the term of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
`
`In a patent infringement case, a court first determines the proper construction of the patent claims,
`
`establishing the scope and boundaries of the subject-matter of the patent as a matter of law.
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S.
`
`370, 384–85 (1996); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015). The trier
`
`of fact will then be called upon to compare the properly construed claims to the allegedly infringing
`
`2
`
`Exhibit 2030
`Apple Inc. and Twitter, Inc. v. Summit 6 LLC
`IPR2015-00686, Summit 6 LLC
`
`

`

`Case 7:14-cv-00014-O Document 265 Filed 03/21/15 Page 3 of 58 PageID 16047
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`devices in order to determine whether there has been infringement. Markman, 52 F.3d at 976.
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`The claims of a patent are the numbered paragraphs at the end of the patent that define the
`
`scope of the invention, and thus the scope of the patentee’s right to exclude others from making,
`
`using, or selling the patented invention. See Astrazeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 384 F.3d 1333,
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`1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Claim construction is the process of giving proper meanings to the claim
`
`language thereby defining the scope of the protection. See Bell Commc’ns Research, Inc. v. Vitalink
`
`Commc’ns Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 619 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
`
`Claim construction starts with the language of the claim itself because a patent’s claims
`
`define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415
`
`F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “[T]he claims themselves provide substantial guidance
`
`as to the meaning of particular claim terms.” Id. at 1314. Moreover, claim terms should be given
`
`their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art as of the
`
`effective filing date of the patent application. Id. at 1313. This is because a patent is addressed to,
`
`and intended to be read by, others skilled in the particular art. Id. However, the patentee is free to
`
`disavow the ordinary meaning of a term and define his own terms, so long as any special definition
`
`given to a term is clearly set forth in the specification or prosecution history. Hill-Rom Servs., Inc.
`
`v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 719 (2014).
`
`When construing disputed claim terms, a court should look first to the intrinsic record of the
`
`patent, including the claims and the specification, to determine the meaning of words in the claims.
`
`Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. v. Arm Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “[T]he
`
`specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive;
`
`it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (internal
`
`3
`
`Exhibit 2030
`Apple Inc. and Twitter, Inc. v. Summit 6 LLC
`IPR2015-00686, Summit 6 LLC
`
`

`

`Case 7:14-cv-00014-O Document 265 Filed 03/21/15 Page 4 of 58 PageID 16048
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`quotation marks omitted). The specification acts as a dictionary when it expressly or implicitly
`
`defines terms. Id. at 1321. Courts should also refer to the prosecution history, if it is in evidence.
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`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The prosecution history
`
`is part of the intrinsic record and consists of a complete record of all proceedings before the United
`
`States Patent and Trademark Office, including prior art cited during the examination of the patent,
`
`and express representations made by the applicant as to the scope of the claims. Id. at 1582–83.
`
`The Federal Circuit has also stated that district courts may “rely on extrinsic evidence, which
`
`consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor
`
`testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (internal quotation marks
`
`omitted). Dictionaries and treatises can be “useful in claim construction”; in particular, technical
`
`dictionaries may help the court “to better understand the underlying technology and the way in which
`
`one of skill in the art might use the claim terms.” Id. at 1318 (internal quotation marks omitted). As
`
`to expert testimony, the Federal Circuit has stated:
`
`[E]xtrinsic evidence in the form of expert testimony can be useful to
`a court for a variety of purposes, such as to provide background on
`the technology at issue, to explain how an invention works, to ensure
`that the court’s understanding of the technical aspects of the patent is
`consistent with that of a person of skill in the art, or to establish that
`a particular term in the patent or the prior art has a particular meaning
`in the pertinent field.
`
`Id. However, “a court should discount any expert testimony that is clearly at odds with the claim
`
`construction mandated by the claims themselves, the written description, and the prosecution history,
`
`in other words, with the written record of the patent.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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`Extrinsic evidence is less significant than the intrinsic record and undue reliance on it may pose a
`
`risk of changing the meaning of claims, contrary to the public record contained in the written patent.
`
`4
`
`Exhibit 2030
`Apple Inc. and Twitter, Inc. v. Summit 6 LLC
`IPR2015-00686, Summit 6 LLC
`
`

`

`Case 7:14-cv-00014-O Document 265 Filed 03/21/15 Page 5 of 58 PageID 16049
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`Id. at 1317, 1319.
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`Where the meaning of a claim is unclear, the claim may be indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
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`¶ 2. “[A] patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating
`
`the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the
`
`art about the scope of the invention.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124
`
`(2014). “The definiteness requirement, so understood, mandates clarity, while recognizing that
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`absolute precision is unattainable. The . . . certainty which the law requires in patents is not greater
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`than is reasonable, having regard to their subject-matter.” Id. at 2129 (internal quotation marks
`
`omitted).
`
`5
`
`Exhibit 2030
`Apple Inc. and Twitter, Inc. v. Summit 6 LLC
`IPR2015-00686, Summit 6 LLC
`
`

`

`Case 7:14-cv-00014-O Document 265 Filed 03/21/15 Page 6 of 58 PageID 16050
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`III.
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ANALYSIS
`
`A.
`
`“Pre-processing”
`
`Plaintiff
`pre-processing modifying the [media
`object data/digital content
`data/one or more image
`files, video files, or audio
`files], as opposed to data
`1
`merely associated with the
`[media object/digital
`content/image files, video
`files, audio files], at the
`client or local device in
`preparation for
`transmission to a remote
`device
`
`Defendants
`modification before further processing /
`modifying before further processing
`
`OR
`
`modifying the [media object data/digital
`content data/one or more image files, video
`files, or audio files], as opposed to data
`merely associated with the [media
`object/digital content/image files, video files,
`audio files], at the client or local [device]
`(sic) prior to transmission to a remote device2
`
`Plaintiff argues that the Court should adopt substantially the same construction of the “pre-
`
`processing” term as in the previous Summit 6 case. See Summit 6 LLC v. Research in Motion Corp.,
`
`No. 3:11-cv-367-O, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186414, at *12–31 (N.D. Tex. May 21, 2012)
`
`(O’Connor, J.) [hereinafter “previous Summit 6 case”]. Defendants contend that “modification
`3
`
`before further processing” better reflects the plain meaning of the term. Defs.’ Open. Br. 17, ECF
`
` According to footnote two of the parties’ Joint Claim Construction Chart: “The Patents-in-Suit use
`1
`different terms in the claims to describe the items that are pre-processed (i.e., ‘media object,’ ‘digital
`content,’ ‘image files, video files, or audio files’). The bracketed text indicates the substitution of these terms
`in their respective claims in the Patents-in-Suit.”
`
` As mentioned in footnote four of the parties’ Joint Claim Construction Chart, because Defendants
`2
`first posed this alternative construction in their Responsive Claim Construction Brief, Summit 6 did not have
`an opportunity to respond to this argument in the briefing. See Defs.’ Resp. Br. 5, ECF No. 229.
`
` The only change Plaintiff proposes to the construction of “pre-processing” in the previous Summit
`3
`6 case is the addition of “one or more image files, video files, or audio files” to the bracketed portion of the
`construction, in order to make the construction consistent with the language in the ’515 patent claims. See
`Joint Status Report Ex. A (Proposed Claim Constructions & Evidence) n.1, ECF No. 232.
`
`6
`
`Exhibit 2030
`Apple Inc. and Twitter, Inc. v. Summit 6 LLC
`IPR2015-00686, Summit 6 LLC
`
`

`

`Case 7:14-cv-00014-O Document 265 Filed 03/21/15 Page 7 of 58 PageID 16051
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`No. 219. In the alternative, Defendants would accept Plaintiff’s proposed construction with the
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`phrase “prior to” replacing the “in preparation for” phrase. Defs.’ Resp. Br. 5, ECF No. 229.
`
`The briefing reflects two primary points of contention regarding the “pre-processing” claim
`
`term. First, although the parties agree that “pre-processing” involves the modification of material,
`
`the parties offer different constructions to describe what happens to the material subsequent to
`
`modification. In Summit 6’s proposal, the material is modified “in preparation for transmission.” In
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`Defendants’ alternate proposals, the material is modified either “before further processing” or “prior
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`to transmission.” Defs.’ Open. Br. 16, ECF No. 219; Defs.’ Resp. Br. 5, ECF No. 229. The parties
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`also disagree as to whether the “pre-processing” construction should address the same three
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`questions discussed in the previous Summit 6 case: what material is pre-processed, where the pre-
`
`processing occurs, and where the material is transmitted. Defendants do not contest the content of
`
`the Court’s prior resolution of these questions; instead, they suggest that the elaborations are not
`
`necessary to the construction of pre-processing. Defs.’ Resp. Br. 4–5, ECF No. 229; see also Hr’g
`
`Tr. at 14:25–15:8, ECF No. 259.
`
`1.
`
`Defendants’ Initial Proposed Construction
`
`The Court turns first to Defendants’ initial proposed construction. Defendants suggest, citing
`
`Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, that the prefix “pre-” in “pre-processing” indicates that
`
`the material must be modified in some way before it undergoes processing. Defs.’ Open. Br. 17, ECF
`
`No. 219. They define “processing” broadly to include the transmission, uploading, transporting,
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`publishing, and distribution of material. Id.; Defs.’ Resp. Br. 4, ECF No. 229. Defendants further
`
`contend that their construction is superior because Plaintiff’s requirement that material must be
`
`modified in preparation only for “transmission” contradicts the claims. Defs.’ Open. Br. 17–19, ECF
`
`7
`
`Exhibit 2030
`Apple Inc. and Twitter, Inc. v. Summit 6 LLC
`IPR2015-00686, Summit 6 LLC
`
`

`

`Case 7:14-cv-00014-O Document 265 Filed 03/21/15 Page 8 of 58 PageID 16052
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`No. 219 (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314). Defendants note that claims 1, 36, and 37 of the ’482
`
`patent provide that, subsequent to modification, material could be “distributed” or “published”
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`instead of being “transmitted.” Id. at 17; Defs.’ App. Supp. Open. Br. Ex. 3 (’482 patent), claims 1,
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`36–37, App. 49, 51, ECF No. 219-1. Thus, they conclude that “modification before further
`
`processing” is the most accurate construction.
`
`Plaintiff responds that, in every instance of “pre-processing” in the claims, the modified
`
`material first is transmitted. Pl.’s Resp. Br. 5–6, ECF No. 227. After transmission to another
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`location, the material may then be distributed or published, but this stage is not required. Id.; see,
`
`e.g., ’482 patent, claim 1(d), App. 49, ECF No. 219-1 (“transmitting said pre-processed group of one
`
`or more items of digital content to said server device for subsequent publishing . . . ”) (emphasis
`
`added). Thus, Plaintiff argues that its proposed construction does not contradict the claims and
`
`instead gives a more specific definition of the “pre-processing” claim term.
`
`Plaintiff further objects that Defendants improperly rely on dictionary definitions over the
`
`intrinsic record. Pl.’s Resp. Br. 5–6, ECF No. 227; Pl.’s Open. Br. 10–13, ECF No. 217. Reliance
`
`on dictionaries, particularly non-technical dictionaries, risks altering the meaning of the claim
`
`beyond what it would mean to a person skilled in the particular art in the context of the patent. See
`
`Phillips, 415, F.3d at 1319–24. Instead, the specification or prosecution history should be the primary
`
`support for a proposed construction. See id. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the intrinsic record
`
`should be the primary support for a proposed construction. See id.
`
`Plaintiff next argues that Defendants’ vague interpretation of “pre-processed” could lead to
`
`jury confusion. See Pl.’s Open. Br. 6–10, ECF No. 217; Pl.’s Resp. Br. 6, ECF No. 227. Indeed,
`
`Defendants note that Plaintiff’s counsel misconstrued the meaning of Defendants’ initial construction
`
`8
`
`Exhibit 2030
`Apple Inc. and Twitter, Inc. v. Summit 6 LLC
`IPR2015-00686, Summit 6 LLC
`
`

`

`Case 7:14-cv-00014-O Document 265 Filed 03/21/15 Page 9 of 58 PageID 16053
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`in its Opening Claim Construction Brief. See Defs.’ Resp. Br. 4, ECF No. 229 (“In essence, Summit
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`6 misconstrues Defendants’ proposed construction by construing ‘further processing’ to mean
`
`‘further modifying.’”).
`
`Confusion arose between the parties for two reasons. First, Defendants’ initial construction
`
`uses the word “processing” in their definition of “pre-processing,” and the construction itself does
`
`not define the word “processing.” It is only in the briefing that Defendants define “processing.” See
`
`Defs.’ Resp. Br. 4, ECF No. 229 (“As Defendants explained in their opening brief, ‘further
`
`processing’ includes ‘transmission of the pre-processed material,’ but may also include other types
`
`of processing, such as uploading, transporting, publishing, and distributing.”). Second, Plaintiff
`
`assumed that the “pre-” in “pre-processing” indicated that the “processing” step will occur before
`
`something else happens, namely “transmission”; whereas Defendants assumed that the “pre-” in
`
`“pre-processing” indicated that something, namely “modification,” would occur before the
`
`“processing” step. Plaintiff’s attempt to reconcile these two assumptions led it to posit that, under
`
`Defendants’ construction, “processing” is synonymous with “modification,” and thus Defendants’
`
`“pre-processing” construction would require two stages of modification. See Pl.’s Resp. Br. 6, ECF
`
`No. 227. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s briefing objected that Defendants were attempting to impose an
`
`improper limitation by requiring two stages of modification when the claims are agnostic as to
`
`whether further modification will take place. Id.; Hill-Rom Servs., 755 F.3d at 1372–73 (holding that
`
`courts “do not read limitations from the embodiments in the specification into the claims”).
`
`Defendants’ briefing clarifies that they did not intend their construction to require two stages of
`
`modification; instead, their construction of “pre-processing” would include one stage of modification
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`and one broadly defined “processing” stage. See Defs.’ Resp. Br. 4, ECF No. 229.
`
`9
`
`Exhibit 2030
`Apple Inc. and Twitter, Inc. v. Summit 6 LLC
`IPR2015-00686, Summit 6 LLC
`
`

`

`Case 7:14-cv-00014-O Document 265 Filed 03/21/15 Page 10 of 58 PageID 16054
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`The Court finds that Plaintiff posits a more specific definition of the “pre-processing” claim
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`term. See Pl.’s Open. Br. 6–10, ECF No. 217. Plaintiff’s construction provides that every instance
`
`of pre-processing involves the “modification” of material before the material is “transmitted” to
`
`another location. Id. This description is based upon the claims and provides helpful specificity and
`
`scope to the relevant claims. See Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2124. The Court further determines that the
`
`inclusion of what material is transmitted where, in answer to the questions at issue in the previous
`
`Summit 6 case, adds helpful clarification to the term without imposing extraneous limitations on the
`
`claims. See Hill-Rom Servs., 755 F.3d at 1372–73. Further, Defendants, in their Responsive Brief,
`
`indicated that they are willing to accept the bulk of Plaintiff’s proposed construction. Defs.’ Resp.
`
`Br. 5, ECF No. 229. Accordingly, the Court now turns to Defendants’ proposed change to one phrase
`
`of Plaintiff’s construction.
`
`2.
`
`“In Preparation For” or “Prior To”
`
`Defendants argue, in the alternative, that the phrase “in preparation for” should be replaced
`
`with the phrase “prior to” in Plaintiff’s construction of “pre-processing.” Id. As this alternate
`
`proposal was introduced in Defendants’ Response Brief, Plaintiff did not specifically address this
`
`issue in its briefing. However, in the hearing on this matter, Plaintiff had the opportunity to clarify
`
`its position. See Hr’g Tr. at 10:8–19, ECF No. 259. According to Plaintiff, the “in preparation”
`
`phrase serves to provide helpful context. Id. at 12:5–7. Plaintiff reasons that, because all of the
`
`claims require transmission of pre-processed content, the pre-processing must occur for the purpose
`
`of preparing something for transmission. Id. at 10:9–14; see also Pl.’s Open. Br. 9, ECF No. 217
`
`(“The specification makes clear that pre-processing does not happen in the abstract, as Defendants’
`
`construction suggests, but rather to prepare media for transmission to another device.”).
`
`10
`
`Exhibit 2030
`Apple Inc. and Twitter, Inc. v. Summit 6 LLC
`IPR2015-00686, Summit 6 LLC
`
`

`

`Case 7:14-cv-00014-O Document 265 Filed 03/21/15 Page 11 of 58 PageID 16055
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`Alternatively, Plaintiff submitted that it would accept a construction that included both “prior to”
`
`and “in preparation for.” Hr’g Tr. at 30:6–18, ECF No. 259. Thus, the Court finds that the parties
`
`agree about the “when” question — that the modification of material occurs “prior to” the
`
`transmission. See id. at 10:2–3 (“[W]e don’t dispute that the pre-processing has to happen before
`
`transmission.”). They disagree as to the “why” question — whether the material is modified for the
`
`purpose of transmission. See id. at 10:3–5.
`
` In the previous Summit 6 case, the Court did not specifically analyze the “in preparation for”
`
`phrase in its construction of “pre-processing.” Thus, the Court will address the question for the first
`
`time here. See Negotiated Data Solutions, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-390-JRG, 2012 WL
`
`6494240, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2012) (“[T]he previous constructions in those cases [concerning
`
`the same patent], and particularly from those in this District, are instructive but are not alone
`
`compelling or binding on the Court.”).
`
`According to Plaintiff, the specification answers the question of why the material is
`
`transported. For support, Plaintiff at the hearing highlighted column 1, lines 7–11 and lines 58–63
`
`of the ’557 patent. See Hr’g Tr. at 12:9–15, ECF No. 259. The first excerpt reads in relevant part:
`
`“The present invention relates to the handling, manipulation and processing of digital content and
`
`more particularly to the transportation and Internet publishing of digital content.” ’557 patent 1:8–11
`
`(emphasis added). The second excerpt distinguishes prior art because Caught in the Web’s
`
`ActiveUpload tool had no “built in ‘intelligence’ to streamline the process of handling and
`
`transporting rich media objects from the front end.” Id. at 1:61–63 (emphasis added); see Hr’g Tr.
`
`at 12:16–23, ECF No. 259. Thus, from these two passages, Plaintiff concluded that the “in
`
`preparation for transmission” language is reflected in the specification.
`
`11
`
`Exhibit 2030
`Apple Inc. and Twitter, Inc. v. Summit 6 LLC
`IPR2015-00686, Summit 6 LLC
`
`

`

`Case 7:14-cv-00014-O Document 265 Filed 03/21/15 Page 12 of 58 PageID 16056
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`Defendants respond that Plaintiff’s “in preparation for” language imposes an unnecessary
`
`limitation on the claims. Hr’g Tr. at 17:24, ECF No. 259. They argue that Plaintiff is attempting to
`
`read out other limitations that are present in the claims through a potentially confusing construction.
`
`See id. at 27:5–12. For instance, some claims, such as claim 13(b) of the ’482 patent, indicate that
`
`the modification takes place for a particular purpose other than transmission. See id. at 23:1–8. Claim
`
`13(b) of the ’482 patent reads in relevant part: “. . . pre-processing parameters controlling said client
`
`device in a placement of said digital content into a specified form in preparation for publication to
`
`one or more devices that are remote . . . ” ’482 patent, claim 13(b) (emphasis added). Defendants add
`
`that the specifications’ repeated use of the language “prior to” instead of “in preparation for” also
`
`demonstrates that the applicant knew how to distinguish between terms. Hr’g Tr. at 24:6–10, ECF
`
`No. 259.
`
`The Court is not convinced that the claims or specifications bear out Plaintiff’s context
`
`argument. In both of the specification excerpts Plaintiff cited as support, “transmission” is paired
`
`along with another function and thus it is not clear why the given purpose of the modification must
`
`be “transmission.” Moreover, merely because material is modified before transmission does not
`
`imply that the purpose of the modification is the transmission itself. The Court also finds persuasive
`
`Defendants’ argument that the patentee knew how to clarify the purpose by using “in preparation”
`
`in some claim terms and not in others. Therefore, in order to avoid reading extraneous limitations
`
`into the claims, the Court will use the broader “prior to” language rather than the more narrow “in
`
`preparation for” phrase. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1320.
`
`Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that “pre-processing” means “modifying the
`
`[media object data/digital content data/one or more image files, video files, or audio files], as
`
`12
`
`Exhibit 2030
`Apple Inc. and Twitter, Inc. v. Summit 6 LLC
`IPR2015-00686, Summit 6 LLC
`
`

`

`Case 7:14-cv-00014-O Document 265 Filed 03/21/15 Page 13 of 58 PageID 16057
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`opposed to data merely associated with the [media object/digital content/image files, video files,
`
`audio files], at the client or local device prior to transmission to a remote device.”
`
`B.
`
`“Server device,” “host server,” “remote device,” “remote server,” “a device
`separate from said client device,” and “distributing party”
`
`server device
`
`Plaintiff
`No construction
`necessary
`
`host server
`
`No construction
`necessary
`
`remote device
`
`device/server
`not co-located
`with the client
`device
`
`Defendants
`device/server from which the pre-processing parameters
`are received by a client device, to which the pre-processed
`selected content is sent from the client device, and which
`delivers the pre-processed selected content to one or more
`recipient devices4
`
`device/server that provides computers with access to data
`or programs and from which the pre-processing
`parameters are received by a client device, to which the
`pre-processed selected content is sent from the client
`device, and which delivers the pre-processed selected
`content to one or more recipient devices
`
`device/server that is not co-located with the client device
`and from which the pre-processing parameters are
`received by the local device or the client device, to which
`the pre-processed selected content is sent from the local
`device or the client device, and which delivers the pre-
`processed selected content to one or more recipient
`devices
`
` In the parties’ Joint Claim Construction Chart, Defendants include the following argument for each
`4
`of the terms in this section: “In order for the claims containing this term to meet the written description
`requirement, the term would have to be construed to mean: [proposed construction of term.] Under this
`term’s plain meaning, the identified claims containing the term are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (e.g.[,] for
`lack of written description and indefiniteness).”
`
`13
`
`Exhibit 2030
`Apple Inc. and Twitter, Inc. v. Summit 6 LLC
`IPR2015-00686, Summit 6 LLC
`
`

`

`Case 7:14-cv-00014-O Document 265 Filed 03/21/15 Page 14 of 58 PageID 16058
`
`remote server
`
`device/server
`not co-located
`with the client
`device
`
`device/server that is not co-located with the client device
`and from which the pre-processing parameters are
`received by a client device, to which the pre-processed
`selected content is sent from the client device, and which
`delivers the pre-processed selected content to one or more
`recipient devices
`
`a device
`separate from
`said client
`device
`
`device other
`than said client
`device
`
`device/server other than the client device from which the
`pre-processing parameters are received by a client device,
`to which the pre-processed selected content is sent from
`the client device, and which delivers the pre-processed
`selected content to one or more recipient devices
`
`distributing
`party
`
`No construction
`necessary
`
`party from which the pre-processing parameters are
`received by a client device, to which the pre-processed
`selected content is sent from the client device, and which
`delivers the pre-processed selected content to one or more
`recipient devices
`
`
`Defendants argue that the claim language, specification, and prosecution history demonstrate
`
`that the claim terms “server device,” “host server,” “remote device,” “remote server,” and “a device
`
`separate from said client device” are “all one and the same.” Defs.’ Resp. Br. 7, ECF No. 229.
`6
`
`According to Defendants, each of these terms describes a location that performs the following three
`7
`
`functions: (1) providing the pre-processing parameters to the client device; (2) receiving the pre-
`8
`
`processed digital content from the client device; and (3) delivering the pre-processed content to the
`
`recipient viewing devices. Id. at 6.
`
` Defendants do not list the term “distributing party” in this list. See Defs.’ Resp. Br. 7, ECF No. 229.
`6
`However, as Defendants’ proposed construction differs from the “server device” term only by substituting
`“party” instead of “device/server,” the Court addresses this term here as well.
`
` According to Defendants, this location is also sometimes described in the claims as the “second
`7
`location” or the “customer’s website/server.” Defs.’ Resp. Br. 11, ECF No. 229.
`
` The parties agree that claim term “pre-processing parameters” means “values directing the pre-
`8
`processing.” Am. Joint Statement 2, ECF No. 232.
`
`14
`
`Exhibit 2030
`Apple Inc. and Twitter, Inc. v. Summit 6 LLC
`IPR2015-00686, Summit 6 LLC
`
`

`

`Case 7:14-cv-00014-O Document 265 Filed 03/21/15 Page 15 of 58 PageID 16059
`
`Plaintiff argues that each term has a distinct meaning and that Defendants improperly seek
`
`to impose a “same server” requirement on the claims, limiting the claims to the preferred
`
`embodiment. Pl.’s Open. Br. 14, ECF No. 217. According to Plaintiff, the claims, specification, and
`
`prosecution history allow for different servers or devices to perform the three functions Defendants
`
`list. Id. at 15. For the “server device,” “host server,” and “distributing party” claim terms, Plaintiff
`
`argues that there is no construction necessary because persons having ordinary skill in the art would
`
`have readily understood the terms. Id. For the “remote device,” “remote server,” and “a device
`
`separate from said client device” claim terms, the parties agree that Plaintiff’s proposed constructions
`
`should be included within the terms’ ultimate definitions, at a minimum. The parties disagree as to
`
`whether the “same server” requirement also should be included in each of these terms.
`
`Courts generally presume that distinct phrases used in the claims have different meanings.
`
`See Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc. v. Int’l Sec. Exch., LLC, 677 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“In
`
`the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the use of these different terms
`
`in the claims connotes different meanings.”) (quoting CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler
`
`GmbH & Co. KG, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Thus, Defendants bear the burden of
`
`overcoming this presumption by establishing that the patentee gave these terms the same meaning.
`
`See previous Summit 6 case, at *70 (“Looking first to the claim language, the Court agrees with
`
`Plaintiff that the terms ‘remote device,’ ‘device separate from said client device,’ and ‘server device’
`
`are presumed to have different meanings because these distinct phrases are used differently in the
`
`same claims and across the claims of the Patents at issue.”).
`
`District courts are instructed to “not read limitations from the embodiments in the
`
`specification into the claims.” Hill-Rom Servs., 755 F.3d at 1371; accord Am. Piledriving Equip.,
`
`15
`
`Exhibit 2030
`Apple Inc. and Twitter, Inc. v. Summit 6 LLC
`IPR2015-00686, Summit 6 LLC
`
`

`

`Case 7:14-cv-00014-O Document 265 Filed 03/21/15 Page 16 of 58 PageID 16060
`
`Inc. v. Geoquip, Inc., 637 F.3d 1324, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“It is well settled that the role of a
`
`district court in construing claims is not to redefine claim recitations or to read limitations into the
`
`claims to obviate factual questions of infringement and validity but rather to give meaning to the
`
`limitations actually contained in the claims, informed by the written description, the prosecution
`
`history if in evidence, and any relevant extrinsic evidence.”).
`
`The fact that a patent describes “only a single embodiment” does not require the invention
`
`to be limited to that embodiment. Id. Only when “the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to
`
`limit the claim scope using ‘words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction,’” will a court
`
`read the claims restrictively. Id. (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898,