Case 7:14-cv-00014-O Document 217 Filed 12/29/14 Page 1 of 44 PageID 10692
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WICHITA FALLS DIVISION
`
`
`SUMMIT 6 LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`
`
`
`HTC CORPORATION,
`HTC AMERICA, INC.,
`LG ELECTRONICS, INC.,
`LG ELECTRONICS USA, INC.,
`LG ELECTRONICS MOBILECOMM
`USA, INC.,
`MOTOROLA MOBILITY LLC, and
`TWITTER INC.,
`
`
`
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 7:14-cv-00014
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`
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`
`
`
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 7:14-cv-00160
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`
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`
`§
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`Defendants.
`
`
`SUMMIT 6 LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`APPLE INC.
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`OF PLAINTIFF SUMMIT 6, LLC
`
`
`McKool 1070670v2
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`
`
`Apple/Twitter
`Ex. 1025
`IPR3 of U.S. Pat. No. 7,765,482
`
`

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`Case 7:14-cv-00014-O Document 217 Filed 12/29/14 Page 2 of 44 PageID 10693
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`
`I.
`II.
`III.
`IV.
`A.
`1.
`
`a)
`
`b)
`
`c)
`
`a)
`b)
`
`c)
`
`a)
`b)
`c)
`
`2.
`
`B.
`1.
`2.
`3.
`
`
`4.
`C.
`1.
`
`2.
`3.
`D.
`E.
`1.
`2.
`
`F.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1
`HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.................................................................................. 1
`PRINCIPLES OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ............................................................ 3
`DISPUTED CLAIM CONSTRUCTIONS ................................................................... 6
`The “Pre-Processing” Term .......................................................................................... 6
`Summit 6’s Construction Defines Pre-Processing Consistent with the Specification
`and Prosecution History. ............................................................................................... 6
`The Intrinsic Evidence Shows that Digital Content Data, Rather Than Data Merely
`Associated with the Digital Content Data, is Pre-Processed. ................................... 7
`The Intrinsic Evidence Shows that Pre-Processing Occurs at the Client or Local
`Device. ...................................................................................................................... 8
`The Intrinsic Evidence Shows that the Digital Content is Pre-Processed in
`Preparation for Sending to a Remote Device. .......................................................... 9
`Defendants’ Proposal is Not Supported by the Intrinsic Record. ............................... 10
`Defendants’ Proposal Improperly Excludes a Claimed Embodiment. ................... 10
`Summit 6 Did Not Disclaim or Define Pre-Processing Such That It Requires
`“Further Processing” .............................................................................................. 12
`Defendants’ Construction Injects an Ambiguous Limitation. ................................ 12
`The “Server,” “Separate” Device, and “Distributing Party” Terms ........................... 13
`The First Three Plain, Ordinary Terms Need Not be Construed. ............................... 14
`Summit 6’s Proposal for the Remaining Two Terms is Not Disputed. ...................... 15
`Defendants Improperly Require All Claims to Use the Same Server or Same
`Device ......................................................................................................................... 15
`Defendants’ Same Server/Device Requirement Contradicts the Claims. ............... 15
`Defendants’ Proposal Ignores the Doctrine of Claim Differentiation. ................... 17
`The Intrinsic Record Contradicts Defendants’ Proposal. ....................................... 18
`The Claims are Not Invalid if Given Their Plain Meaning. ....................................... 20
`The Pre-Processing Parameters “Received From” and “Provided To” Terms ........... 21
`The Plain Meaning and/or Summit 6’s Constructions Should Be Adopted Because
`They Provide Meaning to the Terms at Issue. ............................................................ 22
`Defendants’ Proposal Violates the Doctrine of Claim Differentiation. ...................... 23
`Summit 6 Did Not Limit its Claim to Defendants’ Narrow Proposal. ........................ 24
`The Preambles of the ʼ482 and ʼ515 Patents .............................................................. 24
`The “Distributing” and “Distribution” Terms ............................................................. 26
`These Terms are Not Confusing and Need Not be Construed. ................................... 26
`Defendants Ignore that Different Claim Terms are Presumed to Have Different
`Meaning and Scope. .................................................................................................... 26
`The Terms that Defendants Allege are Indefinite ....................................................... 27
`i
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`1.
`2.
`3.
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`4.
`5.
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`a)
`b)
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`These Terms are Not Indefinite. ................................................................................. 28
`“Said Identification” ................................................................................................... 29
`“Said Client Device” ................................................................................................... 30
`Summit 6’s Construction is Supported by the Intrinsic Record. ............................ 31
`If Necessary, the Court Can Correct This Typographical Error. ............................ 32
`“Media Object Identifier” ........................................................................................... 33
`The “Code Means” Term ............................................................................................ 35
`CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 36
`
`
`
`V.
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`Case 7:14-cv-00014-O Document 217 Filed 12/29/14 Page 4 of 44 PageID 10695
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`
`
`
`CASES
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`2-way Computing Inc. v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,
`2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71142 (D. Nev. May 17, 2013) ..........................................................32
`
`Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp.,
`483 F.3d 800 (Fed. Cir. 2007)............................................................................................17, 24
`
`Ariad Pharms, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
`598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010)................................................................................................20
`
`Ariba, Inc. v. Emptoris, Inc.,
`2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59862 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2008) ..................................................35, 36
`
`Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. A123 Sys.,
`2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32886 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2011) ......................................................28
`
`Bell Commc’ns Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Commc’ns Corp.,
`55 F.3d 615 (Fed. Cir. 1995)......................................................................................................3
`
`Biovail Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc.,
`239 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2001)..................................................................................................5
`
`Comark Commc’ns v. Harris Corp.,
`156 F.3d 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1998)..........................................................................................16, 27
`
`Cree, Inc. v. SemiLEDs Corp.,
`2012 U.S. Dist LEXIS 39582 (D. Del. Mar. 21, 2012) ...........................................................32
`
`DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,
`2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 22902 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 5, 2014) ..........................................................20
`
`Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp.,
`216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000)............................................................................................6, 13
`
`ERBE Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady Tech. LLC,
`629 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..................................................................................................8
`
`Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp.,
`112 F.3d 495 (Fed. Cir. 1997)..................................................................................................12
`
`Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
`355 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................12
`
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`Case 7:14-cv-00014-O Document 217 Filed 12/29/14 Page 5 of 44 PageID 10696
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`
`Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.,
`407 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................................32
`
`Hill-Rom Servs. v. Stryker Corp.,
`755 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014)..................................................................................................6
`
`Hoffer v. Microsoft Corp.,
`405 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................................32
`
`i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp.,
`598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010)......................................................................................10, 11, 12
`
`Intermec Techs. Corp. v. Palm Inc.,
`811 F. Supp. 2d 973 (D. Del. 2011) .........................................................................................32
`
`Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc.,
`766 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2014)..........................................................................................20, 21
`
`Intirtool, Ltd. v. Texar Corp.,
`369 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................25
`
`Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................17, 18, 23, 24
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) ..........................................3
`
`Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB,
`344 F.3d 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003)................................................................................................35
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`134 S. Ct. 2120, 189 L. Ed. 2d 37 (2014) ........................................................................ passim
`
`Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. v. Arm Holdings, PLC,
`403 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..................................................................................................4
`
`Nichia Corp. v. Everlight Elecs. Co.,
`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172024 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2014) .....................................................28
`
`Noah Sys. Inc. v. Intuit Inc.,
`675 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................35
`
`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................4, 14, 15, 26
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)........................................................................................ passim
`
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`Case 7:14-cv-00014-O Document 217 Filed 12/29/14 Page 6 of 44 PageID 10697
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`
`Salazar v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,
`414 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................................28
`
`SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp.,
`859 F.2d 878 (Fed. Cir. 1988)....................................................................................................8
`
`Summit 6 LLC v. Research in Motion Corp., et al.,
`Case No. 3:11-cv-00367, Dkt. No. 168 (N.D. Tex. May 21, 2012) ..............................3, 10, 25
`
`TecSec, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp.,
`731 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013)..........................................................................................35, 36
`
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)......................................................................................4, 12, 24
`
`Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. Open E Cry, LLC,
`728 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2013)................................................................................................20
`
`U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc.,
`103 F.3d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1997)......................................................................................4, 14, 26
`
`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,
`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).......................................................................................... passim
`
`
`
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`Case 7:14-cv-00014-O Document 217 Filed 12/29/14 Page 7 of 44 PageID 10698
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Plaintiff Summit 6, LLC (“Summit 6”) submits its Opening Claim Construction Brief
`
`regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,895,557 (the “’557 patent”) and its continuations U.S. Patent Nos.
`
`7,765,482 (the “’482 patent”) and 8,612,515 (the “ʼ515 patent”) (collectively the “Patents-in-
`
`Suit”). This brief first introduces the technology and history of the Patents-in-Suit, summarizes
`
`relevant case law, and then explains why the Court should adopt Summit 6’s constructions.
`II.
`HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
`The inventors of the Patents-in-Suit have been heavily involved in the digital imaging
`
`industry since its infancy, when digital cameras were a far cry from the slim, sophisticated
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`machines we see today. The bulky Kodak DC50 from 1996 is
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`shown to the right. During this timeframe, the inventors
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`worked at a company called PictureWorks. The inventors and
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`PictureWorks recognized
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`that once
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`the digital camera
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`phenomenon took off, consumers would need a quick and
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`easy way to get digital pictures from their cameras onto their computers. PictureWorks’ mission
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`was born. They partnered with Kodak, Casio, Fuji, and others to provide image-transfer software
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`that was bundled with digital cameras and scanners.
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`Although their camera-to-computer software was successful, the inventors recognized
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`that the next hurdle would be to share images with others over a network such as the Internet. At
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`the time, image sharing proved challenging to most users. As a first example, the recipient of an
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`image may expect or require a different form of image than that provided by the sender (e.g., the
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`recipient may expect a .JPG file instead of a .BMP file, or she may expect an image with
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`640x480 resolution instead of 2048x1536 resolution). One or both parties may not have the
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`technical expertise to reformat the images as required. As a second example, the process of
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`sending an image (or, worse, dozens of images) across a network might be painfully slow if the
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`images were not in an appropriate form beforehand. A 2048x1536 .BMP file might be over 3
`megabytes, whereas a 640x480 .JPG file might only be 60 kilobytes—1/50th the size, requiring
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`1/50th the time to transmit. As a third example, the recipient’s image parameters might change
`over time, requiring the sender to re-prepare the images.1
`The inventors witnessed these problems first hand in the real estate industry. Online
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`realty listing services relied heavily on photos to interest other agents and their customers in
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`properties. The listing services required these images to be in a certain form (e.g., to have a
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`certain resolution and file format) to ensure that they were received and displayed correctly.
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`Realtors therefore had to learn to use expensive image-editing software to modify their files to
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`meet these specifications. Others would even mail in paper copies of the pictures and leave the
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`digital imaging to someone else. To further complicate things, the image specifications were not
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`consistent between listing services, so a Realtor often had to create and manually edit multiple
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`copies of the same image in order to meet differing requirements. In short, electronically
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`transmitting a properly formatted media file was not an easy process for most users in the mid-
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`1990s. The inventors devoted their expertise to finding an elegant—yet simple—solution.
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`The solutions the inventors ultimately patented allowed users to transmit properly
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`formatted media with a few clicks, without using complex technologies or separate editing
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`software. In the simplest form of the invention, users merely select a photo, optionally enter
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`captions or text, and click “go.” The patented technology takes care of the rest, properly
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`formatting the media for the destination and typically reducing the size of the file that has to be
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`transmitted. The patented ideas provide many benefits: submission of media by end users to web
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`servers or other devices without the need for technical know-how; access by website partners to
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`reliable media acquisition; access by website partners to contributed media that consistently
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`meets the recipient’s specifications; faster transmission times; and increased ease-of-use that
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`enhances the user experience. The inventors recognized that their solutions were valuable
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`inventions, and they filed a patent application on July 21, 1999.
`
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`1 Although this explanation is provided in the context of sharing images, the invention and the Patents-in-Suit are
`also applicable to other forms of media, such as videos.
`2
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`The inventors knew their ideas could be embodied in multiple ways and worked to claim
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`different embodiments in three related patents. First, the inventors prosecuted claims covering
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`the use of their invention in the limited context of a web page. This claim set issued as the ’557
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`patent on May 17, 2005. On October 4, 2004, the inventors filed a continuation application. In
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`this continuation, the inventors intentionally added and successfully prosecuted claims more
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`broadly directed to processing media in and transmitting media from one “device” (e.g., a client
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`device) to another “device” (e.g., a remote device or server device). This claim set, which is
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`deliberately not limited to the web site/web page realm, issued as the ’482 patent on July 27,
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`2010. Summit 6 filed another continuation that later issued as the ʼ515 patent on December 17,
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`2013. Like the ʼ482 patent, it broadly claims ideas for processing and then transmitting media to
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`other devices. The ʼ515 patent also adds claims that associate the media with a user account.
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`Summit 6 and its predecessor companies licensed the patented technology to several
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`companies. One of the first customers to do so was eBay, the online auction site. Other
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`customers include Cars.com, the Yellowpages.com, The New York Times, and the Dallas
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`Morning News, among others. In 2011 Summit 6 was forced to sue a handful of companies to
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`protect its intellectual property. See Summit 6 LLC v. Research in Motion Corp., et al., Case No.
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`3:11-cv-00367 (N.D. Tex.) (the “previous Summit 6 case”). That case proceeded through claim
`
`construction, expert reports, pre-trial, and trial. Before trial Facebook, Photobucket, Multiply,
`
`and Blackberry (formerly Research in Motion) each took licenses to the Patents-in-Suit. Only
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`Samsung proceeded through trial where a jury found the ʼ482 patent valid and infringed. The
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`case is currently on appeal.
`III.
`PRINCIPLES OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`Claim construction is an issue of law for courts to decide. Markman v. Westview
`
`Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970–71 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
`
`Claim construction gives proper meaning to the claim language thereby defining the scope of the
`
`right to exclude. See Bell Commc’ns Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Commc’ns Corp., 55 F.3d 615,
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`619 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted).
`3
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`When construing disputed claim terms, the Court should look first to the intrinsic record
`
`of the patent, including the claims and specification, to determine the meaning of words in the
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`claims. Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. v. Arm Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
`
`The Court should start with the language of the claims themselves. “It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of
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`patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the
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`right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (internal
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`citations omitted). A disputed claim term should be construed in light of its “ordinary and
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`customary meaning,” which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary
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`skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the
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`patent application.” Id. In some cases, the ordinary meaning of a disputed term is readily
`
`apparent, and claim construction involves “little more than the application of the widely accepted
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`meaning of commonly understood words.” Id. at 1314. However, district courts are not obligated
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`to construe terms with ordinary meanings, lest they be inundated with requests to parse the
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`meaning of every word in the asserted claims. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech.
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`Co., Ltd., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d
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`1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (claim construction “is not an obligatory exercise in redundancy”).
`
`Claim construction may deviate from the ordinary and customary meaning of a disputed
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`term only if (1) “a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer,” or (2) “the
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`patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during
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`prosecution.” Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
`
`Again, the Court should start with the claims and specification. The specification “is always
`
`highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best
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`guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576,
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`1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). It is therefore “entirely appropriate for a court, when conducting claim
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`construction, to rely heavily on the written description for guidance as to the meaning of claims.”
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`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315.
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`Courts can also look to the prosecution history as part of the intrinsic record to determine
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`how the U.S. Patent Office and the inventor understood the patent. Id. at 1317. Like the
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`specification, the prosecution history is part of the intrinsic record and consists of a complete
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`record of the proceedings before the Patent Office, including prior art cited during the
`
`examination of the patent, and expresses representations made by the applicant as to the scope of
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`the claims. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. The prosecution history is therefore relevant to
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`determining how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the
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`invention during prosecution by narrowing the scope of the claims. Id. at 1582–83. And when
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`multiple patents derive from the same initial application, the prosecution history of the parent
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`application may be considered in construing the claim terms of the other subsequently issued
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`patents. See Biovail Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 239 F.3d 1297, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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`Although the Federal Circuit emphasizes the importance of intrinsic evidence in claim
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`construction, it has also stated that in limited circumstances courts may “rely on extrinsic
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`evidence, . . . ‘including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.’”
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`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (citations omitted). However, courts should reject constructions that
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`sacrifice the intrinsic record in favor of such extrinsic evidence. Id. at 1319–24. Heavy reliance
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`on dictionaries “divorced from the intrinsic evidence risks transforming the meaning of the claim
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`term to the artisan into the meaning of the term in the abstract, out of its particular context, which
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`is the specification.” Id. at 1321.
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`This general framework, and other well-known tenets of claim construction law, were
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`recently reiterated with approval in the Hill-Rom case. These basic tenets are: (1) that courts
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`should “not read limitations from the embodiments in the specification into the claims;” (2) that
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`courts should “expressly reject[] the contention that if a patent describes only a single
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`embodiment, the claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to that embodiment;”
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`and (3) that the doctrine of claim differentiation gives rise to the presumption that limitations
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`from dependent claims should not be imported into independent claims, a presumption that “is
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`especially strong where the limitation in dispute is the only meaningful difference between an
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`independent and dependent claim.” Hill-Rom Servs. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371-74
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`Defendants’ Proposal
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2014).
`IV. DISPUTED CLAIM CONSTRUCTIONS
`A.
`The “Pre-Processing” Term
`Claim Term(s)
`Summit 6’s Proposal
`object
`modifying
`the
`[media
`data/digital content data/one or more
`image files, video files, or audio
`files],2 as opposed to data merely
`associated
`with
`the
`[media
`object/digital
`content/image
`files,
`video files, audio files], at the client
`or local device in preparation for
`transmission to a remote device.3
`’557 Claims: 28-29, 34; ’482 Claims: 1, 6, 10, 12–14, 16–18, 23, 25, 35, 38, 41–42;
`’515 Claims: 1, 7, 10, 11, 20–23, 29, 30, 39–41, 52
`This Court held in the previous Summit 6 case that the term “‘pre-processing’ means
`
`pre-processing
`
`before
`modification
`processing/modifying
`further processing.
`
`further
`before
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`‘modifying the [media object data / digital content], as opposed to data merely associated with
`
`the [media object / digital content], at the client or local device in preparation for transmission to
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`a remote device.’” Previous Summit 6 case, Dkt. No. 168 at 65 (N.D. Tex. May 21, 2012).
`
`Summit 6 asks the Court to adopt this same construction as the legal justification applies with
`
`equal force in this case. Defendants disagree. They propose a construction that conflicts with the
`
`Court’s reasoning and violates numerous principles of claim construction.
`1.
`Summit 6’s Construction Defines Pre-Processing Consistent with the
`Specification and Prosecution History.
`
`The purpose of claim construction is to help the jury understand the meaning and scope
`
`of the claims. See Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
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`(noting that claim construction is “simply a way of elaborating the normally terse claim
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`2 The Patents-in-Suit use different terms in the claims to describe the items that are pre-processed (i.e., “media
`object,” “digital content,” “image files, video files, or audio files”). The bracketed text indicates the substitution of
`these terms in their respective claims in the Patents-in-Suit.
`3 Summit 6 revises its proposal to be consistent with the language recited in the ʼ515 patent claims; hence Summit
`adds the phrase “one or more image files, video files, or audio files” in the bracketed portion of its construction.
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`language[] in order to understand and explain, but not change, the scope of the claims”). Summit
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`6’s construction accomplishes this objective by providing an explanation of what material is pre-
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`processed, where it is pre-processed, and where it is transmitted. The Court answered these
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`questions in its previous Markman order, and those findings should not be disturbed.
`The Intrinsic Evidence Shows that Digital Content Data,4 Rather Than
`a)
`Data Merely Associated with the Digital Content Data, is Pre-Processed.
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`Summit 6’s construction accounts for what is being pre-processed by clarifying that pre-
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`processing happens to the digital content data itself, not data that is associated with the digital
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`content. Summit 6 starts with the claims, which state it is the digital content that undergoes pre-
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`processing. See, e.g., ʼ482 patent at claim 38, Appx. 17. The specification also repeatedly
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`describes “pre-processing on media objects” and “pre-processing of the image.” ʼ557 patent at
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`Abstract, col.5, ll. 44–46; see also id. at col.4, l.65–col.5, l.2, Appx. 20, 27-28.
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`However, the Court also recognized that “it would be helpful to the jury to clarify that the
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`material subject to pre-processing does not include data merely associated with the media object
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`or digital content.” Previous Summit 6 case, Dkt. No. 168 at 8 (N.D. Tex. May 21, 2012). This
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`clarification comes directly from the prosecution history. In explaining why the Hui prior art was
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`different than the present invention, the patentee made the following statements:
`• “The [Hui] image correction process does not modify the underlying image data
`contained within the FlashPix File.” ’482 File History, Office Action Response,
`March 26, 2010, at 22, Appx. 132 (emphasis added).
`• “The composition process of Hui also does not modify the image data contained
`within the FlashPix file. Rather, the composition process is designed to add or delete
`information (e.g., written captions) that is separate from the image data.” Id.
`(emphasis added).
`• “Applicants submit that the image correction and composition processes of Hui are
`both directed to separate information that is associated with the image data, not to the
`image data itself. Accordingly, the correction and composition processes of Hui
`cannot be said to pre-process the digital content . . . At best, Hui processes
`information associated with digital content.” Id. (emphasis added).
`
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`4 As noted above, different claims recite different terms (i.e., media object data, digital content data, or image files,
`video files, or audio files). Summit 6 simply refers to digital content data for ease of discussion.
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`The above arguments show that the “pre-processing” of the Patents-in-Suit is different from the
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`Hui prior art because pre-processing requires modifying the digital content data of the media file,
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`as opposed to data merely associated with the digital content data. These arguments “are relevant
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`to the interpretation of that term in every claim of the patent absent a clear indication to the
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`contrary.” See ERBE Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady Tech. LLC, 629 F.3d 1278, 1286‒87 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted); Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (the prosecution history “is
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`often of critical significance in determining the meaning of the claims”). Summit 6 therefore
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`requests that the Court adopt its construction, which explains what data is pre-processed.
`b)
`The Intrinsic Evidence Shows that Pre-Processing Occurs at the Client or
`Local Device.
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`Summit 6’s construction also explains that pre-processing occurs at the client or local
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`device. This construction is consistent with the claims, specification, and prosecution history.
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`The Court should again start with the language of the claims themselves. SmithKline
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`Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“The first
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`requirement in claim interpretation is to examine the claim language.”). The claims illustrate that
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`pre-processing occurs at the client or local device. See, e.g., ʼ482 patent at col.10, l.31–col.11,
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`l.12; col.13, l.56–col.14, l.14, (requiring “pre-processing said [] digital content at said client
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`device”), Appx. 15-17. The specification also explains that pre-processing occurs “prior to
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`upload” at the client or local device. See, e.g., ʼ557 patent at Abstract (“pre-processing on media
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`objects prior to upload”); col.5, ll.1–2 (“pre-process[ing] the media objects . . . prior to
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`transporting to a second location”); col.5, ll.45–46 (“pre-processing of the image that may be
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`desired prior to upload”), Appx. 20, 28.
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`The pros