throbber
IPR2015-00657, Paper No. 41
`
`trials@uspto.gov
`IPR2015-00662, Paper No. 39
`
`
`April 21, 2016
`
`571-272-7822
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`__________
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`__________
`GOOGLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`AT HOME BONDHOLDERS' LIQUIDATING TRUST,
`Patent Owner.
`__________
`Case IPR2015-00657 (Patent 6,286,045 B1)
`Case IPR2015-00662 (Patent 6,014,698)
`__________
`
`Hearing Held: April 7, 2016
`__________
`
`
`
`BEFORE MIRIAM L. QUINN, KARL D. EASTHOM (via
`videoconference), and JUSTIN T. ARBES (via videoconference),
`Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`
`Oral Argument Hearing held on Thursday, April 7, 2016, at
`12:32 p.m., in Hearing Room 155, taken at the Terminal Annex Federal
`Building, 207 S. Houston Street, Dallas, Texas.
`
`REPORTED BY BETH HOWARD, CSR
`
`

`
`A P P E A R A N C E S:
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
`MICHELLE K. HOLOUBEK, ESQ.
`ZHU HE, ESQ.
`MICHAEL V. MESSINGER, ESQ.
`Sterne Kessler Goldstein Fox
`1100 New York Avenue, NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`202.371.2600 - Fax 202.371.2600
`holoubek@skgf.com
`zhe@skgf.com
`
`MATTHIAS A. KAMBER, ESQ.
`Keker & Van Nest, LLP
`633 Battery Street
`San Francisco, California 94111
`415.391.5400
`mkamber@kvn.com
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
`EMILY O'BRIEN, ESQ.
`Patent Litigation Counsel
`Google, Inc.
`1600 Amphitheater Parkway
`Mountain View, California 94043
`650.253.0000
`emilyobrien@google.com
`
`
` 2
`
`

`
`APPEARANCES: (Continued)
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PATENT OWNER:
`
`GARLAND STEPHENS, ESQ.
`JUSTIN L. CONSTANT, ESQ.
`Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
`700 Louisiana, Suite 1700
`Houston, Texas 77002-2755
`713.546.5011 - Fax 713.224.9511
`garland.stephens@weil.com
`justin.constant@weil.com
`
`ALSO PRESENT:
`Mr. Thomas Todd
`
` 3
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`Case IPR2015-00657 (Patent 6,286,045 B1)
`Case IPR2015-00662 (Patent 6,014,698)
`
`
`P R O C E E D I N G S
`
`(12:32 p.m.)
`JUDGE QUINN: So we are gathered here
`today to hear the oral arguments of IPRs 2015- 660 and
`657, which are consolidated, and IPR2015- 662 and 666
`which are also consolidated, filed by Google, Inc. against
`At Home Bondholders' Liquidating Trust, and concerning
`the following patents; Patent Number 6,286,045 and
`6,014,698.
`
`Presiding over this proceeding are Judges
`Justin Arbes and Karl Easthom, appearing on the screen.
`And they're present in Courtroom D in the Madison
`Building of the USPTO Alexandria Complex. And
`presiding here, I am Judge Miriam Quinn, and I'm present
`in the Texas Regional Office, in Dallas, Texas.
`So at this time, the counsel for Petitioner,
`would you please state your appearances.
`MS. HOLOUBEK: Good morning -- or good
`afternoon, Your Honor.
`My name is Michelle --
`MR. TODD: Is the microphone on?
`MS. HOLOUBEK: Is the microphone on?
`Can everyone --
`JUDGE QUINN: Can you see the light on, is
`
`it green?
`
` 4
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`Case IPR2015-00657 (Patent 6,286,045 B1)
`Case IPR2015-00662 (Patent 6,014,698)
`
`
`MS. HOLOUBEK: It is green.
`MR. TODD: Push it. There you go.
`MS. HOLOUBEK: Oh, it's more green.
`
`Sorry.
`
`I'm Michelle Holoubek, counsel for
`Petitioner Google, Inc.
`JUDGE QUINN: And counsel for Patent
`
`Owner?
`
`MR. STEPHENS: Garland Stephens, of
`Weil, Gotshal & Manges, representing the At Home
`Bondholders' Liquidating Trust. And with me today is
`my colleague, Justin Constant.
`JUDGE QUINN: Thank you.
`Okay. So first of all, some preliminary
`matters. According to our Order of March 8th, 2016,
`which is Paper 40 in the record, a copy of the
`demonstratives should have been provided to the court
`reporter. If you haven't done so, can you do that at this
`time?
`
`MR. STEPHENS: Yes.
`MS. HOLOUBEK: We've done that, Your
`
`Honor.
`
`JUDGE QUINN: Okay. Thank you.
`Then before we proceed, we want to
`memorialize that we received a request by Petitioner to --
`
` 5
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`Case IPR2015-00657 (Patent 6,286,045 B1)
`Case IPR2015-00662 (Patent 6,014,698)
`
`for a conference call on April 5th to raise objections to
`Patent Owner's demonstrative slides, and the Board
`denied Petitioner's request.
`The question for the parties is: Has the
`dispute been resolved?
`MS. HOLOUBEK: No, Your Honor, the
`dispute has not been resolved. Some issues were, but
`unfortunately some issues still remain.
`JUDGE QUINN: So here's some instructions
`on how we're going to proceed with that.
`So Petitioner, during your allotted time for
`argument, you can make a statement of the reasons why
`the Panel should not consider whatever is in the slides of
`Patent Owner that's considered objectionable, but during
`only your argument time. There will be no speaking
`objections at this time.
`And, Patent Owner, during your rebuttal
`time, you may have an opportunity to discuss the
`objections to Patent Owner's [sic] argument.
`Again, I want you to raise whatever issues
`you have in your initial presentation, so that Patent
`Owner may address this during their response.
`And the parties are reminded again that the
`demonstratives are not evidence and they're not part of
`the record. And we're not going to rule on the objections
`
` 6
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00657 (Patent 6,286,045 B1)
`Case IPR2015-00662 (Patent 6,014,698)
`
`here. We're going to take everything under advisement.
`We will determine the propriety of the objections during
`our preparation and final decision; and will take into
`consideration arguments pursuant to the Rules, which
`state that oral argument may be requested on an issue
`raised in a paper. So if it's raised in a paper, they're
`okay.
`
`Are there any questions regarding these
`instructions?
`MR. STEPHENS: No, Your Honor.
`MS. HOLOUBEK: No, ma'am.
`JUDGE QUINN: So Petitioner, the party
`with the burden to prove unpatentability, you may
`proceed first. You have one hour total argument time,
`but you may reserve time for rebuttal.
`How much time would you like to reserve?
`MS. HOLOUBEK: Thank you, Your Honor.
`I'd like to reserve 20 minutes for rebuttal.
`JUDGE QUINN: If you're ready, you may
`
`proceed.
`
`MS. HOLOUBEK: Thank you. May it
`please the Board.
`My name is Michelle Holoubek, as I had
`mentioned before, representing Petitioner Google.
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
` 7
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`Case IPR2015-00657 (Patent 6,286,045 B1)
`Case IPR2015-00662 (Patent 6,014,698)
`
`
`The Board deemed 22 claims of the '045
`patent and 40 claims of the '698 patent as likely to be
`unpatentable over Angles, Merriman, and HTTP1.0,
`which I'll refer to here as simply "HTTP." Davis was
`also used in the combination for a few of the dependent
`claims. None of the evidence or argument that Patent
`Owner has presented since disturbs this result.
`The subject matter here is simple and
`obvious, and facing strong prior art references, Patent
`Owner complicates the facts with incorrect statements.
`And the record that has been developed since the
`Institution Decision shows that the Board's initial
`findings should not be changed.
`The Angles, Merriman, and HTTP1.0
`combination and the '045 and '698 patents are all drawn
`to a well-known method of distributing a banner
`advertisement over a network. This involves sending an
`unblockable signal from the user's computer to a server,
`followed by a redirect from the server.
`Angles discloses the majority of the
`limitations of the independent claim, leaving only minor
`modifications that would have been obvious to a person
`skilled in the art.
`The first of these is replacing Angles'
`location signal --
`
` 8
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`Case IPR2015-00657 (Patent 6,286,045 B1)
`Case IPR2015-00662 (Patent 6,014,698)
`
`
`JUDGE QUINN: Let me you ask something
`
`about that.
`
`MS. HOLOUBEK: Yes, Your Honor.
`JUDGE QUINN: The -- the claims -- 49, for
`example, I was looking at that earlier, and it does say
`that the banner must have been previously stored
`somewhere.
`So isn't that then meaning that the claims
`require that some caching had occurred previously before
`this method was working?
`MS. HOLOUBEK: Yes, Your Honor.
`So we've put Claim 49 -- this is for Slide 4 -
`- on the screen. And that's right. The -- that limitation
`that you're asking about is in the "first banner request
`signal" paragraph, and what it says is that the "signal
`includes information intended to make said first banner
`request signal not blockable by the device or
`intermediary server as a result of storage in the device or
`intermediary server of said requested banner prior to the
`generation of said first banner signal by the device."
`So there's a couple of things I would like to
`point out there.
`First of all, it says that what's stored in the
`cache or -- or in the device, the intermediary server, and
`this is talking about caching, is the requested banner. So
`
` 9
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00657 (Patent 6,286,045 B1)
`Case IPR2015-00662 (Patent 6,014,698)
`
`I think it's important to first look at and take this in a
`few steps.
`
`First, it would have been obvious to a person
`skilled in the art that Angles had a cache that would be
`operating according to standard caching behaviors, and
`that does not appear to be in dispute, that Angles has a
`cache. The question is --
`JUDGE QUINN: And you're relying on
`HTTP1.0 for that proposition; is that right?
`MS. HOLOUBEK: That's right, Your Honor.
`So in the expert declaration, when he was
`talking about the state of the art, he stated that it was
`well- known for browsers to have a cache. And the expert
`further indicated, in Paragraph 142 of his declaration,
`that Angles is a standard browser that would have a
`cache.
`
`And what HTTP tells us, as stated on Pages
`23 to 24, and this is of the '660 IPR, is that a cache
`stores cacheable responses in order to reduce the
`response time, the network bandwidth consumption, on
`future equivalent requests.
`And so here we have Angles operating as a
`standard web browser. It has a cache. And that was all
`laid out in our Petition, along with HTTP.
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
` 10
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00657 (Patent 6,286,045 B1)
`Case IPR2015-00662 (Patent 6,014,698)
`
`
`JUDGE QUINN: Does it matter what HTTP
`version we're speaking of? Angles -- Angles says
`HTTP2.0.
`
`MS. HOLOUBEK: It doesn't matter. HTTP
`is -- The -- the caching functionality of HTTP, I believe,
`hasn't changed throughout those initial drafts. We're
`relying on HTTP1.0 just because it was the one with the -
`- you know, that was submitted, that had the dates, but
`the caching aspects of it, I don't believe, are unchanged -
`- or are changed.
`JUDGE QUINN: So you contend that
`whether it's HTTP1.0 or 2.0, your contentions apply
`equally to either version?
`MS. HOLOUBEK: Yes, Your Honor. That's
`
`correct.
`
`So if we go to -- Let me pull the slide here.
`If we go to Slide 16, so we're talking about the
`unblockable signal here, and the un -- So it says, "First
`request signal cannot be blocked," and then follow-on to
`that is that the first signal cannot be blocked due to the
`previous caching. And so that's the point that you were
`asking about.
`To begin, let's remember what Angles is
`doing. Angles is serving not just any advertisement, but
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
` 11
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00657 (Patent 6,286,045 B1)
`Case IPR2015-00662 (Patent 6,014,698)
`
`dynamic advertisements, and those advertisements may
`be --
`
`JUDGE QUINN: So let me ask you
`something.
`MS. HOLOUBEK: Um-hmm.
`JUDGE QUINN: Because if -- if Angles is
`operating under the standard default of caching, and the
`claims require there were -- there was previous caching -
`-
`
`MS. HOLOUBEK: Um-hmm.
`JUDGE QUINN: -- so you contend that
`Angles is using an unblockable signal. So when is there
`ever caching in Angles?
`MS. HOLOUBEK: So in Angles, there's two
`different signals that are happening, right? There's the
`first request signal -- And so we have two pairs. We
`have the first request signal in Angles, which is the CGI
`script that reads on the unblockable aspect, and what's
`sent back in response is the redirect signal.
`Then there is a second signal, which is the
`banner request signal. It's the signal that requests a
`specific banner. And the response to that second signal
`is the banner.
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`
` 12
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`Case IPR2015-00657 (Patent 6,286,045 B1)
`Case IPR2015-00662 (Patent 6,014,698)
`
`
`When you look at the claim language, it says
`that the first request signal isn't blocked due to storage
`of the banner.
`When you look at the -- the pairs of signals
`that are happening here, under normal caching, if the
`response to a particular signal is cacheable, a cache will
`store it. There are types of signals where the response is
`not cacheable.
`And so it's, I think, important for -- for your
`question to remember that there's two pairs of signals
`here.
`
`So let's talk about the first signal. The first
`signal is the CGI request, and that gets to the
`advertisement provider computer, and what's being sent
`back there is the redirect signal.
`Now, as we'll talk about, the redirect signal
`would not be cached, because a person of skill in the art
`understands that CGI scripts, the responses thereto are
`not cached. And so regardless of what was in cache
`when that first signal goes out, there's never going to be
`a corresponding redirect signal that's been stored in
`cache that would prevent the CGI script signal from
`being sent. And it --
`JUDGE ARBES: Counsel --
`MS. HOLOUBEK: Yes.
`
` 13
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`Case IPR2015-00657 (Patent 6,286,045 B1)
`Case IPR2015-00662 (Patent 6,014,698)
`
`
`JUDGE ARBES: -- are all calls to a CGI
`script, is the response never cached in -- in all
`circumstances or are there circumstances where that
`could be cached?
`MS. HOLOUBEK: The -- the default for a
`CGI script is for it to be cached. Now, there are ways
`that the default functionality can be changed. The CGI
`script may be input improperly.
`But the default functionality -- And Angles
`gives us no reason to assume that it's anything other than
`the default. The default functionality is that the CGI
`script would be -- would be unblockable.
`And I will turn to that question. I just want
`to -- to put further explanation of why that's the case and
`why the evidence that's developed in the record since
`shows that.
`
`I want to make sure I -- I finish Judge
`Quinn's discussion about the -- the unblockable aspect of
`it.
`
`So when we have these signals -- So we have
`the unblockable CGI request that's being sent out. The
`response to that is a redirect request. The response to
`that isn't a banner, and so there's no connection. Even if
`the banner that is ultimately going to be served is in
`cache, there's no link between this initial general request
`
` 14
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`Case IPR2015-00657 (Patent 6,286,045 B1)
`Case IPR2015-00662 (Patent 6,014,698)
`
`for some advertisement to be specifically linked to that
`banner, because that banner is a response to a second
`type of signal.
`JUDGE QUINN: Excuse me. You're talking
`about a redirect that Angles doesn't teach. I'm asking
`you about Angles himself.
`MS. HOLOUBEK: Um-hmm. Sure. So
`there's signal in Angles -- Still in Angles, there's two
`signals: You have the initial CGI request that goes out.
`There is a location signal that goes back, and that is in
`Angles, and that's when the ad provider computer sends a
`specific location of the banner ad. It's not sending the ad
`itself; it's sending the location of the banner ad where
`it's located on the advertisement storage medium 44.
`Once the browser gets that location signal
`back, that's when the second request is issued, and that
`second request is now for that particular banner. The
`banner's identified in that request. And so if the banner
`is previously in cache, now there's something that
`matches that signal, right? So that's where the -- the --
`that second signal can be served from cache.
`But on the CGI script that goes out, it's a
`general request signal. It's not requesting a particular
`banner, and so there's no reason that cache would see the
`banner that's stored as linked for any particular response,
`
` 15
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`Case IPR2015-00657 (Patent 6,286,045 B1)
`Case IPR2015-00662 (Patent 6,014,698)
`
`because what's responding to that -- Say you have five
`banners in cache. That particular first signal, the CGI
`signal, isn't specifying any of those particular five
`banners. So when the cache looks at it, there's nothing
`that matches. It's just requesting "provide me with a
`banner" through the -- through its CGI script.
`The ad provider computer executes that
`script, identifies a particular banner, located -- and
`identifies its location, sends the location back to the
`requesting computer, which in Angles is the consumer
`computer.
`
`And then now that the consumer computer
`says, "Okay. I know exactly what I'm asking for now. I
`have a particular banner. I can now send a request signal
`for the banner at the location that's been provided."
`JUDGE QUINN: Right. And so you're
`referring to the alternative embodiment, where there is a
`local storage of the banners at the computer. But there is
`a preferred embodiment, which is the one in which the
`advertisement provider's computer serves the banner
`itself. So is there caching in that situation?
`MS. HOLOUBEK: So in that situation --
`And I'd first like to point out that that is not the
`embodiment that Petitioner is relying on for its ground
`here.
`
` 16
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00657 (Patent 6,286,045 B1)
`Case IPR2015-00662 (Patent 6,014,698)
`
`
`But in -- in that embodiment where the
`banner is coming directly from the ad provider computer,
`then, yes, there would be something in cache, because
`this -- Well, hold on. Let me think about that, just
`because this is a different situation than what we've been
`analyzing in our Petition.
`So we have a CGI that went out. So in that
`particular instance, no, then there wouldn't be anything
`in the -- there wouldn't be a banner in the -- in the cache
`in that instance, because the CGI script comes, and the
`caches knew -- as the evidence will show, the caches
`knew not to store responses from those dynamic requests.
`So in that situation where you have the
`consumer computer sending the CGI script to the ad
`provider computer, because that was requesting dynamic
`information, it's the advertisement computer that's
`selecting a banner in that particular embodiment, sending
`the banner back, that wouldn't be cached, because the
`cache knew not to store the responses to dynamic
`requests.
`
`JUDGE QUINN: So -- so your contention is
`that there are no requests from -- in Angles that -- from
`the consumer computer that are cacheable when it --
`when it comes to the advertisement itself?
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
` 17
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00657 (Patent 6,286,045 B1)
`Case IPR2015-00662 (Patent 6,014,698)
`
`
`MS. HOLOUBEK: No, Your Honor, that's
`not our contention.
`So, again, that's the first request. And,
`again, I'd like to point out that there are two
`embodiments in Angles, and what we've talked about was
`that first embodiment.
`There is a different embodiment, and the two
`are not the same, and it's not like the second embodiment
`is just a follow- on to -- to the first one.
`JUDGE QUINN: So then in which
`embodiment is there caching?
`MS. HOLOUBEK: The second embodiment
`that we've relied on in our Petition, and that's because
`what's different in the first embodiment and the second
`embodiment, in the first embodiment that we just talked
`about, there is a banner that is actually returned from
`that initial request signal. There's just one request that
`goes out and a banner is brought back.
`The difference with the second embodiment
`is that there's a request that goes out, but instead of
`sending a banner back, there's just an identification of a
`location where the banner can be found. And, as Angles
`describes it, that location is on the advertising storage
`medium.
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
` 18
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`Case IPR2015-00657 (Patent 6,286,045 B1)
`Case IPR2015-00662 (Patent 6,014,698)
`
`
`And so then you can see there's arrows
`between the consumer browsing module and the
`advertising storage medium. So when the consumer
`browser module receives that location information from
`the ad provider computer, then it requests -- That's the
`second request. It requests the actual banner from the
`advertising storage medium, and that's what can be
`cached. That particular signal can be cached, because it
`doesn't have to be a CGI script and Angles doesn't
`disclose it as a CGI script. That's just a standard request
`for contact from the storage.
`JUDGE QUINN: So now my question to you
`regarding that embodiment you're relying on, Angles
`refers to using special software for that alternative
`embodiment. Do you have any positions on what that
`special software is or isn't?
`MS. HOLOUBEK: I don't believe that
`there's any special software required for Angles. It says
`that it may alternatively -- if we pull out -- just pull out
`Angles, I can direct you to a particular location where
`it's talking about it.
`But Angles just indicates that instead of
`being stored, having the advertisement stored on the ad
`provider computer, that the advertisements can be stored
`on the advertising storage medium.
`
` 19
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`Case IPR2015-00657 (Patent 6,286,045 B1)
`Case IPR2015-00662 (Patent 6,014,698)
`
`
`And if we look at Angles -- and this is in
`Column 23, right about Line 27, and this is where it says,
`"In another embodiment, the consumer computer 12
`stores the customized advertisements on the
`advertisement storage medium 44."
`So rather than receiving a copy of the
`advertisement over the Internet, instead, the consumer
`control module 42 receives an advertisement command,
`which directs the consumer control module to retrieve the
`customized advertisement from the advertisement storage
`medium.
`
`And so there -- and then if you follow on in
`the following paragraphs, it says that it -- it retrieves it
`from the advertising storage medium. So there's no
`indication that it's some special software. And, in fact,
`Angles states that the browser is standard Internet
`Explorer, Netscape-type software.
`JUDGE QUINN: I've got you. What do you
`make out of Column 3, Lines 24 to 28, where he says, "In
`an alternate embodiment" -- which I read that to be this
`local storage embodiment -- "the consumer is sent unique
`software which enhances the consumer's Internet browser
`so that custom advertisements can be merged with
`electronic documents obtained from the contents of that
`ad."
`
` 20
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`Case IPR2015-00657 (Patent 6,286,045 B1)
`Case IPR2015-00662 (Patent 6,014,698)
`
`
`MS. HOLOUBEK: Oh -- oh, that --
`JUDGE QUINN: Does that have any impact
`on your position?
`MS. HOLOUBEK: It doesn't have any
`impact on our position. That particular software is
`actually what inserts a cookie into the original CGI
`request signal, and that includes information about the
`user.
`
`So previously they would have registered,
`signed up, had some sort of demographic information, for
`example, and so that particular software is like a browser
`plug- in or a cookie. There's a couple different ways they
`describe it. That's all in the initial set- up.
`And so when the first request signal goes
`out, that CGI script, in addition to including the request
`for an ad, it includes a cookie or some additional
`information about the demographics of the user so that
`the ad provider computer can select the appropriate
`advertisement.
`But there's -- That's where that particular
`software comes in, but there's nothing about the
`transmissions -- You know, even when what cookie is
`inserted into the CGI script, it's still operating according
`to normal HTTP protocol, as CGI scripts were then. And
`then the location signal that goes back, which is then --
`
` 21
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00657 (Patent 6,286,045 B1)
`Case IPR2015-00662 (Patent 6,014,698)
`
`provides the location to the consumer browser module
`and provides a location to where the banner is located,
`when the browser then sends the request for the banner,
`that's just -- that doesn't require that -- that demographic
`information. There's nothing different about that signal.
`It's really just acting on, "Okay. I've been told where to
`pull the ad from, and so now I'm going to go retrieve the
`ad from the location I was provided and display it." So
`that special software that you're talking about is only to -
`- to provide demographic information.
`JUDGE QUINN: Okay. Now, talk to us
`about the addition of Merriman's redirect into Angles.
`MS. HOLOUBEK: Sure. Sure. So what --
`what Merriman states -- let me just --
`And from the perspective of -- of looking at
`it in context, we do have this combination. And the
`important thing to remember is so Merriman is a
`secondary reference, and so we've turned to -- We can
`look at Slide 24.
`So just to start with, we have the
`combination of Angles and Merriman. And as we've been
`talking about, Angles discloses nearly every limitation
`that are in the claims, and so here it's a -- the secondary
`reference, Merriman, is being used to show what was in
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
` 22
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`Case IPR2015-00657 (Patent 6,286,045 B1)
`Case IPR2015-00662 (Patent 6,014,698)
`
`the tool kit of a person of skill in the art reading the base
`reference of Angles.
`So Angles, as we've mentioned, it says that
`the consumer computer, including its storage -- it says it
`can be distributed across the network and that
`appropriate protocols would be used to do that.
`So a person of skill in the art reading Angles
`and trying to implement retrieving a banner ad from the
`storage, as described in Angles, would have known to use
`the standard HTTP redirect.
`Merriman says that it was certainly within
`the knowledge of those of skill in the art dealing with
`advertising systems.
`So the -- the issue here is we're not relying
`on -- on Merriman for the various other teachings. What
`we're focused on Merriman is to show that a person of
`skill in the art in the advertising context would have
`known that 302 redirects were how you get from browser
`computer to retrieve something from storage across a
`network.
`
`So if I may, I'd like to go back to the
`question about the -- how do we know that the CGI script
`in Angles is unblockable. So let's turn to Slide 16 here.
`So to begin, you know, what is Angles doing
`here? Angles is not just serving advertisements; Angles
`
` 23
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`Case IPR2015-00657 (Patent 6,286,045 B1)
`Case IPR2015-00662 (Patent 6,014,698)
`
`is serving dynamic advertisements. And these
`advertisements are specifically tailored to the user, and
`different advertisements may be displayed to the user at
`different times. So after all -- I mean, Angles is actually
`titled "System and method for delivering customized
`advertisements." So there's no question that the point of
`Angles is to get this dynamic advertisement, this
`customized resource, it's different each time, to the user
`for a different display each time.
`If you'll turn to Slide --
`JUDGE ARBES: Is there disclosure -- I'm
`sorry. Is there disclosure in Angles of changing the
`advertisement that's displayed based purely on time?
`For instance, if the user makes a particular
`request and then one minute later makes the same type of
`request, does Angles say that the advertisement would be
`different then? I'm not sure that I remember that from
`the reference.
`MS. HOLOUBEK: There is -- Your Honor, I
`need to find the citation to it. But Angles does indicate
`that after a certain amount of time passes, a different
`advertisement would be served to -- to the user, so that
`the user wouldn't constantly see the same advertisement
`over and over again; that the user would see different
`advertisements.
`
` 24
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`Case IPR2015-00657 (Patent 6,286,045 B1)
`Case IPR2015-00662 (Patent 6,014,698)
`
`
`JUDGE ARBES: What about the example
`that I mentioned, where I make a request, and then one
`minute later, I make the same request? Theoretically,
`you could have -- you could perform caching of that so
`that I -- you don't need to pull that from the ultimate
`server, right, and it wouldn't make a difference.
`MS. HOLOUBEK: Well, if this were a
`normal request, that would be the case. But what Angles
`is specifically using is a CGI script, and it's that CGI
`script that makes this a nonblockable signal.
`So if it were just a random URL request to,
`you know, Yahoo.com/ad and there were a banner that
`responded to that, then -- then yes, that simple URL
`request could be blocked by a cache. But what we have
`in Angles, and what Angles specifically talks about, is a
`CGI script.
`
`So I'd like to focus on, okay, we have a CGI
`script in Angles, how do we know that's unblockable. Is
`that sort of where your question is coming from?
`JUDGE ARBES: Yes.
`MS. HOLOUBEK: Okay. So let's turn to
`Slide 17 and let's take a look at what's required by the
`patent claims here and what does the patent describe as
`being unblockable, so we know what we're comparing it
`to. Because if we have the claim term that's described in
`
` 25
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`Case IPR2015-00657 (Patent 6,286,045 B1)
`Case IPR2015-00662 (Patent 6,014,698)
`
`the patent and the description in the patent describes a
`particular feature as unblockable, then that same feature
`in the reference would also be understood as
`unblockable, because the reference would teach the same
`thing as the patent. And the patent describes a cgi- bin
`string as a variable component used in standard operation
`of HTTP and HTML.
`And so looking at the patent spec -- and I'll
`refer you to paragraph -- or, sorry, to the '045 patent
`spec. And if you look at Column 18, at Line 18, the
`patent states -- Okay. I'll give you a second to get there.
`So at Line 18, the patent states, "Another
`option for implementing the method 110 of the present
`invention using standard HTML and HTTP protocols is to
`incorporate variable components into the links...such that
`the variable components are incorporated into the general
`content URL addresses sent by the terminal.... For
`example" --
`
`And then if you keep looking further, around
`Line 27, it, quote, "can contain a variable component
`such as, for example...a cgi-bin string."
`Then at the end of the paragraph, it says,
`"Since the variable component URL addresses are, by
`definition, different every time, the initial banner request
`signal...will be different every time, thereby preventing
`
` 26
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`Case IPR2015-00657 (Patent 6,286,045 B1)
`Case IPR2015-00662 (Patent 6,014,

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket