throbber
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`_____________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`_____________________
`
`MAKO SURGICAL CORP.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`BLUE BELT TECHNOLOGIES, INC. and
`CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY,
`Exclusive Licensee and Patent Owner.
`_____________________
`
`
`
`IPR2015-00630
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,205,411 B1
`
`_____________________
`
`MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
`
`
`
`Mail Stop Patent Board
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
`
`
`
`
`

`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`
`SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS ........................................................... 1
`
`III. ARGUMENT ................................................................................................... 4
`
`IV. CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED ............................................... 8
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Ariosa Diagnostics v. Verinata Health, Inc.,
`805 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .................................................................. 5
`
`Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Millennium Biologix, LLC,
`IPR2013-00582, Paper No. 32 (Oct. 13, 2014) ................................................ 5, 7
`
`Medtronic, Inc. v. Norred,
`IPR2014-00110, Paper No. 24 (Oct. 9, 2014) ...................................................... 5
`
`
`
`Treatises
`28 Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 6165 (2nd
`ed. 1987) ............................................................................................................... 5
`
`
`
`Regulations
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b) .................................................................................................. 5
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.53(d)(5)(ii) ................................................................................. 1, 5, 7
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5) ............................................................................................ 5
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`
`
`
`I.
`
`Introduction
`
`Patent Owner Carnegie Mellon University and Exclusive Licensee Blue Belt
`
`Technologies, Inc. (collectively, “PO”) move to exclude the redirect testimony of
`
`Petitioner Mako Surgical Corp.’s expert, Dr. Howe. Deposition Transcript of
`
`Dr. Robert Howe, Ex. 2006 (“Howe Dep.”) at 86:22–91:3. Dr. Howe’s redirect
`
`testimony introduces, for the first time, concepts that could have been included in
`
`the Petition and/or Dr. Howe’s Declaration. But having limited the Petition and
`
`Dr. Howe’s Declaration to conclusory allegations, Petitioner cannot now overhaul
`
`its original obviousness rationale via redirect testimony from Dr. Howe.1 Rather,
`
`the scope of Dr. Howe’s redirect testimony exceeds that of his cross-examination,
`
`which was limited to Dr. Howe’s Declaration, and thus should be excluded as
`
`outside the permissible scope under 37 C.F.R. § 42.53(d)(5)(ii).
`
`II. Summary of Relevant Facts
`Independent claims 1 and 10 of U.S. Patent No. 6,205,411 (“the ’411
`
`Patent”) recite that “the pre-operative kinematic biomechanical simulator outputs a
`
`position for implantation of the artificial component.” In ¶ 38 of his Declaration,
`
`
`
` 1 Patent Owner does not concede that Dr. Howe’s redirect testimony, which is
`
`also conclusory, establishes obviousness.
`
`1
`
`

`
`
`
`Dr. Howe alleged the following to support his argument that it would have been
`
`obvious to modify DiGioia2 to meet this limitation:
`
`Claims 1 and 10 require the use of feedback from a simulator to
`output a position for implantation of the artificial component.
`Similarly, claim 7 requires the simulator to be responsive to the
`geometric model and output an implant position. The DiGioia system
`discloses that feedback from the simulator can aid the surgeon in
`determining optimal implant placement. (Ex. 1005 at 2.) It would
`have been obvious to one of skill in the art to utilize the feedback as
`suggested by DiGioia, re-run the simulation to determine optimal
`positioning of the component, and have the simulator output that
`position. In fact, this is suggested by Figure 3 in DiGioia, which
`depicts bi-directional communication between the pre-operative
`planner and the range of motion simulator.
`
`Declaration of Robert D. Howe, Ex. 1004 (“Howe Decl.”), ¶ 38. On cross-
`
`examination, PO asked Dr. Howe questions relating to the following topics:
`
`• Whether DiGioia explicitly describes a system that outputs an implant
`
`location (Howe Dep. at 56:4–10, 64:4–65:12);
`
`
` 2 A.M. DiGioia et al., HipNav: Pre-operative Planning and Intraoperative
`
`Navigational Guidance for Acetabular Implant Placement in Total Hip
`
`Replacement Surgery, 2nd CAOS Symposium, 1996, Ex. 1005.
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`
`
`
`• Whether Dr. Howe believes it would have been obvious to modify
`
`DiGioia’s system so that it outputs an implant location (id. at 56:11–14);
`
`• What evidentiary support, if any, Dr. Howe relied on to support his
`
`conclusion in ¶ 38 (id. at 56:15–59:21);
`
`• Whether Figure 3 of DiGioia shows “bidirectional communication” (id.
`
`at 59:22–63:21);
`
`• Whether Dr. Howe’s proposed modifications would require numerous
`
`software changes (id. at 63:22–64:3) (Dr. Howe did not substantively
`
`answer this question, see id at 64:3);
`
`• Whether a surgeon’s input is important in determining an implant
`
`location (id. at 65:13–66:3);
`
`• Whether human surgeons exercise better judgment and are better at
`
`qualitative analysis than computers (id. at 66:4–69:24); and
`
`• Whether Dr. Howe’s paper Robotics for Surgery3 described the system of
`
`DiGioia as outputting an implant location or suggested such a
`
`modification (id. at 69:25–74:14).
`
`
`
` 3 Robert D. Howe & Yoky Matsuoka, Robotics for Surgery, Annu. Rev. Biomed
`
`Eng., 212–40 (1999), Ex. 2001.
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`
`
`
`On redirect, Dr. Howe was asked:
`
`• “Can you explain why you believe it would have been obvious for the
`
`system to suggest an optimum implant location?” (id. at 87:11–88:8);
`
`• “What do you mean by a low-dimensional space?” (id. at 88:9–24);
`
`• “And what do you mean by high-quality objective functioning?” (id. at
`
`88:25–89:13);
`
`• “And I believe you mentioned well-known optimization techniques. Can
`
`you explain what well-known optimization techniques one of skill in the
`
`art could bring to bear on this problem?” (id. at 89:14–90:14); and
`
`• “And were those techniques known in the 1996, ’97 time frame?” (id. at
`
`90:15–91:2).
`
`On re-cross, Dr. Howe stated that his explanation on redirect was not included in
`
`his Declaration. Id. at 91:6–9. PO objected to Dr. Howe’s redirect testimony as
`
`being beyond the scope of the cross-examination during Dr. Howe’s deposition.
`
`Id. at 88:11–12, 89:3, 89:18, 90:18. Petitioner nevertheless relied on Dr. Howe’s
`
`redirect testimony in support of its obviousness arguments in its Reply.
`
`Petitioner’s Reply, Paper No. 23 (Feb. 19, 2016) at 17–18.
`
`III. Argument
`Dr. Howe’s redirect testimony does not rebut or clarify from his cross-
`
`examination, but rather impermissibly raises new issues to this proceeding, bearing
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`
`
`
`on the rational underpinning for Petitioner’s obviousness ground. Baxter
`
`Healthcare Corp. v. Millennium Biologix, LLC, IPR2013-00582, Paper No. 32 at
`
`6–7 (Oct. 13, 2014) (“Baxter Healthcare”); see also Ariosa Diagnostics v.
`
`Verinata Health, Inc., 805 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“the challenger [is]
`
`obliged to make an adequate case in its Petition.” (citing 37 C.F.R.
`
`§§ 42.104(b)(5), 42.23(b))). Thus, Dr. Howe’s redirect testimony should be
`
`excluded as exceeding the scope of the cross-examination, which was limited to
`
`Dr. Howe’s Declaration. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.53(d)(5)(ii).4
`
`Paragraph 38 of Dr. Howe’s Declaration provides conclusory allegations
`
`insufficient to establish that it would have been obvious to modify DiGioia’s
`
`system. PO’s questions on cross-examination were specifically targeted to these
`
`allegations. For example, the third sentence of ¶ 38 characterizes DiGioia’s
`
`
`
` 4 Like Fed. R. Evid. 611(b), § 42.53(d)(5)(ii) explicitly refers to the scope of
`
`cross-examination. But courts have applied Fed. R. Evid. 611 to limit the scope
`
`of redirect testimony as well, and § 42.53(d)(5)(ii) should be applied similarly.
`
`28 Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 6165 (2nd ed. 1987);
`
`see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Norred, IPR2014-00110, Paper No. 24 at 3 (Oct. 9,
`
`2014) (limiting the scope of redirect testimony to that of cross-examination).
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`
`
`
`disclosure, and thus on cross-examination, PO asked Dr. Howe whether DiGioia
`
`explicitly describes outputting an implant location, whether he asserts such a
`
`system would be obvious, and what evidentiary support, in any, he cited for his
`
`assertion in ¶ 38. Howe Dep. at 56:4–59:21, 64:4–65:12. The next sentence of
`
`¶ 38 alleges that it would have been obvious to modify DiGioia, and so PO asked
`
`Dr. Howe about whether such a modification would require numerous changes
`
`(which he did not substantively answer), whether human (e.g., surgeon) input can
`
`be important in determining an implant location, and whether Dr. Howe’s 1999
`
`paper Robotics for Surgery states or suggests that the modification that Dr. Howe
`
`proposes in ¶ 38. Id. at 63:22–64:3, 65:13–74:14. Finally, PO asked Dr. Howe
`
`whether Figure 3 of DiGioia discloses “bidirectional communication” as he alleged
`
`in the last sentence of ¶ 38. Id. at 59:22–63:21
`
`On redirect, Dr. Howe was not asked to comment on or clarify any of his
`
`answers to the questions he was asked on cross-examination. Instead, he was
`
`asked: “Can you explain why you believe it would have been obvious for the
`
`system to suggest an optimum implant location?” Id. at 87:11–13. Dr. Howe’s
`
`answer included numerous topics not mentioned during the cross-examination,
`
`including a “high quality objective function,” id. at 87:25–88:1; a “brute force”
`
`optimization technique, id. at 89:19; and a “gradient descent” optimization
`
`technique, id. at 89:24–25. Indeed, on re-cross, Dr. Howe acknowledged that none
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`
`
`
`of his allegations in his redirect testimony were included in his Declaration. Id. at
`
`91:6–9.
`
`
`
`By choosing to introduce a new obviousness rationale via Dr. Howe’s
`
`redirect testimony, Petitioner prevented PO from introducing evidence, such as a
`
`declaration from its expert Dr. Cleary, to rebut Dr. Howe’s allegations. Dr.
`
`Howe’s redirect testimony also forces PO to expend further resources rebutting a
`
`new obviousness rationale. Baxter Healthcare at 7 (“We believe it is unfair to
`
`Patent Owner, and not in the interests of justice at this late stage of the case to
`
`impose additional time and financial burdens on Patent Owner to respond to
`
`Petitioner’s new evidence.”). On the other hand, Petitioner suffers no prejudice
`
`from being limited to its original obviousness rationale because nothing prevented
`
`Petitioner from including the substance of Dr. Howe’s redirect testimony in the
`
`Petition. Indeed, on re-cross, PO asked Dr. Howe whether there was any reason
`
`why he was “precluded from providing a detailed opinion about obviousness.” Dr.
`
`Howe replied: “Well, succinctness, you know, there’s a premium on providing,
`
`you know, a clear and succinct document.” Howe Dep. 91:10–15. The Board
`
`should thus reject Petitioner’s attempt to rewrite its obviousness rationale at this
`
`stage, and exclude Dr. Howe’s redirect testimony under 37 C.F.R. § 42.53(d)(5)(ii)
`
`as being beyond the scope of the cross-examination.
`
`
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
`IV. Conclusion and Relief Requested
`For the forgoing reasons, PO respectfully requests that the Board exclude
`
`Dr. Howe’s redirect testimony.
`
`Dated: March 9, 2016
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`By: /Brian M. Buroker/
`
`
`
`Brian M. Buroker (Reg. No. 39,125) (lead)
`GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
`1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, DC 20036-5306
`Telephone: 202.955.8500
`Facsimile: 202.467.0539
`bburoker@gibsondunn.com
`Attorney for Exclusive Licensee Blue Belt
`Technologies, Inc.
`
`8
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
`CERFITICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned certifies service, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e), of a copy
`
`of this Motion to Exclude by electronic mail on March 9, 2016 on the counsel of
`
`record of the Petitioner:
`
`Matthew I. Kreeger, mkreeger@mofo.com
`
`Walter Wu, wwu@mofo.com
`
`
`
`Dated: March 9, 2016
`
`
`
`By: /Brian M. Buroker/
`
`
`
`
`
`Brian M. Buroker (Reg. No. 39,125)
`GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
`1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, DC 20036-5306
`Telephone: 202.955.8500
`Facsimile: 202.467.0539
`bburoker@gibsondunn.com

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket