Case 8:13-cv-01537-ODW-JEM Document 47 Filed 11/17/14 Page 1 of 30 Page ID #:557
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`
`
`
`VINCENT J. BELUSKO (CA SBN 100282)
`vbelusko@mofo.com
`BITA RAHEBI (CA SBN 209351)
`brahebi@mofo.com
`ALEX S. YAP (CA SBN 241400)
`ayap@mofo.com
`JARED W. MILLER (CA SBN 287424)
`jaredmiller@mofo.com
`MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
`707 Wilshire Boulevard
`Los Angeles, CA 90017-3543
`Telephone: (213) 892-5200
`Facsimile: (213) 892-5454
`Attorneys for Defendant-Counterclaimant
`APPLE INC.
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`Case No. 8:13-cv-01537-ODW (JEMx)
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`
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`APPLE INC.’S RESPONSIVE CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`
`
`Not yet set
`Hearing Date:
`Hearing Time: Not yet set
`Judge: Hon. Otis D. Wright, II
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`
`
`Discovery Cutoff: April 6, 2015
`Pretrial Conf.:
`June 15, 2015
`July 7, 2015
`Trial:
`
`
`FARSTONE TECHNOLOGY, INC.,
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`APPLE INC.,
`
`
`APPLE INC.,
`
`v.
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`Defendant.
`
`Counterclaimant,
`
`
`FARSTONE TECHNOLOGY, INC.,
`Counterdefendant
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`Apple Inc. Exhibit 1006 Page 1
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`Case 8:13-cv-01537-ODW-JEM Document 47 Filed 11/17/14 Page 2 of 30 Page ID #:558
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1 
`I. 
`’835 PATENT ................................................................................................. 2 
`II. 
`III.  GOVERNING LAW ....................................................................................... 3 
`A. 
`Principles of Claim Construction .......................................................... 3 
`B. 
`Indefiniteness Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2 ............................................ 4 
`IV.  FARSTONE’S EXPERT IS NOT ONE OF ORDINARY SKILL ................. 5 
`V. 
`CLAIM TERMS AND PHRASES ................................................................. 6 
`A. 
`“recovery unit” (Claims 1, 2, 3, 9, 10, 11) ............................................ 6 
`B. 
`“selecting means, said selecting means selecting a status
`corresponding to said processing system at the time of creation
`of each of said at least one recovery unit” (Claim 1) ........................... 8 
`1. 
`“Selecting means” is a means-plus-function limitation ............. 9 
`2. 
`The patent fails to disclose corresponding structure for the
`“selecting means.” ...................................................................... 9 
`“selecting a status corresponding to said processing system at
`the time of creation of each of said at least one recovery unit”
`(Claim 1) ............................................................................................. 11 
`“said displaying system displaying said selected status”
`(Claim 1) ............................................................................................. 15 
`“said at least one recovery unit respectively reflects a
`corresponding status of said at least one hardware resource [of
`said processing system] at the time of creation of each of said at
`least one recovery unit” (Claims 1 and 9) ........................................... 17 
`“a status of said computer equipment at the time creating said
`corresponded recovery unit” (Claims 2 and 10) ................................. 18 
`“a processing system . . . said processing system creating at least
`one recovery unit” (Claim 9) .............................................................. 19 
`1. 
`This term should be construed under § 112 ¶ 6 ........................ 19 
`2. 
`The patent fails to disclose corresponding structure for the
`“processing system.”................................................................. 20 
`
`C. 
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`D. 
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`E. 
`
`F. 
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`G. 
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`Apple Inc. Exhibit 1006 Page 2
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`Case 8:13-cv-01537-ODW-JEM Document 47 Filed 11/17/14 Page 3 of 30 Page ID #:559
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`(continued)
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`
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`H. 
`
`I. 
`
`Page
`“loading said selected recovery unit into said processing
`system” (Claim 9) ............................................................................... 21 
`“displaying a status corresponding to said processing system
`which corresponds to said selected recovery unit” (Claim 9) ............ 24 
`VI.  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 24 
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`Apple Inc. Exhibit 1006 Page 3
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`CASES
`Atmel Corp. v. Information Storage Devices, Inc.,
`198 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999) .......................................................................... 11
`
`Page(s)
`
`B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs.,
`124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997) .......................................................................... 11
`
`Blackboard v. Desire2Learn, Inc.,
`574 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .................................................................... 11, 21
`
`Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc.,
`296 F.3d 1106 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ............................................................................ 3
`
`Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .......................................................................... 14
`
`Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,
`93 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ............................................................................ 13
`
`Halliburton Energy Servs. v. M-I LLC,
`514 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ........................................................................ 4, 7
`
`Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc.,
`766 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ...................................................................... 4, 12
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) ................... 3
`
`MAS-Hamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc.,
`156 F.3d 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ............................................................................ 9
`
`Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd.,
`133 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ............................................................................ 5
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) ................................................................................... 4, 12
`
`Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc.,
`545 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ............................................................................ 4
`
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`Apple Inc. Exhibit 1006 Page 4
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`Case 8:13-cv-01537-ODW-JEM Document 47 Filed 11/17/14 Page 5 of 30 Page ID #:561
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`Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc.,
`675 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ...................................................................... 4, 21
`
`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ............................................................................ 3
`
`Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,
`525 U.S. 55 (1998) ............................................................................................... 1
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ...................................................................... 3, 23
`
`Texas Instruments Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`988 F.2d 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1993) .................................................................... 13, 14
`
`TriMed, Inc. v. Stryker Corp.,
`514 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ............................................................................ 9
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`No. 2013-1130, 2014 WL 5649886 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 5, 2014) ....................... 6 n. 3
`
`
`
`STATUTES
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 .................................................................................................. 1, 2, 4
`
`
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`Microsoft Computer Dictionary .............................................................................. 16
`
`Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2181 I.A........................................... 6 n. 3
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`Apple Inc. Exhibit 1006 Page 5
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`As explained by the United States Supreme Court, “the patent system
`represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the
`public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an
`exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time.” Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,
`525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998). Farstone has failed to uphold its end of the bargain.
`U.S. Patent No. 7,120,835 does not contain adequate disclosure of any new
`invention. The claims and the specification are incomprehensible. As such, many
`of the disputed terms are indefinite, rendering the claims invalid.
`Farstone argues that plain and ordinary meanings should apply. But that is
`just it—the disputed terms do not have plain and ordinary meanings. And the
`meanings are certainly not informed by the specification, which is bereft of any
`specific disclosure regarding an actual embodiment. Farstone’s alternative
`constructions, in the event that the Court construes these claims, fare no better.
`They are not grounded in the claim language, specification, or file history and, in
`certain instances, confuse the issues even further.
`It is the Patent Owner’s obligation to provide a written description that, in
`turn, permits one of skill in the art to understand the claims. To obtain a valid
`patent, a patent application must contain a full and clear disclosure of the invention
`in the manner prescribed by 35 U.S.C. §112 ¶ 1.1 The requirement for an adequate
`disclosure ensures that the public receives something in return for the exclusionary
`rights that are granted to the inventor by a patent. The primary purpose of the
`requirement of definiteness of claim language in 35 U.S.C. §112 ¶ 2 is to ensure
`that the scope of the claims is clear so the public is informed of the boundaries of
`what constitutes infringement of the patent. Here, the specification and the claims
`of the ’835 patent do not come close to meeting these basic requirements.
`
`1 Because the patent in suit predated the effective date of the America Invents Act (AIA),
`all statutory citations herein are pre-AIA.
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`In support of its arguments that the terms are definite, Farstone relies on the
`opinions of Dr. Martin Kaliski. But Dr. Kaliski conceded that he does not have
`relevant experience in the design and implementation of backup recovery systems.
`On the other hand, Apple’s expert, who has significant experience in the
`implementation and design of backup/recovery systems, studied the ’835 patent and
`found that almost every single term in dispute cannot be understood with
`reasonable certainty.2
`II.
`’835 PATENT
`The ’835 patent, filed on September 11, 2002, appears to be a direct
`translation of the Taiwanese application from which it claims priority. (See Miller
`Decl. Ex. B (File History of ’835 patent).) When read as a whole, it is impossible
`to decipher what the alleged invention is as described and claimed in the ’835
`patent. The patent purports to disclose “a computer equipment having a prompt
`access function and related method to resolve … problems faced by the
`conventional backup/recovery software.” (’835 patent at 1:65-2:1.) But the
`patent’s entire disclosure, which is based on two sparse figures that illustrate a total
`of eight extremely broad elements, is an amorphous discussion of various
`components, such as a “processing system,” “displaying system,” and
`“backup/recovery module,” that somehow operate to allow a user to display, select,
`and restore the “status” of one or more of a “processing system,” “computer
`equipment,” and “hardware resources.” (E.g., id. at 2:30-36; 5:41-47.) The patent
`contains no concrete disclosure of any operations at all, much less specific
`algorithms, that are employed to achieve these functions. Without any concrete
`disclosure of actual operating embodiment, it is impossible for one of ordinary skill
`
`
`2 Pursuant to this Court’s Standing Order (ECF No. 7 at 3), Dr. Cummings’ declaration
`includes a statement of his professional background and qualifications, and a copy of his
`curriculum vitae is attached hereto. (Declaration of Jared W. Miller (“Miller Decl.”) Ex. A
`(Declaration of David M. Cummings (“Cummings Decl.”)) at Ex. 3.) Apple reserves the right to
`proffer the testimony by Dr. Cummings at the Markman hearing.
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`in the art to understand what the system is and how it operates, and therefore it is
`also impossible to understand many of the recitations set forth in the claims. The
`public has received nothing in return for the exclusionary rights that are granted to
`the inventor by a patent, and has not been informed of the boundaries of what
`constitutes infringement of the patent.
`III. GOVERNING LAW
`A.
`Principles of Claim Construction
`Claim construction is a matter of law for the court. See Markman v.
`Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970-71 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d,
`517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996). A claim term is interpreted according to how it would
`have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of
`invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Claim
`construction requires considering “the claims themselves, the remainder of the
`specification, the prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant
`scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the state of the art.” Id.
`at 1314 (citation omitted).
`Construction of a means-plus-function limitation involves two steps. First,
`the court “must identify the claimed function.” Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St.
`Jude Med., Inc., 296 F.3d 1106, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Second, the court must
`“determine what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the
`claimed function.” Id. Means-plus-function elements are not open-ended. Rather,
`they are limited to the “corresponding structure” disclosed in the specification for
`accomplishing the claimed function, and equivalents thereof. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.
`Farstone argues the Court need not construe the disputed terms. (See ECF
`No. 44.) However, “[a] determination that a claim term ‘needs no construction’ or
`has the ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ may be inadequate … when reliance on a
`term’s ‘ordinary’ meaning does not resolve the parties’ dispute.” O2 Micro Int’l
`Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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`B.
`Indefiniteness Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2
`Patent claims must “particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject
`matter which the applicant regards as his invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2.
`“Because the claims delineate the patentee’s right to exclude, the patent statute
`requires that the scope of the claims be sufficiently definite to inform the public of
`the bounds of the protected invention, i.e., what subject matter is covered by the
`exclusive rights of the patent.” Halliburton Energy Servs. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d
`1244, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[o]therwise, competitors cannot avoid infringement,
`defeating the public notice function of patent claims”) (citation omitted).
`“A claim fails to satisfy this statutory requirement and is thus invalid for
`indefiniteness if its language, when read in light of the specification and the
`prosecution history, ‘fail[s] to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the
`art about the scope of the invention.’” Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766
`F.3d 1364, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments,
`Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014)). “[A] patent does not satisfy the definiteness
`requirement of § 112 merely because ‘a court can ascribe some meaning to a
`patent’s claims.’” Id. at 1371 (quoting Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2130). Rather, “[t]he
`claims, when read in light of the specification and the prosecution history, must
`provide objective boundaries for those of skill in the art.” Id.
`A means-plus-function limitation “is indefinite if a person of ordinary skill in
`the art would be unable to recognize the structure in the specification and associate
`it with the corresponding function in the claim.” Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 675
`F.3d 1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “[A] means-plus-function claim element for
`which the only disclosed structure is a general purpose computer is invalid if the
`specification fails to disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed function.”
`Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation
`omitted).
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`Apple Inc. Exhibit 1006 Page 9
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`IV. FARSTONE’S EXPERT IS NOT ONE OF ORDINARY SKILL
`One of ordinary skill with respect to the ’835 patent is a person with an
`undergraduate degree in computer science or equivalent and one year of experience
`in the design and implementation of backup/recovery systems. (Cummings Decl.
`¶ 16.) Farstone’s expert—who lacks the requisite experience in backup/recovery—
`is admittedly not one of ordinary skill in the art under Apple’s proposal. (Miller
`Decl., Ex. C (November 13, 2014 Deposition of Martin E. Kaliski (“Kaliski Dep.
`Tr.”)) at 15:14-17; 19:24-20:3.)
`One of ordinary skill would have experience in the design and
`implementation of backup/recovery systems. The ’835 patent states that the
`claimed invention relates to a “method to resolve [] problems faced by the
`conventional backup/recovery software” by “having a prompt access function . . .
`that does not need to mount restore points in advance, while unlimited restore
`points can simultaneously be accessed at once.” (See ’835 patent at 1:7-12 (“Field
`of Invention”) and 1:63-2:4 (“Summary of Invention”).)
`
`Because Apple’s definition includes the relevant field of the claimed
`invention (and Farstone's does not), and because Dr. Kaliski did not construe the
`terms based on a person of ordinary skill in the art in the field of the invention,
`Dr. Kaliski’s testimony regarding claim construction should be given no weight.
`Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
`(“A technical term used in a patent document is interpreted as having the meaning
`that it would be given by persons experienced in the field of the invention[.]” )
`(citation omitted).
`There is no question that Apple’s expert, Dr. Cummings, is one of ordinary
`skill under either construction. As Farstone’s expert stated, “[h]e’s clearly highly
`qualified in the areas, based on what he’s written in his declaration,” (Kaliski Dep.
`Tr. at 18:9-15) and “[h]e’s obviously very heavily into the field of backup
`recovery.” (Id. at 19:9-23.)
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`V. CLAIM TERMS AND PHRASES3
`A.
`“recovery unit” (Claims 1, 2, 3, 9, 10, 11)
`Apple’s Proposal
`Plaintiff’s Proposal
`Indefinite.
`No construction necessary.
`
`If construed: A collection of file backup
`data and configuration information
`reflecting a state of a computer hardware
`resource at a point in time.
`The term “recovery unit” is indefinite. Both experts agree that it is not term
`of art. (Cummings Decl. ¶ 39; Kaliski Dep. Tr. at 21:8-24 and 22:24-23:6.)
`Further, neither the claim language nor the specification enables a person of skill in
`the art to discern the scope of the claim with “reasonable certainty.” (Cummings
`Decl. ¶ 39; Miller Decl., Ex. D (November 14, 2014 Deposition of David M.
`Cummings (“Cummings Dep. Tr.”)) at 69:3-70:25.)
`While the claim language states that a “recovery unit” is created to “hold
`backup data” and “reflects a corresponding status of said at least one hardware
`resource” (’835 patent, claim 1), this says nothing about the structure of the “unit.”
`The specification equally fails to provide any explanation of what constitutes a
`“recovery unit.” References to “recovery unit” fall under the following categories4:
` The backup/recovery module creates at least one recovery unit to hold
`backup data. (E.g., ’835 patent at 2:34-36; 3:25-27; 4:36-37; 5:67-6:3;
`
`
`3 Apple had previously proposed that the phrase “a backup/recovery module, said
`backup/recovery module creating at least one recovery unit to hold backup data” in claim 1 be
`construed. Since the parties exchanged their constructions, the Federal Circuit issued a decision
`on whether “module” is a nonce term and thus 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 applies. See Williamson v.
`Citrix Online, LLC, No. 2013-1130, 2014 WL 5649886 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 5, 2014) (declining to
`construe “distributed learning control module” under § 112 ¶ 6). Williamson, which contradicts
`MPEP § 2181 I.A, is 2-1 decision with the dissenting opinion setting out an argument in line with
`Apple’s construction. Regardless, in view of Williamson, and the numerous remaining
`indefiniteness issues that remain, Apple will agree that no construction is necessary for this term.
`
`4 An additional category discusses how a recovery unit relates to a “simulating unit.” But
`the “simulating unit” is relevant only to claim 15, which is not asserted in this litigation.
`Accordingly, these references are not discussed here.
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`7:8-9.) This discloses only that a recovery unit is created to hold backup
`data—a function of the recovery unit.
` Data contained in the processing system “corresponds” to a recovery unit.
`(E.g., id. at 2:36-38; 2:45-49; 3:6-11; 4:39-40; 4:46-49; 6:11-15; 6:29-33.)
`This merely discloses that the recovery unit “corresponds” to data in the
`processing system—a function.
` The status corresponding to said processing system is a status of said
`computer equipment at the time of creating said corresponding recovery
`unit. (E.g., id at 2:42-45; 3:4-6; 4:44-46; 6:9-11.) This discloses only that
`the recovery unit in some way “corresponds” to a “status”—a function.
` The recovery method comprises the steps of: selecting a recovery unit,
`mounting the recovery unit, and displaying the status corresponding to the
`processing system/computer equipment which corresponds to the selected
`recovery unit. (E.g., id. at 2:62-3:3; 6:3-8.) This discloses that the
`recovery unit is selected and mounted, and that the status corresponds to
`the recovery unit. Again, all functions of a recovery unit.
`Thus, a person of ordinary skill in the art cannot determine with reasonable
`certainty what structure constitutes a “recovery unit.” (Cummings Decl. ¶ 39;
`Cummings Dep. Tr. at 69:3-70:25.) This is particularly true because many different
`structures could exist to hold data (e.g., files and folders, disk images, disk
`partitions, databases). Moreover, by claiming a structural element—the recovery
`unit—but describing only the purpose and function of the element, Farstone runs
`afoul of the prohibition against open-ended claiming that tries to cover any and all
`structures for performing a function. Halliburton Energy Serv., Inc. v. M-I LLC,
`514 F.3d 1244, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6] was meant to
`preclude the overbreadth inherent in open-ended functional claims, such as those
`presented in this case which effectively purport to cover any and all means so long
`as they perform the recited functions.”).
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`Apple Inc. Exhibit 1006 Page 12
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`

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`Case 8:13-cv-01537-ODW-JEM Document 47 Filed 11/17/14 Page 13 of 30 Page ID #:569
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`Further exacerbating the problem is that the terms “recovery unit” and
`“recovery point” are sometimes used interchangeably and sometimes appear to
`mean different things. (For interchangeable uses, see, e.g., ’835 patent at 2:34-36,
`4:36-37, 5:15-16, 5:43-47, 6:11-15; for different meanings, see, e.g., ’835 patent at
`6:26-29; Cummings Decl. ¶ 40; Cummings Dep. Tr. at 69:3-70:25.) Because of
`these inconsistencies and the lack of any description of a recovery unit, it is
`impossible for a person of skill in the art to determine the scope of the claim with
`reasonable certainty. Farstone offers no explanation on how to reconcile the
`inconsistent use of the term.
`Farstone offers a construction in the event the Court construes the term: “a
`collection of file backup data and configuration information reflecting a state of a
`computer hardware resource at a point in time.”5 (Farstone Br. at 11.) But this
`attempt to construe “recovery unit” simply highlights its indefiniteness.
`If Farstone’s construction is applied, claim 1 would require creation of “a
`collection of file backup data” to hold backup data. It would read as follows:
`said backup/recovery module creating at least one collection of file
`backup data and configuration information reflecting a state of a
`computer hardware resource at a point in time to hold backup data;
`(emphasis added). This makes no sense. (Cummings Decl. ¶ 43.) Similarly,
`Farstone’s construction requires that the recovery unit “reflect a state of a computer
`hardware resource at a point in time,” but this requirement is already explicitly
`recited in the last limitation of the claim.
`B.
`“selecting means, said selecting means selecting a status
`corresponding to said processing system at the time of creation of
`each of said at least one recovery unit” (Claim 1)
`
`
`5 Farstone repeatedly states in its brief that the patent discloses backing up configuration
`information not stored in files. (E.g., Farstone Br. at 2, 11, 12.) This additional recitation has no
`support in the patent and, regardless, is not contemplated by Farstone’s proposed construction.
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`Apple Inc. Exhibit 1006 Page 13
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`Case 8:13-cv-01537-ODW-JEM Document 47 Filed 11/17/14 Page 14 of 30 Page ID #:570
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`Plaintiff’s Proposal
`No construction necessary.
`If 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 applies:
`Recited Function:
`Selecting a status corresponding to said
`processing system at the time of creation
`of each of said at least one recovery unit.
`
`Corresponding Structure:
`A user interface and input devices.
`
`Apple’s Proposal
`Should be construed as 35 U.S.C. § 112
`¶ 6 limitation.
`Recited Function:
`Selecting a status corresponding to said
`processing system at the time of
`creation of each of said at least one
`recovery unit.
`
`Corresponding Structure:
`No corresponding structure disclosed.
`1.
`“Selecting means” is a means-plus-function limitation.
`The “selecting means” limitation should be construed as a means-plus-
`function limitation. The use of the word “means” presumptively invokes 35 U.S.C.
`§112 ¶ 6. TriMed, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 514 F.3d 1256, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
`Farstone has failed to overcome this presumption because it has not shown that the
`claim language itself contains sufficiently definite structure to perform the recited
`function. Id. at 1259-60; MAS-Hamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206,
`1215 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Furthermore, as detailed below, even the specification does
`not disclose structure. There is simply no structure in the patent relating to the
`“selecting means.”
`2.
`The patent fails to disclose corresponding structure for the
`“selecting means.”
`The “selecting means” phrase is indefinite because there is no corresponding
`structure disclosed in the specification for performing the recited function of
`“selecting a status corresponding to said processing system at the time of creation
`of each of said at least one recovery unit.” (Cummings Decl. ¶ 44; Cummings Dep.
`Tr. at 84:12-25; 91:3-10.)
`The specification states that the displaying system “may have a selecting
`means” and that the “selecting means selects a status corresponding to the
`processing system,” but it contains no disclosure at all of any structure for the
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`Apple Inc. Exhibit 1006 Page 14
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`Case 8:13-cv-01537-ODW-JEM Document 47 Filed 11/17/14 Page 15 of 30 Page ID #:571
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`selecting means. (E.g., ’835 patent at 2:38-41; 3:23-24; 3:32-34; 4:40-42; 5:37-40;
`5:48-50; 7:14-16; 8:9-12.)
`Farstone argues that the corresponding structure is “a user interface and
`input devices as described and shown in the ’835 patent, at, for example, Fig. 1
`(reference number 20); 2:14-21; 2:48-49; 3:19-24; 4:59-5:18; 5:26-50; 5:54-6:8;
`6:15-16; 6:23-25; 7:1-6; 7:14-16; 8:10-11; and 9:25-26, and equivalents thereof.”
`(Farstone Br. at 15.) None of these citations even comes close to disclosing a
`structure for “selecting means.” For instance, Farstone states:
`[T]he specification explains that the selecting means is part of
`the displaying system 20, which includes a “user-operating
`interface” (user-interface) and “a keyboard, a mouse, or the like”
`. . .
`(Farstone Br. at 15 (citing ’835 patent at 5:32-40).) But this assertion is belied by
`the very portion of the specification that Farstone relies upon:
`The displaying system 20 may include a user-operating
`interface. The user-operating interface can be a keyboard, a
`mouse, or the like, to provide the user with inputting command
`and information.
`The displaying system 20 may have a selecting means. The
`selecting means selects a status corresponding to the processing
`system 10.
`(’835 patent at 5:33-39 (emphasis added).) This merely identifies the function of
`the selecting means—i.e., “selects a status corresponding to the processing system.”
`Farstone attempts to conflate the “user-operating interface” (e.g., keyboard or
`mouse) with the selecting means. As the above language from the specification
`makes clear, the selecting means and the user-operating interface are not the same
`thing. (Cummings Decl. ¶ 47.) Farstone’s construction violates well-established
`law that a “structure disclosed in the specification is ‘corresponding’ structure only
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`Apple Inc. Exhibit 1006 Page 15
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`Case 8:13-cv-01537-ODW-JEM Document 47 Filed 11/17/14 Page 16 of 30 Page ID #:572
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