Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
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`Paper 8
`Entered: July 30, 2015
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`inCONTACT, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`MICROLOG CORP.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2015-00560
`Patent 7,092,509 B1
`
`Before JUSTIN T. ARBES, FRANCES L. IPPOLITO, and
`MINN CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
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`I. INTRODUCTION
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`Petitioner inContact, Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 2,
`“Pet.”) requesting an inter partes review of claims 1–6 and 8–13 (the
`“challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 7,092,509 B1 (Ex. 1001, “the ’509
`patent”). Microlog Corp. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response
`(Paper 7, “Prelim. Resp.”). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314.
`The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be
`instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood
`that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims
`challenged in the petition.” For the reasons described below, we conclude
`Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing
`the unpatentability of all of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute
`an inter partes review of claims 1–6 and 8–13.
`
`A. Related Proceedings
`According to Petitioner, the ’509 patent is the subject of the following
`pending patent infringement case: Microlog Corp. v. inContact, Inc., No.
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`14‐47 (LPS) (D. Del.). Pet. 1. Patent Owner indicates that the ’509 patent is
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`also at issue in the following proceeding: Microlog Corp. v. NEC America,
`Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00049 (D. Del.). Paper 6, 2.
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`B. The ’509 Patent
`The ’509 patent describes a system and method to receive and
`distribute to agent workstations “contacts” of various media types—such as
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`telephone calls, emails, facsimiles, and web chats—based on criteria
`associated with the contacts and the available agents. See Ex. 1001,
`Abstract, col. 1, ll. 21–30. Figure 1 of the ’509 patent is reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 1 depicts contact center or call center system 100, which includes
`telephony switch 106, contact center server 122, agent workstation 102, and
`agent telephone 104. In an embodiment, telephone switch 106 can be a
`conventional automatic call distributor (ACD) that distributes incoming
`telephone calls to the agents. Id. at col. 1, ll. 38–43; col. 8, ll. 50–52.
`Although conventional call centers were incapable of handling contacts
`other than telephone calls according to the ’509 patent (id. at col. 2, ll. 52–
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`60), contact center system 100 of the ’509 patent can receive, queue, and
`route contacts of additional media types, including emails, facsimiles, web
`callbacks, and web chat, to agent workstations 102 and/or agent telephones
`104. Id. at col. 3, ll. 19–29; col. 9, ll. 35–38.
`The ’509 patent further describes that contacts of different types are
`stored in a common queue before being routed to appropriate agents. Id. at
`col. 41, ll. 44–48. Figure 50 of the ’509 patent is reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 50 shows that incoming contacts of various types are placed in a
`common, shared queue and subsequently routed to available agents. Id.
`According to the ’509 patent, “because the different media-type contacts are
`all queued in a common queue independent of media type, the system is
`adaptable to handle any type of contact.” Id. at col. 41, ll. 52–55. In further
`embodiments, the queued contacts are matched and routed to suitable agents
`based on various criteria, including the media type, the priority level, and the
`agent skill. Id. at col. 10, ll. 6–22; col. 47, ll. 12–60; Fig. 68.
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`C. Illustrative Claim
`Of the challenged claims, claims 1 and 8 are independent. Claims 2–6
`depend directly or indirectly from claim 1, and claims 9–13 depend directly
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`or indirectly from claim 8. Claim 1 is illustrative of the challenged claims
`and is reproduced below:
`1.
`A system for receiving and distributing contacts of
`different media types to a plurality of workstations, comprising:
`a queuing component, adapted to receive said different
`media-type contacts and maintain said contacts in a common
`queue while said contacts are awaiting routing to said
`workstations; and
`a routing component, adapted to route the queued
`contacts to said workstations based on designated criteria.
`
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`D. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`Petitioner asserts the following grounds of unpatentability (Pet. 4, 17–
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`58):
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`Claims Challenged
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`Statutory Basis
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`Ground
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`1–6, 8–13
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`§ 102(b)
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`1–6, 8–13
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`§ 102(e)
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`Anticipated by Haigh1 (Pet. 17–40,
`Ground 1)
`Anticipated by Berkowitz2 (Pet.
`40–58, Ground 2)
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`
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`II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are given
`their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the
`patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see In re Cuozzo Speed
`
`
`
` 1
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` Ex. 1002, U.S. Patent No. 5,793,861 (Aug. 11, 1998).
`2 Ex. 1003, U.S. Patent No. 5,903,877 (May 11, 1999).
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`Tech., LLC, No. 2014-1301, __ F.3d __, 2015 WL 4097949, at *7–8 (Fed.
`Cir. July 8, 2015) (“Congress implicitly approved the broadest reasonable
`interpretation standard in enacting the AIA,” and “the standard was properly
`adopted by PTO regulation.”). Under the broadest reasonable interpretation
`(BRI) standard, and absent any special definitions, claims terms are given
`their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of
`ordinary skill in the art in view of the specification. In re Translogic Tech.
`Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Any special definitions for
`claim terms or phrases must be set forth with reasonable clarity,
`deliberateness, and precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir.
`1994). Particular embodiments appearing in the written description
`generally are not incorporated into a claim if the claim language is broader
`than the embodiment. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir.
`1993).
`For purposes of this Decision, we need only to construe the claim
`term “contacts.” 3 See, e.g., Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc.,
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` Although no other claim construction dispute is at issue in this proceeding
`at this time, we note potential claim construction issues relating to the claim
`terms “a queuing component, adapted to receive said different media-type
`contacts and maintain said contacts in a common queue while said contacts
`are awaiting routing to said workstations” and “a routing component,
`adapted to route the queued contacts to said workstations based on
`designated criteria” in claim 1. Subsequent to the filing of the Petition and
`Preliminary Response in this proceeding, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
`Federal Circuit issued an opinion in Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, No.
`2013-1130, 2015 WL 3687459 (Fed. Cir. June 16, 2015) (en banc in relevant
`part), which modified the preexisting law regarding when to regard a claim
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`200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only those terms that are in controversy
`need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the
`controversy).
`
`A. “Contacts”
`The challenged independent claims recite receiving or maintaining
`“different media-type contacts” in a common queue and routing the queued
`“contacts” to workstations. Pointing to the Specification of the ’509 patent,
`its prosecution history, and the claim language of dependent claims,
`Petitioner contends the term “contacts” should be construed to mean
`“communications.” Pet. 15–17. Patent Owner contends that the term need
`not be construed because the ordinary and customary meaning of the term is
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`recitation as a means-plus-function element under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
`At the initial conference call scheduled on the date indicated in the
`accompanying Scheduling Order, the parties should be prepared to discuss
`the “component” terms in claim 1, including whether the terms should be
`interpreted as means-plus-function limitations subject to § 112, ¶ 6. See
`Williamson at *6–7. The parties also should be prepared to discuss whether
`additional briefing on the matter is warranted, and, if so, an appropriate
`briefing schedule. If authorized, the additional briefing should address
`whether the presumption that the recited terms are not means-plus-function
`limitations subject to § 112, ¶ 6 is overcome, see id., and, if so, what the
`proper constructions of the terms should be under § 112, ¶ 6, including
`identification of the claimed function and the corresponding structure
`described in the Specification that performs the claimed function. In
`addition, the parties should be prepared to discuss whether the additional
`briefing, if authorized, should also address the prior art analysis under § 112,
`¶ 6, i.e., whether the structure corresponding to each of the means-plus-
`function limitations, or an equivalent, is present in the prior art applied in
`this case.
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`readily understood by those skilled in the art. Prelim. Resp. 6. Patent
`Owner, however, does not identify an ordinary meaning, although it reserves
`the right to construe claim terms in its Patent Owner’s Response. Id.
`Petitioner’s proposed construction, “communications,” is overly broad
`when considered in light of the Specification. For example,
`“communications” can encompass transmission of information by printed
`publications on library bookshelves or speeches given to a live audience in a
`public square, which are unrelated to the subject matter claimed in the ’509
`patent. The Specification describes that the contact center system is used to
`accept, distribute, and monitor work coming into an organization involving
`communications of various media types. See Ex. 1001, col. 9, l. 13–col. 10,
`l. 5. Once a contact has been initiated, routed to, and accepted by an agent,
`the agent is expected to develop and deliver appropriate responses. See id. at
`col. 10, ll. 6–13; col. 12, ll. 4–8. The agent’s role is to accept and complete
`the work, i.e., carry out “the contact interaction” to completion. See id. at
`col. 12, ll. 4–6. In the course of the interaction, the agent may communicate
`with the caller or the customer, e.g., communicate over the phone or
`exchange emails, to assist the caller or respond to the customer request. See
`id. at col. 49, ll. 53–55; col. 59, ll. 64– 67; Figs. 73, 98. After the
`communication has been completed, the contact is considered closed after
`the agent performed the wrap-up stage of the interaction. See id. at col. 50,
`ll. 35–54; Figs. 73, 98. On this record, consistent with the term as described
`in the Specification, we construe “contacts,” for the purposes of this
`Decision, to mean “communications to initiate, request, or carry out
`interaction.”
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`III. ANALYSIS OF PETITIONER’S PRIOR ART CHALLENGES
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`A. Anticipation Based on Haigh
`Petitioner contends claims 1–6 and 8–13 are unpatentable under
`35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Haigh. Pet. 17–40. Petitioner provides
`detailed explanations and specific citations to Haigh indicating where in the
`reference the claimed features are disclosed. Id. Petitioner has not provided
`a declaration in support of its position.
`We begin our analysis with the principles of law that generally apply
`to a ground of unpatentability based on anticipation, followed by discussion
`of Haigh. We then discuss the challenged claims and address the arguments
`presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner.
`
`1. Principles of Law
`A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 only if a single prior
`art reference expressly or inherently describes each and every limitation set
`forth in the claim. See Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368,
`1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628,
`631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Further, a reference cannot anticipate “unless [it]
`discloses within the four corners of the document not only all of the
`limitations claimed[,] but also all of the limitations arranged or combined in
`the same way as recited in the claim.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc.,
`545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). To anticipate, a prior art reference
`must disclose more than “multiple, distinct teachings that the artisan might
`somehow combine to achieve the claimed invention.” Id. at 1371; see also
`In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586, 587 (CCPA 1972) (“The [prior art] reference
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`must clearly and unequivocally disclose the claimed [invention] or direct
`those skilled in the art to the [invention] without any need for picking,
`choosing, and combining various disclosures not directly related to each
`other by the teachings of the cited reference.”). Although the elements must
`be arranged in the same way as in the claim, “the reference need not satisfy
`an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re
`Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831,
`832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). We analyze this asserted ground based on anticipation
`with the principles identified above in mind.
`
`2. Overview of Haigh
`Haigh describes a system and method for management and processing
`of transactions, including inbound and outbound telephone calls, emails,
`video calls, facsimile transmissions, and data packets over the Internet.
`Ex. 1002, Abstract. Communications such as inbound and outbound calls
`are deemed “transactions” in which a telemarketing campaign or other
`facility transacts or interacts with actual or potential contacts such as
`customers. Id. at col. 1, ll. 22–23. Figure 1 of Haigh is reproduced below.
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`Figure 1 is a block diagram of the basic transaction processing system of
`Haigh. Id. at col. 1, ll. 52–53, col. 2, ll. 1–2. Figure 1 depicts system 10,
`which is capable of receiving various types of transactions over telephone
`connections, wireless connections, and network connections, such as the
`Internet. Id. at col. 2, ll. 2–8. As shown in Figure 1, system 10 includes
`transaction processing system 12 having memory 14 for storing transactions
`in queue 16. Id. at col. 2, ll. 10–12. Transaction processing system 12 also
`includes transaction controller 18, which processes transactions and controls
`queue 16 to store the received transactions. Id. at col. 2, ll. 24–26. In
`addition, transaction processing system 12 may incorporate ACD techniques
`known in the art. Id. at col. 2, ll. 40–42. Haigh further describes that
`transaction processing system 12 routes the received transactions to
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`appropriate stations 32, 34 through network 30. Id. at col. 4, ll. 2–10.
`Stations 32, 34 include transaction processing hardware and/or software to
`handle various types of transactions. Id. at col. 4, ll. 52–55.
`Figure 2 of Haigh is reproduced below.
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`Figure 2 is a flowchart illustrating the method of operation of the transaction
`processing system described in Figure 1. Id. at col. 1, ll. 54–55. In step 46,
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`transaction processing system 12 receives a transaction, such as an incoming
`telephone call, a video call, an email transmission, a facsimile transmission,
`or an Internet transmission. Id. at col. 5, ll. 10–19. The received transaction
`is queued into an appropriate queue in step 52. Id. at col. 5, ll. 38–39. In an
`embodiment, separate queues store transactions of different types—e.g.,
`inbound telephone calls are queued in an inbound call queue, and facsimile
`transmissions are stored in a facsimile queue. See id. at col. 5, ll. 38–50.
`Alternatively, transactions of various types are queued in a single, shared
`queue. See id. at col. 5, ll. 50–61. Figure 4 of Haigh is reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 4 depicts single queue 82 that stores transactions of different types,
`such as an incoming call IC-N and a facsimile transmission FT-L, in the
`same queue. See id. As described in Figure 2, a queued transaction is sent
`to an available agent (step 60) and the agent responds to the received
`transaction (step 62). See id. at col. 6, ll. 40–50; col. 7, ll. 24–28. In
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`addition, specific agents may be assigned to process a specific type of
`transactions, such as facsimiles, voice mails, or emails. Id. at col. 6, ll. 21–
`23.
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`Claim 1
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`3. Analysis
`
`Petitioner contends Haigh discloses a system essentially identical to
`the one described and claimed in the ’509 patent. Pet. 19. First, Petitioner
`contends Figures 1 and 2 of Haigh disclose “[a] system for receiving and
`distributing contacts of different media types to a plurality of workstations”
`as recited in claim 1. Id. at 19–22. Petitioner contends that system 10,
`shown in Figure 1, discloses the claimed “system” and that Figure 2
`illustrates the method of operation of system 10. Id. at 19–20. Petitioner
`further contends that Haigh discloses that this system is “for receiving and
`distributing contacts of different media types to a plurality of workstations,”
`as recited in claim 1, although Haigh uses the term “transactions” instead of
`“contacts.” Id. at 19–21 (citing Ex. 1002, col. 2, ll. 2–3, col. 4, ll. 9–10,
`col. 5, ll. 10–14, col. 6, ll. 48–49, col. 10, ll. 17–20, col. 12, ll. 7–9, Fig. 2).
`Petitioner next contends that transaction processing system 12 shown
`in Figure 1, which includes memory 14, queue 16, transaction controller 18,
`and identifier generator 20, discloses “a queueing component” as recited in
`claim 1. Id. at 22–23 (citing Ex. 1002, col. 2, ll. 10–24, 41–58, Fig. 1).
`Citing supporting disclosure of Haigh, including step 46 of Figure 2, which
`states “[a step to] receive a transaction, including one of incoming video
`calls, telephone calls, voice mail transmissions, e-mail transmissions,
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`facsimile transmissions, internet transmissions, downloaded files, etc.”
`(capitalization omitted), Petitioner contends transaction processing system
`12 discloses a queueing component that is “adapted to receive said different
`media-type contacts,” as recited in claim 1. Id. at 23 (citing Ex. 1002, col. 2,
`ll. 4–6, 25–27, 34–36, col. 5, ll. 10–17, Fig. 2). Petitioner further contends
`that a single queue embodiment of queue 16, which is depicted in Figure 4
`as single queue 82, discloses “a common queue” as recited in claim 1. Id. at
`24–25 (citing Ex. 1002, col. 2, ll. 36–40, col. 5, ll. 51–59, Fig. 4).
`Petitioner contends that transaction processing system 12 of Haigh
`also discloses “a routing component” and the hardware and software
`components of transaction processing system 12 are “adapted to route the
`queued contacts to said workstations,” as recited in claim 1. Id. at 25–27
`
`(citing Ex. 1002, col. 4, ll. 6–10, col. 5, ll. 55–59, 65‐67, col. 6, ll. 45–49,
`
`col. 10, ll. 56–58 (claim 11), col. 11, ll. 18–19 (claim 13), col. 12, ll. 25–27
`(claim 18), Fig. 2 (step 60)). The disclosure cited by Petitioner includes step
`60 of Figure 2, which states “[a step to] send queued transaction to [an]
`available agent” (capitalization omitted), and claim 11 of Haigh, which
`recites “a transaction controller for conveying a queued transaction having a
`predetermined transaction type to the at least one agent station.” Id. at 27.
`Petitioner further contends Haigh discloses that the queued contacts are
`routed “based on designated criteria,” as recited by claim 1, and provides
`detailed citations to supporting disclosure of Haigh, including column 5, line
`67 to column 6, line 4 (“In a further embodiment, the transaction processing
`system 12 may store agent and supervisor data in the memory 14 which
`identifies each agent and supervisor as being capable of receiving specific
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`types of transactions.”) and column 6, lines 21–23 (“specific agents may be
`assigned to primarily process a specific transaction, such as facsimiles, voice
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`mail, E‐mail, etc.”).
`
`Petitioner further asserts that its reliance on transaction processing
`system 12 to disclose both the “queueing component” and “routing
`component” limitations is proper because the ’509 patent Specification also
`discloses that “the hardware and software components of contact server 122
`perform both functionalities of queuing and routing.” Id. at 26 n.3.
`Patent Owner contends Petitioner’s anticipation analysis is improper
`because Petitioner has combined teachings from multiple distinct
`embodiments of Haigh instead of showing each and every limitation of
`claim 1 is disclosed in a single embodiment of Haigh “without any need for
`picking, choosing, and combining various disclosures not directly related to
`each other by the teachings of the cited reference.” Prelim. Resp. 8–9 (citing
`In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586, 587 (Fed. Cir. 1972); Symantec Corp. v. RPost
`Communications Ltd., Case IPR2014-00357, slip. op. at 20 (PTAB July 15,
`2014) (Paper 14)). Specifically, Patent Owner contends that Haigh discloses
`two different embodiments relating to queuing transactions—i.e., a multiple
`queue embodiment shown in Figure 3, where separate queues store
`transactions of different types, and a single queue embodiment shown in
`Figure 4, where transactions of various types are queued in a single, shared
`queue—and that Petitioner improperly combines the embodiment disclosed
`in Figures 1–3 with the “alternative embodiment” of Figure 4 to satisfy the
`“common queue” limitation of claim 1. Prelim. Resp. 9–10, 11 n.1. Patent
`Owner also contends that Haigh discloses at least three different
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`embodiments relating to routing transactions—including an embodiment
`where agents manually select a queued transaction to process and an
`embodiment where the transaction controller automatically sends the queued
`transactions to a next available agent—and that Petitioner improperly cites
`all three embodiments, “cherry pick[ing] . . . from these disparate teachings
`and embodiments,” to satisfy the “routing component” and routing “based
`on designated criteria” limitations of claim 1. Id. at 10–12, 11 n. 1.
`We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments. Based on the
`current record, we do not see anything in the disclosure of Haigh, nor does
`Patent Owner point to anything in the reference, that confirms or
`demonstrates that the transaction queues described in Figures 3 and 4 belong
`to separate, unrelated embodiments. Nor is there any indication in Haigh
`that Figures 1 and 2 describe embodiments that are unrelated to the single
`queue embodiment of Figure 4. Rather, as discussed above in our overview
`of Haigh, Figures 1 and 2 describe the structure and the method of operation
`of the basic transaction processing system of Haigh with features common to
`most, if not all, of the embodiments disclosed in Haigh. Notwithstanding
`Patent Owner’s argument, based on the current record, Figures 3 and 4 are
`more reasonably understood as describing the optional implementations or
`configurations relating to the queuing component within the basic, overall
`transaction processing system described in Figures 1 and 2. See, e.g.,
`Ex. 1002, col. 5, ll. 63–65 (“The transaction controller 18 may allow agents
`to manually select a queued transaction to be accessed and acted upon from
`the queues shown in FIGS. 3-4.”) (emphases added). Similarly, the alleged
`multiple embodiments relating to routing of transactions to agents are more
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`reasonably understood as optional, and not necessarily mutually exclusive,
`features within the basic, overall system and method disclosed in Haigh.
`Among other reasons, Haigh’s use of permissive language such as “may”
`and “allow” in describing these optional features supports this reading.
`The transaction controller 18 may allow agents to manually
`select a queued transaction to be accessed and acted upon from
`the queues shown in FIGS. 3-4. Alternatively, the transaction
`controller 18 may automatically send the queued transactions to
`a next available agent. In a further embodiment, the transaction
`processing system 12 may store agent and supervisor data in the
`memory 14 which identifies each agent and supervisor as being
`capable of receiving specific types of transactions.
`
`Id. at col. 5, l. 63–col. 6, l. 4 (emphases added).
`In addition, specific agents may be assigned to primarily
`process a specific transaction, such as facsimiles, voice mail, E-
`mail, etc. . . .
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`Id. at col. 6, ll. 21–23 (emphasis added). Hence, the facts of this case are
`distinguishable from the cases cited by Patent Owner. See Groupon, Inc., v.
`Blue Calypso, LLC, Case CBM2013-00034, slip. op. at 38–39 (PTAB Dec.
`17, 2014) (Paper 45) (distinguishing Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d 1359, which
`relied on In re Arkley, 455 F.2d at 587, and finding that a direct e-mail
`campaign and a “refer-a-friend” advertising campaign described in a prior
`art reference directed to an email broadcast management system were not
`multiple, distinct teachings that are unrelated to each other, but, rather,
`options to be used together, “without any need for picking, choosing, and
`combining various disclosures not directly related to each other by the
`teachings of the cited reference,” to anticipate the challenged claims); cf.
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`Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 1361
`(Fed. Cir. 2012) (distinguishing Net MoneyIN and finding that, although a
`prior art reference discloses a number of different combinations of
`compounds for a chewing gum composition, one of the combinations
`anticipates the challenged claim when the combinations are all meant to be
`used in a single product, i.e., they are combinations of components for a
`single product, or configurations within a single product concept, design, or
`model). On this record, for the purposes of this Decision, we are satisfied
`that Petitioner has cited sufficient disclosure from Haigh to show that Haigh
`discloses the queuing component and routing component of claim 1 “without
`any need for picking, choosing, and combining various disclosures not
`directly related to each other.” In re Arkley, 455 F.2d at 587.
`Patent Owner further contends that Haigh does not disclose the
`queuing component limitation because the ’509 patent “defines the queuing
`component to include a routing manager, route request broker, assignment
`manager and agent manager.” Prelim. Resp. 12. Patent Owner argues that
`the queuing component as defined in the Specification must include these
`components and be capable of performing the functions of the components
`in the manner defined in the Specification. Id. at 12–13. Patent Owner
`asserts that Petitioner does not explain how these requirements are met, and,
`therefore, fails to show Haigh discloses the queuing component limitation of
`claim 1. Id. at 13–15. Similarly, Patent Owner contends that Haigh does not
`disclose the routing component limitation of claim 1 because, as defined in
`the ’509 patent Specification, the routing component must include “a media
`proxy, routing manager, assignment manager, agent manager and agent Java
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`interface” and must be capable of performing the tasks assigned to those
`components. Id. at 15–17. In addition, Patent Owner contends Petitioner
`improperly relies upon the same single component of Haigh, i.e., transaction
`processing system 12, as disclosing both the queuing component and routing
`component limitations of claim 1 because the ’509 patent Specification
`describes that the queuing component and routing component have
`“different component parts that perform different functionality.” Id. at 17–
`18, 18 n.2.
`At this preliminary stage, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s
`rebuttal arguments because preferred embodiments described in a
`specification may not be read into the claims “absent clear disclaimer in the
`specification.” In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed.
`Cir. 2004).4 We are also not persuaded at this time that the descriptions in
`the Specification cited by Patent Owner are sufficiently clear or deliberate to
`impart special meanings to the claim terms as argued by Patent Owner. See
`Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1480. “A patentee can act as his own lexicographer, but,
`to do so, ‘a patentee must clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim
`
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` 4
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` The analysis and applicable law would be different if the queuing
`component and the routing component limitations are subject to 35 U.S.C.
`§ 112, ¶ 6. We note that Patent Owner’s rebuttal arguments appear to track
`the analysis for mean-plus-function limitations, although Patent Owner does
`not argue the claim terms are subject to § 112, ¶ 6. Based on the current
`record, we do not interpret the terms as means-plus-function limitations.
`However, as discussed above, the parties should be prepared to discuss the
`matter, and specifically the impact of Williamson, during the initial
`conference call.
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`term other than its plain and ordinary meaning’ and must ‘clearly express an
`intent to redefine the term.’” Cadence Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Exela
`PharmSci Inc., 780 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citations omitted)
`(internal quotation marks omitted). On this record, for the purposes of this
`Decision, we are satisfied that Petitioner has cited sufficient disclosure from
`Haigh to show Haigh discloses all of the limitations of claim 1.
`Based on the foregoing discussion, we are persuaded Petitioner has
`provided sufficient evidence that establishes a reasonable likelihood of
`prevailing in its challenge to claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated
`by Haigh.
`
`Claims 2–6
`
`Claims 2–6 depend directly or indirectly from claim 1. Petitioner
`contends Haigh discloses the additionally recited limitations of claims 2–6.
`Pet. 29–38. Petitioner provides detailed explanations and specific citations
`to Haigh indicating where in the reference the claimed features are
`disclosed. Id.
`Patent Owner does not respond specifically to Petitioner’s challenge
`to claims 2–6 beyond Patent Owner’s arguments advanced with respect to
`claim 1 discussed above. See Prelim. Resp. 19. At this preliminary stage,
`for the purposes of this Decision, we are satisfied that Petitioner has cited
`sufficient disclosure from Haigh to show Haigh discloses the additionally
`recited limitations of claims 2–6. On this record, we are persuaded
`Petitioner has provided sufficient evidence that establishes a reasonable
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`likelihood of prevailing in its challenge to claims 2–6 under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 102(b) as anticipated by Haigh.
`
`Claims 8–13
`
`Petitioner contends independent claim 8 is substantially similar to
`claim 1 “but is written as a ‘method’ claim.” Pet. 14. Petitioner contends
`claim 8 is therefore anticipated by Haigh for the same reasons Haigh
`anticipates claim 1. Id. at 38–39. Petitioner presents a “lookup table” that
`lists the limitations of claim 8, the corresponding limitations of claim 1, and
`the corresponding section of the Petition where the anticipating disclosure of
`Haigh is discussed with respect to claim 1. Id.
`Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of claim 8
`and does not respond specifically to Petitioner’s challenge to claim 8 beyond
`Pat