Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
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`Paper 21
`Entered: July 28, 2015
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`inCONTACT, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`MICROLOG CORP.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2015-00560
`Patent 7,092,509 B1
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Before JUSTIN T. ARBES, FRANCES L. IPPOLITO, and
`MINN CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`
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`I. INTRODUCTION
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`In this inter partes review, instituted pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314,
`Petitioner inContact, Inc. (“Petitioner”) challenges the patentability of
`claims 1–6 and 8–13 (the “challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 7,092,509
`B1 (Ex. 1001, “the ’509 patent”), owned by Microlog Corp. (“Patent
`Owner”). The Board has jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(c). This Final
`Written Decision is entered pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.73. With respect to the grounds instituted in this trial, we have
`considered the papers submitted by the parties and the evidence cited
`therein. For the reasons discussed below, we determine Petitioner has
`shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–6 and 8–13 of the
`’509 patent are unpatentable.
`
`A. Procedural History
`On January 15, 2015, Petitioner filed a Petition (Paper 2, “Pet.”)
`requesting an inter partes review of claims 1–6 and 8–13 of the ’509 patent.
`Patent Owner filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 7, “Prelim. Resp.”). On
`July 30, 2015, we instituted an inter partes review of claims 1–6 and 8–13
`based on the ground that the challenged claims are unpatentable as
`anticipated by Haigh1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Paper 8 (“Dec. on Inst.”).
`After institution of trial, Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner Response
`(Paper 13, “PO Resp.”), to which Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 17,
`“Reply”). No oral hearing was held in this proceeding in view of the Joint
`
`
`1 Ex. 1002, U.S. Patent No. 5,793,861 (issued Aug. 11, 1998).
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`Notice of Waiver of Oral Argument (Paper 19) filed by the parties. See
`Paper 20.
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`B. Related Proceedings
`According to Petitioner, the ’509 patent is the subject of the following
`
`patent infringement case: Microlog Corp. v. inContact, Inc., No. 14‐47
`
`(LPS) (D. Del.). Pet. 1.
`
`II. THE ’509 PATENT
`
`A. Described Invention
`The ’509 patent describes a system and method to receive and
`distribute to agent workstations “contacts” of various media types—such as
`telephone calls, emails, facsimiles, and web chats—based on criteria
`associated with the contacts and the available agents. See Ex. 1001,
`Abstract; col. 1, ll. 21–30. Figure 1 of the ’509 patent is reproduced below.
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`Figure 1 depicts contact center or call center system 100, which includes
`telephony switch 106, contact center server 122, agent workstation 102, and
`agent telephone 104. In an embodiment, telephone switch 106 can be a
`conventional automatic call distributor (ACD) that distributes incoming
`telephone calls to the agents. Id. at col. 1, ll. 38–43; col. 8, ll. 50–52.
`According to the ’509 patent, although conventional call centers were
`incapable of handling contacts other than telephone calls (id. at col. 2, ll. 52–
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`60), contact center system 100 of the ’509 patent can receive, queue, and
`route contacts of additional media types, including emails, facsimiles, web
`callbacks, and web chat, to agent workstations 102 and/or agent telephones
`104. Id. at col. 3, ll. 19–29; col. 9, ll. 35–38.
`The ’509 patent further describes that the received contacts of
`different types are queued and routed to appropriate agents by way of a
`common queue. Id. at col. 41, ll. 44–48. Figure 50 of the ’509 patent is
`reproduced below.
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`
`Figure 50 shows that incoming contacts of various types are placed in a
`common, shared queue and subsequently routed to available agents. Id.
`According to the ’509 patent, “because the different media-type contacts are
`all queued in a common queue independent of media type, the system is
`adaptable to handle any type of contact.” Id. at col. 41, ll. 52–55. In further
`embodiments, the queued contacts are matched and routed to suitable agents
`based on various criteria, including the media type, the priority level, and the
`agent skill. Id. at col. 10, ll. 6–22; col. 47, ll. 12–60; Fig. 68.
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`B. Illustrative Claim
`Of the challenged claims, claims 1 and 8 are independent. Claims 2–6
`depend directly or indirectly from claim 1, and claims 9–13 depend directly
`or indirectly from claim 8. Claim 1 is illustrative of the challenged claims
`and is reproduced below:
`1.
`A system for receiving and distributing contacts of
`different media types to a plurality of workstations, comprising:
`a queuing component, adapted to receive said different
`media-type contacts and maintain said contacts in a common
`queue while said contacts are awaiting routing to said
`workstations; and
`a routing component, adapted to route the queued
`contacts to said workstations based on designated criteria.
`
`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are given
`their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the
`patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see Cuozzo Speed
`Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016) (holding that 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.100(b) “represents a reasonable exercise of the rulemaking authority
`that Congress delegated to the . . . Office”). Under the broadest reasonable
`interpretation (BRI) standard, and absent any special definitions, claim terms
`are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by
`one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the specification. In re Translogic
`Tech. Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Any special definitions
`for claim terms or phrases must be set forth with reasonable clarity,
`deliberateness, and precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir.
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`1994). A particular embodiment appearing in the written description
`generally is not incorporated into a claim if the claim language is broader
`than the embodiment. SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358
`F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed.
`Cir. 1993).
`
`A. “Component” Limitations
`A key issue in this proceeding is whether U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 62 applies to
`certain limitations of the challenged claims reciting the term “component,”
`notwithstanding the absence of the word “means” in the limitations.
`Subsequent to the filing of the Petition and the Preliminary Response in this
`case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a decision in
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc
`in relevant part), which modified the preexisting law regarding when to
`regard a claim recitation as a means-plus-function element subject to § 112,
`¶ 6. In general, a claim term that does not use the word “means” triggers a
`rebuttable presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply. Apex Inc. v. Raritan
`Comp., Inc., 325 F.3d 1364, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Under Williamson,
`that presumption can be overcome “if the challenger demonstrates that the
`claim term fails to ‘recite sufficiently definite structure’ or else recites
`‘function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.’”
`Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (citation omitted). “The standard is whether
`
`2 Section 4(c) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
`125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), re-designated 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, as
`35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Because the ’509 patent has a filing date prior to
`September 16, 2012, the effective date of § 4(c) of the AIA, we refer to the
`pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 112. See AIA § 4(e).
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`the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art
`to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.” Id.
`In our Decision on Institution and during the Initial Conference in this
`proceeding, we encouraged the parties to discuss in their Response and
`Reply whether, in view of Williamson, the claim terms “a queuing
`component, adapted to receive said different media-type contacts and
`maintain said contacts in a common queue while said contacts are awaiting
`routing to said workstations” (the “queuing component limitation”) and “a
`routing component, adapted to route the queued contacts to said
`workstations based on designated criteria” (the “routing component
`limitation”) recited in claim 1 should be interpreted as means-plus-function
`limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. See Dec. on Inst. 6–7 n.3; Initial
`Conference Summary and Order (Paper 11) 2–3. In the Patent Owner
`Response and Petitioner’s Reply, the parties discussed claim construction of
`three “component” limitations—namely, the “queuing component” and
`“routing component” limitations recited in claim 1 and the “contact handling
`component” limitation recited in claim 4. PO Resp. 6–13 & n.2; Reply 1–17
`& n.2. The parties dispute whether the presumption against means-plus-
`function treatment is overcome and § 112, ¶ 6 applies. Patent Owner argues
`the disputed “component” limitations should be construed as means-plus-
`function limitations subject to § 112, ¶ 6 because the term “component” does
`not connote any definite structure, and the words modifying “component” do
`not impart any additional structure. PO Resp. 6–11. Petitioner disagrees,
`arguing that the structural modifiers preceding “component” prevent the
`application of § 112, ¶ 6. Reply 1–14. Petitioner asserts that the disputed
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`“component” limitations should be accorded their ordinary and customary
`meaning. Id. at 1, 14. We address each of the three “component”
`limitations in turn.
`
`1. “Queuing Component”
`Patent Owner argues that the term “component” is widely recognized
`as not connoting a definite structure. PO Resp. 8–9 (citing MPEP § 2181).
`Patent Owner further asserts that adding the modifier “queuing” to
`“component” does not impart any additional structure. Id. at 9. In support
`of its assertion, Patent Owner argues the term “queuing component” lacks a
`widely recognized structural definition because the term is not found in two
`purportedly “major” computing dictionaries. See id. at 7 (citing Exs. 2001,
`2002).
`Petitioner asserts that Patent Owner’s analysis is insufficient and that
`several dictionaries in fact show the term “queue”—the noun form of the
`“queuing” modifier—has a reasonably well-understood meaning as a name
`for a structure. See Reply 2–3, 10. According to Petitioner, a “queue” is
`described as a “specialized form of addressless memory” or a “FIFO [first-
`in-first-out] memory” in technical dictionaries. Id. at 3–4 (citing Exs. 1008,
`1010). Petitioner further argues that multiple technical and non-technical
`dictionaries also define “queue” as a data structure that stores data elements
`that can be removed according to a specified order, such as the FIFO order
`or the order of priority assigned to each element. Id. at 3 (citing Exs. 1007,
`1008, 1009, 1011). In addition, Petitioner argues that the Specification of
`the ’509 patent confirms the structural character of “queue” and “queuing
`component.” Id. at 5. For example, the Specification describes “software
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`and related hardware” that “provide unified queuing of all media types, such
`as e-mail, telephony, web chat, and web call back into a single unified
`queue” (Ex. 1001, col. 10, ll. 17–19), as well as an “‘in memory’ queue”
`where these contacts of different media types are maintained prior to being
`routed to agent workstations (id. at col. 47, ll. 10–20). Reply 5. Citing the
`Declaration of David Klausner (Ex. 1006), Petitioner asserts that one of
`ordinary skill would understand the “‘in memory’ queue” to be a data
`structure implemented in memory hardware. Id. (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 17).
`In addition, Petitioner appears to argue that the prior art of record
`shows a “queue” is included in a “queuing component,” indicating the
`structural nature of the term “queuing component.” See id. at 5–6. For
`example, Petitioner argues Haigh discloses “a transaction processing
`system” that includes a “memory” for storing transactions in “at least one
`queue.” Id. at 6 (citing Ex. 1002, col. 2, ll. 10–12). Petitioner further argues
`that additional prior art references disclose “the queue in [the] transaction
`processing platform” (Ex. 1003 (“Berkowitz”), col. 3, ll. 34–35; col. 5,
`ll. 44–45) and a “processing unit” having “associated memory including a
`queue of queued inbound calls” (Ex. 1004 (“Clare”), col. 22, ll. 9–14).
`Reply 6.
`We credit the testimony of Mr. Klausner and are persuaded by
`Petitioner’s arguments that the word “queue” (the noun form of the modifier
`“queuing”) would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to have a
`sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure. As Petitioner points
`out, the Specification describes queues as entities with definite structure,
`such as “a single unified queue” to provide “unified queuing of [contacts of]
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`all media types” (Ex. 1001, col. 10, ll. 17–19) and an “‘in memory’ queue”
`where the contacts are maintained before being routed to agent workstations
`(id. at col. 47, ll. 10–20). This is consistent with the language of claim 1,
`which recites that the “queuing component” is adapted to receive media-type
`contacts and maintain them in a “common queue” while they are awaiting
`routing. The Specification also describes committing a contact to a
`“persistent queue” as part of the process of queuing contacts for further
`processing. Id. at col. 46, ll. 65–67; col. 47, ll. 4–11; Fig. 66. Because
`entities such as an “‘in memory’ queue” or a “persistent queue” must have a
`physical presence in the system where they reside, we find that, in the
`context of the ’509 patent, a “queue” has a sufficiently definite meaning as
`the name for a structure present in the contact center system described in the
`patent.
`Nevertheless, we note that the limitation at issue is not a “queue,” but
`rather “a queuing component, adapted to receive said different media-type
`contacts and maintain said contacts in a common queue while said contacts
`are awaiting routing to said workstations.” To the extent Petitioner argues
`that the term “queuing component” connotes sufficiently definite structure
`because the “queuing component” includes a “queue,” there exists support
`for Petitioner’s argument in the intrinsic record. First, the disputed
`limitation recites that a “queuing component” is “adapted to . . . maintain
`[the different media-type] contacts in a common queue.” Because the
`queuing component “maintain[s]” the contacts in a common queue (as
`opposed to, for example, merely communicating with a separate common
`queue), we interpret the language to mean that the common queue is part of
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`the queuing component, imparting a structural connotation to the term
`“queuing component.” In fact, the “common queue” is central to the
`queuing operation described in the Specification, which lends support to this
`interpretation. For example, Figure 50 of the ’509 patent reproduced in
`Section II.A above shows that the common queue plays a central role in the
`basic queuing and routing operation disclosed in the ’509 patent. See
`Ex. 1001, col. 41, ll. 45–49 (“FIG. 50 . . . illustrat[es] the basic manner in
`which the contact center system 100 receives contacts of different media
`types, retains the different media types in a common queue, and routes the
`queued contacts to the appropriate agents.” (emphasis added)). The
`Specification further describes in detail how contacts of each media type are
`received, queued, and routed, utilizing the common queue as the central unit
`of the operation. See id. at col. 41, l. 63–col. 47, l. 20; Figs. 51–68
`(describing queuing and routing telephone calls, IVR calls, web callback
`requests, web chat requests, VoIP calls, facsimiles, and e-mails through the
`common queue).
`Even if the “common queue” is deemed to be separate from and
`external to the “queuing component,” the claim language and the
`Specification establish that the term “queuing component” connotes
`sufficiently definite structure to avoid means-plus-function treatment under
`§ 112, ¶ 6. Considering the claim language, the disputed limitation
`expressly requires the “queuing component” to maintain contacts in a
`“common queue.” In other words, the “queuing component” must keep the
`contacts in the queue while the contacts are waiting to be routed to
`appropriate agent workstations. Tracking the claim language, the
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`Specification describes “a queuing component, capable of receiving contacts
`of different media-types, such as telephone calls, e-mails, facsimiles, web
`callbacks, web chat, voice over internet protocol, and so on, and maintaining
`the different media types contacts in a common queue while awaiting routing
`to the agent workstations.” Ex. 1001, col. 3, ll. 21–26 (emphases added).
`As discussed above, the Specification also describes in detail how contacts
`of each media type are placed in the common queue and routed out of the
`common queue to the agent workstations. See id. at col. 41, l. 45–col. 48,
`l. 15; Figs. 50–68. These interactions take place in a particular manner
`specified in the ’509 patent in order to store and maintain contacts in the
`common queue having a particular structure, as discussed above. See id. at
`col. 10, ll. 17–19 (“Specifically, the software and related hardware provide
`unified queuing of all media types . . . into a single unified queue.”)
`(emphases added); col. 46, l. 40–col. 47, l. 11, Fig. 66 (describing
`committing contacts to a “persistent queue” and adding contacts to an “‘in
`memory’ queue”).
`In addition, the Specification identifies the subcomponents of the
`queuing component as well as the location of the queuing component in the
`contact center system and the component’s relationship with other
`components of the system. For example, Figures 1 and 51 show that contact
`center system 100 includes contact system server 122, which includes a
`“queuing component,” such as the component for queuing telephone calls.
`See id. at col. 3, ll. 20–26 (“a contact center system . . . includes a queuing
`component, capable of receiving contacts of different media-types . . . and
`maintaining the different media types contacts in a common queue”);
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`col. 41, l. 66–col. 42, l. 3 (“The components associated with the receipt,
`queuing and routing of telephone calls are shown in the diagram of FIG. 51,
`while FIG. 52 illustrates the steps performed by these components for
`receiving and placing the calls in the common queue.”); col. 42, ll. 11–12
`(“the routing manager . . . is . . . resident in the contact system [server]
`122”), 34–36 (“The routing manager then begins the process of adding the
`contacts to the common queue . . . .”). Further, Figure 65 shows
`“components of the contact center server 122 . . . that are involved in placing
`a contact in the queue,” including the routing manager and assignment
`manager. Id. at col. 46, ll. 40–44. As noted above, Figure 66 illustrates the
`process of queuing contacts (see id. at col. 46, ll. 40–44), where “the routing
`manager commits the contact to a persistent queue” (id. at col. 46, ll. 66–67)
`and “the assignment manager adds the contact to ‘in memory’ queue” (id. at
`col. 47, ll. 10–11).
`Therefore, the claim and the Specification describe how the “queuing
`component” interacts with other components of the contact center system “in
`a way that . . . inform[s] the structural character” of the disputed limitation
`and “impart[s] structure” to the “queuing component” recited in the claim
`(see Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351), including the internal structure of the
`“queuing component” and how the subcomponents of the “queuing
`component” interact with the specified structures of the common queue,
`such as the “persistent queue” and the “‘in memory’ queue.” Hence, unlike
`Williamson, where the term “module” was “simply a generic description for
`software or hardware that performs a specified function,” id. at 1350, in this
`case, the term “queuing component” is not simply a general reference to any
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`structure that will perform a particular function because the intrinsic
`evidence establishes the structural character of the “queuing component”
`through its use of subcomponents in interaction with the system’s other
`components. See Finjan, Inc., v. Proofpoint, Inc., No. 13-cv-05808, 2015
`WL 7770208, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2015) (distinguishing Williamson
`and determining that the term “content processor” did not invoke § 112, ¶ 6
`because, unlike Williamson, “the intrinsic evidence establishes the structural
`character of ‘content processor’ through its interaction with the system’s
`other components”); see also Inventio AG v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator
`Americas Corp., 649 F.3d 1350, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding that the
`term “modernizing device” was not a purely functional limitation subject to
`§ 112, ¶ 6 because the specification describes internal components of the
`“modernizing device” and how the “modernizing device,” utilizing its
`subcomponents, interacts with the other components of the system),
`overruled as to the strength of the § 112, ¶ 6 presumption by Williamson,
`792 F.3d at 1349.
`The parties were alerted to the need to address the interpretation of the
`“component” limitations during trial, and did so. See Dec. on Inst. 6–7 n.3,
`20 n.4; Initial Conference Summary and Order (Paper 11) 2–3. We have
`reviewed all of the arguments and evidence submitted by Petitioner and
`Patent Owner regarding the queuing component limitation. Based on the
`foregoing, we determine that, under the particular circumstances of this case,
`the presumption against means-plus-function treatment is not overcome and
`§ 112, ¶ 6 does not apply because the claim language and the Specification
`establish that the term “queuing component” connotes sufficiently definite
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`structure. We find Petitioner’s analysis, supported by the testimony of
`Mr. Klausner, persuasive, and do not find sufficient evidence in the record to
`rebut the presumption against means-plus-function treatment.3 See Reply 1–
`6; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 15–18. Accordingly, we accord the term “queuing
`component” as used in claim 1 its ordinary and customary meaning, as
`would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, and interpret the
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`3 The parties dispute whether Petitioner’s § 101 unpatentability argument
`advanced in the related district court litigation effectively conceded that the
`“component” limitations are means-plus-function limitations subject to
`§ 112, ¶ 6. See PO Resp. 9–10; Reply 13. Patent Owner argues that
`Petitioner characterized the terms “queuing component” and “routing
`component” as “purely functional, generic language” in the district court
`case. PO Resp. 9–10. Petitioner counters that “a drafter’s decision to define
`‘a particular mechanism in functional terms is not sufficient to convert a
`claim element containing that term into a ‘means for performing a specified
`function’ within the meaning of section 112(6)’ because ‘many devices take
`their names from the functions they perform.’” Reply 13 (citing Flo
`Healthcare Solutions, LLC v. Kappos, 697 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012))
`(emphasis by Petitioner). In an additional counter argument, Petitioner
`asserts that Patent Owner conceded, when rebutting Petitioner’s § 101
`unpatentability argument, that the terms “routing component” and “queuing
`component” are structural limitations. See id. at 11–12 (citing Ex. 2006, 7
`(“[C]laims 1 through 6 of the ’509 Patent recite improvements to well
`defined structures including a “queuing component,” and “routing
`component.”), 10 (“[T]he Asserted Claims . . . explicitly recite defined
`hardware and software components . . .”), 15 (“These limitations are
`structural, not merely functional descriptions.”), 16 (“Plaintiff asserts that
`the claimed routing and queuing components as specifically modified by the
`claims would be understood as structure limitations . . .”) (emphases by
`Petitioner)). For the reasons discussed in this Final Written Decision, we
`determine that the terms “queuing component” and “routing component” do
`not invoke § 112, ¶ 6 notwithstanding the parties’ arguments regarding
`§ 101 in the district court litigation.
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`term to designate a class of structures of computer hardware that implement
`a data structure storing multiple elements that can be removed according to a
`particular order. See Ex. 1006 ¶ 18.
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`2. “Routing Component”
`Patent Owner acknowledges that the term “routing component”
`connotes “some type of structure.” PO Resp. 8. Nonetheless, Patent Owner
`asserts that the term should be construed as a means-plus-function limitation
`under § 112, ¶ 6 because it lacks sufficiently definite structure. Id. Patent
`Owner argues that, although “routing components” are recognized in the art
`to denote a “class of structures,” the definitions do not provide sufficient
`details on the structures, and, therefore, do not show the term “routing
`component” has a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.
`Id. (citing Ex. 2003).
`Similar to its argument with respect to the “queuing component”
`limitation, Patent Owner argues that the term “component” is widely
`recognized as not connoting a definite structure. Id. at 8–9. Patent Owner
`further argues that the addition of the modifier “routing” does not impart any
`structure. Id. at 9. Patent Owner, however, does not provide any
`explanation or evidence in support of this contention.
`Petitioner asserts that several technical and non-technical dictionaries
`show the term “router” has a reasonably well-understood meaning as a name
`for a structure. Reply 6–7 (citing Ex. 1007, 380 (“[a] hardware device that
`connects two or more networks or network segments together to form a
`single internetwork, by forwarding data packets from one network into
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`Patent 7,092,509 B1
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`another”); Ex. 1008, 557; Ex. 1009, 1518 (“[a] device in a network that
`handles message transfers between computers”); Ex. 1010, 457; Ex. 1011,
`415 (“[a]n intermediary device on a communication network that expedites
`message delivery”)).4 To the extent Patent Owner argues these definitions
`denote a “class of structures” and do not provide sufficient detail on the
`structures, Petitioner asserts that several Federal Circuit decisions have cited
`definitions short on detail to conclude that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply. Reply
`8–9 (citing Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1300 (Fed. Cir.
`2014) (“The limitation need not connote a single, specific structure; rather, it
`may describe a class of structures.”) (emphasis added), overruled as to the
`strength of the § 112, ¶ 6 presumption by Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349; Flo
`Healthcare Solutions, LLC v. Kappos, 697 F.3d 1367, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir.
`2012) (determining that claim term “height adjustment mechanism”
`designates “a class of structures that are generally understood to persons of
`skill in the art”) (emphasis added), overruled as to the strength of the § 112,
`¶ 6 presumption by Williamson at 1349).
`Citing the testimony of Mr. Klausner, Petitioner argues that one of
`ordinary skill in the art would understand “routing component” to designate
`a class of structures for forwarding data packets within one or more
`networks. Id. at 7 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 19–20). In addition, Petitioner asserts
`that the written description of the ’509 patent confirms that “routing
`component” indicates structure (e.g., hardware related to certain software)
`for forwarding data packets (e.g., data packets containing contacts) within
`
`4 The page numbers for Exhibits 1007, 1008, 1009, 1010, and 1011 refer to
`the page numbers of the references as originally published.
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`one or more networks (e.g., network(s) over which the contact center
`components communicate). Id. at 7–8 (citing Ex. 1001, col. 10, ll. 14–22;
`Ex. 1006 ¶ 21).
`The fact that a particular device is defined in functional terms is not
`sufficient to convert the claim element into a means-plus-function limitation
`because many devices take their names from the functions they perform.
`Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir.
`1996) (citing the examples of “filter,” “brake,” “clamp,” “screwdriver,” and
`“lock”). Here, we find that the term “router,” which is equivalent to
`“routing component,” is such a term. See Ex. 1007, 380 (defining “router”
`as “[a] hardware device that connects two or more networks or network
`segments together to form a single internetwork, by forwarding data packets
`from one network into another” and “routing” as “[t]he process by which
`network traffic is guided from one switch or router to the next until it
`reaches its final destination”). As discussed below, similar to the queuing
`component limitation, the claim language and the Specification establish that
`the term “routing component” connotes sufficiently definite structure to
`avoid means-plus-function treatment under § 112, ¶ 6.
`Considering the claim language, “a routing component, adapted to
`route the queued contacts to said workstations based on designated criteria,”
`the routing component limitation expressly requires the “routing
`component” to route “the queued contacts,” which are the “contacts in a
`common queue” recited in the queuing component limitation. In other
`words, the “routing component” must interact with the “common queue” to
`find and retrieve contacts queued in the common queue and route them to
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`the workstations. Tracking the claim language, the Specification describes
`“a routing component which routes the queued contacts to the agents based
`on criteria of the contacts, criteria of the agents, or both.” Ex. 1001, col. 3,
`ll. 27–29. Similar to the queuing component limitation, these interactions
`take place in a particular manner specified in the ’509 patent in order to get
`and route contacts from the common queue having a particular structure.
`See id. at col. 10, ll. 17–19 (“Specifically, the software and related hardware
`provide unified queuing of all media types . . . into a single unified queue.
`The software and associated hardware also provide skills-based and priority-
`based routing of these contacts to agents within the contact center.”
`(emphases added)). Further, Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Klausner, confirms that
`“routing component” is an expression that would be understood by a person
`of ordinary skill in the art to denote a type of structure for forwarding data
`packets within one or more networks. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 19–20; see also Lighting
`World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir.
`2004) (“The task of determining whether the limitation in question should be
`regarded as a means-plus-function limitation . . . is a question on which
`evidence from experts may be relevant.”), overruled on other grounds by
`Williamson, 792 F.3d 1339. Mr. Klausner also explains that the
`Specification confirms that “routing component” indicates structure (e.g.,
`hardware related to certain software) for forwarding data packets (e.g., data
`packets containing contacts) within one or more