Case 1:14-cv-00047-LPS Document 47 Filed 07/31/15 Page 1 of 18 PageID #: 612
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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`C.A. No. 14-cv-47-LPS
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`Jury Trial Demanded
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`§§§§§§§§§§
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`MICROLOG CORP.,
` Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`INCONTACT, INC.,
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`Defendant.
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`PLAINTIFF MICROLOG CORP’S
`OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`
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`Brian E. Farnan (Bar No. 4089)
`Michael J. Farnan (Bar No. 5165)
`FARNAN LLP
`919 North Market Street
`12th Floor
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`Telephone: 302-777-0300
`Facsimile: 302-777-0301
`bfarnan@farnanlaw.com
`mfarnan@farnanlaw.com
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`Jay D. Ellwanger (admitted pro hac vice)
`Stefanie T. Scott (admitted pro hac vice)
`DiNovo Price Ellwanger & Hardy LLP
`7000 North MoPac Expressway
`Suite 350
`Austin, Texas 78731
`(512) 539-2626 (phone)
`(512) 539-2627 (fax)
`jellwanger@dpelaw.com
`sscott@dpelaw.com
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
`MICROLOG LLC
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`
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`Dated: July 31, 2015
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`inContact, Inc. Exhibit 1012
`inContact, Inc. v. Microlog Corp., IPR2015-00560
`Page 1 of 18
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`Case 1:14-cv-00047-LPS Document 47 Filed 07/31/15 Page 2 of 18 PageID #: 613
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I. 
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`INTRODUCTION AND TECHNICAL TUTORIAL .................................................. 1 
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`II. 
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`LEGAL PRINCIPLES OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION .......................................... 5 
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`III.  CLAIM TERMS IN DISPUTE ................................................................................. 8 
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`A.  Claim Term 1: “maintain[…] contacts in a common queue” ................................ 8 
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`B.  Claim Term 2: “contact[s]” ................................................................................... 9 
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`C.  Claim Term 3: “contacts of different media types” ............................................ 11 
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`D.  Claim Term 4: “different media-type contacts” .................................................. 11 
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`E. 
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`Claim Term 5: “common queue” ........................................................................ 12 
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`IV.  CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 14 
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`inContact, Inc. Exhibit 1012
`inContact, Inc. v. Microlog Corp., IPR2015-00560
`Page 2 of 18
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`Case 1:14-cv-00047-LPS Document 47 Filed 07/31/15 Page 3 of 18 PageID #: 614
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Cases 
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`Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States,
` 384 F.2d 391 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ..................................................................................................... 10
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`Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc.,
` 512 F.3d 1338 (Fed.Cir.2008).................................................................................................. 12
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`Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc.,
` 358 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004).................................................................................................. 7
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`Chimie v. PPG Industries, Inc.,
` 402 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005).................................................................................................. 6
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`Graham v. John Deere Co.,
` 383 U.S. 1 (1966) ....................................................................................................................... 5
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`inContact, Inc. v. Microlog Corp.,
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`IPR2015-00560, Paper 8 (PTAB July 30, 2015) ...................................................................... 10
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`Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs.,
` 512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008).................................................................................................. 6
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`Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve,
` 256 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001)................................................................................................ 10
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`Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P.,
` 327 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003).................................................................................................. 6
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`Kara Technology Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc.,
` 582 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2009).................................................................................................. 6
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`KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc.,
` 223 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2000)................................................................................................ 12
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`Lemelson v. Gen. Mills, Inc.,
` 968 F.2d 1202 (Fed. Cir. 1992).................................................................................................. 6
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`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
` 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995)...................................................................................................... 5
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`Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd.,
` 133 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998).................................................................................................. 6
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`Outside the Box Innovations, LLC v. Travel Caddy, Inc.,
` 695 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................ 13
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`
`
`ii
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`inContact, Inc. Exhibit 1012
`inContact, Inc. v. Microlog Corp., IPR2015-00560
`Page 3 of 18
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`Case 1:14-cv-00047-LPS Document 47 Filed 07/31/15 Page 4 of 18 PageID #: 615
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`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
` 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)...................................................................................... 6, 7, 8, 9
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`Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms., Inc.,
` 438 F.3d 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2006).................................................................................................. 8
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`SRAM Corp. v. AD-II Eng’g, Inc.,
` 465 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2006).................................................................................................. 7
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`St. Clair Intellectual Property Consultants, Inc. v. Canon Inc.,
` C.A. No. 09-1052 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 10, 2011) .............................................................................. 10
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`Stumbo v. Eastman Outdoors, Inc.,
` 508 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2007).................................................................................................. 7
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`U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc.,
` 103 F.3d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1997).................................................................................................. 9
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`Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp.,
` 503 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2007).................................................................................................. 6
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`Xerox Corp. v. Google Inc.,
` 801 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D. Del. 2011) ......................................................................................... 12
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`Rules 
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`37 C.F.R. 1.131 ............................................................................................................................. 12
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`iii
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`inContact, Inc. Exhibit 1012
`inContact, Inc. v. Microlog Corp., IPR2015-00560
`Page 4 of 18
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`Case 1:14-cv-00047-LPS Document 47 Filed 07/31/15 Page 5 of 18 PageID #: 616
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`Pursuant to thhe Court’s orrder amendiing the Schedduling Ordeer (D.I. 43) PPlaintiff Miccrolog
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`Corporattion (“Microolog” or “Pllaintiff”) files this Opeening Claimm Constructi
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`on Brief, annd in
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`support tthereof, statees as followss:
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`I.
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`INNTRODUCCTION ANDD TECHNICCAL TUTOORIAL
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`MMicrolog alleeges that inCContact, Inc.. (“inContacct” or “Defenndant”) infrringes claimss 1–6
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`and 8–133 of U.S. Paatent No. 7,0092,509 (“thhe ’509 pateent”). D.I. 445, Ex. B. PPresently at
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`before thhe Court in thhis proceedinng are five ddisputed claimm terms fromm the ’509 PPatent.
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`TThe ’509 pattent relates tto a call cennter system——referred too in the pateent as a “coontact
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`center syystem”—cappable of receeiving contaccts of differeent media tyypes, such ass telephone
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`calls,
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`e-mails, ffacsimiles, wweb chat, vooice over Inteernet protocool and web ccallbacks. SSee D.I. 45, EEx. B
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`at Abstraact. The ’5009 patent’s contact center system maaintains the ddifferent meedia-type conntacts
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`in a commmon queuee, and distribbutes the quueued contaacts to approopriate agennts in the coontact
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`center for handling bbased on critteria associatted with the contacts annd the availabble agents.
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`col. 1, ll.
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` 21-30. Thee figure beloww illustratess an exemplaary embodimment of the innvention.
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`Fig. 50
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`Id. at
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`inContact, Inc. Exhibit 1012
`inContact, Inc. v. Microlog Corp., IPR2015-00560
`Page 5 of 18
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`Case 1:14-cv-00047-LPS Document 47 Filed 07/31/15 Page 6 of 18 PageID #: 617
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`TThe inventionn contains twwo key compponents: (1)) a common
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`queuing commponent; annd (2)
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`a routingg componentt. As Fig, 550 shows, a
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`contacts
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`from differeent media tyypes and to
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`common quueuing commponent is addapted to reeceive
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`they awaait routing to agent workstations for hhandling.
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`maintain thhese contactts in a commmon queue wwhile
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`AA routing coomponent (nnot picturedd), is adapteed to route
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`the queuedd contacts too the
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`workstatiions based oon designatedd criteria. CCriteria mighht include, foor example, tthe media tyype of
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`a contactt, the amountt of time a contact has sppent in queuue, informatiion gathered
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`by an interaactive
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`voice ressponse (IVR)) system prioor to queuinng, and capabbilities or staatus of an aggent (e.g., fooreign
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`languagee ability, speccial training, etc.). Id.att col. 3, ll. 266-28.
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`TThe system
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`described envisions thaat particularr agents maay be assignned to partiicular
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`campaignns. For exammple, a givenn agent mayy have familiiarity with oone or more ggeographic aareas,
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`or one orr more subjeect matter arrenas. Accoordingly, ageents may be assigned too receive conntacts
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`from somme campaignns but not othhers, as showwn in Fig. 155.
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`inContact, Inc. Exhibit 1012
`inContact, Inc. v. Microlog Corp., IPR2015-00560
`Page 6 of 18
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`Case 1:14-cv-00047-LPS Document 47 Filed 07/31/15 Page 7 of 18 PageID #: 618
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`EEmbodimentss of the tecchnology alsso envision
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`that particuular agents mmay be assiigned
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`particularr media-typee skills. Seee Fig. 8, beloow. Thus, ann agent withh a particularr set of skillss may
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`be assignned to draw ffrom a commmon queue oonly those tyypes of contaacts with res
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`agent hass sufficient
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`aptitude. Seee also id. aat col. 14, lll. 28 et seq.
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`(“It is notedd that camp
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`have difffering mediaa type requireements, and not all agennts will use aall of the typees.”)
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`pect to whicch the
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`AAdditionally, media typees themselvees may be aassigned prioority relativve to other mmedia
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`types.
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`d the correig. 23, andpicted in FThis capability is dep
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`sponding ddiscussion inn the
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`specifica
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`ol. 5, ll. 9-113. Fig. 23
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`represents
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`a window thhrough whicch an
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`administrrator may innput routingg criteria for
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`contacts. ““[T]he systeem administrrator can usse the
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`Routing RRule Adminnistration winndows to define the 40 sskills of an aagent, priorittize contactss, and
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`define media types annd skill requuirements forr campaignss.” Id. at coll. 30, ll. 38-441.
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`3
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`inContact, Inc. Exhibit 1012
`inContact, Inc. v. Microlog Corp., IPR2015-00560
`Page 7 of 18
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`Case 1:14-cv-00047-LPS Document 47 Filed 07/31/15 Page 8 of 18 PageID #: 619
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`TThe system ddescribed hass the further capability oof capturing
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`system and
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`agent metricc data
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`for evaluuation and aanalysis of ccampaigns aand/or agentt efficacy, aas shown inn Fig. 35, beelow,
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`thereby improving ovverall commmunication effficiency.
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`4
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`inContact, Inc. Exhibit 1012
`inContact, Inc. v. Microlog Corp., IPR2015-00560
`Page 8 of 18
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`Case 1:14-cv-00047-LPS Document 47 Filed 07/31/15 Page 9 of 18 PageID #: 620
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`See also
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`D.I. 45, Ex.
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`B at Figs. 29-34.
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`II. LLEGAL PRIINCIPLES
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`OF CLAIMM CONSTRUUCTION
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`TThe Court is
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`riefly h are only brction, whichaim construcnciples of clawell-versedd in the prin
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`summarizzed below.
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` Claim consstruction, a
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`matter of laaw for the CCourt, is the
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`infringemment or validdity analysiss. See Markmman v. Westtview Instrumments, Inc.,
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` first step inn any
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`52 F.3d 9677, 979
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`(Fed. Cirr. 1995), afff’d, 517 U.S.
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`370 (1996). A district
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`court shouldd construe thhe claims inn light
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`of their
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`explicit langguage as innformed by
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`their preammbles, the sppecification,
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`figures, an
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`patent’s pprosecution
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`history. Seee id. at 980;
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`see also Grraham v. Johhn Deere Coo., 383 U.S.
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`1, 33
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`(1966) (““[A]n inventtion is constrrued not onlyy in the lightht of the claimms, but also
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`with referennce to
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`the file
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`wrapper orr prosecution history inn the Patennt Office.”).. The Fedderal Circuitt has
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`5
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`inContact, Inc. Exhibit 1012
`inContact, Inc. v. Microlog Corp., IPR2015-00560
`Page 9 of 18
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`Case 1:14-cv-00047-LPS Document 47 Filed 07/31/15 Page 10 of 18 PageID #: 621
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`repeatedly held that the ordinary meaning of a claim term, to one of ordinary skill in the art, is
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`presumed to be the correct meaning of the term. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312
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`(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“We have frequently stated that the words of a claim are generally
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`given their ordinary and customary meaning. . . [T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a
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`claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in
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`question at the time of the invention.”).
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`The specification is the “best source for understanding a technical term,” to be
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`supplemented, “as needed, by the prosecution history.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1303, 1315
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`(quoting Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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`The prosecution history represents key evidence of how the examiner and the inventor construed
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`the patent. See Lemelson v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Although
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`expert testimony may illuminate the written description and the prosecution history, it should not
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`be accepted if it conflicts with the other claims, the written description, or the prosecution
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`history, as the written record of the patent. See Kara Technology Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc., 582
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`F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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`It is well settled to be improper to confine a claim to a particular embodiment; the claim
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`language itself is paramount. See, e.g., Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1370
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`(Fed. Cir. 2008); Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1305 (Fed. Cir.
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`2007); Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13, 1323 (“Although the specification often describes very
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`specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims
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`to those embodiments”); Chimie v. PPG Industries, Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
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`Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 327 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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`6
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`inContact, Inc. Exhibit 1012
`inContact, Inc. v. Microlog Corp., IPR2015-00560
`Page 10 of 18
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`Case 1:14-cv-00047-LPS Document 47 Filed 07/31/15 Page 11 of 18 PageID #: 622
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`Microlog’s constructions comport with these principles. For example, Microlog
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`construes “maintain[…] contacts in a common queue” to mean, simply: “keep track of received
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`contacts in the common queue.” See III. A. Term 1: “maintain[…] contacts in a common queue”
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`below.
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`Defendant’s approach to claim construction is designed to improperly limit the scope of
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`asserted claims in an effort to avoid infringement. This exercise is unnecessary and improperly
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`rewrites the claims of the patents. SRAM Corp. v. AD-II Eng’g, Inc., 465 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2006) (“We are powerless to rewrite the claims and must construe the language of the claim
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`at issue based on the words used.”); Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1374
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`(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[the Federal Circuit] repeatedly and consistently has recognized that courts
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`may not redraft claims.”). In contrast, Microlog proposes one claim term (“maintain[…]
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`contacts in a common queue”) for construction.
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`A further fundamental flaw in Defendant’s approach is that it selectively cites the
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`specification and prosecution history to redefine “common queue” in a manner that is contrary to
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`its ordinary meaning. The specification and the prosecution history should only be used in
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`limited circumstances to override the plain meaning.1 Stumbo v. Eastman Outdoors, Inc., 508
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`F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“In examining the specification for proper context, however,
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`this court will not at any time import limitations from the specification into the claims” (internal
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`1The Federal Circuit has identified only two specific circumstances in which the
`specification will support a construction that departs from a claim term’s ordinary meaning: (1)
`where the patentee expressly defines a term to have a peculiar meaning, Phillips, 415 F.3d at
`1316 (“The specification may reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee
`that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess. In such cases, the inventor’s
`lexicography governs”); and (2) where the specification includes an express disclaimer or
`disavowal of claim scope (i.e., subject matter that would otherwise be encompassed by the
`ordinary meaning of the claim language is disclaimed). Id. (“In other cases, the specification may
`reveal an intentional disclaimer, or disavowal, of claim scope by the inventor”). These unique
`circumstances do not apply here.
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`7
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`inContact, Inc. Exhibit 1012
`inContact, Inc. v. Microlog Corp., IPR2015-00560
`Page 11 of 18
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`Case 1:14-cv-00047-LPS Document 47 Filed 07/31/15 Page 12 of 18 PageID #: 623
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`citation omitted)); Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323; Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms., Inc., 438
`
`F.3d 1123, 1137 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Extraneous limitations cannot be read into the claims from
`
`the . . . prosecution history” (internal citation omitted) (ellipses in original)). Defendant’s
`
`constructions violate these well-settled principles and should be rejected.
`
`III. CLAIM TERMS IN DISPUTE
`
`The claims asserted in this case from the ’509 patent are independent claims 1 and 8 and
`
`dependent claims 2-6 and 9-13.
`
`A. Claim Term 1: “maintain[…] contacts in a common queue”
`
`Claims
`
`1 and 8
`
`Claim Term (in context
`of Claim 1)
`A queuing component,
`adapted to receive said
`different media-type
`contacts and maintain said
`contacts in a common
`queue while said contacts
`are awaiting routing to said
`workstations
`
`Plaintiff’s
`Construction
`“Keep track of the
`received contacts in the
`common queue.”
`
`Defendant’s
`construction
`Defendant’s proposed
`construction for
`“common queue” is
`set forth below;
`otherwise, plain and
`ordinary meaning.
`
`In accordance with the intrinsic record and as described in the explicit claim language,
`
`the function of the queuing component is to receive and keep track of the contacts that have been
`
`received and queued in the common queue. The Court should adopt Microlog’s straightforward
`
`construction that stays true to the claim language and reject Defendant’s attempt to incorporate
`
`additional restrictions and limitations into the claims, as argued below with respect to Claim
`
`8
`
`Term 5.
`
`
`
`
`
`inContact, Inc. Exhibit 1012
`inContact, Inc. v. Microlog Corp., IPR2015-00560
`Page 12 of 18
`
`

`
`Case 1:14-cv-00047-LPS Document 47 Filed 07/31/15 Page 13 of 18 PageID #: 624
`
`Plaintiff’s
`Construction
`Plain and ordinary
`meaning.
`
`Defendant’s
`Construction
`“Received incoming
`communication(s)”
`
`B. Claim Term 2: “contact[s]”
`
`Claims
`
`Claim Term (in
`context of Claim 1)
`1-4, 6-11, and 13 A system for
`receiving and
`distributing contacts
`of different media
`types to a plurality of
`workstations,
`comprising: a
`queuing component,
`adapted to receive
`said different media-
`type contacts and
`maintain said
`contacts in a common
`queue while said
`contacts are awaiting
`routing to said
`workstations; and a
`routing component,
`adapted to route the
`queued contacts to
`said workstations
`based on designated
`criteria.
`
`The Court should construe “contacts” in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`The Federal Circuit has explained that “[i]n some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language
`
`as understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and
`
`claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted
`
`meaning of commonly understood words.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. Here, the disputed
`
`phrases have a plain meaning easily understood by persons of ordinary skill and by jurors.
`
`Defendant’s proposed construction imports the term “incoming,” which introduces a
`
`unilateral directionality that is not required by the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim.
`
`Moreover, claim construction is not an exercise in substituting new words for clear claim
`
`
`
`9
`
`inContact, Inc. Exhibit 1012
`inContact, Inc. v. Microlog Corp., IPR2015-00560
`Page 13 of 18
`
`

`
`Case 1:14-cv-00047-LPS Document 47 Filed 07/31/15 Page 14 of 18 PageID #: 625
`
`language, particularly when, as here, Defendant’s construction would potentially change the
`
`meaning and scope of the claims. See U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568
`
`(Fed. Cir. 1997) (claim construction is appropriate to “clarify and when necessary to explain
`
`what the patentee covered by the claims,” but is not an “obligatory exercise in redundancy”); see
`
`also Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (“Courts can neither
`
`broaden nor narrow the claims . . . .”) “If the claim language is clear on its face, then our
`
`consideration of the rest of the intrinsic evidence is restricted to determining if a deviation from
`
`the clear language of the claims is specified.” Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve, 256
`
`F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The specification specifies no deviation from the clear
`
`language of the claims, and thus the Court should decline to adopt Defendant’s proposed
`
`construction.
`
`Most importantly, Defendant’s proposed construction of “contracts” has been explicitly
`
`rejected by the Patent Trail and Appeal Board which found Defendant’s construction too broad
`
`even under the broadest reasonable construction standard. inContact, Inc. v. Microlog Corp.,
`
`IPR2015-00560, Paper 8 (PTAB July 30, 2015) (attached hereto as Ex. 1). The PTAB’s
`
`construction is persuasive evidence that Defendant’s construction is overreaching and should not
`
`be adopted here. St. Clair Intellectual Property Consultants, Inc. v. Canon Inc., C.A. No. 09-
`
`1052 (Fed. Cir. January 10, 2011).
`
`
`
`
`
`10
`
`inContact, Inc. Exhibit 1012
`inContact, Inc. v. Microlog Corp., IPR2015-00560
`Page 14 of 18
`
`

`
`Case 1:14-cv-00047-LPS Document 47 Filed 07/31/15 Page 15 of 18 PageID #: 626
`
`C. Claim Term 3: “contacts of different media types”
`
`Claims
`
`1 and 8
`
`Claim Term (in
`context of Claim 1)
`A system for
`receiving and
`distributing contacts
`of different media
`types to a plurality of
`workstations
`
`Plaintiff’s
`Construction
`Plain and ordinary
`meaning.
`
`Defendant’s
`Construction
`“Received incoming
`communications of
`different media types”
`
`Defendant’s proposal is redundant with their proposed construction of “contacts.” That
`
`construction is incorrect for the reasons set forth above. The term “contacts of different media
`
`types” needs no construction based on the parties’ request that the Court construe the term
`
`“contact(s).” Once “contact(s)” is construed, “contacts of different media types” can easily be
`
`understood by a jury without further definition.
`
`D. Claim Term 4: “different media-type contacts”
`
`Plaintiff’s
`Construction
`Plain and ordinary
`meaning.
`
`Defendant’s
`Construction
`“Received incoming
`communications of
`different media types”
`
`Claims
`
`1 and 8
`
`Claim Term (in
`context of Claim 1)
`A queuing
`component, adapted
`to receive said
`different media-type
`contacts and maintain
`said contacts in a
`common queue while
`said contacts are
`awaiting routing to
`said workstations
`
`Similar to Claim Term 3 above, the term “different media-type contacts” needs no
`
`construction based on the parties’ request that the Court construe the term “contact(s).” Once
`
`“contact(s)” is construed, “different media-type contacts” can easily be understood by a jury
`
`without further definition.
`
`
`
`11
`
`inContact, Inc. Exhibit 1012
`inContact, Inc. v. Microlog Corp., IPR2015-00560
`Page 15 of 18
`
`

`
`Case 1:14-cv-00047-LPS Document 47 Filed 07/31/15 Page 16 of 18 PageID #: 627
`
`E. Claim Term 5: “common queue”
`
`Claims
`
`1 and 8
`
`
`
`Defendant’s
`Construction
`“Single queue that retains
`different media-type
`contacts independent of
`media type”
`
`Plaintiff’s
`Construction
`“Queue that
`receives different
`media type contacts
`for routing to
`appropriate agents
`of the call center
`system”
`
`Claim Term (in
`context of Claim 1)
`A queuing
`component, adapted
`to receive said
`different media-type
`contacts and maintain
`said contacts in a
`common queue while
`said contacts are
`awaiting routing to
`said workstations
`
`Defendant’s proposed construction of “common queue” improperly attempts to limit the
`
`claim’s coverage to a single queue, indicating that if their system employs more than one
`
`common queue, there is no infringement. That is incorrect under the rules of patent construction.
`
`The “a” preceding “common queue” cannot be used to limit the construction to “single queue.” It
`
`is black letter law that in patent claims, the word “a” is generally understood to mean “one or
`
`more.” Xerox Corp. v. Google Inc., 801 F. Supp. 2d 293, 300 (D. Del. 2011) (citing KCJ Corp. v.
`
`Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“This court has repeatedly
`
`emphasized that an indefinite article ‘a’ or ‘an’ in patent parlance carries the meaning of ‘one or
`
`more’ in open-ended claims containing the transitional phrase ‘comprising.’”)). There is no
`
`evidence that the patentee sought to limit “a” to “single” and thus no exception to the rule of
`
`construction for “a” applies here. Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338,
`
`1342 (Fed.Cir.2008) (“That ‘a’ or ‘an’ can mean ‘one or more’ is best described as a rule, rather
`
`than merely as a presumption or even a convention. The exceptions to this rule are extremely
`
`limited: a patentee must evince a clear intent to limit ‘a’ or ‘an’ to ‘one.’”).
`
`
`
`12
`
`inContact, Inc. Exhibit 1012
`inContact, Inc. v. Microlog Corp., IPR2015-00560
`Page 16 of 18
`
`

`
`Case 1:14-cv-00047-LPS Document 47 Filed 07/31/15 Page 17 of 18 PageID #: 628
`
`While the specification discloses a single common queue as an embodiment of the
`
`invention, nothing within the specification precludes more than one common queue, so long as a
`
`single queue commonly handles multiple media types. The meaning of “common” in the context
`
`of “common queue” correlates to multiple media types sharing one queue in common, not that
`
`only one such queue may exist or infringement is avoided.
`
`Defendant’s citations to the prosecution history similarly fail to support their proposed
`
`construction limiting “common queue” to a “single queue.” There is nothing in the patentee’s
`
`responses dated October 7, 2005 and February 28, 2006, nor the notice of allowance dated March
`
`17, 2006, that could be construed to evince a clear intent to limit “common queue” to “single
`
`queue.” See D.I. 45-3, 45-4, and 45-5. These responses focus on a declaration filed under 37
`
`C.F.R. 1.131 that enabled the ’509 Patent to antedate prior art cited by the examiner. To the
`
`extent a single queue is discussed by the patentee, the patentee argues that “the single
`
`multimedia-queue” disclosed in a piece of prior art cited by the examiner was not entitled to the
`
`priority date the examiner contended it was and thus was not prior art relative to the ’509 Patent.
`
`See D.I. 45-4 at 3. This type of argument cannot evince the clear intent by the patentee required
`
`to limit “a common queue” to “a single queue.”
`
`Defendant’s attempt to limit “common queue” to a “single queue” appears to be an
`
`improper attempt to circumvent fundamental principles of patent law infringement. “It is
`
`fundamental that one cannot avoid infringement merely by adding elements if each element
`
`recited in the claims is found in the accused device.” Outside the Box Innovations, LLC v. Travel
`
`Caddy, Inc., 695 F.3d 1285, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Defendant presumably seeks to avoid this
`
`fundamental tenet of infringement by attempting to import the “single” limitation, in an attempt
`
`to preclude infringement by multiple common queues. There is no basis to limit “common
`
`
`
`13
`
`inContact, Inc. Exhibit 1012
`inContact, Inc. v. Microlog Corp., IPR2015-00560
`Page 17 of 18
`
`

`
`Case 1:14-cv-00047-LPS Document 47 Filed 07/31/15 Page 18 of 18 PageID #: 629
`
`queue” to “single queue.” Defendant’s construction of “common queue” and its transparent
`
`attempt to use the claim construction process to avoid infringement should be rejected.
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`
`For the reasons set forth above, the Court should adopt Microlog’s constructions and
`
`reject Defendant’s efforts to rewrite and improperly narrow the asserted claims.
`
`
`
`Dated: July 31, 2015
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`
`
`FARNAN LLP
`
`
`
`/s/ Brian E. Farnan
`Brian E. Farnan (Bar No. 4089)
`Michael J. Farnan (Bar No. 5165)
`919 North Market Street
`12th Floor
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`Telephone: 302-777-0300
`Facsimile: 302-777-0301
`bfarnan@farnanlaw.com
`mfarnan@farnanlaw.com
`
`Jay D. Ellwanger (admitted pro hac vice)
`Stefanie T. Scott (admitted pro hac vice)
`DiNovo Price Ellwanger & Hardy LLP
`7000 North MoPac Expressway
`Suite 350
`Austin, Texas 78731
`(512) 539-2626 (phone)
`(512) 539-2627 (fax)
`jellwanger@dpelaw.com
`sscott@dpelaw.com
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
`MICROLOG LLC
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`14
`
`inContact, Inc. Exhibit 1012
`inContact, Inc. v. Microlog Corp., IPR2015-00560
`Page 18 of 18