`Filed: April 1, 2016
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`________________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`________________
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`AMNEAL PHARMACEUTICALS LLC, PAR PHARMACEUTICAL, INC., and
`WOCKHARDT BIO AG,
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`Petitioners,
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`v.
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`JAZZ PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
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`Patent Owner
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`________________
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`Case IPR2015-005471
`Patent 7,765,107
`________________
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`PATENT OWNER’S OPPOSITION TO PETITIONERS’
`MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
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`1 Case IPR2015-01820 has been joined with this proceeding.
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`Patent Owner Opposition to Motion to Exclude IPR2015-00547
`Patent 7,765,107
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Petitioners seek to exclude highly relevant evidence regarding whether a
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`person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) exercising reasonable diligence would
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`have located the Advisory Committee Materials (“ACA”) (Exs. 1003-1006) based
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`on the Federal Register notice submitted as Ex. 1015 in this inter partes review
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`(“IPR”). Petitioners’ objections are based on alleged hearsay, irrelevance, and
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`improper expert testimony. At the outset, Petitioners’ Motion to Exclude (“Mtn.”)
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`should be denied because it is not based on “objections in the record” since
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`Petitioners never satisfied the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1) by filing
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`their objections. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(c). The motion should also be denied
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`because Petitioners’ objections go to weight rather than admissibility, and for the
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`specific reasons set forth below.
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`II. ARGUMENT
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`A. The objected-to portions of the DiPiro and Bergeron Declarations
`and Exs. 2049-2050 are relevant to public accessibility of the ACA
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`Petitioners argue that certain portions of the DiPiro (Ex. 2046) and Bergeron
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`(Ex. 2047) Declarations, as well as Exs. 2049-2050 “are irrelevant to the issue of
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`public accessibility of the ACA” because: (1) the Federal Register’s notice
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`function allegedly establishes public accessibility as a matter of law and
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`(2) Dr. DiPiro’s opinions are allegedly directed to “uninterested” POSAs. See
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`Mtn. 3-7.
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`Patent Owner Opposition to Motion to Exclude IPR2015-00547
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`Patent 7,765,107
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`Petitioners’ objections, however, failed to provide this particularity, i.e., the
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`objections did not explain why the exhibits were allegedly irrelevant to public
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`accessibility. Instead, Petitioners asserted only a boilerplate relevance objection:
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`JAZZ EXHIBIT 2046 are objected to under Fed. R. Ev. 401–402
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`because they are irrelevant to the question of whether, more than one
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`year before December 17, 2002, PAR1004–PAR1006 were
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`disseminated or otherwise made available to the public to the extent
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`that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or
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`art, exercising reasonable diligence, could locate it [sic].
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`Paper 55 at 1; id. at 2-3 (same for Exs. 2047, 2049, 2050). Thus, Petitioners failed
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`to “identify the grounds for the objection with sufficient particularity to allow
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`correction in the form of supplemental evidence.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1). These
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`objections should be denied for this reason alone. See B/E Aerospace, Inc. v. MAG
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`Aerospace Indus., LLC, IPR2014-01510, Paper 106 at 6-7 (Mar. 18, 2016).
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`1.
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`Petitioners erroneously equate the Federal Register’s
`notice function with the standard for public accessibility
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`Petitioners object to Jazz’s evidence showing that a POSA exercising
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`reasonable diligence would not have located the ACA through the half-page entry
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`in the Federal Register—out of the 67,700 pages of the 2001 version of the Federal
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`Register—as irrelevant by arguing that “[u]nder Federal law, every person in the
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`United States, which of course includes POSAs, is deemed to have been given
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`sufficient notice for items published in the Federal Register.” Mtn. 3-6 (emphasis
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`Patent 7,765,107
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`added). Petitioners’ argument about the legal effect of the Federal Register is
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`incorrect, and conflates a legal interest with a scientific or technical one.
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`Specifically, the “notice” the Federal Register provides is a legal construct to
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`prevent individuals from later claiming ignorance of the law if their legally
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`protected interests are adversely affected. Indeed, as the cases Petitioners cite
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`explain, “[t]he purpose of notice is to ‘inform [the recipient] that the matter [in
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`which his protected interests are at stake] is pending.’” Moreau v. F.E.R.C., 982
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`F.2d 556, 569 (D.D.C. 1993) (emphasis added); see also N. Ala. Express, Inc. v.
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`United States, 585 F.2d 783, 786 (5th Cir. 1978) (explaining that the
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`Administrative Procedures Act requires “[r]easonable notice to interested persons
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`that their legally protected interests may be adversely affected by administrative
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`action”) (emphasis added); id. at 787 n.2 (noting that the Federal Register provides
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`“legally sufficient notice to all interested persons”) (emphasis added).
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`Thus, the notice that the Federal Register provides is specifically directed to
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`interested persons whose legally protected interests are at jeopardy of being
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`adversely affected. See id. at 790 (requiring republication of inadequate notice in
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`the Federal Register to inform competitors of a company granted increased
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`operating capacity); Moreau, 982 F.2d at 569 (finding notice was given to
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`individuals whose property interests were affected by a gas pipeline); S. Terminal
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`Corp. v. E.P.A., 504 F.2d 646, 654, 657 (1st Cir. 1974) (finding that “interested
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`Patent 7,765,107
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`persons”—persons whose legal interests were affected by an air quality
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`transportation plan—had notice of a technical document in the Federal Register).
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`Petitioners try to conflate the Federal Register’s “deemed” notice to
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`individuals with a “legally protected interest,” with a “person of ordinary skill in
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`the art interested in the subject matter of the patents in suit and exercising
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`reasonable diligence” actually locating prior art. See Bruckelmeyer v. Ground
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`Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). There is
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`simply no caselaw holding that the POSA’s “interest[] in the subject matter of the
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`patents in suit” is a “legally protected interest” that has the potential to be
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`adversely affected. There is also no caselaw that equates “deemed” notice of a rule
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`with the ability to actually locate that rule, when exercising reasonable diligence.2
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`On the other hand, this Board has previously held that statements in the very same
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`Federal Register notice at issue in this IPR do not show that the ACA “actually
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`2 For example, just because a person might be on constructive notice of an
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`obscure mining law published in the Federal Register, does not mean that person,
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`exercising reasonable diligence, would be able to actually locate the mining law.
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`The public accessibility caselaw requires that a POSA exercising reasonable
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`diligence be able to actually locate the prior art in question.
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`Patent Owner Opposition to Motion to Exclude IPR2015-00547
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`Patent 7,765,107
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`w[ere] made available to the extent that interested, ordinarily skilled persons,
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`exercising reasonable diligence, could have located” them before the critical date.
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`Coalition for Affordable Drugs III LLC, v. Jazz Pharms., Inc., IPR2015-01018,
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`Paper 17 at 14-15 (Oct. 15, 2015).
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`In sum, Petitioners have not asserted, let alone proven, that a POSA’s legally
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`protected interests could have been affected by the June 6, 2001 Advisory
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`Committee Meeting at issue in this IPR. There is no evidence that a POSA
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`exercising reasonable diligence would have located the ACA through the Federal
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`Register; instead, the evidence of record—which Petitioners seek to exclude—
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`definitively proves otherwise. Thus, Petitioners’ motion to exclude the objected to
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`portions of the DiPiro and Bergeron Declarations, as well as Exs. 2049 and 2050,
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`as “irrelevant as a matter of law” (Mtn. 4), lacks merit and should be denied. The
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`evidence is relevant because it makes the fact that a POSA exercising reasonable
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`diligence would not have located the ACA through the Federal Register more
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`probable. See Fed. R. Evid. 401.
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`2.
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`Paragraphs 54-56 of the DiPiro Declaration are directed to
`the actions of POSAs interested in the subject matter of the
`patents in suit
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`Petitioners argue that Paragraphs 54-56 of the DiPiro Declaration should be
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`excluded as irrelevant because Dr. DiPiro purportedly “alleges that a POSA, as
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`defined by Dr. Valuck, has ‘no focus on drug distribution, safety, and abuse or
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`regulatory affairs.’” Mtn. 7. This is false. Dr. DiPiro clearly testified: “A
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`Pharmacist POSA, as defined by Dr. Valuck, is not a researcher with a specific
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`focus on drug distribution, safety, and abuse or regulatory affairs.” Ex. 2046, ¶55
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`(emphasis added). He also explained this at his deposition. Ex. 1055 at 248:1-4.
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`There is good reason why Petitioners intentionally omitted the “a researcher
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`with a specific focus” portion of Dr. DiPiro’s opinion to make their “uninterested”
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`POSA argument. Petitioners’ counsel attempted, but failed, to have Dr. DiPiro
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`agree at his deposition that a POSA would not have a “specific interest” in “drug
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`distribution” and “safety and abuse issues.” See Ex. 1055 at 248:8-249:5. Dr.
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`DiPiro repeatedly answered “I’m not agreeing.” See id. Instead, Dr. DiPiro
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`explained that a POSA “would be expected to have an interest in drug distribution
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`systems, be interested in safety, be interested in [abuse] and regulatory affairs.”
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`See id. at 249:6-250:17. He also explained the difference between his statement
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`regarding a “researcher with a specific focus” and a POSA with a “specific
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`interest.” See id. The POSA is not a “researcher with a specific focus.” In fact,
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`Dr. Valuck did not mention any “researcher with a specific focus on drug
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`distribution, safety, and abuse or regulatory affairs” as part of his POSA when he
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`explained it to Petitioners’ counsel during re-direct testimony at his deposition.
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`See Ex. 2045 at 237:17-238:1.
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`Patent Owner Opposition to Motion to Exclude IPR2015-00547
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`Patent 7,765,107
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`Thus, Petitioners’ argument that “[t]he DiPiro Declaration only relates to
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`what persons uninterested in the subject matter of the ’059 patent would have
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`done” lacks credibility. Dr. DiPiro was addressing the correct POSA and his
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`opinions are relevant. The opinions make the fact that a POSA exercising
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`reasonable diligence would not have located the ACA through the Federal Register
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`more probable. See Fed. R. Evid. 401.
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`Finally, Petitioners’ one-sentence argument that Paragraphs 54-56 should be
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`excluded under Rule 403 (Mtn. 7), also lacks merit. Dr. DiPiro’s opinions directly
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`contradict Dr. Valuck’s unsupported assertions regarding the Federal Register.
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`Further, the Board will not be confused by them, as evidenced by Petitioners’
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`failure to give even a single example of how confusion would arise.
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`B.
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`The Van Buskirk Deposition is admissible under Rule 807,
`and it is not improper expert testimony, nor is it irrelevant
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`Exhibit 2054 is an excerpt of a deposition in the co-pending district court
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`litigation addressing the patents-at-issue in this IPR. The witness testifying,
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`Dr. Glenn Van Buskirk, was hired as an expert by the generic pharmaceutical
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`company, Roxane Laboratories Inc., in an effort to invalidate Jazz’s patents. Thus,
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`Roxane and Petitioners share a common goal. During his deposition, however,
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`Dr. Van Buskirk provided testimony that directly contradicts Petitioners’ argument
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`in this IPR that a POSA would have located the ACA through the Federal Register.
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`Patent Owner Opposition to Motion to Exclude IPR2015-00547
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`Patent 7,765,107
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`Petitioners are now making every effort they can to exclude it—asserting that it is
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`inadmissible hearsay, improper expert testimony, and irrelevant. Petitioners have
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`not met their burden to exclude Ex. 2054.
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`1.
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`The Van Buskirk Deposition is admissible under Rule 807
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`Petitioners argue that Exhibit 2054 is inadmissible hearsay because “neither
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`of the exceptions in Rule 801(d) apply.” Mtn. 8. Petitioners ignore, however, that
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`the Van Buskirk Deposition is admissible under the residual exception to hearsay.
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`Fed. R. Evid. 807. Rule 807 has four requirements: (1) the statement has
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`equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; (2) it is offered as
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`evidence of a material fact; (3) it is more probative on the point for which it is
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`offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable
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`efforts; and (4) admitting it will best serve the purposes of the Federal Rules of
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`Evidence and the interests of justice. The Van Buskirk Deposition meets these
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`requirements.
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`First, because the Van Buskirk Deposition is sworn testimony taken during a
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`legal proceeding, it has the requisite guarantees of trustworthiness. See Pozen Inc.
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`v. Par Pharm., Inc., 696 F.3d 1151, 1161 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Second, the Van
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`Buskirk Deposition is offered as evidence of a material fact because it relates to the
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`issue of whether a POSA would have located the ACA based on the Federal
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`Register. See United States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656, 667 n. 6 (6th Cir. 1993) (“A
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`fact or proposition is ‘material’ if it is properly provable in a case in the sense that
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`it is disputed or, at least, is ‘in issue.’”). Third, the Van Buskirk Deposition is
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`more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that can
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`be obtained through reasonable efforts. While taking positions against Jazz,
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`Dr. Van Buskirk is the only expert, not specifically involved in this IPR, who
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`testified about what information would be conveyed to a POSA based on the
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`Federal Register. Fourth, the Van Buskirk Deposition will best serve the purposes
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`of the rules and the interests of justice for the reasons set forth above.
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`Petitioners were well aware of Jazz’s intent to rely on the Van Buskirk
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`Deposition, but made no efforts to challenge it. Petitioners could have asked Jazz
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`to secure Dr. Van Buskirk’s deposition in this IPR. They did not. Petitioners also
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`could have easily requested from Roxane, or Dr. Van Buskirk directly, a
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`declaration countering what is set forth in the Van Buskirk Deposition. Again,
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`they did not. Instead, Petitioners made no efforts to challenge the merits of the
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`Van Buskirk Deposition. Accordingly, even if it is hearsay, the Van Buskirk
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`Deposition is admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 807.
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`Finally, even if the Van Buskirk Deposition does not qualify for the residual
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`exception, Jazz cured Petitioners’ objection by timely serving Ex. 2059. Exhibit
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`2059 is a declaration from Dr. DiPiro in which he relies on Dr. Van Buskirk’s
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`testimony as evidence consistent with his testimony that a POSA would not have
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`Patent 7,765,107
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`been motivated to look to the Federal Register and, therefore, would not have
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`located the ACA. Ex. 2059, ¶¶3-4. An expert is permitted to rely on hearsay, and
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`Ex. 2059 cures Petitioners’ hearsay objection. While Petitioners complain that
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`“Jazz has never made Exhibit 2059 part of record in this proceeding, and has
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`neither identified how it cured Petitioners’ objections nor how Jazz was relying on
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`the supplemental evidence,” Jazz was not required to do so. See Sealed Air Corp.
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`v. Pregis Innovative Packaging, Inc., IPR2013-00554, Paper 18 at 2-3 (Apr. 1,
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`2014) (explaining that previously-served supplemental evidence should not be
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`made of record until an opposition to a motion to exclude is filed). Thus,
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`Petitioners’ complaint is baseless.
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`2.
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`The Van Buskirk Deposition is proper expert testimony
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`Petitioners also argue that the Van Buskirk Deposition is “improperly relied
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`upon as expert opinion testimony” because “Jazz has not qualified . . . Dr. Van
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`Buskirk[] as an expert in this proceeding.” Mtn. 9. Petitioners do not explain why
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`Dr. Van Buskirk would not have the competency to testify concerning the
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`pharmacist POSA. Instead, Petitioners ignore that Dr. Van Buskirk testified that
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`he has the degree required for a pharmacist POSA—a B.S. in Pharmacy—and is
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`also a registered pharmacist. Compare Ex. 2054 at 115:10- 22 with Ex. 1007, ¶ 21.
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`Further, even if Dr. Van Buskirk does not qualify as a POSA, that would not
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`cure Petitioners’ faulty argument. He has relevant experience in what Petitioners
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`Patent 7,765,107
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`have asserted is the field of invention—pharmacy. See Mytee Prods. v. Harris
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`Research, Inc., 439 F. App’x 882, 886–87 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (upholding admission
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`of the testimony of an expert who “had experience relevant to the field of the
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`invention,” despite admission that he was not a POSA). Moreover, there need not
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`be a perfect match between the expert’s qualifications and the patent at issue. See
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`SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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`Accordingly, Petitioners have not met their burden of showing that the
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`Van Buskirk Deposition is improper expert testimony.
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`3.
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`The Van Buskirk Deposition is relevant
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`In a last-ditch effort, Petitioners repeat the same relevancy argument that is
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`based upon the Federal Register’s “notice” function. As discussed above,
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`however, Petitioners’ argument is legally incorrect and should be rejected.
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`C. The Przybylski Declaration is not hearsay, nor is it irrelevant
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`Exhibit 2057 is a declaration from Jazz’s paralegal Lyndsey Przybylski.
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`On November 5 and 6, 2015, Ms. Przybylski spoke with three employees,
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`including Ms. Adams-Buckley, at the Health Sciences Library at the University of
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`Colorado Denver (the “Library”). Ex. 2057 ¶3. During these conversations, the
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`three employees confirmed that the only paper copy of the Federal Register in the
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`Library is from 1968. Id. Ms. Adams-Buckley also confirmed this through e-mail.
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`Id., Ex. 1. Exhibit 2057, and the e-mail sent by Ms. Adams-Buckley, directly
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`Patent 7,765,107
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`contradict Dr. Valuck’s testimony regarding how he allegedly views materials in
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`the Federal Register. Realizing the damage this does to their case, Petitioners now
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`attempt to exclude Ex. 2057 as hearsay and irrelevant. Petitioners have not met
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`their burden.
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`1.
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`The Przybylski Declaration is not hearsay
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`Petitioners assert that Ex. 2057 “solely contains out-of-court statements by
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`others to prove the truth of the matter asserted .” Mtn. 11. Not so. Jazz offered
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`Exhibit 2057 as direct testimony in this IPR. The PTAB has repeatedly held that
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`declarations offered in IPRs are not “out-of-court statements.” See Phigenix, Inc v.
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`Immunogen, Inc., IPR2014-00676, Paper 39 at 28 (Oct. 27, 2015); Toyota Motor
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`Corp. v. Am. Vehicular Scis. LLC, IPR2013-00417, 2015 WL 124522, at *5 (Jan.
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`7, 2015). Notably, Petitioners had the opportunity to depose Ms. Przybylski and
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`challenge her statements and the exhibit she cited, but chose not to do so. That is
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`Petitioners’ failing, not Jazz’s. Ms. Przybylski’s statements are not hearsay, and
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`Petitioners’ efforts to exclude them as such should be rejected.
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`But even if Ex. 2057 is hearsay—it is not—it qualifies for the residual
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`exception to hearsay under Fed. R. Evid. 807. It is offered as evidence of a
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`material fact—whether Dr. Valuck’s testimony regarding his practice of reading
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`the Federal Register is accurate—that has guarantees of trustworthiness, as it was
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`submitted as a declaration in this IPR. It is also more probative on the point for
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`which it is offered than other evidence in this proceeding, and admitting it will best
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`serve the purposes of the rules and the interests of justice.
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`Moreover, Jazz files concurrently herewith Ex. 2058, which it timely served
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`as supplemental evidence, to cure the objection. Exhibit 2058 is a declaration from
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`Ms. Adams-Buckley, wherein she attests to the same facts regarding paper copies
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`of the Federal Register at the Library that are set forth in the Przybylski
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`Declaration. See Ex. 2058. Petitioners complain that “Jazz has never made
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`Exhibit 2058 part of record in this proceeding, and has neither identified how it
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`cured Petitioners’ objections nor how Jazz was relying on the supplemental
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`evidence.” Mtn. 11. Jazz was not required to do so. See Sealed Air, IPR2013-
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`00554, Paper 18 at 2-3. In any event, Ex. 2058’s content makes clear that it was
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`served to cure Petitioners’ objection to the Przybylski Declaration.3 Accordingly,
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`Petitioners’ motion to exclude Ex. 2057 as hearsay should be denied.
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`2.
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`The Przybylski Declaration is relevant
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`Exhibit 2057 (and Exhibit 2058) prove that the Library does not have any
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`paper copies of the Federal Register, except a 1968 version. Petitioners argue that
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`this is irrelevant because the evidence provides information “regarding the contents
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`3 Petitioners may argue that Ex. 2058 is hearsay. They would be incorrect. See
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`See Phigenix, IPR2014-00676, Paper 39 at 28; Toyota, 2015 WL 124522, at *5.
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`of the [Library] as of November 2015,” and Dr. Valuck’s testimony regarding
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`reading paper copies of the Federal Register allegedly applied only to 2001, not
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`2015. Mtn. 11-12. This is incorrect, as demonstrated by Dr. Valuck’s testimony
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`shown below.
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`As an initial matter, however, Petitioners’ objections made no mention of the
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`alleged date discrepancy they now allege. Instead, Petitioners asserted only a
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`boilerplate relevance objection: “JAZZ EXHIBIT 2057 is objected to under Fed.
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`R. Ev. 401–402 because it is irrelevant to any issue at dispute in this proceeding.”
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`Paper 55 at 6. Thus, Petitioners’ objection failed to provide Jazz “with sufficient
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`particularity to allow correction in the form of supplemental evidence.” 37 C.F.R.
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`§ 42.64(b)(1). The objection should be denied for this reason alone. See B/E
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`Aerospace, IPR2014-01510, Paper 106 at 6-7.
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`In any event, Petitioners’ relevance objection is baseless. The disputed
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`testimony-at-issue is:
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`Q.
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`A.
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`[I]s the Federal Register online or paper?
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`The – can you be more specific? You mean today or . . . at the
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`time of this particular notice or at a specific point in time?
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`Q. Sure. Let’s start with 2001 at the time of this notice in
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`PAR1015.
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`A. My – at that time, I was using a paper-based subscription sort of
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`format, if you will, of the Federal Register. Our health sciences
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`library has copies of the Federal Register that – that come
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`Patent Owner Opposition to Motion to Exclude IPR2015-00547
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`Patent 7,765,107
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`there. So they’re available to us on campus that way. And that
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`happens to be how I typically would see the Federal Register.
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`Ex. 2045 at 341:19-342:6 (emphasis added). As is clear from the exchange, Jazz’s
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`counsel asked Dr. Valuck to explain how he views the Federal Register, starting
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`with 2001. Dr. Valuck provided his answer using the past tense, starting with
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`2001. Dr. Valuck then proceeded to testify in the present tense. He testified that
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`the Library has paper copies of the Federal Register and that they are available.
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`Thus, Petitioners’ irrelevancy argument is without merit. Dr. Valuck’s testimony
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`was not limited to 2001.
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`Tellingly, Petitioners did not attempt to rebut Ex. 2057 in their reply.
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`Petitioners could have easily obtained a counter-declaration from the Library
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`showing that the Library did in fact possess paper copies of the Federal Register in
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`2001 if that were true. Petitioners either chose not to do so or could not do so.
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`Petitioners’ irrelevancy objection should be rejected.
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`III. CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, the Board should deny Petitioners’ Motion to
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`Exclude.
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`Patent Owner Opposition to Motion to Exclude IPR2015-00547
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`Patent 7,765,107
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`Date: April 1, 2016
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`Respectfully submitted,
`
`By: /F. Dominic Cerrito (Reg. No. 38,100)/
` F. Dominic Cerrito (Reg. No. 38,100)
` Eric C. Stops (Reg. No. 51,163)
` Evangeline Shih (Reg. No. 50,170)
` Frank C. Calvosa (Reg. No. 69,064)
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
`SULLIVAN, LLP
`51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor
`New York, NY 10010
`General Tel: (212) 849-7000
`Fax: (212) 849-7100
`nickcerrito@quinnemanuel.com
`ericstops@quinnmemanuel.com
`evangelineshih@quinnemanuel.com
`frankcalvosa@quinnemanuel.com
`
`John V. Biernacki
`Reg. No. 40,511
`JONES DAY
`North Point
`901 Lakeside Avenue
`Cleveland, Ohio 44114
`General Tel: (216) 586-3939
`Direct Tel: (216) 586-7747
`Fax: (216) 579-0212
`jvbiernacki@jonesday.com
`
`Attorneys for Jazz Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`________________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`________________
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`AMNEAL PHARMACEUTICALS LLC, PAR PHARMACEUTICAL, INC., and
`WOCKHARDT BIO AG,
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`Petitioners,
`
`v.
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`JAZZ PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
`
`Patent Owner
`
`________________
`
`Case IPR2015-005474
`Patent 7,765,107
`________________
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`4 Case IPR2015-01820 has been joined with this proceeding.
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e), the undersigned hereby certifies that
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`PATENT OWNER’S OPPOSITION TO PETITIONERS’ MOTION TO
`
`EXCLUDE EVIDENCE and Exs. 2058-2059 were served on April 1, 2016 by
`
`filing these documents through the Patent Review Processing System, as well as e-
`
`mailing copies to mruedy@meiplaw.com, smaddox@meiplaw.com, and
`
`PCGallagher@duanemorris.com.
`
`Date: April 1, 2016
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`
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` Respectfully submitted,
`
`By: /F. Dominic Cerrito (Reg. No. 38,100)/
` F. Dominic Cerrito (Reg. No. 38,100)
` QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
` SULLIVAN, LLP
` 51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor
` New York, NY 10010
` General Tel: (212) 849-7000
`Fax: (212) 849-7100
`nickcerrito@quinnemanuel.com
`
`Lead Counsel for
`Jazz Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
`
`
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