`Patent 7,434,973
`Filed on behalf of Delaware Display Group LLC.
`By:
`Justin B. Kimble (jkimble@bcpc-law.com)
`
`Bragalone Conroy P.C.
`
`2200 Ross Ave.
`
`Suite 4500 – West
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`Dallas, TX 75201
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`Tel: 214.785.6670
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`Fax: 214.786.6680
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`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`LG DISPLAY CO., LTD.
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`DELAWARE DISPLAY GROUP LLC
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`Case IPR2015-00506
`U.S. Patent No. 7,434,973
`
`
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR
`INTER PARTES REVIEW OF U.S. PATENT NO. 7,434,973
`
`
`
`Mail Stop PATENT BOARD
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`
`
`
`1
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`
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`Case IPR2015-00506
`Patent 7,434,973
`I.
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Patent Owner Delaware Display Group LLC (“DDG” or “Patent Owner”)
`
`hereby files this preliminary response (“Preliminary Response”) to the Petition for
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`Inter Partes Review (the “Petition”) of U.S. Patent No. 7,434,973 (the “’973 patent”)
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`in IPR2015-00506 filed by LG Display Co., LTD (“LGD” or “Petitioner”).
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`The PTAB should deny the Petition’s request to institute an inter partes review
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`(“IPR”) of the ’973 patent because the grounds in the Petition do not demonstrate a
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`reasonable likelihood of any claims being invalid. Furthermore, the PTAB should
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`deny the Petition because it fails to comply with 35 U.SC. 312(a)(2) requiring
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`petitioner to identify all real parties-in-interest.
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`This Response is timely under 35 U.S.C. § 313 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.107, as it
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`is filed within three months of the January 22, 2014, date of the Notice of Filing Date
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`Accorded to Petition and Time for Filing Patent Owner Preliminary Response (Paper
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`No. 5). Patent Owner has limited its identification of the deficiencies in Petitioner’s
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`argument in this Preliminary Response; Patent Owner does not intend to waive any
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`arguments by not addressing them in this Preliminary Response.
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`Patent Owner notifies the Board that the district court in Innovative Display
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`Technologies v. Acer, Inc. et al., No. 2:13-cv-522 (E.D. Tex. 2013) (Dkt. No. 101)
`
`(“Claim Construction Order”) (Ex. 2001) has ruled on constructions of terms that
`
`appear in this patent (but the ruling was only on related patents, not the patent-at-
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`Patent 7,434,973
`issue), including entering an agreed construction of “deformities,” which Petitioner
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`adopts in its Petition. This Preliminary Response does not take a position on any
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`remaining claim construction issues at this point. Patent Owner reserves the right to
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`propose its own construction of any and all claim terms for which an issue arises in
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`the event the PTAB institutes this IPR.
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`A. Grounds in Petition
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`
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`The Petition includes five grounds of alleged invalidity – one for 102(e)
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`anticipation and for four 103(a) obviousness combinations – all against claims 1-5
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`of the ’973 patent. For the following reasons, which are discussed in more detail
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`below, none of the grounds demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner
`
`prevailing against any claims:
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` Ground 1: Unpatentable Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) As Being Obvious
`
`Over The ’389 Patent In View Of Pelka (claims 1-5)
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` Ground 2: Unpatentable Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) As Being
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`Anticipated By Shinohara (Claims 1-5)
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` Ground 3: Unpatentable Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) As Being Obvious
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`Over Shinohara In View Of Yoshikawa (Claims 1-5)
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` Ground 4: Unpatentable Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) As Being Obvious
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`Over Pelka In View Of Funamoto (claims 1-5)
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`Patent 7,434,973
` Ground 5: Unpatentable Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) As Being Obvious
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`Over Hooker In View Of Mizobe (claims 1-5)
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`B. Claim Construction
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`The arguments in this Preliminary Response stand despite Petitioner’s
`
`proposed construction and despite the broadest reasonable construction of the terms.
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`This Preliminary Response does not take a position on claim construction at this
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`point. Patent Owner reserves the right to propose its own construction of any and all
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`claim terms for which an issue arises in the event the PTAB institutes this IPR.
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`Patent Owner notifies the Board that the district court in Innovative Display
`
`Technologies v. Acer, Inc. et al., No. 2:13-cv-522 (E.D. Tex. 2013) (Dkt. No. 101)
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`(“Claim Construction Order”) (Ex. 2001) has ruled on constructions of terms in this
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`patent, including entering an agreed construction of “deformities” that Petitioner
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`adopts in its Petition. Pet. at 8; Ex. 2001 at 58.
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`II.
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`PRIORITY DATE OF THE ’973 PATENT
`
`A. The Petition Fails to Establish That the ’973 Patent Should Receive a
`Later Priority Date
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`In arguing that the ’973 Patent is not entitled to its June 27, 1995, priority date,
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`Petitioner fails to consider the whole disclosure in the ’973 Patent and in its priority
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`applications. However, as detailed below, Petitioner shows that the ’973 Patent is
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`entitled to its original priority date.
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`Case IPR2015-00506
`Patent 7,434,973
`1.
`Patent Owner Is Entitled to a Priority Date of June 27, 1995
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`The limitations of Claims 1-5 of the ’973 Patent are described in the disclosure
`
`of the originally-filed application for U.S. Patent No. 5,613,751, to which the ’973
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`Patent claims priority.
`
`Petitioner alleges that the following limitation of Claim 1 lacks support prior
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`to either November 28, 2007, or February 23, 1999: “the density, size, depth and/or
`
`height of the deformities in close proximity to the input edge is greatest at
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`approximate midpoints between adjacent pairs of light sources.” Petition at 7-14.
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`Specifically, Petitioner states “[T]he only possible support for this limitation is new
`
`figure 39B.” Id. at 11. However, the application filed on June 27, 1995, includes at
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`least the following supporting disclosure for this limitation:
`
`By varying the density, opaqueness or translucence, shape, depth, color,
`area, index of refraction, or type of deformities or disruptions may be
`used to control the percent of light emitted from any area of the panels.
`For example, less and/or smaller size deformities 21 may be placed on
`panel areas where less light output is wanted. Conversely, a greater
`percentage of and/or larger deformities may be placed on areas of the
`panels where greater light output is desired.
`
`Varying the percentages and/or size of deformities in different areas of
`the panel is necessary in order to provide a uniform light output
`distribution. For example, the amount of light traveling through the
`panels will ordinarily be greater in areas closer to the light source than
`in other areas further removed from the light source. A pattern of light
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`5
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`Case IPR2015-00506
`Patent 7,434,973
`extracting deformities 21 may be used to adjust for the light variances
`within the panel members, for example, by providing a denser
`concentration of light extracting deformities with increased distance
`from the light source 3 thereby resulting in more uniform light output
`distribution from the light emitting panels.”
`
`Ex. 2002, Application Serial No. 08/495,176, Original Specification at page 8, line
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`20 through page 9, line 7; see also id. at page 10, lines 1-3; Fig. 4a; Original Claims
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`5, 6, 7, 82, 83 at 18-26. Neither the Petitioner nor its expert address this disclosure.
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`A patent application is entitled to the benefit of the filing date of an earlier
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`filed application if the disclosure of the earlier application provides written
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`description support for the claims of the later application. See PowerOasis, Inc., 522
`
`F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing In re Chu, 66 F.3d 292, 297 (Fed. Cir.
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`1995)). To satisfy the written description requirement, the disclosure of the prior
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`application must “convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as
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`of the filing date sought, [the inventor] was in possession of the invention.” Vas-
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`Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The disclosure,
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`however, does not have to contain precisely the same words as found in the asserted
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`claims in order to provide written description support. Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-
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`Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Purdue Pharma LP v.
`
`Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“To satisfy the written
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`Patent 7,434,973
`description requirement, the disclosure as originally filed does not have to provide
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`in haec verba support for the claimed subject matter at issue.”).
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`This disclosure from the original application provides adequate disclosure for
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`the limitation added to the claims of the ’973 Patent on November 28, 2007. Thus,
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`Petitioner fails to show that claim 1 of the ’973 patent is not entitled to its presumed
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`priority date of June 27, 1995.
`
`III.
`GROUND 1 – CLAIMS 1-5 ARE NOT OBVIOUS OVER THE
`’389 PATENT IN VIEW OF PELKA
`
`A. The ’389 Patent is Not Prior Art
`
`As shown above, claims 1-5 of the ’973 patent are entitled to a priority date
`
`of June 25, 1995, established by the filing of its original parent application. The ’973
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`patent claims priority to and is a continuation of the ’389 Patent which was filed on
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`Jul.15, 2003. Because the ’973 patent is entitled to the earlier filing date, the ’389
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`Patent cannot serve as prior art to it. Further, Petitioner does not allege that Pelka
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`separately teaches every element of claim 1. Accordingly, Ground 1 of the Petition
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`based on the combination of the ’389 patent and Pelka fails for claim 1 and each of
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`its dependent claims 2-5.
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`B. Pelka Does Not Disclose Each Limitation of Claims 1-5
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`Independent Claim 1 of the ’973 Patent, and each of dependent Claims 2-5,
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`require that “wherein the density, size, depth and/or height of the deformities in close
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`proximity to the input edge is greatest at approximate midpoints between adjacent
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`pairs of the light sources,” which Petitioner labeled as element [1.g] of Claim 1.
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`Petitioner claims that Pelka Fig. 7 (below) discloses this limitation. Pet. 26-
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`27.
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`
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`The Petitioner alleges that “[i]t is obvious that the most dense area is at the
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`midpoint between the light sources.” Pet. 19-20. However, the Petitioner fails to
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`show that. In fact, Pelka describes the elongate structures 54 as being arranged in
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`“concentric arcs,” and shows the overlapping structures along the input edge as
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`consistent across the entire area of overlap. Pelka, Ex. 1009 at 9:7-11, Fig. 7.
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`Petitioner’s statement that the structures are the most dense at midpoint between the
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`light sources is merely conclusory. Moreover, Petitioner does not show or explain
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`how the most dense structures are the ones “in close proximity to the input edge.”
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`Patent 7,434,973
`For at least these reasons, Petitioner has not shown that the combination of ’389
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`Patent in view of Pelka would render Claims 1-5 obvious and Ground 1 fails.
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`IV.
`GROUND 2 – SHINOHARA DOES NOT ANTICIPATE
`CLAIMS 1-5 UNDER 35 U.S.C. 102(E).
`
`A. Shinohara Is Not Prior Art
`
`As discussed in above, Claims 1-5 should be accorded a priority date of June
`
`25, 1995. Shinohara’s earliest possible priority date is October 27, 1997, when the
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`PCT application which resulted in Shinohara was filed. Thus, Shinohara does not
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`qualify as prior art under 35 USC 102(e) as alleged by Petitioner.
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`B. Shinohara Cannot Anticipate Because Petitioner Combines
`Embodiments That Are Not Directly Related to Each Other
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`Petitioner’s contentions that Shinohara anticipates Claims 1-5 of the ’973
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`Patent under 35 U.S.C. 102(e) depend on picking, choosing, and combining various
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`embodiments within Shinohara’s disclosure. See, e.g., Petition at 34 (relying on Fig.
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`9 for element [1.e]) and at 36 (relying on the different embodiment shown in Fig. 27
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`for element [1.g]). Thus, Patent owner fails to show that Shinohara anticipates
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`Claims 1-5 of the ’973 Patent. See In re Arkley, 455 F. 2d 586, 587 (CCPA 1972)
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`(“The [prior art] reference must clearly and unequivocally disclose the claimed
`
`[invention] or direct those skilled in the art to the [invention] without any need for
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`picking, choosing, and combining various disclosures not directly related to each
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`other by the teachings of the cited reference.”); see also Net MoneyIN, Inc. v.
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`VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369-1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“the prior art reference—
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`in order to anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102—must not only disclose all elements of
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`the claim within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those
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`elements “arranged as in the claim.” Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d
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`1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983)”). The PTAB has regularly found that an examiner erred
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`when combining various passages from different embodiments to support an
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`anticipation rejection. See Ex Parte Ross, 2013 WL 3293194, at *3 (PTAB Apr. 25,
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`2013) (“the Examiner cites and combines various passages from different
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`embodiments of Mangal in connection with this feature which renders the
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`Examiner's anticipation rejection problematic as noted above.”); Ex Parte Duncan,
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`2015 WL 933431, at *3 (PTAB Feb. 25, 2015).
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`V. GROUND 3: CLAIMS 1-5 ARE NOT OBVIOUS OVER SHINOHARA
`IN VIEW OF YOSHIKAWA UNDER 35 U.S.C. 103(A).
`
`As discussed above in regards to Ground 2, Shinohara is not prior art because
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`the ’973 Patent claims priority back to June 27, 1995, well prior to the earliest date
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`that can be accorded to Shinohara. Thus, because Shinohara is not prior art, it cannot
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`be combined with Yoshikawa to render any claims obvious under 35 U.S.C. 103(a).
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`VI. GROUND 4 – CLAIMS 1-5 ARE NOT OBVIOUS OVER PELKA AND
`FUNAMOTO
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`A. Niether Pelka nor Funamoto are Prior Art
`
`As discussed above, the ’973 Patent has a priority date of June 27, 1995, well
`
`prior to the earliest date that can be accorded to Pelka (filed Sept. 24, 1997). Thus,
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`Pelka is not prior art to ’973 Patent.
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`Petitioner also claims that Funamoto qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C.
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`102(e) “because Funamoto was published on November 18, 1998, before either the
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`November 28, 2007 or the February 23, 1999 priority dates to which the ’973 Patent
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`may be entitled.” Pet. at 16. However, as discussed above, the ’973 Patent claims
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`priority back to June 27, 1995, well prior to the earliest date claimed by Funamoto,
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`so Funamoto is also not prior art. Thus, the combination of Pelka and Funamoto
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`cannot render any claims obvious under 35 U.S.C. 103(a).
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`Furthermore, Funamoto, a European Patent Application filed on Sep. 24, 1997
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`does not qualify as 102(e) art, regardless of the priority date of ’973 patent. See,
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`e.g., MPEP 706.02(f)(1) at I.(a) (“The potential reference must be a U.S. patent, a
`
`U.S. application publication (35 U.S.C. 122(b)) or a WIPO publication of an
`
`international application under PCT Article 21(2) in order to apply the reference
`
`under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(e).”).
`
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`B. Even if Pelka and Funamoto Were Considered Prior Art, the
`Combination Would Not Render the ’973 Patent Obvious
`
`Petitioner again refers to Pelka Fig. 7 as disclosing element [1.g] “wherein the
`
`density, size, depth and/or height of the deformities in close proximity to the input
`
`edge is greatest at approximate midpoints between adjacent pairs of the light
`
`sources.” Pet. at 48. As described above with respect to Ground 1, Petitioner has not
`
`shown that Pelka discloses this element. Neither does Petitioner allege that
`
`Funamoto discloses this limitation. Thus, for at least this reason, Ground 5 fails to
`
`render Claims 1-5 obvious.
`
`VII.
`GROUND 5 – CLAIMS 1-5 ARE NOT OBVIOUS OVER
`HOOKER IN VIEW OF MIZOBE
`
`A. Petitioner does not consider Hooker and Mizobe as a Whole
`
`The Petitioner alleges that Claims 1-5 are rendered obvious by Hooker in view
`
`of Mizobe, but fails to establish the prerequisites for demonstrating prima facie
`
`obviousness.
`
`As confirmed by the Supreme Court in KSR, an obviousness analysis begins
`
`with a consideration of the Graham factors. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
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`550 U.S. 398, 406-407 (2007) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966)).
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`The Graham factors are as follows:
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`(A) Determining the scope and content of the prior art;
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`(B) Ascertaining the differences between the claimed invention
`
`and the prior art; and (C) Resolving the level of ordinary skill in
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`the pertinent art.
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`Graham at 17-18.
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`In considering the Graham factors, both the claimed invention and the scope
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`and content of the prior art must be considered as a whole, including disclosures in
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`the references that diverge from and teach away from the invention at hand. W.L.
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`Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
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`469 U.S. 851 (1984). It is improper to limit the obviousness inquiry to a difference
`
`from the prior art and then to show that that difference alone would have been
`
`obvious. Schenck v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782 (Fed. Cir. 1983). But this improper
`
`element-by-element analysis is exactly the approach used in the Petition. The
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`Petitioner fails to consider Hooker as whole and account for the potential negative
`
`impacts to the Hooker device if the proposed substitution were implemented. Hooker
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`teaches arranging a pattern of attenuating dots (ink dots on a thin sheet) to effectively
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`block light near the light sources. Hooker, Ex. 1013 at 3:8-18.
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`The analysis below will explain how the negative impacts of the proposed
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`substitution would indeed diverge from and teach away from the proposed
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`substitution. But the Petition’s obviousness inquiry is improperly limited to picking
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`specific differences from the prior art and a showing that the difference alone would
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`have been obvious. Such an obviousness inquiry is deficient and cannot be the basis
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`for establishing a prima facie case of obviousness.
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`Because the Petition fails to demonstrate a prima facie case that the
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`combination of Hooker and Mizobe as a whole would render the claimed subject
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`matter obvious, Ground 1 fails for all claims.
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`C. The Proposed Combination of Hooker and Mizobe Would Render the
`Resulting Device Unfit for its Intended Purpose
`
`Petitioner claims that the “half ellipse” ink dot patterns 60 of Hooker’s Fig. 6
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`to be the claimed limitation “pattern of individual light extracting deformities
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`associated with respective light sources” of claim 1. Pet. 55-56.
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`Hooker, Fig. 6.
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`But these dots cover up the light, decreasing the light output as they get closer
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`to the light sources 30. Petitioner also proposes that the light reflecting “concavities
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`and convexities” of Mizobe serve as the claimed deformities. Id. But Mizobe uses
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`these to reflect light in dimmer areas to improve Mizobe’s uniformity. This is
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`inconsistent with the function of Hooker’s attenuating dots.
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`D. The Petition Fails to Establish That the Combination of Hooker In
`view of Mizobe Would Have Been Obvious
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`The Petition alleges that claims 1-5 are rendered obvious by Hooker in view
`
`of Mizobe but fails to establish the prerequisites for demonstrating prima facie
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`obviousness.
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`To establish prima facie obviousness, there must be some articulated
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`reasoning for the modifications proposed by the Petition. “[R]ejections on
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`obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead,
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`there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support
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`the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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`But the Petition’s obviousness allegations are devoid of analysis and are made up of
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`only conclusory statements. For example, the Petition alleges that it would have been
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`obvious to include the light reflecting means 5 of Mizobe at the light inputs of
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`Hooker is place patterned light attenuating surface but offers no analysis as to what
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`would motivate one of ordinary skill in the art to make such modification of Hooker.
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`Pet. at 51-52.
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`The Petition and its claim chart for Ground 5 refers to the Escuti Declaration
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`(Ex. 1004) for additional support. Pet. at 51; Escuti Decl. ¶¶ 216-217. But with
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`respect to both Hooker and Mizobe, the Escuti Declaration offers the exact same
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`conclusory statement for motivation to include the reflecting means of Mizobe. The
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`Escuti Declaration alleges that the motivation to combine Hooker with Mizobe is
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`because they “a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the
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`rugged layer 4 having light reflecting means 5 could be used in place of the layer
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`having attenuating means in Hooker in order to achieve the similar objective of
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`Hooker of improving uniformity of illumination and thus would have been
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`motivated to combine the teachings of Mizobe with Hooker.” Escuti Decl. ¶ 217.
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`These allegations of Escuti lack any analysis of the teaching of Mizobe and Hooker,
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`and fall short of the articulated reasoning required to establish prima facie
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`obviousness.
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`Mizobe is directed to an illumination device configured for using fluorescent
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`lamps as light sources. Mizobe, Ex. 1014 at 2:36-39. In particular, the illumination
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`device of Mizobe includes reflecting means 5 with a density for fluorescent lamps.
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`Mizobe 2:40-3:4; 4:16-23. Hooker, on the other hand, is directed to an optical wave
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`guide having cut-outs and dot patterns specifically configured for point light sources.
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`Hooker, Ex. 1013 at 2:1-5. The Petitioner and Escuti fail to explain why the technical
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`solution for point light sources would be helpful in a fluorescent-based device or that
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`it’s even compatible to combine the two references. The Petitioner and Escuti fail to
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`provide a comparison of these benefits and drawbacks of incorporating the
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`configuration taught in Mizobe into Hooker. Without this analysis, Escuti and the
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`Petitioner have failed to provide the articulated reasoning required for establishing
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`prima facie obviousness.
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`Because the Petitioner fails to demonstrate a prima facie case that Hooker in
`
`view of Mizobe would render the claimed subject matter obvious, Ground 5 fails for
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`all claims.
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`E. No Disclosure of Element [1.d]
`
`Independent Claim 1 of the ’973 patent recites the following limitation:
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`“wherein the density, size, depth and/or height of the deformities in close proximity
`
`to the input edge is greatest at approximate midpoints between adjacent pairs of the
`
`light sources.” Petitioner fails to show that Mizobe or Hooker discloses this
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`limitation.
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`VIII. REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST
`
`The Petitioner of this Request is LG Display Co., Ltd. Pet. at 1. The Petition
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`also lists LG Display America, Inc. as a real party-in-interest. Id. The Petition,
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`however, omits two other real parties-in-interest: LG Electronics Inc. and LG
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`Electronics U.S.A., Inc. LG Electronics Inc. is a real party-in-interest because it
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`owns 37.9% of Petitioner and because it has admitted to being a related party to
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`Petitioner. See Ex. 2003 at 75 and 109 (Excerpt of LG Electronics Consolidated
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`Financial Statements, December 31, 2013 and 2012). LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc.
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`is a real party-in-interest because it is 100% owned by LG Electronics, Inc. Id. at 16.
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`Further, LG Electronics Inc. is a real party-in-interest because the same
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`attorneys that filed this IPR request represent LG Electronics Inc. in a lawsuit that
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`involves this patent: Delaware Display Group LLC et al. v. LG Electronics, Inc., LG
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`Electronics U.S.A., Inc., LG Display Co., Ltd., and LG Display America, Inc., Case
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`No. 1:13-cv-02109 (D. Del., filed December 31, 2013) (the “Delaware lawsuit”). In
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`the Delaware lawsuit, Robert G. Pluta has appeared for LG Electronics Inc. See Ex.
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`2004, (Docket Report for Delaware Case). Mr. Pluta is also primary attorney on this
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`Petition. Furthermore, Jamie B. Beaber also represents LG Electronics Inc. in the
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`Delaware lawsuit Id., and he has sought permission to appear pro hac vice in this
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`IPR proceeding.
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`These facts show that both LG Electronics Inc. and LG Electronics U.S.A.,
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`Inc. are in sufficient control of these proceedings to be considered real parties-in-
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`interest. Both have the “actual measure of control or opportunity to control that
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`might reasonably be expected between two formal coparties.” IPR2013-00609, Zoll
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`Lifecor Corp. v. Phillips Elec. N. America Corp., Paper No. 15 at 11. Accordingly,
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`this Petition does not meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 312(a).
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`Unlike
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`a
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`clerical issue such as using the incorrect font in a petition, the effect of failure to
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`name real parties-in-interest may give rise to arguments that the unnamed parties are
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`18
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`Case IPR2015-00506
`Patent 7,434,973
`free to operate without the estoppel restrictions of 35 U.S.C. 315(e). When the named
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`and unnamed parties are related entities that are each parties in a co-pending lawsuit
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`involving the same attorneys and asserting the same patent, the potential tactical
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`advantage gained by failing to comply with the RPI naming requirement is
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`considerable. In situations like this, the PTAB should decline to institute IPRs to
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`discourage petitioners from intentionally omitting clear real parties-in-interest.
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`IX.
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`CONCLUSION
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`This Preliminary Response shows that none of the Grounds proposed in the
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`Petition are reasonably likely to invalidate any of the claims of the ’973 patent. For
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`the reasons contained herein, Patent Owner requests that the PTAB deny the Petition.
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`Dated: April 22, 2015
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`Respectfully submitted,
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` ________________________
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`Justin B. Kimble
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`Attorney for Patent Owner
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`Registration No. 58,591
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`Bragalone Conroy P.C.
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`2200 Ross Ave.
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`Suite 4500 – West
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`Dallas, TX 75201
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`Case IPR2015-00506
`Patent 7,434,973
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that document has been served via electronic
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`mail on April 22, 2014, to Petitioner at following email addresses pursuant to its
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`consent
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`in
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`its
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`Petition
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`at
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`pp.
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`2-3:
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`rpluta@mayerbrown.com,
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`bpaul@mayerbrown.com, astreff@mayerbrown.com, and alam@mayerbrown.com,
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`with a courtesy copy to DDGIPR@mayerbrown.com
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` _______________________
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`Justin B. Kimble
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`Attorney for Patent Owner
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`Registration No. 58,591
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`Bragalone Conroy P.C.
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`2200 Ross Ave.
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`Suite 4500 – West
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`Dallas, TX 75201
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`20