Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 134 Filed 12/17/14 Page 1 of 19 PageID #: 3155
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`
`SOLOCRON MEDIA, LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`Case No. 2:13-cv-1059-JRG-RSP
`
`
`
`
`
`[JURY TRIAL DEMANDED]
`
`
`
`
`
`
`VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC., CELLCO
`PARTNERSHIP D/B/A VERIZON WIRELESS,
`AT&T MOBILITY LLC, SPRINT SPECTRUM L.P.,
`AND T-MOBILE USA, INC.,
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO SEVER
`
`
`
`Redacted Version
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`Page 2027-001
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`Solocron Ex. 2027 - Verizon Wireless, AT&T Mobility - IPR2015-00380
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`

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`Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 134 Filed 12/17/14 Page 2 of 19 PageID #: 3156
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`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
`
`
`
`II.
`
`
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
`
`BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................ 1
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`A. Legal Background ......................................................................................................... 1
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`B. Factual Background ...................................................................................................... 3
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`III.
`
`
`ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 7
`
`A. Joinder Is Improper Because the Accused Products and Processes Are Not
`“the Same.” ................................................................................................................... 7
`
`B. Joinder Is Improper Because the Transactions or Occurrences Are Not “the
`Same.” ........................................................................................................................... 8
`
`C. Solocron’s Allegations Do Not Satisfy the Joinder Requirements. ............................ 10
`
`IV.
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`
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 12
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`i
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`Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 134 Filed 12/17/14 Page 3 of 19 PageID #: 3157
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`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`Arroyo v. PHH Mortg. Corp.,
`No. 13-cv-2335(JS)(AKT), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68534 (E.D.N.Y. May 19, 2014) .............. 3
`Brandeis Univ. v. East Side Ovens, Inc.,
`No. 11-cv-619-BBC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18902 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 15, 2012) ...................... 3
`Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear,
`620 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ................................................................................................ 11
`In re EMC,
`677 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ........................................................................................ 1, 9, 11
`In re Nintendo,
`544 Fed. Appx. 934 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .......................................................................................... 2
`IpVenture, Inc. v. Acer, Inc.,
`879 F. Supp. 2d 426 (D. Del. 2012) ............................................................................................ 9
`Lodsys, LLC v. Brother Int’l Corp.,
`No. 2:11-cv-90-JRG, 2013 WL 1338767 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2013) .................................. 1, 2, 9
`Medsquire LLC v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc.,
`No. 2:11-cv-04504-JHN-PLAx, 2011 WL 7710202 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2011) ........................ 11
`Net Nav. Sys., LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`4:11-cv-660, 2012 WL 7827543 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2012) ...................................................... 3
`Norman IP Holdings, LLC v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc.,
`6:12-cv-508, 2012 WL 3307942 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2012) .................................................. 3, 9
`Reese v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,
`No. 2:13-cv-3811-ODW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98635 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2013) .................. 2
`SimpleAir, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`No. 2:11-cv-416-JRG, Dkt. No. 416 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2013) .............................. 1, 8, 9, 10, 12
`Summit 6 LLC v. HTC Corp.,
`No. 7:14-cv-0014-O, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126800 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2014) .................... 8
`WiAV Networks, LLC v. 3Com Corp.,
`No. C 10-03448 WHA, 2010 WL 3895047 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2010) ................................ 10, 11
`Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 299 ............................................................................................................................... 2
`Rules
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 ........................................................................................................................ 1, 2
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 ........................................................................................................................ 1, 3
`
`
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`ii
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`I.
`
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
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`Plaintiff Solocron’s joinder of four unrelated competitors—Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile
`
`and Sprint—in a single lawsuit runs afoul of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 as well as the
`
`strict joinder requirements of the America Invents Act. Solocron’s complaint and infringement
`
`contentions accuse different products, each of which was independently developed and were
`
`independent implemented across the four competitor defendants. As such, no shared set of
`
`aggregate facts supports Solocron’s improper attempt to join Defendants in a single action.
`
`Therefore, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, Defendants respectfully request that
`
`the Court sever the claims levied against each Defendant into separate actions.
`
`A.
`
`Legal Background
`
`
`II.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2) provides that multiple defendants may be joined
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`in a single action if (1) any claim asserted against each of them arises out of the same
`
`transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and (2) there is a question of
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`law or fact common to all defendants that will arise in the action. Importantly, the accused
`
`products or processes must be “the same” and “even the existence of some similarity . . . cannot
`
`satisfy the ‘same transaction’ requirement.” See Lodsys, LLC v. Brother Int’l Corp., No. 2:11-
`
`cv-90-JRG, 2013 WL 1338767, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2013) (analyzing In re EMC, 677 F.3d
`
`1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); see also SimpleAir, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:11-cv-416-JRG,
`
`Dkt. No. 416, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2013) (same). Following EMC, this Court noted
`
`that, among others, “pertinent factual considerations” underlying joinder under Rule 20 include
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`“the existence of some relationship among the defendants,” “the use of identically sourced
`
`components,” “licensing of technology agreements between the defendants,” and “overlap of the
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`products’ or processes’ development and manufacture.” Lodsys, at *3 (quoting EMC I at 1359-
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`60). As explained below, no such overlapping facts exist in this case.
`
`In addition to satisfying the requirements of Rule 20, Solocron must also satisfy the more
`
`strict standards of 35 U.S.C. § 299.1 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 299, accused infringers can be
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`joined in the same action “only if” the right to relief arises out of “the same transaction,
`
`occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences relating to the making, using, . . . , or selling
`
`of the same accused product or process; and questions of fact common to all defendants or
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`counterclaim defendants will arise in the action.” 35 U.S.C. § 299(a) (emphasis added).2 In
`
`other words, under § 299(a), there must be one transaction, or set of transactions, relating to the
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`making, using or selling of one accused product or process. In re Nintendo, 544 Fed. Appx. 934,
`
`939 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Reese v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 2:13-cv-3811-ODW, 2013 U.S. Dist.
`
`LEXIS 98635, *1 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2013) (severing action against T-Mobile, AT&T, Verizon,
`
`and Sprint—the same Defendants as in this case—because the “[n]ewly enacted statute, 35
`
`U.S.C. § 299, requires a higher standard for joinder.”). And, while joinder requires that the
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`claims share questions of law or fact common to all defendants in addition to arising out of the
`
`same transaction or occurrence, the Federal Circuit has held that satisfaction of those
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`requirements is still not sufficient to support joinder; rather, courts must also consider “principles
`
`of fundamental fairness” and “prejudice.” Nintendo, 544 Fed. Appx. at 939. Neither the
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`requirements of Section 299, nor “principles of fundamental fairness” support joinder of
`
`Defendants in this case.
`
` 1 Solocron’s complaint was filed December 6, 2013. See Dkt. No. 1. “Effective September
`16, 2011, joinder in patent cases is governed by the America Invents Act . . . 35 U.S.C. §
`299.” In re Nintendo Co., 544 Fed. Appx. 934, 939 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
` 2 The statute explicitly prohibits joining multiple defendants “based solely on allegations that
`they each have infringed the patent or patents-in-suit.” 35 U.S.C. § 299(b).
`
`
`
`2
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`Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 134 Filed 12/17/14 Page 6 of 19 PageID #: 3160
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`“Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that joinder is proper....” Arroyo v. PHH
`
`Mortg. Corp., No. 13-cv-2335(JS)(AKT), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68534, *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 19,
`
`2014); see also Brandeis Univ. v. East Side Ovens, Inc., No. 11-cv-619-BBC, 2012 U.S. Dist.
`
`LEXIS 18902, *4 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 15, 2012). In cases of misjoinder, the Court may “at any time
`
`. . . sever any claim against a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 (emphasis added); see also Net Nav.
`
`Sys., LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 4:11-cv-660, 2012 WL 7827543, at *2 n.2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 22,
`
`2012) (“If parties are misjoined in violation of AIA [§ 299], Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21
`
`provides the remedy of severance.”); Norman IP Holdings, LLC v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 6:12-cv-
`
`508, 2012 WL 3307942, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2012) (“An improperly joined party may be
`
`dropped from the action or have the claims against them severed [under] Fed. R. Civ. P. 21.”).
`
`B.
`
`Factual Background
`
`This case now involves six patents from the same patent family: four patents relating to
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`downloadable ringtones (the “Ringtone Patents”), and two patents allegedly relating to
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`Multimedia Messaging Service (“MMS Patents”).3 See generally Am. Compl. (Dkt. No. 20).
`
`With respect to the Ringtone Patents, Solocron separately accuses Defendants’ respective
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`“ringtones stores” of providing “audio files [that] can be received by Defendants’ customers, and
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`programmed into their mobile phones, for use as an audio notifications [sic] of incoming
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`telephone calls.” Id. at ¶ 51. The infringement accusations against each Defendant relate to
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`different products:
`• For Verizon, Solocron identifies the Verizon Media store.
`• For AT&T, Solocron identifies the AppCenter and “Shop Music” ringtone stores.
`
`
` 3 Solocron’s Original and Amended Complaints asserted seven patents; Solocron recently
`withdrew one of the Ringtone Patents.
`
`
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`3
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`• For Sprint, Solocron identifies the “Sprint Music Plus” store.
`• For T-Mobile, Solocron identifies “Megatones,” “HiFi Ringtones,” and
`“Callertunes” stores.
`
`See id. at ¶¶ 52–55. Solocron does not allege that any Defendant shares its ringtone store with
`
`another Defendant, that Defendants worked together to develop their respective ringtone stores,
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`or that Defendants acquired or established the accused stores in a single transaction or set of
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`related transactions.
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`Regarding the two MMS Patents, Solocron alleges in its Amended Complaint that each
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`Defendants’ server “allow[s] Defendants’ customers to, for example, send text, picture, video,
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`and/or audio messages from the customer’s mobile device to another mobile device provided by
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`the same or a different Defendant.” Id. at ¶ 56. While Solocron references an industry standard
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`in the Complaint, it again fails to allege that Defendants worked together to implement their
`
`respective systems or acquired the accused systems in a single transaction or series of
`
`transactions.
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`Moreover, since filing its Amended Complaint, Solocron has yet to identify any overlap
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`in Defendants’ accused instrumentalities, their operations, or any related transaction associated
`
`with the accused stores and servers. Consistent with the allegations in its Amended Complaint,
`
`Solocron’s infringement contentions accuse different products and services for each Defendant:
`
`Defendant Ringtone Instrumentalities
`T-Mobile4 T-Mobile’s server(s), software, and Internet site(s)
`associated with T-Mobile’s ringtone stores including at
`least the “MegaTones,” “HiFi Ringers,” “T-Mobile
`
`MMS Instrumentalities
`T-Mobile’s Multimedia
`Messaging Services
`Center and related servers
`
`
` 4 Ex. A (Infringement Contentions against T-Mobile, dated Apr. 14, 2014) at 3–5. The
`exhibits cited herein are attached to the accompanying Declaration of David J. Tobin in
`support of Defendant’s Motion to Sever.
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`
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`4
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`
`AT&T5
`
`MMS Instrumentalities
`for MMS messaging.
`
`AT&T’s Multimedia
`Messaging Services
`Center and related servers
`for MMS messaging.
`
`Verizon’s Multimedia
`Messaging Services
`Center and related servers
`for MMS Messaging.
`
`Verizon6
`
`Defendant Ringtone Instrumentalities
`Mall HiFi Ringers,” and
`http://tmomystore.hcac.com/ringtone stores.
`
`Wireless telephones made, used, sold, and/or offered
`for sale by T-Mobile that are capable of accessing T-
`Mobile’s ringtone stores and operating on T-Mobile’s
`wireless network.
`AT&T’s server(s), software, and Internet site(s)
`associated with AT&T’s ringtone stores including at
`least the “Music Shop” located at
`att.uglabs.net/shopmusic3.
`
`Wireless telephones made, used, sold, and/or offered
`for sale by AT&T that are capable of accessing
`AT&T’s ringtone stores including at least the “Music
`Shop” located at att.uglabs.net/shopmusic3 and
`operating on AT&T’s wireless network.
`Verizon’s server(s), software, and Internet site(s)
`associated with Verizon’s ringtone stores including at
`least the “Verizon Media Store”
`(mediastore.verizonwireless.com); “VZW Media Store”
`application for Android; “VCAST Tones”; and
`“Verizon Tones” ringtone stores.
`
`Wireless telephones made, used, sold, and/or offered
`for sale by Verizon that are capable of accessing
`Verizon’s ringtone stores including at least the
`“Verizon Media Store”
`(mediastore.verizonwireless.com); “VZW Media Store”
`application for Android; “VCAST Tones”; and
`“Verizon Tones” ringtone stores and operating on
`Verizon’s wireless network.
`Sprint’s server(s), software, and Internet site(s)
`associated with Sprint’s ringtone stores including at
`least the mobilemusic.sprint.com, Sprint Music Plus,
`Sprint Music Plus application for Android; and Sprint
`Music Plus application for iOS ringtone stores.
`
`Wireless telephones made, used, sold, and/or offered
`
` 5 Ex. B (Infringement Contentions against AT&T, dated Apr. 14, 2014) at 3–5.
` 6 Ex. C (Infringement Contentions against Verizon, dated Apr. 14, 2014) at 3–5.
` 7 Ex. D (Infringement Contentions against Sprint, dated Apr. 14, 2014) at 3–5.
`
`Sprint7
`
`Sprint’s Multimedia
`Messaging Services
`Center and related servers
`for MMS messaging.
`
`
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`5
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`Defendant Ringtone Instrumentalities
`for sale by Sprint that are capable of accessing Sprint’s
`ringtone stores including at least the
`mobilemusic.sprint.com, Sprint Music Plus, Sprint
`Music Plus application for Android; and Sprint Music
`Plus application for iOS ringtone stores and operating
`on Sprint’s wireless.
`
`MMS Instrumentalities
`
`Since receiving Solocron’s infringement contentions, and pursuant to the docket control order,
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`Defendants have produced to Solocron substantial numbers of technical and other documents.
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`Despite that discovery, Solocron has failed to identify any basis for joining Defendants in a
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`single action.
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`In addition, with the benefit of Defendants’ documents, Solocron has narrowed its
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`asserted claims pursuant to the Docket Control Order (Dkt. No. 116) and General Order 13-20.
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`Even after that narrowing, Solocron does not assert the same claims against all Defendants. For
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`example, Solocron asserts claim 10 of U.S. Pat. No. 7,257,395 and claim 19 of U.S. Pat. No.
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`7,295,864 against AT&T and Verizon, but not against T-Mobile or Sprint. Compare Dkt. No.
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`117 (Notice Concerning Preliminary Election of Asserted Claims) with Exs. A–D. In an effort to
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`obviate the need for this Motion, on July 21, 2014, counsel for T-Mobile sent a letter to counsel
`
`for Solocron requesting consent to severance for trial purposes on the grounds that “Defendants’
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`accused instrumentalities are materially different from each other and are obviously not the
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`‘same accused product or process.’” Ex. E. Counsel for T-Mobile and Solocron then met and
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`conferred on August 4, 2014, at which point Solocron requested that Defendants defer moving
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`for severance until after Solocron reduced the number of asserted claims. Defendants complied
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`with Solocron’s request. After Solocron narrowed its claims and filed its Notice Concerning
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`Preliminary Election of Asserted Claims on November 14, 2014, T-Mobile’s counsel, on behalf
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`of Defendants, met and conferred with Solocron on December 1 and December 10, 2014 and
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`6
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`again asked Solocron to agree to severance for trial purposes. Solocron confirmed on December
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`17, 2014 that it opposes severance.
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`Accordingly, Defendants hereby respectfully request that the Court sever Plaintiff’s
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`claims against Defendants for trial purposes. Defendants are agreeable to proceeding on a
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`consolidated basis for pretrial purposes, including Markman proceedings.
`
` ARGUMENT
`III.
`
`A.
`
`Joinder Is Improper Because the Accused Products and Processes Are Not “the
`Same.”
`
`As explained above, § 299(a) permits accused infringers to be joined in one action only if
`
`the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or occurrence relating to the same accused
`
`product or process. Here, joinder is improper, because Defendants’ Accused Products are neither
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`“the same” nor did Defendants acquire or develop those Accused Products out of the “same
`
`transaction.” Indeed, the chart below identifies the vendors used by each Defendant since
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`December 2007 for their accused ringtone and MMSC products—six years prior to when
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`Solocron filed its complaint (see Dkt. No. 1). As the chart below shows, Defendants
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`independently sourced and/or obtained the Accused Products.
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`
`Defendant
`T-Mobile8
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`AT&T9
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`Verizon10
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`Sprint11
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`Ringtone Store
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`MMSC
`
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`
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`
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`As this Court acknowledged, “[u]nless there is an actual link between the facts underlying each
`
`claim of infringement, independently developed products using differently sourced parts are not
`
`part of the same transaction, even if they are otherwise coincidentally identical.” SimpleAir, slip
`
`op. at 4; Summit 6 LLC v. HTC Corp., No. 7:14-cv-0014-O, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126800, *43
`
`(N.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2014) (granting severance because “Apple’s accused products are not the
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`same as the accused products of the remaining Defendants, a requirement for joinder under the
`
`AIA”). Given these undisputed facts, severance is required.
`
`B.
`
`Joinder Is Improper Because the Transactions or Occurrences Are Not “the Same.”
`
`Even if the accused products and processes had been the same (and they are not), joinder
`
`here would still be improper because the transactions or occurrences at issue across the various
`
`Defendants are not the same. Indeed, Defendants T-Mobile, Verizon, AT&T and Sprint compete
`
`
` 8 Ex. F (T-Mobile’s 1st Supp’l Resp. to Interrog. No. 1).
` 9 Ex. G (AT&T’s 2nd Supp’l Resp. to Interrog. No. 1).
` 10 Ex. H (Verizon’s 1st Supp’l Resp. to Interrog. No. 1).
` 11 Ex. I (Sprint’s 1st Supp’l Resp. to Interrog. No. 1).
`
`
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`8
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`with one another in the marketplace, and each Defendant sourced the accused products
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`independently. As such, Solocron can point to no common transaction or occurrence that
`
`satisfies Section 299. Indeed, this Court (among numerous other courts) has recognized that
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`severance is appropriate in cases involving defendants who are competitors. SimpleAir, slip op.
`
`at 5 (analyzing In re EMC and severing case because “defendants are, in fact, competitors in the
`
`smartphone marketplace”); see also IpVenture, Inc. v. Acer, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 426, 430 (D.
`
`Del. 2012) (The defendants “are all direct competitors, which also significantly counsels against
`
`their joinder in the same case.”).
`
`Furthermore, while the absence of a common transaction as required by Section 299
`
`renders the Rule 20 factors12 identified by the Federal Circuit in EMC moot, none of those factors
`
`support joinder in any event:
`• Factor One—the time period of alleged infringement—differs among Defendants.
`For example,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Thus, for the Ringtone Patents, the damages period for at least
` will differ from the damages periods
`• Factor Two—the existence of some relationship among defendants—fails.
`Defendants’ relationship is one of competition, and Defendants have no common
`contractual (or other) relationship covering the accused products and services, either
`in their development or implementation.
`• Factors Three and Five—use of identically sourced components and overlap in the
`development of the accused produces or process—as explained above, Defendants
`separately sourced and/or obtained the accused components, and no overlap exists
`among the accused products and services, either in their development or
`manufacture. SimpleAir, slip op. at 5; see also Lodsys, 2013 WL 1338767, at *4
`(ordering severance because “[i]t is clear that each of the accused products are
`independently designed and manufactured”).
`
` 12 Lodsys, 2013 WL 1338767, at *3 (quoting In re EMC, 677 F.3d at 1359–60); see also
`Norman IP Holdings, 2012 WL 3307942, at *2.
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`• Factor Four—licensing of technology agreements between defendants—Solocron
`does not allege, nor can it allege, licensing of relevant technology agreements
`between Defendants. See Ex. K (Pl.’s Initial Disclosures Related to Damages,
`dated April 28, 2014).
`• Factor Six—whether plaintiff asserts a claim for lost profits—Solocron has not
`disclosed any theory of lost profits. See id.
`
`As indicated above, none of the six factual considerations identified by the Federal Circuit and
`
`repeated in Lodsys support joinder of Defendants.
`
`C.
`
`Solocron’s Allegations Do Not Satisfy the Joinder Requirements.
`
`No “link” exists between the facts underlying the claims against each respective
`
`Defendant. Indeed, regarding the Ringtone Patents, Solocron does not even allege in its
`
`Amended Complaint or Infringement Contentions any “sameness” of Defendants’
`
`instrumentalities, nor does it allege any common set of operative facts.
`
`Regarding the two MMS Patents, Solocron’s allegations of commonality fail. Solocron,
`
`for example, alleges that the “operation of Defendants’ hardware and software in accordance
`
`with [the OMA MMS] standards constitutes important evidence of infringement.” See Am.
`
`Compl. (Dkt. No. 20) at ¶ 26. But as this Court held, assertions of common operation, even if
`
`assumed, arguendo, to be true, are irrelevant because “the fact that all of the accused products
`
`employ similar but independent [messaging] services is insufficient to prevent severance.”
`
`SimpleAir, slip op. at 5. Furthermore, other courts have rejected similar arguments of
`
`commonality based solely on implementation of an industry standard. For example, in WiAV
`
`Networks, LLC v. 3Com Corp., No. C 10-03448 WHA, 2010 WL 3895047, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
`
`1, 2010), the court rejected joinder under Rule 20 based on plaintiff’s assertion that each
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`“defendant[] sells products that implement the IEEE 802.11 wireless protocol.” In ordering
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`dismissal for misjoinder, the court explained that the plaintiff “makes no such assertion” that
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`“the asserted claims in WiAV’s patents will cover all implementations of the protocol,” and “no
`
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`Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 134 Filed 12/17/14 Page 14 of 19 PageID #: 3168
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`showing has been made that practicing the asserted patents is essential to complying with the
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`protocol in all instances.” Id. at *3 (analyzing Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear, 620 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2010)); see also Medsquire LLC v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-04504-JHN-PLAx,
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`2011 WL 7710202 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2011) (finding allegations “that each Defendant makes and
`
`sells software that complies with a federal standard” to be insufficient for joinder under Rule 20).
`
`Here, “Solocron has not declared any of the Patents-In-Suit essential or necessary to
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`practice any Standard.” Ex. L (Solocron’s 9/29/2014 Resp. to Interrog. No. 14) at 22–23. Nor
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`does Solocron allege that the relevant provisions of the OMA standard are even mandatory. See
`
`id. “All in all, plaintiff cannot escape the fact that it is suing unrelated and competing defendants
`
`for their own independent acts of patent infringement.” WiAV, 2010 WL 3895047, at *3 (noting
`
`that “infringement issues will vary from product to product [as will] the damages issues”). In
`
`quoting from the WiAV opinion, the Federal Circuit explained that “accused defendants—who
`
`will surely have competing interests and strategies—are also entitled to present individualized
`
`assaults on questions of non-infringement, invalidity, and claim construction.” In re EMC, 677
`
`F.3d at 1355 (quoting WiAV, 2010 WL 3895047, at *2). The reasoning applied in WiAV and
`
`EMC apply with equal force to this case.
`
`Solocron’s contention that certain unidentified customers of one cellular carrier (e.g.,
`
`AT&T) may happen to transmit an MMS message to a customer of another carrier (e.g.,
`
`Verizon) is also insufficient to establish joinder. See Am. Compl. (Dkt. No. 20) at ¶ 27. In
`
`SimpleAir, this Court rejected a similar proposition. Indeed, in the SimpleAir case, Microsoft,
`
`Google, Nokia, and Ericsson were accused of providing infringing wireless messaging and
`
`notification services. Slip op. at 2–4. In response to the defendants’ motion to sever, the
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`Patentee sought to establish a “link” between the defendants by asserting, among other theories,
`
`
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`11
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`Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 134 Filed 12/17/14 Page 15 of 19 PageID #: 3169
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`that a user of a Google Android phone, using Facebook, could send a message to a user of a
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`Microsoft Windows phone, who was also using Facebook. In other words, Facebook served as
`
`the “link” between these two disparate accused products. This Court rejected that theory of
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`joinder, finding that “[w]hile each of the four accused products may operate in a similar
`
`manner,” each claim of infringement did not share an aggregate of operative facts. Id. at 5. The
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`Court found that the four accused instrumentalities “are different products,” “are independently
`
`manufactured by four unrelated companies,” and the “defendants are, in fact, competitors.” Id.
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`The same is true for Defendants here. Accordingly, Solocron cannot meet its burden to satisfy
`
`the joinder requirements.
`
`IV.
`
` CONCLUSION
`
`For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants respectfully request that the Court sever
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`Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants for purposes of trial. In the interests of judicial economy
`
`and efficiency, Defendants are agreeable to proceeding on a consolidated basis for pre-trial
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`purposes, including Markman proceedings.
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`
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`12
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`

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`Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 134 Filed 12/17/14 Page 16 of 19 PageID #: 3170
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`
`Dated: December 17, 2014
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
` By:
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` /s/ Mark N. Reiter
`Josh A. Krevitt (Lead Attorney)
`New York Bar No. 2568228
`jkrevitt@gibsondunn.com
`GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
`200 Park Avenue
`New York, New York 10166
`Telephone: (212) 351-4000
`Telecopier: (212) 351-4035
`Mark N. Reiter
`Texas Bar No. 16759900
`mreiter@gibsondunn.com
`Robert A. Vincent
`Texas Bar No. 24056474
`rvincent@gibsondunn.com
`David J. Tobin
`Texas Bar No. 24060735
`dtobin@gibsondunn.com
`
`GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP
`
`2100 McKinney Ave., Ste. 1100
`Dallas, TX 75201-6912
`Telephone: (214) 698-3100
`Telecopier: (214) 571-2900
`
`E. Glenn Thames, Jr.
`Texas Bar No. 00785097
`glennthames@potterminton.com
`
`POTTER MINTON
`
`A Professional Corporation
`110 N. College Avenue, Suite 500
`Tyler, TX 75702
`Telephone: (903) 597-8311
`Telecopier: (903) 593-0846
`Attorneys for Defendant T-Mobile USA, Inc.
`
`
`13
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`Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 134 Filed 12/17/14 Page 17 of 19 PageID #: 3171
`
`
`/s/ Kevin P. Anderson
`Michael E. Jones
`Texas Bar No. 10929400
`mikejones@potterminton.com
`
`
`
`POTTER MINTON
`
`A Professional Corporation
`110 N. College, Suite 500 (75702)
`P.O. Box 359
`Tyler, TX 75710
`Telephone: (903) 597-8311
`Telecopier: (903) 593-0846
`and
`Kevin P. Anderson
`D.C. Bar No. 476504
`kanderson@wileyrein.com
`
`WILEY REIN, LLP
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1776 K Street NW
`Washington, DC 20006
`Telephone: (202) 719-7000
`Telecopier: (202) 719-7049
`Counsel for Defendants Cellco Partnership d/b/a
`Verizon Wireless and Verizon Communications
`Inc.
`
`
`
`/s/ Theodore Stevenson, III
`Theodore Stevenson, III (Lead Attorney)
`Texas Bar No. 19196650
`tstevenson@mckoolsmith.com
`Scott W. Hejny
`Texas Bar No. 24038952
`shejny@mckoolsmith.com
`Nicholas Mathews
`Texas Bar No. 24085457
`nmathews@mckoolsmith.com
`
`Warren Lipschitz
`Texas Bar No. 24078867
`wlipschitz@mckoolsmith.com
`MCKOOL SMITH, P.C.
`
`300 Crescent Court, Suite 1500
`Dallas, Texas 75201
`Telephone: (214) 978-4000
`Telecopier: (214) 978-4044
`
`
`
`14
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`Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 134 Filed 12/17/14 Page 18 of 19 PageID #: 3172
`
`
`Harry Lee Gillam, Jr
`Texas Bar No. 07921800
`gil@gillamsmithlaw.com
`
`GILLAM & SMITH, LLP
`
`303 South Washington Avenue
`Marshall, TX 75670
`Telephone: (903) 934-8450
`Telecopier: (903) 934-9257
`Attorneys for Defendant AT&T Mobility LLC
`
`/s/ Franklin D. Kang
`Robert W. Weber
`Texas Bar No. 21044800
`bweber@smithweber.com
`
`
`
`
`
`SMITH WEBER, LLP
`
`5505 Plaza Drive -- P.O. Box 6167
`Texarkana, TX 75505-6167
`Telephone: (903) 223-5656
`Telecopier: (903) 223-5652
`and
`David E. Finkelson (Pro Hac Vice)
`Virginia Bar No. 44059
`dfinkelson@mcguirewoods.com
`
`MCGUIRE WOODS, LLP
`
`One James Center
`901 East Cary Street
`Telephone: (804) 775-1157
`Telecopier: (804) 225-5377
`and
`Franklin D. Kang (Pro Hac Vice)
`California Bar No. 192314
`fkang@mcguirewoods.com
`
`MCGUIRE WOODS, LLP
`
`1800 Century Park East, 8th Floor
`Los Angeles, CA 90067
`Telephone: (310) 315-8231
`Telecopier: (310) 956-3102
`Attorneys for Defendant, Sprint Spectrum, LP
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`15
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`Case 2:13-cv-01059-JRG-RSP Document 134 Filed 12/17/14 Page 19 of 19 PageID #: 3173
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`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was filed electronically in
`
`compliance with Local Rule CV–5(a). As such, this document was served on all counsel who
`
`have consented to electronic service on December 17, 2014. In compliance with Local Rule CV-
`
`5(c), the sealed exhibits were promptly served via electronic mail.
`
`
`
`
`
` /s/ Mark N. Reiter
` Mark N. Reiter
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORIZA