UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_____________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_____________________
`
`
`
`APPLE INC.
`Petitioner
`v.
`DSS TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT, INC.
`Patent Owner
`
`_____________________
`
`CASE IPR: Unassigned
`Patent 6,128,290
`_____________________
`
`PETITION FOR INTER PARTES REVIEW
`OF U.S. PATENT NO. 6,128,290
`UNDER 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-319 and 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.1-.80, 42.100-.123
`
`
`
`Mail Stop PATENT BOARD
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
` 
`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1 
`I. 
`II.  MANDATORY NOTICES (37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(1)) ..................................... 2 
`A. 
`Real Party-In-Interest (37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(1)) .................................... 2 
`B. 
`Notice of Related Matters (37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(2)) .............................. 2 
`C. 
`Designation of Counsel (37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(3)) ................................. 3 
`D.  Notice of Service Information (37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(4)) ....................... 3 
`III.  GROUNDS FOR STANDING (37 C.F.R. § 42.104(a)) ................................ 3 
`IV.  PRECISE RELIEF REQUESTED (37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)) ............................ 3 
`V. 
`THE ’290 PATENT ........................................................................................ 4 
`A.  Overview of the ’290 Patent .................................................................. 4 
`B. 
`Priority Date of the ’290 Patent............................................................. 5 
`C. 
`Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art ......................................................... 6 
`VI.  CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ........................................................................... 6 
`A. 
`“local oscillator” .................................................................................... 6 
`IDENTIFICATION OF CHALLENGE (37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)) .................. 8 
`A. 
`Statutory Grounds for the Challenge ..................................................... 8 
`B. 
`Citation of Prior Art .............................................................................. 9 
`C. 
`The Proposed Grounds Are Not Redundant.......................................... 9 
`VIII.  GROUNDS OF REJECTION ...................................................................... 11 
`A.  Ground 1: Claims 9 and 10 would have been obvious in
`view of Barber. .................................................................................... 11 
`1. 
`Overview of Barber .................................................................. 11 
`2. 
`Independent claim 9 would have been obvious in view
`of Barber. ................................................................................. 13 
`Claim 10 would have been obvious in view of Barber. ........... 23 
`3. 
`Ground 2: Claims 6, 7, 9, and 10 would have been obvious
`over Natarajan in view of Neve. .......................................................... 24 
`1. 
`Overview of Natarajan ............................................................. 24 
`2. 
`Overview of Neve .................................................................... 26 
`3. 
`Overview of the Combination of Natarajan and Neve ............ 27 
`4. 
`Independent claim 6 would have been obvious over
`Natarajan in view of Neve. ...................................................... 30 
`
`VII. 
`
`B. 
`
`i
`
`

`
`6. 
`
`7. 
`
`C. 
`
`
`
`5. 
`
`Claim 7 would have been obvious over Natarajan in
`view of Neve. ........................................................................... 41 
`Independent claim 9 would have been obvious over
`Natarajan in view of Neve. ...................................................... 41 
`Claim 10 would have been obvious over Natarajan in
`view of Neve. ........................................................................... 51 
`Ground 3: Claims 6 and 7 would have been obvious over
`Mahany. ............................................................................................... 51 
`1. 
`Overview of Mahany ............................................................... 51 
`2. 
`Independent claim 6 would have been obvious over
`Mahany. .................................................................................... 52 
`Claim 7 would have been obvious over Mahany. .................... 60 
`3. 
`IX.  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 60 
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`
`
`
`Cases 
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`342 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003) .............................................................................. 6
`
`Canon Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC,
`IPR2014-00535, Paper 9 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 24, 2014) ............................................ 10
`
`In re Cortright,
`165 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999) .............................................................................. 6
`
`KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) ...................................................................................... 30, 35
`
`Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co.,
`CBM2012-00003, Paper 7 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2012) ........................................... 10
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .............................................................................. 6
`
`Statutes 
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102(b) ........................................................................................ 9, 10, 11
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102(e) .............................................................................................. 9, 11
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103 ................................................................................................... 9, 11
`
`35 U.S.C. § 325(d) ..................................................................................................... 9
`
`Rules 
`
`37 C.F.R § 42.10(b) ................................................................................................... 3
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) ................................................................................................ 6
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(a) ................................................................................................. 3
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) ................................................................................................ 8
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.106(a) ................................................................................................. 3
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.63(e) ................................................................................................... 3
`
`iii
`
`

`
`
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(1) ................................................................................................ 2
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(1) .............................................................................................. ..2
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(1) ................................................................................................ 2
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(1) .............................................................................................. ..2
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(2) ................................................................................................ 2
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(2) .............................................................................................. ..2
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(3) ................................................................................................ 3
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(3) .............................................................................................. ..3
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(4) ................................................................................................ 3
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(4) .............................................................................................. ..3
`
`
`
`iv
`iv
`
`

`
`
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`Apple Inc. petitions for inter partes review of claims 6, 7, 9, and 10 of U.S.
`
`Patent No. 6,128,290 to Carvey, titled “Personal Data Network” (“the ’290 pa-
`
`tent”) (APL 1001). The claims of the ’290 patent recite nothing more than the
`
`combination of well-known concepts. Indeed, the ’290 patent specification disclos-
`
`es little more than well-known techniques patent owner admits are in the prior art.
`
`The ’290 patent characterizes its alleged inventions by describing that “the general
`
`scheme of data transmission and reception is a form of time division multiple ac-
`
`cess (TDMA).” (’290 patent, 3:57-59.) The ’290 patent plainly admits that its
`
`“basic modulation scheme is frequency shift keying (FSK), well known to those
`
`skilled in digital radio transmission.” (Id. at 3:65-67 (emphasis added).) The ’290
`
`patent describes a litany of other “well-known” concepts, for example, the oscilla-
`
`tor phase shifts in FIG. 5 were “commonly known to radio engineers”. (Id. at 4:51-
`
`57 (emphasis added).) And while the “operational modes appear different, they
`
`are essentially well known variants to the underlying time division multiple access
`
`technique.” (Id. at 6:16-29 (emphasis added).) Still further, capturing only the
`
`strongest “RF bursts” in TDMA schemes was a “well known aspect of FM modu-
`
`lation.” (Id. at 6:36-41 (emphasis added).)
`
`The ’290 patent purports to divert from well-known TDMA schemes be-
`
`cause transmissions occur “in only those slots indicated by a TDMA program…For
`
`- 1 -
`
`

`
`
`
`each slot, this TDMA program indicates that a PEA or host is to transmit, or not,
`
`and whether it will receive, or not. In the intervals between slots in which a PEA is
`
`to transmit or receive, all receive and transmit circuits are powered down.” (Id. at
`
`3:67-4:8.) But this allegedly point of novelty was also well-known, as explained in
`
`detail below. Thus, none of the ’290 patent’s claims recite a patentable invention.
`
`Its uncommon and ambiguous terms veil the well-known concepts described and
`
`claimed in the ’290 patent. Accordingly, Apple respectfully requests inter partes
`
`review of claims 6, 7, 9, and 10, and that these claims be found invalid.
`
`II. MANDATORY NOTICES (37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(1))
`A. Real Party-In-Interest (37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(1))
`The real party-in-interest is Petitioner Apple Inc.
`
`B. Notice of Related Matters (37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(2))
`The ’290 patent is involved in the following cases that may affect or be af-
`
`fected by a decision in this proceeding: DSS Technology Management, Inc. v. Ap-
`
`ple Inc., 6:13-cv-00919-JDL1 and DSS Technology Management, Inc. v. Lenovo
`
`(United States), Inc., 6:14-cv-00525-JDL, both in the Eastern District of Texas. A
`
`Petition for IPR of claims 1-4 of the ’290 patent is concurrently filed.
`
`
`
`
`1 Motion to transfer to the Northern District of California has been granted.
`
`- 2 -
`
`

`
`
`
`C. Designation of Counsel (37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(3))
`
`Back-Up Counsel
`Lead Counsel
`Mark W. Rygiel (Reg. No. 45,871)
`David K.S. Cornwell (Reg. No. 31,944)
`STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN
`STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN
`& FOX P.L.L.C.
`& FOX P.L.L.C.
`1100 New York Avenue, NW
`1100 New York Avenue, NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Washington, DC 20005
`202.772.8510 (telephone)
`202.772.8580 (telephone)
`202.371.2540 (facsimile)
`202.371.2540 (facsimile)
`mrygiel-PTAB@skgf.com
`davidc-PTAB@skgf.com
`D. Notice of Service Information (37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(4))
`
`Please send correspondence to lead counsel at the above address. Apple con-
`
`sents to email service at: davidc-PTAB@skgf.com and mrygiel-PTAB@skgf.com.
`
`III. GROUNDS FOR STANDING (37 C.F.R. § 42.104(a))
`Apple certifies that the ’290 patent is available for IPR. Apple is not barred
`
`or estopped from requesting IPR of any claim of the ’290 patent on the grounds
`
`identified herein. This Petition is filed in accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 42.106(a). A
`
`Power of Attorney and Exhibit List under § 42.10(b) and § 42.63(e), respectively,
`
`are filed herewith. The required fee has been paid through online credit card pay-
`
`ment. The Office is authorized to charge fee deficiencies and credit overpayments
`
`to Deposit Acct. No. 19-0036 (Customer ID No. 63,975).
`
`IV. PRECISE RELIEF REQUESTED (37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a))
`Apple requests IPR and cancellation of claims 6, 7, 9, and 10. Apple’s full
`
`statement of the reasons for the relief requested is set forth below.
`
`
`
`- 3 -
`
`

`
`
`
`V. THE ’290 PATENT
`A. Overview of the ’290 Patent
`The ’290 patent describes a network for “bidirectional wireless data com-
`
`munications between a microcomputer unit and a plurality of peripheral units.”
`
`(’290 patent, 1:11-15.) FIG. 1 illustrates a server microcomputer (11) and associat-
`
`ed peripheral units (21, 29). The server microcomputer can be a personal digital
`
`assistant (“PDA”). (Id. at 2:66-67, FIG. 1.) The “peripheral units,” or “personal
`
`electronic accessories (PEAs),” include “conventional” peripheral devices like a
`
`keyboard and mouse, and “a wide variety of less conventional” peripheral and in-
`
`put devices, like displays on a headband or glasses and “physiological sensors.”
`
`(Id. at 1:62-2:18.) The sensors can be temperature, heartbeat, and respiration sen-
`
`sors for patient monitoring or fitness training. (Id. at 2:10-15.) The microcomputer
`
`and peripherals are linked “in close physical proximity, e.g., within twenty me-
`
`ters,” to establish a common time base or synchronization. (Id. at 1:50-55.)
`
`The ’290 patent seeks to “provide wireless communication between a host or
`
`server microcomputer unit and a plurality of peripheral units” that is reliable, low
`
`power, avoids interference, and relatively simple. (Id. at 1:33-46.) This is purport-
`
`edly achieved by a low duty cycle pulsed operation mode, where transmitters are
`
`active for short durations of time, which “substantially reduces power consumption
`
`and facilitates the rejection of interfering signals.” (Id. at 1:57-61, 2:35-39.)
`
`- 4 -
`
`

`
`
`
`B. Priority Date of the ’290 Patent
`The ’290 patent was filed on October 14, 1997 and assigned Application No.
`
`08/949,999 (“the ’999 application”) (APL 1005) as a continuation-in-part of Ap-
`
`plication No. 08/611,695, filed on March 6, 1996 (“the ’695 application”) (APL
`
`1006). At least claims 9 and 10 are only entitled to the ’290 patent’s October 14,
`
`1997 filing date because they recite new matter added to the ’999 application. The
`
`’695 and ’999 specifications are nearly identical, but the ’999 application added
`
`new disclosure that the peripheral units are “located within short range of the serv-
`
`er unit, e.g. within 20 meters.” (’290 patent, Abstract.) And in comparison to the
`
`’695 application, the ’999 application recites: “the server microcomputer unit and
`
`the several peripheral units which are to be linked are all in close physical proximi-
`
`ty, e.g., under two meters separation within twenty meters”, changing the range of
`
`“close physical proximity” from “under two meters” to “within twenty meters”.
`
`(Compare APL 1006, p. 25 with APL 1005, p. 25.)
`
`Claim 9 specifically claims the newly added features, reciting “a plurality of
`
`peripheral units which provide either input information from the user or output in-
`
`formation to the user, and which are adapted to operate within about 20 meters of
`
`said server unit.” Thus, at least independent claim 9, and its dependent claim 10,
`
`are entitled only to the benefit of the ’290 patent’s October 14, 1997 filing date.
`
`
`
`- 5 -
`
`

`
`
`
`C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) at the time of invention would
`
`have typically had an undergraduate degree in Electrical Engineering and 1-2 years
`
`of experience working with wireless network technology, or equivalent education
`
`and/or work experience. (Grimes Dec. ¶ 9.)
`
`VI. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b), the challenged claims must be given their
`
`broadest reasonable interpretations (“BRI”) in light of the patent specification.
`
`Generally, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning. Phillips v.
`
`AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l
`
`Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The broadest reasonable in-
`
`terpretation must also be consistent with the interpretation a POSA would reach. In
`
`re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
`
`Apple presents interpretations of certain claim limitations under the BRI
`
`standard. Apple reserves the right to present different constructions in the District
`
`Court litigation where a different claim construction standard applies, and does not
`
`acquiesce to being bound in the litigation by claim construction presented herein.
`
`A. “local oscillator”
`The term “local oscillator” appears in challenged claims 6 and 9. Yet its use
`
`in the claims is at odds with the ’290 patent specification. In claim 6, the peripheral
`
`units include “a local oscillator which can be synchronized to said server unit oscil-
`
`- 6 -
`
`

`
`
`
`lator using said synchronizing information.” In claim 9, each peripheral unit has a
`
`“local oscillator” and “a second mode to synchronize the respective local oscillator
`
`with the server unit oscillator.” So, in the claims, the “local oscillator” of the pe-
`
`ripheral unit is synchronized with the server unit oscillator.
`
`The ’290 patent teaches otherwise—the PDA and PEA modems each have a
`
`“crystal oscillator” and a “local oscillator.” (See e.g., ’290 patent, FIGS. 2-3.) The
`
`PDA modem has “a crystal oscillator 18 which is utilized in maintaining the net-
`
`work time base.” (Id. at 4:14-15, FIG. 3.) The PDA modem also has “a local oscil-
`
`lator 16 which is shared by the transmitter and the receiver.” (Id. at 4:11-12, FIG.
`
`3.) Similarly, the PEA modem has “a voltage controlled crystal oscillator oscillator
`
`[sic] 44 which is utilized in maintaining a common time base with the host micro-
`
`computer.” (Id. at 3:36-38; see also id. at 8:40-41, FIG. 2.) The PEA modem also
`
`has “a local oscillator 42 which is shared by the transmitter and the receiver.” (Id.
`
`at 3:33-34, FIG. 2.) In FIG. 4, “transmission is effected using the local oscillator 45
`
`to drive the transmit antenna amplifier 50 whose output drives transmit antenna
`
`51.” (Id. at 4:25-27; see also id. at 4:30-32.)
`
`So the ’290 patent discloses that the “crystal oscillators”—CXO (18) of the
`
`PDA (server unit) and VCXO (44) of the PEA (peripheral unit)—maintain a com-
`
`mon time base (synchronization). And the “local oscillators” drive the transmit an-
`
`tennas. This is how a POSA would have understood the oscillators to work.
`
`- 7 -
`
`

`
`
`
`(Grimes Dec. ¶ 25.) In particular, “local oscillator” is a term of art and its usage in
`
`the ’290 specification to denote a component that drives the transmitter/receiver is
`
`consistent with its commonly understood meaning. (Id.) But this does not square
`
`with the claims, which require that the “local oscillator” of the peripheral unit is
`
`synchronized to the server unit oscillator (i.e., a crystal oscillator “for establishing
`
`a time base).
`
`The ambiguity of the claims and their discord with the specification creates a
`
`peculiar situation. Interpreted literally and consistently with “local oscillator” in
`
`the specification, the claims are unsupported by the specification. In the District
`
`Court litigation, the patent owner recognized this defect and concocted a construc-
`
`tion where “local oscillator” simply means “an oscillator located in a peripheral
`
`unit,” using “local” as an adjective for the oscillator’s location—in the peripheral
`
`unit. (Claim Constr. Brief, pp. 22-24) (APL 1007.) This makes a “local oscillator”
`
`any oscillator in the peripheral unit. This cannot be the case and Apple disagrees
`
`this can be the broadest reasonable interpretation of “local oscillator” in view of
`
`the specification, as required. If the Board adopts this impermissibly broad inter-
`
`pretation of “local oscillator,” the prior art discloses this feature as shown herein.
`
`VII. IDENTIFICATION OF CHALLENGE (37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b))
`A. Statutory Grounds for the Challenge
`Petitioner requests review of claims 6, 7, 9, and 10:
`
`
`
`- 8 -
`
`

`
`
`
`GROUND 1: Claims 9 and 10 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
`
`obvious over by “BodyLANTM: A Low-Power Communications System” by
`
`Thomas J. Barber Jr. (“Barber”).
`
`GROUND 2: Claims 6, 7, 9, and 10 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103
`
`as obvious over U.S. Patent No. 5,241,542 to Natarajan et al. (“Natarajan”) in view
`
`of U.S. Patent No. 4,887,266 to Neve et al. (“Neve”).
`
`GROUND 3: Claims 6 and 7 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as ob-
`
`vious over U.S. Patent No. 5,696,903 to Mahany (“Mahany”).
`
`B. Citation of Prior Art
`Barber (APL 1002) is prior art under at least 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). It was
`
`published at least as early as April 11, 1996, more than 1 year before the priority
`
`date for claims 9 and 10 of the ’290 patent, its October 14, 1997 filing date.
`
`Natarajan (APL 1003) is prior art under at least § 102(b), issuing on August
`
`31, 1993, more than 2 years before the ’290 patent’s earliest possible priority date.
`
`Neve (APL 1004) is prior art under at least § 102(b), issuing on December
`
`12, 1989, more than 6 years before the ’290 patent’s earliest possible priority date.
`
`Mahany (APL 1010) is prior art under at least § 102(e). It was filed on April
`
`29, 1994, almost 2 years before the ’290 patent’s earliest possible priority date.
`
`C. The Proposed Grounds Are Not Redundant
`Apple recognizes the Board may use its discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d)
`
`- 9 -
`
`

`
`
`
`to institute trial only on certain grounds when multiple grounds “are presented in a
`
`redundant manner by a petitioner who makes no meaningful distinction between
`
`them.” Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., CBM2012-00003,
`
`Paper 7, p. 2 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2012). The grounds here are not redundant and
`
`Apple discusses the distinctions below. The Board typically exercises its discretion
`
`when numerous grounds are asserted against the same claims. See e.g., Canon Inc.
`
`v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, IPR2014-00535, Paper 9, pp. 19-20 (P.T.A.B. Sept.
`
`24, 2014) (all 31 claims challenged, total of 49 grounds over multiple petitions).
`
`Here, IPR is requested for only four claims, with just two grounds for each claim.
`
`For this reasonable number of challenged claims and grounds, the Board may insti-
`
`tute inter partes review on all grounds when the petitioner “articulate[s] relative
`
`strengths and weaknesses between references.” Liberty Mutual, CBM2012-00003,
`
`Paper 7 at 3. Apple does so here.
`
`Ground 1 is based on Barber under § 103. Barber alone discloses each claim
`
`limitation in view of a POSA’s knowledge and what would have been obvious to a
`
`POSA. This ground is stronger in that only a single reference is needed for obvi-
`
`ousness. Barber qualifies as prior art under § 102(b) because claims 9-10 recite
`
`new matter added to the ’290 patent and are entitled only to the ’290 patent’s filing
`
`date. This ground is arguably weaker in that the patent owner may argue that Bar-
`
`ber does not qualify as prior art because in the patent owner’s view the ’290 patent
`
`- 10 -
`
`

`
`
`
`is entitled to an earlier priority date (even though it is not). Similarly, Ground 3,
`
`based Mahany alone under § 103, qualifies as prior art under § 102(e), so the pa-
`
`tent owner may argue an earlier conception date.
`
` Ground 2 is based on Natarajan and Neve under § 103. Both references
`
`qualify as prior art under § 102(b) even against the ’290 patent’s earliest possible
`
`priority date. This ground is stronger in that the patent owner cannot attempt to
`
`prove an earlier priority date to overcome the references. This ground is arguably
`
`weaker in that a combination of references is used, rather than a single reference,
`
`to demonstrate obviousness.
`
`Apple would be prejudiced if the Board institutes trial based only on one
`
`ground for each claim. If the Board institutes trial, for example, based only on
`
`Ground 2 and avoids addressing the ’290 patent’s lack of priority, Apple would be
`
`denied the opportunity to present an arguably “stronger” ground. Yet if the Board
`
`institutes trial based only Ground 1, the patent owner might attempt to argue that
`
`the ’290 patent is entitled to an earlier priority date (although it is not) to overcome
`
`Barber. Thus, the totality of the circumstances counsels that the Board should insti-
`
`tute trial for each of the four challenged claims based on both presented grounds.
`
`VIII. GROUNDS OF REJECTION
`A. Ground 1: Claims 9 and 10 would have been obvious in view of Barber.
`1. Overview of Barber
`Barber is a Master’s thesis titled “BodyLANTM: A Low-Power Communica-
`
`- 11 -
`
`

`
`
`
`tions System.” (Barber, p. 1.) Notably, the author thanks Phil Carvey of Bolt
`
`Barenek and Newman. (Id. at 3.) Philip Carvey is the named inventor on the ’290
`
`patent, assigned on its face to BBN Corporation.
`
`Barber describes “a low-power wireless communications system designed to
`
`operate within the sphere of the body.” (Id. at 9.) Barber discloses three network
`
`configurations, including the “Star” in Figure 1a, where all communications occur
`
`through a central node, the “Hub.” (Id.) The other nodes are “Personal Electronic
`
`Assistants (PEAs),” strikingly similar to the ’290 patent’s “personal electronic ac-
`
`cessories (PEAs).” (Id. at 12.) “The Hub is responsible for interfacing with the us-
`
`er, controlling the overall TDMA schedule and gathering and processing the data
`
`from the PEAs. The PEAs are responsible for initializing the connection to the
`
`network, gathering data and transmitting the data to the Hub.” (Id.)
`
`Barber discusses that Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA), Frequency
`
`Division Multiple Access (FDMA), and Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA)
`
`are all well-known methods of dividing communications access, and that TDMA is
`
`preferred for the BodyLANTM. (Id. at 11-12.) In this system, “each node has a
`
`scheduled time to use the channel and is inactive during all other times,” decreas-
`
`ing power consumption. (Id. at 11.) The TDMA system requires “synchronizing
`
`the receiver symbol clock to the transmitter symbol clock.” (Id. at 12.)
`
`Barber describes three operation modes: attachment, synchronization, and
`
`- 12 -
`
`

`
`
`
`TDMA. (Id. at 24.) In attachment, the PEA searches for attachment beacons from
`
`the Hub. (Id. at 26, Figure 13.) Attachment beacons are collected to form an initial
`
`TDMA plan used in the synchronization phase. (Id. at 52.)
`
`A set of 106 attachment beacons contains the entire sequence of bits
`
`necessary to initialized [sic] the TDMA plan. The 106 bits are broken
`
`down as follows: 23 bits for a new, PEA specific code word, 42 bits
`
`define seven 6-bit time intervals for beacon arrival, 6 bits for a PEA
`
`identification number, 6 bits for frequency selection, an 8 bit initiali-
`
`zation flag and a 16 bit checksum. (Id.)
`
`After attachment, synchronization begins. (Id. at 26.) Synchronization bea-
`
`cons are transmitted from the Hub to the PEAs with information to align the local
`
`symbol clock of a PEA with the Hub symbol clock. (Id.) “[T]he synchronization
`
`beacons are based on the code word transmitted to the PEA during the attachment
`
`mode, which is a code specific to that Hub rather than a universal code.” (Id. at
`
`27.) Once the PEA and Hub are synchronized, they transmit and receive according
`
`to the TDMA plan. (Id. at 30.)
`
`2. Independent claim 9 would have been obvious in view of Barber.
`(a) “A data network system for effecting coordinated operation of a
`plurality of electronic devices”
`
`Barber discloses “a communications network designed to gather data from
`
`within the sphere of the body and provide that information to the user through
`
`- 13 -
`
`

`
`
`
`wireless links.” (Barber, p. 2.) In the “Star” configuration, many individual nodes
`
`communicate through a single central node, or “Hub,” which “can conveniently
`
`control all the communications.” (Id. at 9, 10, 12, Figure 1a.) Thus, Barber disclos-
`
`es limitation (a) of claim 9. (Grimes Dec. ¶¶ 57-58.)
`
`(b) “a server microcomputer unit, said server unit including an oscil-
`lator for establishing a time base”
`Barber’s Hub constitutes the “server microcomputer unit.” (Id. at 59.) The
`
`Hub may be battery powered and portable to operate “within the sphere of the
`
`body.” (Barber, pp. 2, 9.) The Hub “can conveniently control all the communica-
`
`tions.” (Id. at 10, Figure 1a.) It has a “central Hub computer” that is “responsible
`
`for presenting the data gathered from the PEAs in a format that is acceptable to the
`
`user.” (Id. at 12-13.)
`
`Barber also discloses that “[s]ynchronizing a TDMA system consists of syn-
`
`chronizing the receiver symbol clock to the transmitter symbol clock.” (Id. at 12
`
`(emphasis added).) A POSA would have understood that the “transmitter symbol
`
`clock” is located in the Hub and responsible “for establishing a time base.”
`
`(Grimes Dec. ¶ 60.) Indeed, the PEA’s local symbol clock is “phase-locked to the
`
`Hub symbol clock.” (Barber pp. 24-25.) This is accomplished by the PEA “[u]sing
`
`a voltage controlled crystal oscillator” because “the frequency will not vary much
`
`and synchronization can be maintained during power down by storing the control
`
`voltage on a capacitor.” (Id. at 12 (emphasis added).) The “voltage controlled crys-
`
`- 14 -
`
`

`
`
`
`tal oscillator” would have been synchronized with a corresponding crystal oscilla-
`
`tor in the Hub, as suggested by the “phase-lock” between the PEA and Hub.
`
`(Grimes Dec. ¶ 60.) This oscillator would have been responsible “for establishing a
`
`time base.” (Id.) Thus, Barber discloses limitation (b) of claim 9. (Id. at 61.)
`
`(c) “a plurality of peripheral units which provide either input infor-
`mation from the user or output information to the user, and
`which are adapted to operate within about 20 meters of said serv-
`er unit”
`
`“The BodyLAN™ architecture consists of two components a central Hub
`
`and many individual nodes, called Personal Electronic Assistants (PEAs).” (Bar-
`
`ber, p. 12, Figure 2.) The PEAs are the “plurality of peripheral units.” (Grimes
`
`Dec. ¶ 62.) The peripheral units “provide either input information from the user or
`
`output information to the user.” (Id. at 63) Sensors of the PEAs “are responsible
`
`for collecting data, which can be provided to the user through the Hub computer.”
`
`(Barber, p. 13.) This collected data is “input information from the user” as contem-
`
`plated by the ’290 patent, for example, the data from “physiological sensors such
`
`as temperature, heartbeat and respiration rate sensors.” (’290 patent, 2:7-25;
`
`Grimes Dec. ¶ 63.) It also would have been obvious for a peripheral unit to be a
`
`display to provide “output information to the user.” (Id. at 64.) In the “Complete”
`
`configuration, each node “has the ability to independently send data to and receive
`
`data from other nodes as well as accept input and deliver output to a user.” (Barber,
`
`p. 10, Figure 1c.) It would have been obvious to integrate this functionality into the
`
`- 15 -
`
`

`
`
`
`“Star” configuration to provide output to the user via a peripheral device instead of
`
`the Hub. (Grimes Dec. ¶ 64.)
`
`Finally, the PEAs are “adapted to operate within about 20 meters of said
`
`server unit.” (Id. at 65.) Barber’s system is “designed to gather data from within
`
`the sphere of the body” (Barber, p. 2), with the Hub (i.e. “server unit”) worn on the
`
`waist or back and the PEAs worn on the wrist (id. at 10). So the PEAs “operate
`
`within about 20 meters” of the Hub. (Grimes Dec. ¶ 65.) Table 1 also shows the
`
`BodyLAN™ range is 6-10 feet. (Barber, p. 9.) Thus, Barber discloses limitation (c)
`
`of claim 9. (Grimes Dec. ¶ 66.)
`
`(d) “said server microcomputer incorporating an RF transmitter
`controlled by said oscillator for sending commands and synchro-
`nizing information to said peripheral units, said synchronizing in-
`formation being carried by time spaced beacons characteristic of
`the particular server unit”
`
`Barber discloses that “the Hub transmitter and receiver oscillators are locked
`
`to a multiple of the Hub symbol clock.” (Barber, p. 28.) Because the Hub has
`
`“transmitter and receiver oscillators,” a POSA would have understood that the Hub
`
`(server microcomputer) includes both a transmitter and a receiver. (Grimes Dec. ¶
`
`67.) The PEA has a radio modem with a transmitter and receiver that operates in
`
`the 320-400 Mhz band. (Barber, p. 15.) Thus, the system operates via radio fr