UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_____________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_____________________
`
`
`
`APPLE INC.
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`DSS TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT, INC.
`Patent Owner
`
`_____________________
`
`Case IPR: Unassigned
`Patent 6,128,290
`_____________________
`
`PETITION FOR INTER PARTES REVIEW
`OF U.S. PATENT NO. 6,128,290
`UNDER 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-319 and 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.1-.80, 42.100-.123
`
`
`
`Mail Stop PATENT BOARD
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OOF CONTTENTS
`
`
`
`ABCD
`
`T ABC
`
`AB
`
`ABC
`
`VII. 
`
`
`..................................
`
`
`
`
`
`
`INNTRODUCCTION ......................................................
`.... 1 
`I. 
`.... 3 
`
`
`
`
`
`II.  MMANDATOORY NOTTICES (37 C.F.R. § 442.8(a)(1))
`
`..................................
`..... 3 
`A. 
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Real Party-In-Innterest (377 C.F.R. § 442.8(b)(1))) ................................
`..... 3 
`B. 
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Noticce of Relatted Matterss (37 C.F.RR. § 42.8(bb)(2)) ..........................
`..... 4 
`C. 
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Desiggnation of Counsel (337 C.F.R. §§ 42.8(b)(33)) .............................
`..... 4 
`
`
`
`
`
`
`D.  Noticce of Serviice Informaation (37 CC.F.R. § 422.8(b)(4)) ...................
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`III.  GGROUNDSS FOR STAANDING ((37 C.F.R.. § 42.104((a)) .............................
`.... 4 
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IV.  SSTATEMEENT OF TTHE PREECISE REELIEF REEQUESTEDD AND TTHE
`.... 5 
`
`
`
`
`
`REASOONS THERREFOR (377 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)) ..................
`
`..................................
`V. 
`
`THE ’290 PPATENT ..
`
`..................................
`
`..................................
`.... 5 
`................
`
`
`
`
`.................ent ............A.  Overrview of the ’290 Pate
`
`..................................
`..... 5 
`B. 
`
`
`
`
`Priorrity Date off the ’290 PPatent........................
`
`..................................
`..... 6 
`C. 
`
`
`
`
`Level of Ordinaary Skill inn the Art ....................
`
`..................................
`..... 8 
`
`
`
`
`
`VI.  CCLAIM COONSTRUCCTION .......................................
`
`..................................
`.... 8 
`A. 
`
`
`“withhin short raange of sai
`
`d server unnit” ..........
`
`..................................
`..... 9 
`B. 
`
`
`
`
`“codee sequencee” ...............................................
`
`..................................
`... 10 
`
`
`
`
`IDDENTIFICCATION OOF CHALLLENGE (3
`
`
`)) ..............7 C.F.R. §§ 42.104(b)
`.. 11 
`A. 
`
`
`
`
`Statuutory Grounnds for thee Challengee ...............
`
`..................................
`... 11 
`B. 
`
`
`
`
`Citation of Prioor Art .........................................
`
`..................................
`... 12 
`C. 
`
`
`
`
`The PProposed GGrounds AAre Not Reddundant....
`
`..................................
`... 12 
`
`
`
`
`
`VIII.  GGROUNDSS OF REJEECTION ....................................
`
`..................................
`.. 15 
`
`
`
`
`AA.  Grouund 1: Claiims 1-4 woould have
`
`
`ew of been obviious in vie
`
`
`Barber. ..............................................................
`
`
`
`..................................
`
`
`
`Overvieww of Barbeer ................................
` 1.
`
`..................................
`view
` 2.
`
`Independdent claim
`
`
`1 would hhave been oobvious in
`
`..................................
`
`
`
`of Barberr. ...............................................
`
`
` 3.
`
`Claim 2 wwould havve been obvvious in vi
`
`ew of Barbber. ...........
`
`
` 4.
`
`Claim 3 wwould havve been obvvious in vi
`
`ew of Barbber. ...........
`
`
` 5.
`
`Claim 4 wwould havve been obvvious in vi
`
`ew of Barbber. ...........
`
`
`Grouund 2: Claims 1-4
`
`would hhave been
`obvious
`over
`
`..................................
`
`
`
`
`Natarrajan in vieew of Nevee. ...............................
` 1.
`
`
`
`Overvieww of Nataraajan ...........................
`
`..................................
`
`... 15 
`.. 15 
`
`.. 18 
`.. 31 
`.. 31 
`.. 32 
`
`... 33 
`.. 33 
`
`
`
`BB. 
`
`i
`
`

`
`.. 37 
`.. 39 
`
`.. 42 
`
`.. 56 
`
`.. 57 
`
`.. 58 
`.. 60 
`
`
`..................................
`
`
`
`Overvieww of Neve ..................................
`
`
`
`
`
`Overvieww of the Coombinationn of Nataraajan and NNeve ..........
`over
`
`
`Independdent claimm 1 would
`
`have beenn obvious
`
`..................................
`
`
`
`Natarajann in view oof Neve. ....................
`an in
`Claim 2
`
`
`
`would havve been obbvious oveer Nataraj
`
`
`
`view of NNeve. .........................................
`
`..................................
`
`
`
`would havve been obbvious oveer Nataraj
`an in
`Claim 3
`
`
`
`view of NNeve. .........................................
`
`..................................
`
`
`
`would havve been obbvious oveer Nataraj
`an in
`Claim 4
`
`
`
`view of NNeve. .........................................
`
`..................................
`
`IX.  CCONCLUSSION .........
`
`..................................
`
`..................................
`................
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
` 2.
` 3.
` 4.
`
` 5.
`
` 6.
`
` 7.
`
`

`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases 
`
`Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`342 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003) .............................................................................. 8
`
`Canon Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC,
`IPR2014-00535, Paper 9 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 24, 2014) ............................................ 13
`
`In re Cortright,
`165 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999) .............................................................................. 8
`
`KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) ...................................................................................... 42, 48
`
`Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co.,
`CBM2012-00003, Paper 7 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2012) ........................................... 13
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .............................................................................. 8
`
`Statutes 
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102 ........................................................................................................ 11
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102(b) ...................................................................................... 12, 13, 14
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103 ..................................................................................... 11, 12, 13, 14
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 .......................................................................................................... 9
`
`35 U.S.C. § 325(d) ................................................................................................... 12
`
`Rules 
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.10(b) .................................................................................................. 4
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) ................................................................................................ 8
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(a) ................................................................................................. 4
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) .............................................................................................. 11
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.106(a) ................................................................................................. 4
`
`iii
`
`

`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a) ................................................................................................... 5
`37 C.F.R. §42.22(a) ................................................................................................. ..5
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.63(e) ................................................................................................... 4
`37 C.F.R. §42.63(e) ................................................................................................. ..4
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(1)) ............................................................................................... 3
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(1)) ............................................................................................. ..3
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(1) ................................................................................................ 3
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(1) .............................................................................................. ..3
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(2) ................................................................................................ 3
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(2) .............................................................................................. ..3
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(3) ................................................................................................ 4
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(3) .............................................................................................. ..4
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(4) ................................................................................................ 4
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(4) .............................................................................................. ..4
`
`
`
`iv
`iv
`
`

`
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Apple Inc. petitions for inter partes review of claims 1-4 of United States
`
`Patent No. 6,128,290 to Carvey, titled “Personal Data Network” (“the ’290 pa-
`
`tent”) (APL 1001). The claims of the ’290 patent recite nothing more than the
`
`combination of well-known concepts. Indeed, the ’290 patent specification is little
`
`more than a recitation of well-known techniques patent owner admits are in the
`
`prior art. The ’290 patent characterizes its alleged inventions by describing that
`
`“the general scheme of data transmission and reception is a form of time division
`
`multiple access (TDMA).” (’290 patent, 3:57-59.) The ’290 patent plainly admits
`
`that its “basic modulation scheme is frequency shift keying (FSK), well known to
`
`those skilled in digital radio transmission.” (Id. at 3:65-67 (emphasis added).) The
`
`’290 patent describes a litany of other “well-known” aspects of the alleged inven-
`
`tions, for example:
`
` The oscillator phase shift illustrated in FIG. 5 shows the Im and Qm
`
`signals, “the so-called ‘in-phase’ and ‘quadrature-phase’ signals
`
`commonly known to radio engineers” (id. at 4:51-57 (emphasis add-
`
`ed));
`
` The “all pass phase shifters” disclosed were “well known” (id. at
`
`5:21-33);
`
`- 1 -
`
`

`
` The disclosed “limiter circuits” “are well known and have been inte-
`
`grated into integrated receiver chips for many years” (id. at 5:38-41
`
`(emphasis added));
`
` In describing various operational modes, the ’290 patent admits,
`
`“[w]hile all these operational modes appear different, they are essen-
`
`tially well known variants to the underlying time division multiple
`
`access technique” (id. at 6:16-29 (emphasis added));
`
` Capturing data from only the stronger “RF bursts” in TDMA schemes
`
`is a “well known aspect of FM modulation” (id. at 6:36-41 (emphasis
`
`added));
`
` “Interleaving” is “a well known scheme to handle burst errors” (id. at
`
`7:1-4 (emphasis added)); and
`
` In describing the “error correction” that occurs “[w]hen codewords
`
`from separate ensembles are aligned”, the ’290 patent discloses that
`
`“[a]s is well known, this uncorrectible error rate is sufficiently low
`
`that…an effectively error free channel can be obtained.” (Id. at 7:52-
`
`62 (emphasis added)).
`
`The ’290 patent purports to divert from well-known TDMA schemes be-
`
`cause transmissions occur “in only those slots indicated by a TDMA program…For
`
`each slot, this TDMA program indicates that a PEA or host is to transmit, or not,
`
`- 2 -
`
`

`
`and whether it will receive, or not. In the intervals between slots in which a PEA is
`
`to transmit or receive, all receive and transmit circuits are powered down.” (Id. at
`
`3:67-4:8.) But this allegedly point of novelty was also well-known, as explained in
`
`detail below. Thus, none of the ’290 patent’s claims recite a patentable invention.
`
`Rather, the ’290 patent has taken from the public technology that was already in
`
`the public domain or would have been obvious to one of skill in the art. The ’290
`
`patent should never have issued. Its uncommon and frankly ambiguous terms veil
`
`the well-known concepts described in the ’290 patent and recited in the ’290 pa-
`
`tent’s claims.
`
`Accordingly, Apple respectfully requests inter partes review of claims 1-4
`
`and that these claims be found invalid.
`
`II. MANDATORY NOTICES (37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(1))
`A. Real Party-In-Interest (37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(1))
`The real party-in-interest is Petitioner Apple Inc.
`
`B. Notice of Related Matters (37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(2))
`The ’290 patent is involved in the following cases that may affect or be af-
`
`fected by a decision in this proceeding: DSS Technology Management, Inc. v. Ap-
`
`ple Inc., 6:13-cv-00919-JDL1 and DSS Technology Management, Inc. v. Lenovo
`
`
`1 A motion to transfer to Northern District of California has been granted.
`
`- 3 -
`
`

`
`(United States), Inc., 6:14-cv-00525-JDL, both in the Eastern District of Texas. A
`
`Petition for Inter Partes Review of claims 6, 7, 9, and 10 of the ’290 patent is con-
`
`currently filed.
`
`C. Designation of Counsel (37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(3))
`
`Lead Counsel
`David K.S. Cornwell (Reg. No. 31,944)
`STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN
`& FOX P.L.L.C.
`1100 New York Avenue, NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`202.772.8580 (telephone)
`202.371.2540 (facsimile)
`davidc-PTAB@skgf.com
`
`Back-Up Counsel
`Mark W. Rygiel (Reg. No. 45,871)
`STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN
`& FOX P.L.L.C.
`1100 New York Avenue, NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`202.772.8510 (telephone)
`202.371.2540 (facsimile)
`mrygiel-PTAB@skgf.com
`
`D. Notice of Service Information (37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(4))
`
`Please direct all correspondence to lead counsel at the above address. Apple
`
`consents
`
`to
`
`email
`
`service
`
`at: davidc-PTAB@skgf.com
`
`and mrygiel-
`
`PTAB@skgf.com.
`
`III. GROUNDS FOR STANDING (37 C.F.R. § 42.104(a))
`Apple certifies pursuant to Rule 42.104(a) that the ’290 patent is available
`
`for IPR, and that Apple is not barred or estopped from requesting IPR of any claim
`
`of the ’290 patent on the grounds identified herein. This Petition is filed in accord-
`
`ance with 37 C.F.R. § 42.106(a). A Power of Attorney and Exhibit List pursuant to
`
`§ 42.10(b) and § 42.63(e), respectively, are filed herewith. The required fee has
`
`been paid through online credit card payment. The Office is authorized to charge
`
`- 4 -
`
`

`
`fee deficiencies and credit overpayments to Deposit Acct. No. 19-0036 (Customer
`
`ID No. 63,975).
`
`IV. STATEMENT OF THE PRECISE RELIEF REQUESTED AND THE
`REASONS THEREFOR (37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a))
`
`Apple requests IPR and cancellation of claims 1-4. Apple’s full statement of
`
`the reasons for the relief requested is set forth below.
`
`V. THE ’290 PATENT
`A. Overview of the ’290 Patent
`The ’290 patent describes a data network for “bidirectional wireless data
`
`communications between a microcomputer unit and a plurality of peripheral units.”
`
`(’290 patent, 1:11-15.) FIG. 1 of the ’290 patent illustrates the server microcom-
`
`puter (11) and associated peripheral units (21, 29). The ’290 patent describes that
`
`the “server microcomputer” can be a personal digital assistant (“PDA”). (Id. at
`
`2:66-67.) The “peripheral units,” referred to
`
`generally as “personal electronic accesso-
`
`ries (PEAs),” include “conventional” pe-
`
`ripheral devices such as a keyboard and
`
`mouse, and also “a wide variety of less conventional” peripheral and input devices,
`
`including body-mounted accessories such as displays “mounted on a headband or
`
`eyeglasses,” and “physiological sensors.” (Id. at 1:62-2:18.) For example, the phys-
`
`iological sensors can be temperature, heartbeat, and respiration sensors for patient
`
`- 5 -
`
`

`
`monitoring and fitness training. (Id. at 2:10-15.) The server microcomputer and pe-
`
`ripherals are linked “in close physical proximity, e.g., within twenty meters,” to es-
`
`tablish a common time base or synchronization. (Id. at 1:50-55.)
`
`The goal of the ’290 patent is to “provide wireless communication between a
`
`host or server microcomputer unit and a plurality of peripheral units” that is “relia-
`
`ble,” “low power,” “avoids interference from nearby similar systems,” and is “rela-
`
`tively simple.” (Id. at 1:33-46.) This goal is purportedly achieved, in part, by gen-
`
`erating “code sequences” which control the operation of transmitters in a low duty
`
`cycle pulsed mode of operation. (Id. at 1:57-61, 2:35-39.) This allows the transmit-
`
`ters to only be active for short durations of time, which “substantially reduces
`
`power consumption and facilitates the rejection of interfering signals.” (Id. at 1:59-
`
`61.) The ’290 patent describes that “[t]he codes are mostly zeros with three scat-
`
`tered ones representing the locations of the slots in which RF bursts are to be
`
`transmitted or received.” (Id. at 7:27-29.) Thus, the ’290 patent’s alleged point of
`
`novelty is using a code sequence to designate when devices are to transmit or re-
`
`ceive data.
`
`Priority Date of the ’290 Patent
`
`B.
`The ’290 patent was filed on October 14, 1997 and assigned Application No.
`
`08/949,999 (“the ’999 application”). It is a continuation-in-part of U.S. Application
`
`No. 08/611,695, filed on March 6, 1996 (“the ’695 application”)(APL 1006). But
`
`- 6 -
`
`

`
`independent claim 1 of the ’290 patent, and its dependent claims 2-4, are entitled
`
`only to the benefit of the ’290 patent’s October 14, 1997 filing date because they
`
`recite new matter added to the ’999 application.
`
`The specifications of the ’999 application and the ’695 application are nearly
`
`identical, except for two features that were added to the ’999 application and spe-
`
`cifically claimed in the ’290 patent. The ’999 application added new disclosure
`
`that the peripheral units are “located within short range of the server unit, e.g. with-
`
`in 20 meters.” (’290 patent, Abstract.) Additionally, in comparison to the ’695 ap-
`
`plication, the ’999 application was changed as shown: “the server microcomputer
`
`unit and the several peripheral units which are to be linked are all in close physical
`
`proximity, e.g., under two meters separation within twenty meters”. (Compare
`
`APL 1006, p. 25 with APL 1005, p. 25.) Thus, the ’999 application added that the
`
`peripheral units are “located within short range of the server unit” and also extend-
`
`ed the range of “close physical proximity” from “under two meters” to “within
`
`twenty meters”.
`
`The ’290 patent specifically claims the newly added features first disclosed
`
`in the ’999 application. Independent claim 1 recites “a plurality of peripheral units
`
`which are battery powered and portable, which provide either input information
`
`from the user or output information to the user, and which are adapted to operate
`
`within short range of said server unit”. Therefore, independent claim 1 and its de-
`
`- 7 -
`
`

`
`pendent claims 2-4, are entitled only to the benefit of the ’290 patent’s October 14,
`
`1997 filing date.
`
`C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) at the time of invention would
`
`have typically had an undergraduate degree in Electrical Engineering and 1-2 years
`
`of experience working with wireless network technology, or equivalent education
`
`and/or work experience. (Grimes Dec. ¶ 9.) Further, a POSA would have had
`
`knowledge of and understood commonly known devices, methods, and techniques
`
`in this field, for example, those described as “well known” in the ’290 patent.
`
`VI. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b), the challenged claims must be given their
`
`broadest reasonable interpretations in light of the patent specification. Generally,
`
`claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning. Phillips v. AWH
`
`Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade
`
`Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The broadest reasonable interpre-
`
`tation must also be consistent with the interpretation that those skilled in the art
`
`would reach. In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
`
`Apple presents herein interpretations of certain claim limitations under the
`
`broadest reasonable interpretation standard. Apple reserves the right to present dif-
`
`ferent constructions in the District Court litigation where a different claim con-
`
`- 8 -
`
`

`
`struction standard applies, and in no way acquiesces to being bound in the District
`
`Court litigation by the claim construction presented in this Petition.
`
` “within short range of said server unit”
`
`A.
`The term “within short range of said server unit” appears in challenged
`
`claim 1. The ’290 patent added as new matter that the peripheral units are “located
`
`within short range of the server unit, e.g. within 20 meters.” This feature was add-
`
`ed only to the Abstract and then specifically claimed in claim 1. While the ’290 pa-
`
`tent uses “within 20 meters” as an example (by using “e.g.”), this is the only indi-
`
`cation in the ’290 patent as to what the newly added term “short range” means. No
`
`other “examples” are provided. And the term “short range” has no commonly ac-
`
`cepted meaning in the art. (Grimes Dec. ¶ 23.) Accordingly, a POSA would not
`
`have understood this term to have a meaning outside of the guidance provided by
`
`the specification. (Id.) Thus, if the example provided by the specification is ig-
`
`nored, the term “short range” is indefinite.2 So the term must be construed in view
`
`of the specification. Since the only guidance in the ’290 patent specification for
`
`this newly added feature is “within 20 meters”, Apple submits that the broadest
`
`
`2 While Apple understands that indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112 cannot
`
`be raised in inter partes review, because this term would be indefinite on its own, it
`
`must be construed in view of the ’290 patent specification.
`
`- 9 -
`
`

`
`reasonable interpretation of “within short range of said server unit” is “within 20
`
`meters of said server unit.”
`
` “code sequence”
`
`B.
`The term “code sequence” appears in challenged claims 1 and 3. A “code
`
`sequence” is not a term of art and therefore must be construed in view of the ’290
`
`patent specification. The ’290 patent describes that “[u]sing the common time base,
`
`code sequences are generated which control the operation of the several transmit-
`
`ters in a low duty cycle pulsed mode of operation.” (’290 patent, 1:57-59 (empha-
`
`sis added).) The ’290 patent further describes that, “[t]he server and peripheral unit
`
`transmitters are energized in low duty cycle pulses at intervals which are deter-
`
`mined by a code sequence which is timed in relation to the synchronizing infor-
`
`mation initially transmitted from the server microcomputer”, which is similar to
`
`the language recited in claim 1. (Id. at 2:35-39 (emphasis added).) The ’290 patent
`
`also discloses that the PEA controller is responsible for “acquiring from the host
`
`appropriate code sequences to be used in data communications.” (Id. at 3:43-44.)
`
`The phrase “code sequence” is not used anywhere else in the ’290 patent,
`
`although the ’290 patent also uses “Optically Orthogonal Codes” and “codewords.”
`
`(Id. at 7:15-44.) “The codes are mostly zeros with three scattered ones represent-
`
`ing the locations of the slots in which RF bursts are to be transmitted or received.”
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`(Id. at 7:26-29 (emphasis added).)
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`- 10 -
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`Therefore, a “code sequence” is a series of ones and zeros (i.e., values) rep-
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`resenting possible transmission time slots. A “one” indicates that a unit will trans-
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`mit in that time slot and, therefore, its transmitter will be energized. A “zero” indi-
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`cates that a unit will not transmit, and so its transmitter will not be energized. Ac-
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`cordingly, Apple submits that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term
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`“code sequence” in view of the ’290 patent specification is “a series of values,
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`where each value in the series represents a time slot where a unit’s transmitter is
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`energized or a time slot where a unit’s transmitter is depowered.”
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`VII. IDENTIFICATION OF CHALLENGE (37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b))
`A.
`Statutory Grounds for the Challenge
`Petitioner requests review of claims 1-4 on two grounds:
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`GROUND 1: Claims 1-4 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious
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`over by “BodyLANTM: A Low-Power Communications System” by Thomas J.
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`Barber Jr. (“Barber”).3
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`3 Although Apple believes claims 1-4 are also anticipated by Barber under
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`35 U.S.C. § 102, due to the page limit of this Petition, Apple presents herein that
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`claims 1-4 are clearly obvious in view of Barber.
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`GROUND 2: Claims 1-4 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious
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`over U.S. Patent No. 5,241,542 to Natarajan et al. (“Natarajan”) in view of U.S.
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`Patent No. 4,887,266 to Neve et al. (“Neve”).
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`B. Citation of Prior Art
`Petitioner cites the following prior art references:
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`BodyLANTM: A Low-Power Communications System by Thomas J. Bar-
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`ber Jr. (APL 1002) is prior art under at least 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because it was
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`published at least as early as April 11, 1996, more than one year prior to the proper
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`priority date for claims 1-4 of the ’290 patent, its October 14, 1997 filing date.
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`U.S. Patent No. 5,241,542 to Natarajan et al. (APL 1003) is prior art under
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`at least 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because it issued on August 31, 1993, more than 2 years
`
`before the earliest possible priority date of the ’290 patent.
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`U.S. Patent No. 4,887,266 to Neve et al. (APL 1004) is prior art under at
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`least 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because it issued on December 12, 1989, more than 6
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`years before the earliest possible priority date of the ’290 patent.
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`C. The Proposed Grounds Are Not Redundant
`Apple recognizes that the Board may use its discretion under 35 U.S.C. §
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`325(d) to institute trial only on certain grounds when multiple grounds “are pre-
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`sented in a redundant manner by a petitioner who makes no meaningful distinction
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`between them.” Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co.,
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`- 12 -
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`CBM2012-00003, Paper 7, p. 2 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2012). The grounds presented
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`here are not redundant and Apple discusses the distinction between them below.
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`The Board has typically exercised its discretion when numerous proposed grounds
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`are asserted against the same claims. For example, the Board recently exercised its
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`discretion where all 31 claims of a patent were challenged and the petitioner pre-
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`sented at total of 49 grounds over multiple petitions. See e.g., Canon Inc. v. Intel-
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`lectual Ventures I LLC, IPR2014-00535, Paper 9, pp. 19-20 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 24,
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`2014). Such is not the case here. Only four claims are presented for inter partes re-
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`view, challenged under just two distinct grounds.
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`In view of the reasonable number of challenged claims and grounds present-
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`ed, Apple also points out that the Board may institute inter partes review on any
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`and all grounds where the petitioner “articulate[s] relative strengths and weakness-
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`es between references.” Liberty Mutual, CBM2012-00003, Paper 7 at 3. Apple
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`does so here.
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`The first ground presented is based on the Barber thesis. Barber is asserted
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`under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as disclosing each of the claim limitations on its own in
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`view of the knowledge of a POSA and what would have been obvious to a POSA.
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`In this respect, this ground is stronger in that only a single reference is needed to
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`render the claims obvious. Apple asserts that Barber qualifies as prior art under 35
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`U.S.C. § 102(b) because the claims against which Barber is asserted are entitled
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`only to the filing date of the ’290 patent. These claims specifically recite new mat-
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`ter added to the application that became the ’290 patent. In this respect, this ground
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`is arguably weaker in that the patent owner may argue that Barber does not qualify
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`as prior art because in the patent owner’s view the ’290 patent is entitled to an ear-
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`lier priority date (even though it is not entitled to an earlier date).
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`The second ground of rejection is based on the Natarajan and Neve patents.
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`This combination is asserted under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as rendering each of the chal-
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`lenged claims obvious. Both Natarajan and Neve qualify as prior art under 35
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`U.S.C. § 102(b) even based on the earliest possible priority date for the ’290 pa-
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`tent. Thus, the combination of Natarajan and Neve is stronger in that the patent
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`owner cannot even attempt to prove the claims are entitled to an earlier priority
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`date to overcome these references. However, this ground is arguably weaker in that
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`a combination of references is used, rather than a single reference, to demonstrate
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`the obviousness of the challenged claims.
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`Apple would be prejudiced by the Board’s decision to institute trial based
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`only on Barber or the combination of Natarajan and Neve. If the Board institutes
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`trial, for example, based only on Natarajan and Neve and thereby avoids address-
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`ing the ’290 patent’s lack of priority, Apple would be denied the opportunity to
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`present what is arguably the “stronger” ground of rejection. Yet if the Board insti-
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`tutes trial based only on Barber and the patent owner somehow proves an earlier
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`priority
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`date, Appple could loose the oppportunity tto challengge claims tthat are cleearly
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`unpatenntable.
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`AAccordinglyy, the totaality of thee circumstaances here
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`counsels
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`that the BBoard
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`should
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`use its disscretion too institute
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`trial for e
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`based o
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`unds.
`n both presented gro
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`ach of thee four challlenged claaims
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`VIII. GGROUNDSS OF REJJECTION
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`
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`A. Grouund 1: Claaims 1-4 wwould havee been obvvious in vieew of Barb
`ber.
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`A E
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`Each and eevery limittation of cclaims 1-44 is disclossed by Baarber or wwould
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`have beeen obviouus to a POSSA in vieww of Barbeer. Therefoore, Barberr renders oobvi-
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`ous claiims 1-4 of the ’290 patent.
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`of Barber
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`TThe Barber reference
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`System.”
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`
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`is a Masteer’s thesis ttitled “BoddyLANTM:
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`A Low-Poower
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` O1. Overview o
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`Commuunications
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`(Barber, pp. 1.) Notaably, the auuthor, Thoomas J. Baarber
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`Jr., thannks Phil Carvey of BBolt Barennek and Neewman. (Idd. at 3.) Phhilip Carveey is
`
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`the nammed inventoor on the ’2290 patent,, assigned
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`on its facee to BBN CCorporationn.
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`BBarber is ddirected too “a low-ppower wirreless commmunicatio
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`ns systemm de-
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`signed tto operate
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`within thee sphere off the body.
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`” (Id. at
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`9.) Barbber disclosses three ppossible neetwork connfigura-
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`tions, inncluding thhe “Star” cconfiguration, shownn in Fig-
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`ure 1a
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`of Barbeer, where
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`
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`all commmunication
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`s occur
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`
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`throughh a central nnode calledd the “Hubb.” (Id.) Baarber descrribes that tthe other nnodes
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`are called “Personal Electronic Assistants (PEAs),” a term strikingly similar to the
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`’290 patent’s “personal electronic accessories (PEAs).” (Id. at 12.) Barber de-
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`scribes the roles of the Hub and PEAs:
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`The Hub is responsible for interfacing with the user, controlling the
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`overall TDMA schedule and gathering and processing the data from
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`the PEAs. The PEAs are responsible for initializing the connection to
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`the network, gathering data and transmitting the data to the Hub.
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`(Id.)
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`Barber discusses that Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA), Frequency
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`Division Multiple Access (FDMA), and Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA)
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`are all well-known methods of dividing communications access, and that TDMA is
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`the preferred method for the BodyLANTM system. (Id. at 11-12.) In Barber’s
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`TDMA system, “each node has a scheduled time to use the channel and is inactive
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`during all other times,” which decreases power consumption. (Id. at 11.) The
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`TDMA system requires “synchronizing the receiver symbol clock to the transmit-
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`ter symbol clock.” (Id. at 12.)
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`Barber describes three modes of operation: attachment, synchronization, and
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`TDMA. (Id. at 24.) During attachment, the PEA searches for attachment beacons
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`from the Hub. (Id. at 26.) Attachment beacons are the same for all PEAs—a 23 bit
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`code word expanded to 32 bits and transmitted during a 520 bit period, shown in
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`- 16 -
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`Figure 13. (Id. at 51-52.) The attachment beacons are collected to form an initial
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`TDMA plan used during the synchronization phase. (Id. at 52.) Barber describes
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`that:
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`A set of 106 attachment beacons contains the entire sequence of bits
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`necessary to initialized [sic] the TDMA plan. The 106 bits are broken
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`down as follows: 23 bits for a new, PEA specific code word, 42 bits
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`define seven 6-bit time intervals for beacon arrival, 6 bits for a PEA
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`iden