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`Copyduty: Saving Fair Use in the Coming Era of "Privacation"
`
`Glenn Otis Brown
`
`We may well see the day when our students are taught not of "copyright" but of "copyduty" — the legal duty of
`copyright holders to assure public access. That, I believe, would be progress. — Professor Larry Lessig 1
`
`Today, the Internet is a pirate’s paradise, or at least it is perceived as such. The instant and practically costless copying
`and distribution the Net facilitates have made many creators, authors, and copyright-holders balk at digitizing and posting
`their ideas. In an effort to protect their work, publishers and other idea-peddlers have lobbied for stricter legal intellectual
`property [IP] protection. More important, they have scrambled to develop code solutions to the copying problem.
`
`As a result, argues Mark Stefik, "technology is altering the balance again." 2 In the near future, trusted systems may
`provide IP owners with far more protection than the law currently does. "[S]ome legal scholars believe the change is so
`dramatic," says Stefik, "that publishers will be left with too much power, undercutting the rights and needs of consumers
`and librarians." 3 Intellectual property, despite Thomas Jefferson, may not necessarily be "incapable of confinement or
`exclusive appropriation." 4 Some fear that IP owners will keep their goods locked up well past the copyright lifespan, that
`fair use will become an empty privilege, and that even uncopyrightable works will be kept outside the public domain. The
`Internet could become the proprietor’s paradise—not the pirate’s—with even the fairest of users at the mercy of protective
`code. Those who celebrate the death of copyright may find themselves dancing upon the grave of fair use.
`
`It is in this context that Lessig’s "copyduty" notion comes into play. Those of Lessig’s mindset 5 express concern that
`self-help run amok may upset the balance of copyright law. Far from an absolute right, copyright is merely a means to the
`end of a society rich with ideas and innovation. "The protection that the law allows is just enough to create an incentive to
`produce," says Lessig, "and is not so much as to produce a choke on future production." 6 Thus, the "copyduty" camp
`argues that copyright law—at least as it applies to Net-based IP—must undergo a fundamental transformation. In the
`traditional world of publication, copyright’s role was to intervene on behalf of IP holders’ rights. In the future, in the world of
`"privacation," it must step in to check proprietors’ unlimited private power to ensure public access to creative works.
`
`Such a change would not be minor. As it is now written and construed, Section 107 of the Copyright Act—the "fair use"
`provision—only permits alleged copyright infringers to make fair use copyrighted works; it does not entitle them to do so
`on demand. Procedurally, it serves as an affirmative defense, not an independent cause of action. In the language of legal
`realist forefather Wesley Hohfeld, fair use is a privilege, not a right. Copyduty, on the other hand, would make fair use a
`right, and, as its name implies, impose a duty upon IP holders to grant the public fair use upon request.
`
`Yet how would such a regime be implemented and enforced? Are copyright-protective trusted systems to be selectively
`broken up by government power, or could private action, led by enterprising code-breakers, suffice? And what kinds of
`challenges—legal and logistical—would copyduty face? Despite the appeal of their rhetoric, Lessig and other friends of
`fair use offer no clear vision of the specifics of copyduty.
`
`At risk of biting off more than it can chew, this paper seeks to sketch a picture of how such a system might be
`implemented. First, I address and attempt to dispense with the possible legal and political hurdles copyduty would face,
`including objections based on First and Fifth Amendment grounds. Second, I explore the feasibility of various copyduty
`enforcement mechanisms.
`
`Throughout, the question "How is the Internet Different?" looms in the background. To attempt to answer this question, I
`will refer back from time to time to a simple cyberspace-versus-realspace analogy. While many cyber-pundits compare
`trusted systems to safes or lockboxes, I prefer a different, though far from perfect, comparison: fair use under copyduty
`would be like a public easement—say, a sidewalk. The trusted system, then, would be analogous to a fence.
`
`Let me explain. Fair use is a limitation on a copyright holder’s property interest; similarly, the concept of a public easement
`is a limitation upon a real (in both senses) property owner’s interests. Like fair use, a sidewalk benefits the public at the
`cost of an individual owner’s absolute dominion of her property. And just as a pedestrian could invoke the power of the
`government to prevent a landowner from blocking the sidewalk running through her front lawn, a fair user under copyduty
`could legally force an IP owner to grant access to her work. I ask the reader to keep this analogy in mind as the paper
`progresses.
`
`I. Copyduty and the Constitution—Legal Challenges
`
`Would Copyduty Amount to Compelled Speech or "Forced" Association?
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`
`Foes of copyduty might invoke the First Amendment doctrine of compelled speech or argue that copyduty violates an IP
`owner’s freedom of association. By what right, the argument might go, does the government demand that I let anyone else
`quote my words, my ideas, my expressions?
`
`In light of the First Amendment, an opponent of copyduty might argue, cracks appear in my simple fair-use-as-sidewalk
`analogy. Making a citizen give up exclusive control over part of her land is contentious enough; forcibly dislodging her
`words or expressions—for use by a total stranger or even a political rival—is completely unacceptable.
`
`A relatively simple, though extreme, hypothetical would test even the most zealous copyduty advocate’s dedication.
`Imagine that the NAACP posts a code-protected editorial on its website, and a white supremacist organization demands
`that the NAACP do its "copyduty" by allowing them to copy the piece and add their own comments in the margins and
`between the lines—arguably a fair use of the document. Surely society cannot ask the NAACP to associate itself with its
`mortal enemy.
`
`But it is not such a simple case. First, no one reading the white supremacists’ "annotated" version of the press release
`would confuse its message with the NAACP’s. No one would think that the NAACP has suddenly endorsed or become
`affiliated with the hate group. In this regard, the most extreme cases might be the easiest ones; a trickier case would
`involve a copyist whose philosophy or identity closely resembles the IP owner’s. Yet even this latter scenario would not
`prove too problematic, since the common law doctrines of misappropriation, false advertising, and unfair competition
`would likely prevent forced fair uses that bordered on "passing off" or other forms of consumer deception.
`
`Second, the First Amendment argument could be flipped in copyduty’s defense: the spirit of the First Amendment calls for
`the free flow of ideas, and the notions of "fair use" and "public domain"—concepts copyduty is designed to protect—are
`imbued with the same spirit of free information exchange. 7 From this angle, speech is not an individual’s private property,
`but part of the public discourse. Remember that the ultimate aim of copyright, and the constitutional provision from which it
`stems, is not to protect individual IP owners, but "to Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 8
`
`Copyduty, therefore, might be the Constitution’s agent rather than its adversary. It could prove a useful tool in checking the
`power trusted systems grant IP owners, thereby helping to achieve the constitutional balance between rewarding authors
`and fostering a rich public exchange of ideas.
`
`Would Enforcing Copyduty Amount to a Takings?
`
`Copyduty might also face Fifth Amendment challenges based upon the doctrine of Takings. Opponents of copyduty might
`apply the phrase "Nor Shall Private Property Be Taken For Public Use Without Just Compensation" to the affirmative right
`of fair use. 9 After all, a fair use doctrine actively enforced by the government is a "public use"—as I have argued
`above—and copyrighted and encoded IP certainly appears to be private property. Recall the sidewalk analogy: if the
`government establishes a public easement across your front lawn, chances are high they will have to pay you for it.
`Likewise with copyduty, some might argue. And a regime in which every copyduty "Taking" were subject to litigation and
`constitutional scrutiny would likely be a prohibitively inefficient and expensive one.
`
`Yet the Fifth Amendment challenge is not difficult to overcome. The key lies in the word "to take" and in the nature of
`intellectual property. Unlike real property, intellectual property can be "taken" and used without being diminished or
`affected. When the government lays a concrete strip across your front yard, you can no longer grow flowers in that area;
`when the government lets schoolteachers freely copy your web-based photographs, the images remain whole and
`unaltered for your use and enjoyment.
`
`Furthermore, many of the factors weighed in a Takings analysis are already built into Section 107, the fair use statute.
`Where the Takings doctrine asks how strong and "public" the purpose of the regulation is, Part 1 of Section 107 calls upon
`courts to assess "the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
`nonprofit educational purposes." 10 Where Takings analysis considers the type of property entitlement abridged and the
`degree to which the private property is quasi-public 11 , Part 2 of Section 107 looks to "the nature of the copyrighted work."
`12 Where Takings considers the net effect of a regulation upon the worth of an entire property, Part 3 of Section 107
`weighs "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole." 13 Where Takings
`asks how severe the adverse economic impact of the regulation, Part 4 of Section 107 considers "the effect of the use
`upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." 14 Given these similarities—and since copyduty would be
`enforced only when a fair use was found—subjecting copyduty to a Takings analysis would be largely redundant.
`
`Copyduty and the Right to Bear Arms?
`
`If the reader will permit me to indulge a whim, I will now briefly consider a Second Amendment analogy to copyduty. In the
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`(cid:51)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:50)(cid:90)(cid:81)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:38)(cid:82)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:42)(cid:88)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:43)(cid:82)(cid:79)(cid:71)(cid:76)(cid:81)(cid:74)(cid:86)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:44)(cid:81)(cid:70)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:40)(cid:91)(cid:75)(cid:76)(cid:69)(cid:76)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:19)(cid:21)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:83)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:21)
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`debate over the future of trusted systems, some commentators have articulated a concern that a purely private, self-help
`regime will result in "code wars" between hack-savvy fair users and code-happy IP owners. The escalation of technology
`envisioned is sometimes described as a kind of "arms race." Given this terminology, it is possible (though highly unlikely)
`that the rhetoric resembling that of the gun-control debate seeps into the trusted systems discourse.
`
`Yet, considering the philosophical implications of the trusted systems issue, perhaps it is not too far-fetched an analogy.
`Like the NRA, the foes of copyduty and the champions of trusted systems do not fear private means of self-defense and
`are reluctant to hand the implements of power (guns, code) over to the government. Like gun-control advocates, the
`copyduty camp are loath to leave powerful weapons in private hands and prefer a policeman/copyduty-cop on every street
`corner to a gun/trusted system in every home(page).
`
`Unlike guns, though, trusted systems can be narrowly customized to work only against certain trespassers, and are
`passive, defensive weapons—again, more akin to fences than firearms. 15
`
`II. But Is Government Intervention Necessary? Possible?
`
`Having examined some possible constitutional objections to copyduty, I now turn to the more serious logistical challenges
`of instituting such a regime. Problems of enforcement on the Net are notorious. The speed and anonymity with which
`outlaws can operate—and the jurisdictional tangles associated with an international network—spell the end of traditional
`legal enforcement, or so goes conventional wisdom.
`
`So would government-enforced fair use be a futile, albeit well intentioned, policy? Wouldn’t a market solution be a more
`feasible alternative? Despite the chorus of support for such a position, I am skeptical that the problem will take care of
`itself without some form of government initiative.
`
`Take John Perry Barlow’s approach, perhaps best summarized in his essay "The Economy of Ideas" and in his recent
`"appearance" in the Atlantic Monthly’s "Roundtable on Intellectual Property." In Barlow’s vision of the future of cyberspace,
`authors will make their works available for free, not out of fear of government sanction, but out of rational self-interest. Just
`as readers prefer bookstores (and their record-shop kin) that allow them to browse before buying, cyber-authors will
`gradually learn that the public will consume much more of their work if given free samples. What creators lose in sales
`revenue they will more than make up for in ticket sales for live performances, lectures, appearances, and even
`merchandising. The reports of the death of fair use are exaggerated, he claims: shrewd authors won’t bind their ideas up
`with code, they will gladly distribute them to anyone willing to listen, knowing that they will be duly compensated—in fact,
`better compensated—through other channels.
`
`Barlow, for years a lyricist for the Grateful Dead, is fond of celebrating the Dead’s policy of allowing fans to record their
`concerts. "In regard to my own soft product, rock 'n' roll songs," Barlow writes, "there is no question that the band I write
`them for, the Grateful Dead, has increased its popularity enormously by giving them away." 16 And he argues that others
`do likewise: "Most of the folks who presently make their livings by their wits do so not under the protection of legally
`instantiated methods of ‘owning’ their own intelligence or expertise but rather by defining value on the basis of continued
`and deepening interaction with an audience or client base." 17
`
`Despite its appeal, this approach has several problems. First, Barlow’s notion of voluntary fair use does not account for
`authors who are not also performers. This list would include the inarticulate poet, the reclusive novelist, the dead
`filmmaker (or her widower), and any painter or photographer without a taste for performance art. Second, and more
`important, Barlow’s vision of voluntary sharing often describes good old-fashioned marketing, not fair use. As laid out
`under Section 107, fair use does not excuse infringers because it is ultimately in authors’ economic interest to do so, but
`because some copying is simply too socially valuable to proscribe. Fair use is meant to apply in exactly those situations in
`which the copyright holder is not willing to allow access; given that it’s an affirmative defense, fair use never arises unless
`an IP owner sues for copyright infringement. So the idea of voluntary fair use seems oxymoronic.
`
`Others, including Tom Lipscomb of Center for a Digital Future, have suggested that market forces will eventually correct
`abusive trusted systems, forcing IP owners and trusted-system designers to compete to provide the "fairest" code. That is,
`trusted-systems programmers will offer electronic copyright protections that feature the same owners’ rights and users’
`privileges (including fair use) established by copyright law because users will demand it.
`
`This argument also fails on several levels. First, consumers of copyrighted expression have little consumer choice; they
`cannot "shop around" for similar ideas offered in friendlier trusted-systems packages, since anything too similar will likely
`be a copyright infringement of the original. Since copyright is essentially a limited monopoly, no perfect substitutes exist for
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`copyrighted works—almost by definition. 18
`
`Furthermore, the features of many trusted systems will often be invisible to the would-be fair user, and therefore quite
`difficult to bargain around or base comparisons on. In this sense, the various restrictions trusted systems could impose on
`a user resemble the fine print used in real-space contracts of adhesion—both are terms that bind without having been
`specifically agreed to. Indeed, such "clickwrap" agreements are perhaps even more oppressive than traditional adhesion
`contracts, since the former involve self-executing terms that may never be reviewed by a court. 19
`
`Finally, a fairly intuitive point, best articulated by Lessig: "Just as we would expect few to buy lock to their house that
`permits ‘fair use’ by neighbors, we should expect few to buy a lock for their intellectual property that would permit ‘fair use’
`by others." 20 Only the most conscientious (or foolish) IP owners would demand that their trusted systems not offer greater
`protection than copyright law.
`
`III. Implementing Copyduty: A Powerful Concept—but an Empty Right?
`
`Given the shortcomings of the market-solution arguments, then, it seems plain that the notion that some form of
`government action to enforce copyduty might be, at the very least, worth considering. But how, precisely, would such a
`regime be implemented? For reasons explained below, my optimism about the possibility of a workable copyduty regime is
`measured. Consider the following options, discussed in increasing order of feasibility.
`
`A. Contingent Copyright?
`
`One possible means of enforcing copyduty would be to make copyright protection contingent upon compliance with
`copyduty. Under such a regime, copyright protection would depend on an IP owner’s compliance with fair use as an
`affirmative right. Periodically, perhaps every year, the government could consider revoking or suspending an IP owner’s
`copyright if thwarted fair users filed a certain number of complaints regarding the proprietor’s overly protective trusted
`systems. Proprietors whose works were considered particularly valuable to the public discourse—for example, copyrighted
`works with significant educational uses—might be subjected to a stricter review process.
`
`Yet the shortcomings of this proposal are plain. First, it would be an administrative nightmare, as most efforts at traditional
`regulation of the Internet tend to be. Governmental monitoring of myriad "outlaw" websites’ practices would be costly, if not
`impossible. Even if a kind of quasi-private, Better Business Bureau for Copyright were established, it could not keep pace
`with the rapid growth of intellectual works on the web. Furthermore, revoking an IP owner’s copyright protection might
`prove a toothless punishment in a world of trusted systems. If a proprietor can adequately secure her works through
`private means, what difference will it make if copyright protection is made unavailable? Who needs the constable when
`you have the perfect fence?
`
`B. On-Line Library of Congress?
`
`Another possibility would be to create an on-line Library of Congress, or at least a branch of the Library that housed virtual
`copies of all copyrighted works. Potential fair users who encountered overly exclusionary trusted systems could simply
`access the Library’s web-based copy, much as any citizen can stroll into the actual Library to peruse the books on its
`shelves. To discourage pirates from taking advantage of this arrangement, the Library could protect its copies with its own
`trusted systems, specially tailored to prevent repeated copying, unrestricted distribution, or other "unfair" uses.
`
`Yet such an approach would probably suffer from the same problems as the "contingent copyright" system described
`above. IP owners would simply refuse to file their works with the Library, thereby foregoing copyright protection, and take
`their chances with private means of protection. Even if proprietors cooperated with the filing system, the government
`would face an organizational problem unprecedented in the history of library science: maintaining web pages for every
`piece of Net-based IP in the United States.
`
`C. Fair Use-Friendly Systems Backed by Uncle Sam:
`
`A Government-Induced Network Effect?
`
`A somewhat more promising (and decidedly more interesting) approach to copyduty enforcement would be a government
`initiative to promote the widespread use of a trusted system that offered the same protections as, but no more than, those
`provided by copyright law. The government might heavily subsidize a trusted system that offered adequate protection
`against wholesale copying but allowed the duplication of phrases or small portions of works, or granted educational
`institutions wider latitude in their uses of copyrighted materials. Once the public became "hooked" on this cheap, fair
`use-friendly system—and, crucially, once the network externalities of the widespread use of such a system set in—the
`government could recede from the market. This approach would limit governmental intrusion (as compared with options A
`
`(cid:23)(cid:3)(cid:82)(cid:73)(cid:3)(cid:26)
`
`(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:18)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:18)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:23)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:29)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:48)
`(cid:51)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:50)(cid:90)(cid:81)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:38)(cid:82)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:42)(cid:88)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:43)(cid:82)(cid:79)(cid:71)(cid:76)(cid:81)(cid:74)(cid:86)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:44)(cid:81)(cid:70)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:16)(cid:3)(cid:40)(cid:91)(cid:75)(cid:76)(cid:69)(cid:76)(cid:87)(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:19)(cid:21)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:83)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:23)
`
`
`
`(cid:38)(cid:82)(cid:83)(cid:92)(cid:71)(cid:88)(cid:87)(cid:92)(cid:29)(cid:3)(cid:54)(cid:68)(cid:89)(cid:76)(cid:81)(cid:74)(cid:3)(cid:41)(cid:68)(cid:76)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:56)(cid:86)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:76)(cid:81)(cid:3)(cid:87)(cid:75)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:38)(cid:82)(cid:80)(cid:76)(cid:81)(cid:74)(cid:3)(cid:40)(cid:85)(cid:68)(cid:3)(cid:82)(cid:73)(cid:3)(cid:5)(cid:51)(cid:85)(cid:76)(cid:89)(cid:68)(cid:70)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:76)(cid:82)(cid:81)(cid:5)
`
`(cid:75)(cid:87)(cid:87)(cid:83)(cid:86)(cid:29)(cid:18)(cid:18)(cid:70)(cid:92)(cid:69)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:17)(cid:79)(cid:68)(cid:90)(cid:17)(cid:75)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:89)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:71)(cid:17)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:88)(cid:18)(cid:73)(cid:68)(cid:79)(cid:79)(cid:86)(cid:72)(cid:80)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:18)(cid:73)(cid:76)(cid:81)(cid:68)(cid:79)(cid:66)(cid:83)(cid:68)(cid:83)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:86)(cid:18)(cid:37)(cid:85)(cid:82)(cid:90)(cid:81)(cid:17)(cid:75)(cid:87)(cid:80)(cid:79)
`
`and B above) and greatly reduce administrative costs.
`
`Yet this policy would have serious limitations as well. A fair use-friendly trusted system might not catch on as quickly or
`effectively as, say, the QWERTY keyboard, or Microsoft Windows, or other computer features or protocols that have
`become industry standards and have thus benefited from network effects. This is because the fair use-friendly trusted
`system, in comparison to more protective systems, would put its user at a distinct disadvantage for reasons entirely
`separate from the network-effect variable: it would provide less protection than the systems offered by the market. In
`comparison, different keyboard arrangements and other standardized features are fairly neutral technologies and do not,
`in and of themselves, significantly benefit or disadvantage users. 21
`
`In fact, there is no indication that trusted systems are susceptible to network externalities at all. Unlike the markets for
`operating systems or standardized protocols, the world of trusted systems involves two distinct—in fact, competing
`—market interests: those who use trusted systems and those who want to get around them. Unlike the telephone, or the
`common operating system, or the standardized protocol—all of which facilitate communication—trusted systems’ principle
`goal is to impede interconnectivity, or at least to customize the terms on which it occurs. Thus, while there may be a
`benefit in using the same trusted system as other IP owners or paying consumers—in order to share IP securely with
`them—there is no advantage to using a trusted system that allows access by non-paying strangers. Again, recall Lessig’s
`fair-use door lock comment 22 , or my fair-use-as-public-easement analogy: 23 landowners will not invest in permeable
`fences with "friendly" locks, no matter how inexpensive or popular they are.
`
`
`
`Legislating Code?A.
`
`In a recent Note in the Stanford Law Review, Mark Gimbel makes brief mention of another method of enforcing copyduty:
`legislating code.
`
`One can just as easily use trusted systems to enforce the letter and the spirit of existing intellectual property
`law as to circumvent it.. . . If we believe fair use is an important privilege, we can prohibit the digital rights
`that might encumber it. In short, we can create a federal digital property rights language and give it the force
`of law. 24
`
`In a way, Gimbel’s suggestion is a variant of option C—a form of government-sanctioned trusted system—though it relies
`on direct and sustained government action and enforcement. Where the induced network-effects approach is all carrot,
`Gimbel’s approach seems to be pure stick. Though perhaps inelegant, legislating code seems much more certain to
`produce standardization and compliance than government subsidization.
`
`At least upon first glance. Unfortunately, Gimbel does not elaborate upon his suggestion, leaving the details of
`implementation and spin-off constitutional issues "for another day." 25 Gimbel’s note sets out appealing ideals yet stops
`short, understandably, of addressing the issue of enforcement, the specter that haunts Internet regulators. Even if
`Congress were to mandate use of fair use-friendly trusted systems, resistance would likely be considerable, and
`enforcement problematic, as usual.
`
`Administrative costs of traditional means of enforcement might be prohibitively costly and slow. For example, if every
`instance of an IP user wielding overly protective code resulted in a lawsuit, courts’ dockets would likely overflow with
`copyduty cases. Furthermore, the fast-changing nature of the web might create evidentiary problems, as IP owners could
`remove their works from the web by the time of trial, and could probably do so without a trace. 26
`
`Another problem with the traditional lawsuit as enforcement mechanism is that small-time plaintiffs—those with complaints
`about relatively "unimportant" IP lock-ups—will likely be discouraged by legal costs from bringing suit. That each of these
`minor infractions will go unremedie