Petition for Inter Partes Review of U.S. Patent No. 7,774,280
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`___________________
`
`
`APPLE INC.
`Petitioner,
`v.
`
`CONTENTGUARD HOLDINGS, INC.,
`Patent Owner
`
`
`Patent No. 7,774,280
`Issued: August 10, 2010
`Filed: October 4, 2004
`Inventors: Nguyen, et al.
`Title: System and Method for Managing Transfer of Rights Using Shared State
`Variables
`
`Inter Partes Review No. IPR2015-00352
`
`
`
`PRELIMINARY RESPONSE OF PATENT OWNER
`
`
`Mail Stop PATENT BOARD
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`United States Patent and Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Table of Contents
`
`Page
`
`B. 
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1 
`I. 
`II.   THE PETITION FAILS TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
`INSTITUTING AN INTER PARTES REVIEW .............................................. 3 
`The Petition Fails to Comply with 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) and 37
`A. 
`C.F.R. §§ 42.22(a)(2) and 42.104(b)(4) ................................................. 4 
`The Board Should Not Institute Trial Based on the Petition’s
`Redundant Grounds ............................................................................... 8 
`Horizontal Redundancies Across Related Petitions Merit
`1. 
`Their Denial ................................................................................ 9 
`Vertical Redundancies Within This Petition Also Merit
`Its Denial ................................................................................... 12 
`III.  THE PETITION ADVANCES CERTAIN FLAWED CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTIONS THAT SHOULD BE REJECTED .............................. 13 
`A.  Overview of the ‘280 Patent ................................................................ 14 
`B. 
`Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art ....................................................... 18 
`C. 
`Response to Apple’s Proposed Claim Constructions .......................... 18 
`1.  Meta-right .................................................................................. 18 
`2. 
`Usage right ................................................................................ 19 
`3. 
`State variable ............................................................................. 22 
`4.  Wherein the created right includes at least one state
`variable ...................................................................................... 23 
`License ...................................................................................... 24 
`Repository ................................................................................. 24 
`a. 
`Physical integrity ............................................................ 25 
`b. 
`Communications integrity .............................................. 25 
`c. 
`Behavioral integrity ........................................................ 26 
`7.  Means-plus-function limitations ............................................... 26 
`
`2. 
`
`5. 
`6. 
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`V. 
`
`2. 
`
`b. 
`c. 
`
`d. 
`
`e. 
`
`f. 
`
`IV.  TRIAL SHOULD NOT BE INSTITUTED ON THE MEANS-PLUS-
`FUNCTION CLAIMS BECAUSE THE PETITION FAILS TO
`PROVIDE A PROPER ANALYSIS OF THOSE CLAIMS ......................... 33 
`THE PETITION DOES NOT MEET APPLE’S BURDEN TO SHOW
`A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON
`ITS
`REMAINING GROUNDS OF INVALIDITY ............................................. 34 
`A. 
`Legal Standards ................................................................................... 34 
`B. 
`The Petition Fails to Demonstrate That the Challenged Claims
`Are Obvious Based on Gruse .............................................................. 39 
`The Office Previously Found the Claims Patentable Over
`1. 
`the Teachings of Gruse (via Downs) ........................................ 39 
`Gruse Fails to Disclose Several Limitations of the Claims ...... 41 
`Gruse Fails to Disclose: “a meta-right specifying a
`a. 
`right that can be created when the meta-right is
`exercised” ....................................................................... 42 
`Gruse Fails to Disclose: “a repository” .......................... 44 
`Gruse Fails
`to Disclose: “a meta-right
`. . .
`enforceable by a repository” ........................................... 46 
`Gruse Fails to Disclose: “determining, by a
`repository, whether the rights consumer is entitled
`to the right specified by the meta-right” and
`“exercising the meta-right to create the right
`specified by the meta-right if the rights consumer
`is entitled to the right specified by the meta-right” ........ 47 
`Gruse Fails
`to Disclose:
`the
`limitations of
`dependent claims 2–4, 13–15, and 25–27 ...................... 50 
`Gruse Fails to Disclose: dependent claims 11, 22
`and 34 .............................................................................. 52 
`C.   The Petition Fails to Demonstrate That the Challenged Claims
`Are Obvious Based on Gruse In View of the Knowledge of a
`Person of Ordinary Skill ...................................................................... 53 
`The Petition Fails to Demonstrate That the Challenged Claims
`Are Obvious Based On Gruse In View Of Wiggins ........................... 55 
`Secondary Considerations ................................................................... 57 
`
`D. 
`
`E. 
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`VI.
`
`CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 57
`
`VI.  CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 57 
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Table of Authorities
`
`Cases
`Activevideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc.,
`694 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ............................................................................ 36
`Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., In re,
`367 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ............................................................................ 13
`Bass, In re,
`314 F.3d 575 (Fed. Cir. 2002) .............................................................................. 13
`Canon, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures, LLC,
`IPR2014-00535, Paper 9 (Sept. 24, 2014) ............................................................ 11
`Cisco Sys., Inc. v. C-Cation Techs., LLC,
`IPR2014-00454, Paper 12 (Aug. 29, 2014) ............................................... 5, 36, 38
`Conopco, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
`IPR2013-00510, Paper 9 (Feb. 12, 2014) ............................................................... 5
`Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, In re,
`No. 2014-1301, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 1699 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 4, 2015) .............. 13
`Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., In re,
`676 F.3d 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ............................................................................ 37
`Dell, Inc. v. Elecs & Telecommc’ns Res. Inst.,
`IPR2014-00152, Paper 12 (May 16, 2014) .......................................................... 38
`Dominion Dealer Solutions, LLC v. Autoalert, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00223, Paper 9 (August 15, 2013) ........................................................ 38
`Donaldson Co., In re,
`16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994)(en banc) ............................................................... 33
`Dow Chem. Co., In re,
`837 F.2d 469 (Fed. Cir. 1988) .............................................................................. 37
`EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Techs., LLC,
`IPR2013-00087, Paper 25 (June 5, 2013) .............................................................. 9
`Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc.,
`523 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ............................................................................ 28
`Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc.,
`582 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ............................................................................ 33
`Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,
`383 U.S. 1 (1966) ............................................................................................ 7, 35
`Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc.,
`IPR2012-00027, Paper 26 (June 11, 2013) ............................................................ 9
`Intri-Plex Techs., Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Rencol Ltd.,
`IPR2014-00309, Paper 83 (Mar. 23, 2014) ................................................... 35, 37
`
`
`
`iv
`
`

`

`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) ............................................................................................. 35
`Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.,
`CBM2012-00003, Paper 7 (Oct. 25, 2012) .................................................. passim
`Med. Instr. & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB,
`344 F.3d 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ............................................................................ 31
`Medtronic, Inc. v. Robert Bosch Healthcare Systems, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00436, Paper 17 (June 19, 2014) .......................................................... 36
`Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc.,
`545 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ............................................................................ 51
`Newell, In re,
` 891 F.2d 899 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ............................................................................. 37
`NTP, Inc., In re,
`654 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ............................................................................ 38
`Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co.,
`774 F.2d 1082 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ............................................................................ 57
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) ............................................................ 14
`SAS Inst. Inc. v. Complementsoft, LLC,
`IPR2013-00581, Paper 15 (Dec. 30, 2013) .......................................................... 12
`SAS Inst. Inc. v. Complementsoft, LLC,
`IPR2013-00581, reh’g denied, Paper 17 (Feb. 24, 2014) .................................... 12
`Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
`655 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ............................................................................ 38
`TecSec, Inc. v. IBM Corp.,
`731 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ............................................................................ 28
`Translogic Tech., Inc., In re,
`504 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ............................................................................ 14
`Travelocity.com L.P. et al. v. Conos Technologies, LLC,
`CBM2014-00082, Paper 12 (Oct. 16, 2014) ......................................................3, 8
`TRW Auto. US LLC v. Magna Elecs., Inc.,
`IPR2014-00258, Paper 16 (June 26, 2014) .......................................................... 37
`Typhoon Touch Techs., Inc. v. Dell, Inc.,
`659 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ............................................................................ 27
`Wowza Media Sys., LLC v. Adobe Sys., Inc.,
`IPR2013-00054, Paper 12 (Apr. 8, 2013) .............................................................. 5
`Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ........................................................................................................ 27
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) ..................................................................................................... 1
`
`
`
`v
`
`

`

`35 U.S.C. § 325(d) ................................................................................................... 11
`Other Authorities
`Office Patent Trial Practice Guide,
`77 Fed. Reg. 48,756–73 (Aug. 14, 2012) ............................................................... 4
`Regulations
`37 C.F.R. 42 ................................................................................................ 1, 5, 8, 13
`
`
`
`vi
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`

`

`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Patent Owner ContentGuard Holdings, Inc. (“CG”) respectfully submits this
`
`Preliminary Response in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 313 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.107,
`
`responding to the Petition for Inter Partes Review (the “Petition”) filed by Apple
`
`Inc. (“Apple”) regarding claims of United States Patent No. 7,774,280 (“the ‘280
`
`patent”). CG requests that the Board not institute inter partes review for several
`
`reasons.
`
`
`
`The Board has discretion to “deny some or all grounds for unpatentability
`
`for some or all of the challenged claims.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(b); see 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 314(a). Apple bears the burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that it
`
`would prevail in showing unpatentability on the grounds asserted in its Petition. 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.108(c). While it is not required to file a Preliminary Response (37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.107(a)), CG takes this limited opportunity to point out substantive and
`
`non-substantive reasons the Board should not institute trial.
`
`First, the Board should reject the Petition because it fails to sufficiently
`
`identify and explain its precise invalidity legal theories and supporting evidence, in
`
`violation of the particularity required by governing statutes and regulations. It
`
`obscures whether the challenge based on the primary reference, Gruse, is based on
`
`anticipation or obviousness. The ambiguous nature of Apple’s theories permeates
`
`its redundant additional grounds, based on Gruse in combination with Wiggins.
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`

`Never once conceding which claim limitations are missing from Gruse, the Petition
`
`fails to clearly articulate any theory of obviousness premised on combining the
`
`teachings of Gruse with Wiggins. The conclusory arguments consisting mostly of
`
`broad assertions followed by unexplained citations and improper attempts to
`
`incorporate extraneous additional argument from a voluminous expert declaration.
`
`Second, the Board should reject the Petition because it proposes vertically
`
`redundant grounds of invalidity without identifying how any one ground improves
`
`on any other, violating Board precedent requiring petitioners to identify differences
`
`in the proposed rejections. The proposed rejections are also horizontally redundant
`
`of grounds proposed in other IPR petitions filed by Apple against the ‘280 patent.
`
`Apple’s four petitions against the ‘280 patent collectively assert various
`
`combinations of the same five prior art references and are supported by the same
`
`expert declaration. Accordingly, the Board should exercise its discretion and deny
`
`the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) and the redundancy principles established in
`
`Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Progressive Casualty Insurance. Co., CBM2012-
`
`00003, Paper 7 (Oct. 25, 2012).
`
`Third, Apple’s arguments are premised on numerous flawed claim
`
`constructions, and are therefore legally unsustainable. Indeed, the Petition entirely
`
`ignores
`
`the corresponding disclosed structure of
`
`the means-plus-function
`
`limitations of claims 12, 13–16, 19, 22, 24–28, 31 and 34, and it makes no attempt
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`to equate any prior art system to the structural requirements of those claims.
`
`Fourth, the Petition fails to demonstrate any likelihood that Apple could ever
`
`sustain its grounds over the disclosure of Gruse alone. It concludes that the claims
`
`are obvious based on Gruse only by misinterpreting the meaning of several claim
`
`terms, by ignoring the claims as a whole, and by misreading and/or ignoring key
`
`aspects of Gruse’s disclosure.
`
`Fifth, the assertions of obviousness based on combining Gruse with
`
`teachings of Wiggins are mere conclusory statements. Because the Petition fails to
`
`provide a persuasive fact-based analysis with some rational underpinning to
`
`support these combination theories of obviousness, trial must be denied as to these
`
`theories for this additional reason.
`
`CG does not attempt to fully address the numerous other deficiencies of the
`
`poorly articulated and underdeveloped grounds asserted in the Petition. See
`
`Travelocity.com L.P. et al. v. Conos Technologies, LLC, CBM2014-00082, Paper
`
`12 at 10 (Oct. 16, 2014)(“nothing may be gleaned from the Patent Owner’s
`
`challenge or failure to challenge the grounds of unpatentability for any particular
`
`reason”). However, the deficiencies addressed herein are dispositive, and preclude
`
`trial on any grounds asserted in the Petition.
`
`II. THE PETITION FAILS TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
`INSTITUTING AN INTER PARTES REVIEW
`
`Trial should not be instituted because Apple’s petition does not comply with
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`numerous requirements that must be satisfied.
`
`A.
`
`The Petition Fails to Comply with 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) and 37
`C.F.R. §§ 42.22(a)(2) and 42.104(b)(4)
`
`
`
`CG requests that the Board deny inter partes review because the Petition
`
`fails to meet 37 C.F.R. § 41.104(b), which requires, among other things, that Apple
`
`specify the statutory grounds upon which the claim is challenged, where each
`
`element of the claim is found in the prior art, and the specific portions of the
`
`evidence supporting the challenge. Similarly, 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2) requires that
`
`each petition include “a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence
`
`including material facts, and the governing law, rules, and precedent.” The Office
`
`Patent Trial Practice Guide cautions that petitioners should “avoid submitting a
`
`repository of all the information that a judge could possibly consider, and instead
`
`focus on concise, well organized, easy-to-follow arguments supported by readily
`
`identifiable evidence of record.” 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756–73 at 48,763 (Aug. 14,
`
`2012). The Petition does not comply with these requirements in at least three
`
`respects.
`
`
`
`First, it presents a brief summary of the Gruse system and then provides
`
`citations to a 342-page expert declaration and to portions of Gruse to support
`
`conclusory assertions that mimic the language of each claim limitation. The
`
`Petition only rarely explains the significance of these citations, which often do not
`
`support Apple’s representations regarding the relevant teachings. Where Apple
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`fails to state the relevance of evidence or identify the specific relevant portions, the
`
`Board may exclude or give no weight to that evidence. Wowza Media Sys., LLC v.
`
`Adobe Sys., Inc., IPR2013-00054, Paper 12 at 11 (Apr. 8, 2013).
`
`
`
`This deficiency is compounded by the degree to which Apple purports to
`
`incorporate the Prakash Declaration. Information contained in exhibits, but not
`
`discussed in the Petition, is not incorporated into the Petition. See 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 42.6(a)(3). The Board has cautioned against the practice of burying arguments in
`
`an expert declaration. See, e.g., Cisco Sys., Inc. v. C-Cation Techs., LLC, IPR2014-
`
`00454, Paper 12 at 7–10 (Aug. 29, 2014)(250-page expert declaration incorporated
`
`by reference circumvents the page limits imposed on petitions while imposing on
`
`the Board’s time); Conopco, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., IPR2013-00510, Paper
`
`9 at 8 (Feb. 12, 2014)(“We decline to consider information presented in a
`
`supporting declaration, but not discussed in a petition, because, among other
`
`reasons, doing so would encourage the use of declarations to circumvent the page
`
`limits that apply to petitions”).
`
`
`
`Apple ignored the Board’s warnings. The Prakash Declaration includes over
`
`145 pages of discussion regarding the ‘280 patent and its file history, the
`
`construction of the challenged claims, and the disclosures of the asserted Gruse and
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`Wiggins references as they allegedly relate to those claims.1 It presents further
`
`details of the references and expresses legal theories and arguments well beyond
`
`those in the Petition. The Petition improperly attempts to buttress conclusory
`
`assertions via citations to broad sections of the Declaration. As one example of this
`
`tactic, the Petition alleges that “the core elements of DRM schemes – including
`
`those claimed in the ‘280 patent – were well-known before 2001,” and cites in
`
`support of that assertion:
`
`See also Ex. 1003 [Prakash Declaration] at ¶¶ 129–155 (usage rights),
`¶¶ 156–187 (meta-rights), ¶¶ 188–210 (state variables).
`
`(Pet. at 51.) Here, by one mere sentence in the Petition, Apple purports to require
`
`the Board and CG to hunt through eighty-two paragraphs of the Declaration in
`
`attempting to discern its actual arguments and whether they have any evidentiary
`
`support whatsoever. That tactic repeats throughout the Petition.
`
`
`
`The Declaration also purports to rely on extrinsic documents regarding the
`
`state of the art and other information not discussed in the Petition. Apple is not
`
`entitled to this unfair advantage, and the Board should not have to study this large
`
`volume of material to salvage a Petition that does not specify sufficiently exactly
`
`
`1 The remainder of the Declaration is mostly devoted to other prior art references
`
`and other redundant invalidity grounds asserted by Apple against the ‘280 patent
`
`and against a second CG patent in seven other pending petitions.
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`where and how each reference discloses the claimed elements.
`
`
`
`In addition to asserting grounds based on Gruse alone, the Petition asserts
`
`grounds combining Gruse with Wiggins without clearly articulating a single
`
`difference between Gruse and the claims. However, the “[d]ifferences between the
`
`claimed invention and the prior art are a critically important underlying factual
`
`inquiry for any obviousness analysis. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,
`
`383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).” Liberty Mut., CBM2012-00003, Paper 7 at 2–3. Therefore,
`
`a petition that does not state the differences between a challenged claim and the
`
`prior art, and relies instead on the patent owner and the Board to determine those
`
`differences, fails to adequately state a ground of obviousness and risks having the
`
`claim excluded from trial. Id. at 3.
`
`
`
`Instead of clearly articulating what is lacking in Gruse, and a specific
`
`rationale for why Gruse would have been modified to incorporate the missing
`
`elements, the Petition ambiguously asserts that Gruse “suggests a range of possible
`
`implementations of its scheme” and supposedly would have “rendered obvious
`
`variations of the processes, systems and devices it expressly describes . . . .” (Pet.
`
`at 50.) The ensuing discussion (Pet. at 50–60), requires the Board and CG to
`
`speculate about which claim limitations are being addressed, whether Apple
`
`contends that Gruse discloses them, why allegedly anticipatory disclosures would
`
`still require modification to arrive at the claims, what specific teachings are being
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`combined, the rationale for why a person of ordinary skill would have made the
`
`combination, and other aspects of a proper obviousness analysis.
`
`
`
`By failing to identify the differences between Gruse and the subject matter
`
`recited in the challenged claims, Apple has failed to demonstrate why a person of
`
`ordinary skill would have combined Gruse with the knowledge of persons skilled
`
`in the art or with the secondary reference in the manner proposed. Travelocity,
`
`CBM2014-00082, Paper 12 at 5.
`
`
`
`Because the Petition fails to adequately identify the specific invalidity
`
`theories and supporting evidence and rationale it relies on to challenge specific
`
`claim elements, it is deficient and the Board should not institute trial.
`
`B.
`
`The Board Should Not Institute Trial Based on the Petition’s
`Redundant Grounds
`
`
`
`The Board should also reject this Petition because it raises grounds that are
`
`redundant both internally and in view of grounds in related IPR petitions.
`
`“[M]ultiple grounds, which are presented in a redundant manner by a
`
`petitioner who makes no meaningful distinction between them, are contrary to the
`
`regulatory and statutory mandates, and therefore are not all entitled to
`
`consideration.” Liberty Mut., CBM2012-00003, Paper 7 at 2 (Oct. 25, 2012). Such
`
`redundancies place a significant burden on both the Board and the patent owner,
`
`causing unnecessary delay and compromising the ability to complete review within
`
`the statutory deadline. Id.; see 37 C.F.R. § 42.108. Eliminating redundant grounds
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`streamlines and converges the issues. Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc.,
`
`IPR2012-00027, Paper 26 at 4–5 (June 11, 2013). A redundancy analysis properly
`
`focuses on whether the petitioner articulated a meaningful distinction of the relative
`
`strengths and weaknesses of its application of the prior art to one or more claim
`
`limitations. EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Techs., LLC, IPR2013-00087, Paper 25 at
`
`3–4 (June 5, 2013).
`
`
`
`Here, Apple has collectively raised eleven grounds of unpatentability against
`
`the same twenty-one challenged claims in four related Petitions, which totals 231
`
`grounds. The Board (and CG) will be burdened by having to consider these
`
`redundant grounds in contravention of 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b).
`
`1.
`
`Horizontal Redundancies Across Related Petitions Merit
`Their Denial
`
`Horizontal redundancy exists when a proposed grounds applies “a plurality of
`
`prior art references . . . not in combination to complement each other but as distinct
`
`and separate alternatives.” Liberty Mut., CBM2012-00003, Paper 7 at 3. The
`
`references “provide essentially the same teaching to meet the same claim limitation,
`
`and the associated arguments do not explain why one reference more closely
`
`satisfies the claim limitation at issue in some respects than another reference, and
`
`vice versa.” Id. (emphasis in original).
`
`Apple’s grounds, filed serially across these four Petitions are:
`
`
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`

`Proceeding
`
`IPR2015-00351
`
`IPR2015-00352
`
`IPR2015-00353
`
`‘280 Patent Claims
`1–5, 8, 11–16, 19, 22,
`24–28, 31, 34
`1–5, 8, 11–16, 19, 22,
`24–28, 31, 34
`
`1–5, 8, 11–16, 19, 22,
`24–28, 31, 34
`
`Grounds
`103 (Ireton);
`103 (Ireton + England);
`103 (Ireton + Gruse)
`103 (Gruse);
`103 (Gruse + Wiggins)
`103 (England);
`103 (England + Gruse);
`103 (England + Wiggins);
`103 (England + Gruse + Wiggins)
`103 (Ginter);
`103 (Ginter + Wiggins)
`
`IPR2015-00354
`
`Apple relies upon the same Prakash Declaration in support of all four petitions.
`
`1–5, 8, 11–16, 19, 22,
`24–28, 31, 34
`
`(Ex. 1003.) Each grounds of a given petition is horizontally redundant to the
`
`distinct and separate grounds of the other three petitions. For example, the ground
`
`challenging all claims based on Gruse alone is redundant to nine distinct grounds
`
`challenging the same claims based on using Ireton, England or Ginter as the base
`
`reference. The instant Petition provides no explanation as to the differences
`
`between any of the four base references (Ireton, Gruse, England or Ginter) or
`
`between any of the base references and the grounds applying combinations of
`
`distinct references. Apple never explains which base reference or which
`
`obviousness combination using any of the base references is better (or worse) in
`
`any respect than the others for any of the challenged claims. Contrary to the
`
`Board’s mandate in Liberty Mutual, Apple relies on multiple references to provide
`
`essentially the same teaching to meet the same claim limitations, and its associated
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`arguments do not explain why one reference more closely satisfies the claim
`
`limitation at issue than another reference, and vice versa.
`
`
`
`Apple should not be permitted to evade the prohibition against unjustified
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`horizontally redundant grounds by spreading them among multiple petitions. This
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`tactic only increases the burden on the Board and the patent owner, as well as the
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`prospect for unnecessary delay, contrary to 37 C.F.R. § 42.108 and Liberty Mutual.
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`Related to this, the Board has discretion to reject a petition when “the same
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`or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the
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`Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). This provision helps avoid serial challenges and the
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`resulting burden on the USPTO in managing multiple proceedings involving the
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`same patent. 157 Cong. Rec. S1041–42 (daily ed. Mar 1, 2011)(statement of Sen.
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`Kyl). Here, Apple’s eleven grounds (although each applying a distinct reference or
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`combination) collectively involve the same five prior art references, and the
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`teachings relied on from each reference are substantially the same in each
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`combination in which the reference is used. Neither the Board nor CG should be
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`burdened by handling Apple’s duplicative proceedings involving a common set of
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`prior art references and common declarant testimony. The Board should exercise
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`its discretion to deny the Petition for this additional reason. See, e.g., Canon, Inc. v.
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`Intellectual Ventures, LLC, IPR2014-00535, Paper 9 at 19–20 (Sept. 24,
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`2014)(denying review on certain proposed grounds based upon duplicative nature
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`11
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`

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`of arguments across petitions); SAS Inst. Inc. v. Complementsoft, LLC, IPR2013-
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`00581, Paper 15 (Dec. 30, 2013)(denying four grounds as substantially similar to
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`grounds based on other prior art and arguments in another IPR), reh’g denied,
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`Paper 17 (Feb. 24, 2014)(rejecting argument that page limit requirements
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`prevented petitioner from advancing its most salient grounds in one petition).
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`2.
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`Vertical Redundancies Within This Petition Also Merit Its
`Denial
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`Vertical redundancy “exists when there is assertion of an additional prior art
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`reference to support another ground of unpatentability when a base ground already
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`has been asserted against the same claim without the additional reference and the
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`Petitioner has not explained what are the relative strength and weakness of each
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`ground.” Liberty Mut., CBM2012-00003, Paper 7 at 12. An example is when a
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`proposed rejection is based on one reference alone while another proposed rejection
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`against the same claim is based on that same reference plus another reference.
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`The Petition includes vertically redundant grounds directed to overlapping
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`groups of claims without any explanation or rationale as to the potentially
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`deficiency of one ground relative to another. Apple first advances a purported
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`§ 103 rejection using solely Gruse; Apple then argues additional § 103 rejections
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`using Gruse in combination with Wiggins. Both of these purported § 103 grounds
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`is directed to the identical set of claims and limitations. (Pet. at 2–3, 24–60.)
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`12
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`Apple’s “base ground” is Gruse. It fails to provide a bidirectional analysis of
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`perceived strengths or weaknesses in base ground relative to the redundant ground.
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`Specifically, Apple fails to articulate a reasonable basis why, from one perspective,
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`the base ground of Gruse is stronger than the combination of Gruse with Wiggins,
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`and weaker from another perspective. Liberty Mut., CBM2012-00003, Paper 7 at
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`12. Apple does not articulate why the redundant ground should be considered at
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`all. Given Apple’s failure to follow Board procedures in order to assert vertically
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`redundant grounds, the Board should deny the Petition.
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`III. THE PETITION ADVANCES CERTAIN FLAWED CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTIONS THAT SHOULD BE REJECTED
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`In an inter partes review, the Board construes claim terms in an unexpired
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`patent using their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of
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`the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). The claim language should
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`be read in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary
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`skill in the art. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, No. 2014-1301, 2015 U.S. App.
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`LEXIS 1699, *14 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 4, 2015); In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367
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`F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The broadest reasonable meaning given to claim
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`language must take into account any definitions presented in the specification. Id.
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`(citing In re Bass, 314 F.3d 575, 577 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Under this standard, claim
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`terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by
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`one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re
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`13
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`Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007)(citing Phillips v.
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`AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(en banc)).
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`Apple advances certain constructions that do not comport with the claim
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`language or the specification, and therefore do not reflect the broadest reasonable
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`construction in light of the specification. The Petition also does not take into
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`account the Claim Construction Memorandum Opinion and Order issued by the
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`Eastern District of Texas on March 20, 2015 (after the filing date of the Petition),
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`which rejected certain of Apple’s claim construction positions similar to those
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`advanced in its Petition here. (Ex. 2001.) The district court applied the claim
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`construction standard for litigation established in Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303. The
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`Petition makes no showing that the “broade