UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`VALEO NORTH AMERICA, INC., VALEO S.A., VALEO GMBH,
`VALEO SCHALTER UND SENSOREN GMBH,
`AND CONNAUGHT ELECTRONICS LTD.
`Petitioners
`
`v.
`
`MAGNA ELECTRONICS INC.
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2015-00251
`Patent 8,676,491
`
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER MAGNA ELECTRONICS INC.’S RESPONSE
`UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.120
`
`
`
`
`
`Mail Stop “PATENT BOARD”
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
`
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00251 of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,676,491
`
`Table of Contents
`
`I. 
`Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1 
`Overview of the Claimed Inventions in the ’491 Patent ................................. 3 
`II. 
`III.  Claim Construction .......................................................................................... 4 
`A. 
`“display intensity” ................................................................................. 4 
`B. 
`“human machine interface” ................................................................... 4 
`C. 
`“electronically-generated overlay” ........................................................ 4 
`IV.  The combination of references fails to disclose each claimed feature. ........... 6 
`A. 
`Lemelson does not disclose “said visual cue comprising an
`electronically-generated overlay,” as recited in independent
`claim 13. ................................................................................................ 6 
`1. 
`The claimed “electronically-generated overlay” is not
`disclosed by Lemelson. ............................................................... 6 
`A POSA would not have understood Lemelson to
`implicitly disclose an “electronically-generated overlay.” ....... 10 
`Valeo does not allege that the claimed “electronically-
`generated overlay” would have been obvious to a POSA
`in view of Lemelson. ................................................................. 11 
`Lemelson does not disclose “wherein said CMOS camera is
`mounted at the rear of the equipped vehicle,” as recited in
`independent claim 13. ......................................................................... 12 
`The cited portion of Lemelson does not disclose that the visual
`cue indicates a “distance to an object exterior of the equipped
`vehicle,” as recited in independent claim 13. ...................................... 16 
`D.  Kajimoto does not disclose “wherein said video display screen
`is operable to display images derived, at least in part, from
`image data captured by said CMOS camera with a display
`intensity of at least about 200 candelas/sq. meter,” as recited in
`independent claim 13. ......................................................................... 18 
`1. 
`Anticipation case law should be applied because Valeo
`asserts that Kajimoto expressly teaches the claimed
`feature. ....................................................................................... 18 
`Kajimoto teaches away from the claimed range. ...................... 20 
`
`B. 
`
`C. 
`
`2. 
`
`3. 
`
`2. 
`
`
`
`- i -
`
`

`
`E. 
`
`F. 
`
`Case IPR2015-00251 of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,676,491
`The cited portion of Lemelson does not disclose that the visual
`cue indicates a “distance to an object exterior of the equipped
`vehicle,” as recited in dependent claim 14. ......................................... 22 
`Lemelson does not disclose “responsive to detection of an
`object exterior of the equipped vehicle by . . . (i) non-visual
`object detection, . . . (a) the driver’s attention is drawn to an
`object displayed by said video display screen . . . ,” as recited in
`dependent claim 15. ............................................................................. 22 
`V.  Valeo’s obviousness analysis is deficient because Valeo fails to
`resolve the level of ordinary skill in the art as required by Graham. ............ 26 
`VI.  Valeo’s obviousness analysis is deficient because Valeo fails to
`satisfy criteria set forth in pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). ............................... 28 
`A.  Valeo fails to show that the subject matter as a whole would
`have been obvious to a POSA. ............................................................ 29 
`1. 
`Valeo’s Petition fails to explain how the subject matter as
`a whole would have been obvious. ........................................... 29 
`Dr. Wilhelm’s Declaration makes only conclusory
`allegations regarding the asserted references and the
`alleged obviousness of the instituted claims. ............................ 31 
`Valeo fails to provide rationale that a POSA would have
`combined Lemelson with Huang, Kajimoto, and Toyoda. ................. 34 
`Valeo’s obviousness analysis is deficient because the Petition
`fails to identify how the construed claims are unpatentable. .............. 36 
`VII.  Dr. Wilhelm’s Declaration should be afforded no weight because he
`applies an incorrect standard for obviousness. .............................................. 40 
`VIII.  Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 43 
`
`2. 
`
`B. 
`
`C. 
`
`
`
`- ii -
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00251 of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,676,491
`
`Table of Authorities
`
`Cases 
`ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Communications, Inc.,
`694 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ............................................................................ 33
`
`Atofina v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp.,
`441 F. 3d 991 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ............................................................................. 19
`
`Fidelity National Information Services, Inc. v. DataTreasury Corp.,
`IPR2014-00489, Paper 9 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 13, 2014) ............................................ 37
`
`Google Inc. v. Visual Real Estate, Inc.,
`IPR2014-01338, Paper 3 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 2, 2014) .............................................. 37
`
`Graham v. John Deere Co.,
`383 U.S. 1 (1966) ................................................................................................. 26
`
`In re Fine,
`837 F.2d 1071) (Fed. Cir. 1988) ........................................................................... 31
`
`In re Fritch,
`972 F.2d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ............................................................................ 31
`
`In re Geisler,
`116 F. 3d 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ........................................................................... 20
`
`In re Kahn,
`441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .............................................................................. 34
`
`In re Wertheim,
`541 F.2d 257 (C.C.P.A. 1976) .............................................................................. 18
`
`In re Woodruff,
`919 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ............................................................................ 18
`
`KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) .......................................................................... 15, 26, 29, 34
`
`Marvell Semiconductor, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC,
`IPR2014-00547, Paper 3 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 10, 2014) ............................................. 37
`
`
`
`- iii -
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00251 of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,676,491
`
`Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc.,
`950 F.2d 714 (Fed. Cir. 1991). ............................................................................. 27
`
`Wowza Media Sys., LLC v. Adobe Sys. Inc.,
`IPR2013-00054, Paper 16 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 13, 2013) ............................................. 33
`
`Statutes 
`35 U.S.C. § 103 ........................................................................................................ 18
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) ........................................................................................... passim
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316(e) .................................................................................. 1, 12, 16, 26
`
`Regulations 
`37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) ................................................................................................. 32
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) .............................................................................................. 36
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) ............................................................................. 28, 31, 36
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5) .......................................................................................... 36
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.24(a)(1)(i) ........................................................................................ 36
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`- iv -
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00251 of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,676,491
`
`Exhibit List
`
`Ex. No.
`2001
`
`Description
`Declaration of Dr. Matthew A. Turk with Curriculum Vitae
`
`
`
`- v -
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00251 of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,676,491
`
`I.
`
`Introduction
`
`The Board instituted trial for claims 13-15 of U.S. Patent No. 8,676,491
`
`(“the ’491 patent”). But as Patent Owner Magna Electronics Inc. (“Magna”) will
`
`show, Petitioners Valeo North America, Inc., Valeo S.A., Valeo GmbH, Valeo
`
`Schalter und Sensoren GmbH, and Connaught Electronics Ltd. (collectively
`
`“Valeo”) have failed to satisfy their burden of demonstrating the invalidity of the
`
`instituted claims by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e).
`
`First, specifically claimed features are not disclosed by the asserted
`
`references. For example, Lemelson does not disclose an “electronically-generated
`
`overlay” or that the camera is “mounted at the rear” of the vehicle. And Kajimoto
`
`does not disclose, and in fact teaches away from, the claimed display intensity
`
`range.
`
`Second, Valeo fails to resolve the level of ordinary skill in the art. This is
`
`one of the fundamental Graham factors that controls the obviousness inquiry and
`
`thus must be addressed in the Petition. Yet Valeo’s Petition fails to even mention
`
`the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art. Thus, Valeo’s obviousness
`
`analysis is deficient.
`
`Third, Valeo fails to establish a prima facie case of obviousness for the
`
`instituted claims. Valeo fails to articulate sufficient rationale explaining how or
`
`
`
`- 1 -
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00251 of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,676,491
`why a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”)1 would have combined the
`
`asserted references. Valeo’s grounds are based on impermissible hindsight because
`
`a POSA would not have sought to combine the asserted references. Valeo fails to
`
`provide any rationale under which a POSA would have combined the asserted
`
`references. The proposed ground of obviousness includes four references, yet
`
`Valeo fails to provide explicit analysis explaining why a POSA would have
`
`combined these references. Instead, Valeo merely sets forth portions of various
`
`references that purportedly disclose claimed elements, without explaining how or
`
`why a POSA would have been motivated to combine the asserted references.
`
`Fourth, Dr. Wilhelm’s Declaration (Ex. 1011) should be afforded no weight
`
`because he applies an incorrect standard for obviousness.2 Dr. Wilhelm incorrectly
`
`relies on a “more likely than not” standard. As a result, Valeo cannot rely on his
`
`obviousness analysis as evidence to support its allegation that the claims would
`
`have been obvious to a POSA.
`
`1 A person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made
`
`would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical, electronic, or mechanical
`
`engineering, or equivalent experience, and at least two years of experience in the
`
`relevant field, such as imaging systems for vehicles. (Turk Decl., Ex. 2001 ¶ 12.)
`
`2 Magna also notes that Dr. Wilhelm’s signature lacks a page number and
`
`does not correspond to the page numbering in his Declaration.
`
`
`
`- 2 -
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00251 of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,676,491
`The totality of these deficiencies demonstrate that Valeo has not satisfied its
`
`burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 13-15 of the
`
`’491 patent would have been obvious. Accordingly, the Board should find that
`
`claims 13-15 are not unpatentable.
`
`II. Overview of the Claimed Inventions in the ’491 Patent
`The ’491 patent relates generally to driver assist systems for a vehicle that
`
`includes a camera and a video display screen viewable by the driver. (’491 patent,
`
`Ex. 1001, Abstract.) More particularly, the ’491 patent relates to driver assist
`
`systems where image data from the camera is displayed by the video display screen
`
`during a reversing maneuver. (Id.) And when not reversing, information associated
`
`with, for example, a navigational system, a telematics system, or a vehicle
`
`information system, is displayed. (Id.)
`
`The ’491 patent describes that the camera can be mounted at the rear of the
`
`vehicle to view a field immediately rearward of the vehicle to assist the driver in
`
`reversing the vehicle. (Id. at 16:16-19, 27:55-58.) The video display screen can
`
`have a display intensity of at least about 200 candelas/sq. meter. (Id. at 9:60-67.)
`
`The display screen can include a video view rearward of the vehicle and also
`
`electronically generated indicia overlaying the video image of the rearward scene.
`
`(Id. at 26:52-55.) The electronically generated overlay can include, for example,
`
`indicia indicating the distance of detected objects and/or highlights of objects that
`
`
`
`- 3 -
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00251 of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,676,491
`the reversing vehicle is in jeopardy of colliding with. (Id. at 26:55-59.) The driver
`
`assist systems having electronically generated indicia overlaying the video image
`
`of the rearward scene described in the ’491 patent were a significant advance over
`
`prior reversing systems. (Id. at 26:64-27:3.)
`
`III. Claim Construction
`A.
` “display intensity”
`Valeo proposed that the term “display intensity” should be construed to
`
`mean “luminance” (Petition, Paper 1, p. 17) and the Board adopted Valeo’s
`
`proposed construction (Institution Decision, Paper 7, p. 6). For the purposes of this
`
`Response, Magna relies on this construction.
`
`“human machine interface”
`
`B.
`The Board determined that no express construction is necessary for the term
`
`“human machine interface,” which is recited in independent claim 1. (Institution
`
`Decision, pp. 6-7.) Magna agrees that no express construction is necessary here,
`
`especially because the Board did not institute trial for independent claim 1.
`
`“electronically-generated overlay”
`
`C.
`Independent claim 13 recites that “a visual cue is displayed by said video
`
`display screen in conjunction with display of said captured image data, said visual
`
`cue comprising an electronically-generated overlay.” The ’491 patent describes
`
`that:
`
`
`
`- 4 -
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00251 of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,676,491
`an image on the screen includes a video view rearward of
`the vehicle, and also preferably includes electronically
`generated indicia overlaying the video image on the
`video screen and indicating the distance of detected
`objects (such as via a graphic display or via an
`alphanumeric display in feet/inches) and/or highlighting
`of obstacles/objects that a reversing vehicle is in jeopardy
`of colliding with (such as a child or a barrier).
`
`(’491 patent, 26:52-59 (emphasis added).) Further, the ’491 patent describes “a
`
`graphic overlay with indicia of forward or backup travel” where “the intended path
`
`of travel and/or a distance grid can be electronically superimposed upon the video
`
`image from a reverse-aid camera as displayed on any screen of the above video
`
`mirrors, video display assemblies and accessory modules.” (Id. at 27:17-26
`
`(emphasis added).)
`
`Based on the plain language of the term “electronically-generated overlay,”
`
`the description in the ’491 patent, and the understanding of this term by a POSA,
`
`“electronically-generated overlay” should be construed to mean “electronically-
`
`generated indicia superimposed upon and overlaying a displayed video image.”
`
`(Turk Decl. ¶ 22.)
`
`
`
`- 5 -
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00251 of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,676,491
`IV. The combination of references fails to disclose each claimed feature.
`A. Lemelson does not disclose “said visual cue comprising an
`electronically-generated overlay,” as recited in independent claim
`13.
`1.
`
`The claimed “electronically-generated overlay” is not
`disclosed by Lemelson.
`
`Independent claim 13 recites that the visual cue displayed by the video
`
`display screen comprises “an electronically-generated overlay.” As discussed
`
`above, an “electronically-generated overlay” should be construed to mean
`
`“electronically-generated indicia superimposed upon and overlaying a displayed
`
`video image.” (Turk Decl. ¶ 25.) Lemelson fails to teach visual cues comprising an
`
`electronically-generated overlay that is displayed by the video display screen in
`
`conjunction with display of captured image data.
`
`In the context of the ’491 patent and the claims at issue, a POSA would have
`
`understood the recitations “wherein a visual cue is displayed by said video display
`
`screen in conjunction with display of said captured image data” and “said visual
`
`cue comprising an electronically-generated overlay” to require guidelines or other
`
`markings that are electronically generated to be superimposed upon and overlaying
`
`video images being displayed on the video display. (Id. at 26.) Thus, a driver of a
`
`vehicle equipped with a system according to the claimed inventions would see,
`
`displayed on the video display, video images captured by the camera(s) with the
`
`
`
`- 6 -
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00251 of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,676,491
`likes of guidelines, markings, or similar overlays superimposed upon and
`
`overlaying the actual video images being displayed in real time. (Id.)
`
`Valeo asserts that Lemelson at 6:49-55, shown below, purportedly discloses
`
`the recited “electronically-generated overlay,” but it does not. (Petition, pp. 41-42;
`
`Turk Decl. ¶ 27.)
`
`The image display may include highlighting of hazards,
`special warning images such as flashing lights, alpha-
`numeric messages, distance values, speed indicators and
`other hazard and safety related messages. Simulated
`displays of symbols representing the hazard objects as
`well as actual video displays may also be used to enhance
`driver recognition of dangerous situations.
`(Lemelson, Ex. 1004, 6:49-55.)
`
`A POSA would have interpreted this passage from Lemelson to simply mean
`
`that the image display (i.e., the video display screen itself) may include such
`
`highlighting or warnings. (Turk Decl. ¶ 28.) But this does not mean that the
`
`highlighting or warnings are electronically-generated overlays that are displayed
`
`by the video display screen in conjunction with and overlaying displayed video
`
`images, as recited in the subject claims. (Id.) Indeed, the warnings and simulated
`
`displays of symbols described in Lemelson could be displayed by the video screen
`
`entirely separate from (i.e., above or below or to the left or right) the video images
`
`also being displayed by the video screen. (Id.) This is at least because display of
`
`
`
`- 7 -
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00251 of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,676,491
`such symbolic or numeric messages, if overlaying or superimposed as claimed in
`
`the ’491 patent, could mask, confuse, or obscure image data in the video images
`
`being displayed. (Id.)
`
`Lemelson thus fails to disclose that the claimed visual cue is “an
`
`electronically-generated overlay,” as this term is properly construed. (Id.) All
`
`Lemelson discloses is that the “image display may include highlighting of hazards,
`
`special warning images such as flashing lights, alpha-numeric messages, distance
`
`values, speed indicators and other hazard and safety related messages.” (Lemelson,
`
`6:49-52 (emphasis added).) Simply being “included” on a display does not mean
`
`that something is an “electronically-generated overlay.” (Turk Decl. ¶¶ 29-32.)
`
`So, while Lemelson discusses an “image display” which “include[s]
`
`highlighting of hazards,” Lemelson does not teach that the hazards are part of
`
`image data captured by the camera or that the highlighting overlays the image data,
`
`as recited in the claims. (Id. at 29.) Indeed, the hazards in Lemelson may be
`
`included side by side with image data, such as on a “split screen,” or above, below,
`
`to the left, or to the right of the image data. (Id.) And Valeo presents no further
`
`analysis as to how the cited portion of Lemelson allegedly discloses “an
`
`electronically-generated overlay.” Thus, Valeo has not met its burden of showing
`
`that Lemelson discloses this recited feature. (Id.)
`
`
`
`- 8 -
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00251 of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,676,491
`Lemelson also describes a warning system which includes warning levels.
`
`For example, “[t]he warning level is indicated as being green, yellow, or red,
`
`depending on the danger level presented by the detected hazard.” (Lemelson, 9:53-
`
`55.) These “[c]ontinuous or discrete warnings can be generated on the output,”
`
`where the output includes “light indicators of different intensity, continuously
`
`variable audible alarms, continuously variable color
`
`indicators, or others
`
`arrangements with possible combinations of visible and audible alarms.” (Id. at
`
`9:55-60.) These visible and audible warnings may be “combined with actual video
`
`displays of vehicle situations including hazards and nearby objects.” (Id. at 9:60-
`
`62.) Importantly, however, Lemelson does not teach that any of these warnings are
`
`electronically-generated cues that overlay the displayed image data. Lemelson only
`
`describes a warning system where warning colors may be shown together with
`
`image data, but not overlay the image data displayed on a video display. (Turk
`
`Decl. ¶ 30.)
`
`Lemelson also includes a presentation of “symbols representing the hazard
`
`objects as well as actual video displays.” (Lemelson, 6:53-54.) Lemelson again
`
`fails to teach the symbols representing the hazard objects overlay displayed video
`
`images. (Id. at 31.) Indeed, these symbols could be anywhere on the video display
`
`without overlaying the displayed image data. (Id.)
`
`
`
`- 9 -
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00251 of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,676,491
`In short, Lemelson does not disclose that any of the listed information
`
`overlays the video (i.e., “displayed . . . in conjunction with display of said captured
`
`image data”), as recited in independent claim 13 of the ’491 patent. (Id. at 32.)
`
`Lemelson
`
`is even unclear as
`
`to whether
`
`the additional
`
`information
`
`is
`
`simultaneously displayed with the displayed video, let alone overlaid. (Id.) Indeed,
`
`one portion of the display could be designated for video, while a separate portion
`
`of the display shows the other information (i.e., a “split screen”). (Id.) As stated in
`
`the ’491 patent specification, “[t]he combination of a video reverse-aid system
`
`with an audible reverse-aid system based off an object detection system . . . is a
`
`significant advance over reversing systems known to date, and particularly with
`
`distance or similar graphics overlaying the video image of the rearward scene.”
`
`(’491 patent, 26:64-27:3 (emphasis added).) Lemelson does not suggest otherwise.
`
`For at least these reasons, Lemelson fails to teach “wherein a visual cue is
`
`displayed by said video display screen in conjunction with display of said captured
`
`image data, said visual cue comprising an electronically-generated overlay,” as
`
`recited in independent claim 13.
`
`2.
`
`A POSA would not have understood Lemelson to
`implicitly disclose an “electronically-generated overlay.”
`A POSA reading the cited portion of Lemelson would not have understood it
`
`to mean that Lemelson discloses “the ability to graphically overlay information
`
`onto the video image displayed to the driver,” as asserted by Dr. Wilhelm.
`
`
`
`- 10 -
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00251 of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,676,491
`(Wilhelm Decl., Ex. 1011 ¶ 34; Institution Decision, p. 12; Turk Decl. ¶ 33.) All
`
`Lemelson does is list certain things that can be included on the image display.
`
`(Turk Decl. ¶ 33.) Lemelson does not disclose that the information listed is
`
`provided as an “electronically-generated overlay,” as claimed. (Id.) Indeed, as
`
`discussed above, Lemelson could have a “split screen” that shows video on one
`
`portion of the screen and other information on another portion of the screen. (Id.)
`
`Accordingly, a POSA reading Lemelson would not have understood Lemelson to
`
`implicitly disclose an “electronically-generated overlay,” as recited in independent
`
`claim 13. (Id.)
`
`3.
`
`Valeo does not allege that the claimed “electronically-
`generated overlay” would have been obvious to a POSA in
`view of Lemelson.
`
`The Petition provides no explanation as to how the cited portion of
`
`Lemelson could be construed by a POSA as “an electronically-generated overlay”
`
`or that this claimed feature would have been obvious to a POSA in view of
`
`Lemelson. Indeed, the Petition does not even refer to the inaccurate generalization
`
`in Dr. Wilhelm’s Declaration, also cited in the Institution Decision, that Lemelson
`
`discloses “the ability to graphically overlay information onto the video image
`
`displayed to the driver.” (Wilhelm Decl. ¶ 34; Institution Decision, p. 12; Turk
`
`Decl. ¶ 34.) Moreover, on its own, this blanket assertion does not provide sufficient
`
`evidence that Lemelson suggests the claimed “electronically-generated overlay”
`
`
`
`- 11 -
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00251 of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,676,491
`feature. And even if this generalization satisfied Valeo’s initial burden at the
`
`institution stage (which it does not), Valeo’s ultimate burden is to show, by a
`
`preponderance of the evidence, that the claimed invention would have been
`
`obvious to a POSA. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Valeo has not satisfied this higher
`
`standard because Lemelson does not disclose an “electronically-generated overlay”
`
`explicitly or implicitly, as discussed above, and because this feature would not
`
`have been obvious to a POSA in view of Lemelson. (Turk Decl. ¶ 34.)
`
`Thus, Valeo fails to satisfy its burden of demonstrating the invalidity of the
`
`instituted claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Lemelson does not disclose
`
`or even suggest that the visual cue displayed by the video display screen comprises
`
`“an electronically-generated overlay,” as recited in independent claim 13.
`
`Accordingly, the Board should find that independent claim 13 and claims 14 and
`
`15 depending therefrom are not unpatentable over the asserted references.
`
`B.
`
`Lemelson does not disclose “wherein said CMOS camera is
`mounted at the rear of the equipped vehicle,” as recited in
`independent claim 13.
`Independent claim 13 recites that the “CMOS camera is mounted at the rear
`
`of the equipped vehicle.” The claim explicitly recites the location of the CMOS
`
`camera—it is mounted at the rear of the vehicle. The claimed feature is more
`
`specific than simply having a camera that faces the rearward direction of the
`
`vehicle. (Turk Decl. ¶ 35.) Yet Lemelson, which Valeo asserts discloses this
`
`
`
`- 12 -
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00251 of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,676,491
`claimed feature, at most describes only a camera that faces the rearward direction.
`
`(Id.)
`
`Valeo addresses this specific element with a disjointed quotation from
`
`Lemelson that discusses distances of objects from the vehicle, not the claimed
`
`camera location:
`
`
`
`(Petition, pp. 40-41.) Valeo attempts to correlate Lemelson’s indication of
`
`distances between the vehicle and objects that are “to the rear” of the vehicle with
`
`the claimed camera location (i.e., “camera is mounted at the rear” of the vehicle).
`
`But from the entire passage in Lemelson, shown below, it is evident that the
`
`location of the camera itself is not being described at all. (Turk Decl. ¶ 37.)
`
`In a modified form, video scanning and radar or lidar
`
`scanning may be jointly employed to identify and
`
`indicate distances between the controlled vehicle and
`
`objects ahead of, to the side(s) of, and to the rear of the
`
`controlled vehicle.
`
`(Lemelson, 6:5-8.)
`
`
`
`- 13 -
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00251 of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,676,491
`What Lemelson describes is where objects to be identified may be located
`
`with respect to the vehicle, namely “ahead of, to the side(s) of, and to the rear of”
`
`the vehicle. (Turk Decl. ¶ 38.) This is not the same as the claimed element that the
`
`“CMOS camera is mounted at the rear of the equipped vehicle.” (Id.) Lemelson
`
`does not disclose that the camera itself is mounted at the rear of the vehicle, as
`
`recited in independent claim 13 of the ’491 patent. (Id.) A camera need not be
`
`mounted at the rear of the vehicle in order to be used for rearward viewing from
`
`the equipped vehicle. (Id.) Indeed, a camera mounted, for example, in a side-view
`
`mirror or on the roof of the vehicle, and directed rearward could identify objects
`
`“to the rear” of the vehicle, as described by Lemelson. (Id.) And the quoted
`
`passage from Lemelson relied upon by Valeo does not even disclose that a camera
`
`necessarily has a view to the rear of the controlled vehicle. (Id.) Lemelson merely
`
`discloses that video scanning and radar or lidar scanning may be jointly employed
`
`to identify and indicate distances between the controlled vehicle and objects. (Id.)
`
`Thus, Lemelson’s system described in the quoted passage may, for example, use a
`
`camera that does not even have a view rearward of the vehicle. (Id.) Rather,
`
`identifying and indicating distances between the vehicle and objects to the rear of
`
`the vehicle may be provided by the disclosed radar or lidar scanning (employed
`
`jointly with video scanning in some other direction). (Id.)
`
`
`
`- 14 -
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00251 of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,676,491
`Moreover, Valeo’s Petition is far from “sufficiently show[ing] in Lemelson
`
`the obviousness of placing a rearward facing camera at the rear of the equipped
`
`vehicle.” (Institution Decision, p. 13 (emphasis added); Turk Decl. ¶ 39.) In fact,
`
`the Petition does not include any explanation for the portion of Lemelson that is
`
`quoted in the claim chart. As discussed above, the quote refers not to the location
`
`of the camera, but to where objects to be identified (e.g., by jointly employing
`
`video scanning and radar or lidar scanning) may be located with respect to the
`
`vehicle. (Turk Decl. ¶ 39.) And Valeo’s Petition does not address why the claimed
`
`location would have been obvious in view of Lemelson. Valeo makes no mention
`
`of any “inferences and creative steps” that a POSA may have employed to arrive at
`
`the specifically claimed camera location recited in independent claim 13. (See
`
`Institution Decision, p. 13 (citing KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
`
`398, 418 (2007).) Furthermore, Dr. Wilhelm’s only reference to camera location is
`
`his inaccurate generalization that Lemelson describes “systems that included a
`
`plurality of video cameras on the front, side, and rear of the vehicle.” (Wilhelm
`
`Decl. ¶ 34 (emphasis added); Turk Decl. ¶ 39.) Again, this is not what Lemelson
`
`discloses. (Turk Decl. ¶ 39; see Lemelson 6:36-38 (describing only “front, side and
`
`rear viewing,” not camera location).) And even if this generalization satisfied
`
`Valeo’s initial burden at the institution stage (and it does not), Valeo’s ultimate
`
`burden is to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimed invention
`
`
`
`- 15 -
`
`

`
`Case IPR2015-00251 of
`U.S. Patent No. 8,676,491
`would have been obvious to a POSA. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Valeo’s Petition is
`
`devoid of any obviousness analysis regarding the location of Lemelson’s cameras.
`
`Accordingly, Valeo fails to satisfy its burden of demonstrating by a preponderance
`
`of the evidence that the instituted claims would have been obvious.
`
`Lemelson does not disclose that the “camera is mounted at the rear of the
`
`equipped vehicle,” as recited in independent claim 13. And Valeo did not provide
`
`any reasoning why this feature would have been obvious. Accordingly, the Board
`
`should find that independent claim 13 and claims 14 and 15 depending therefrom
`
`are not unpatentable.
`
`C. The cited portion of Lemelson does not disclose that the visual cue
`indicates a “distance to an object exterior of the equipped
`vehicle,” as recited in independent claim 13.
`Independent claim 13 recites that the visual cue indicates a “distance to an
`
`object exterior of the equipped vehicle.” Valeo asserts that Lemelson at 6:49-51
`
`discloses this feature, but it does not. (Petition, p. 42; Turk Decl. ¶ 40.)
`
`Valeo cites to a portion of Lemelson that describes that “[t]he image display
`
`may include . . . distan