Page 1
`Page 1
`
`
`
`Analysis
`Analysis
`As of: Jul 29, 2015
`As of: Jul 29, 2015
`
`STRAIGHT PATH IP GROUP, INC., Plaintiff, v. BANDWIDTH.COM, INC., et al.,
`STRAIGHT PATH IP GROUP, INC., Plaintiff, v. BANDWI])TH.COM, INC., et al.,
`Defendants.
`Defendants.
`
`Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-932 (AJT/IDD)
`Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-932 (AJT/IDD)
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
`VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
`VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
`
`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25394
`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25394
`
`February 25, 2014, Decided
`February 25, 2014, Decided
`February 25, 2014, Filed
`February 25, 2014, Filed
`
`SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Related proceeding at
`SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Related proceeding at
`Straight Path IP Group, Inc. v. Blackberry Ltd., 2014
`Straight Path IP Group, Inc. v. Blackberry Ltd., 2014
`U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92787 (N.D. Cal., July 8, 2014)
`U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92787 (N.D. Cal., July 8, 2014)
`
`COUNSEL:
`[*1] For Straight Path IP Group, Inc.,
`[*1] For Straight Path IP Group,
`Inc.,
`COUNSEL:
`Plaintiff: Brent Lee VanNorman, LEAD ATTORNEY,
`Plaintiff: Brent Lee VanNorman, LEAD ATTORNEY,
`Gregory N. Stillman, Hunton & Williams, Norfolk, VA;
`Gregory N. Stillman, Hunton & Williams, Norfolk, VA;
`Sona Rewari, Hunton & Williams, McLean, VA.
`Sona Rewari, Hunton & Williams, McLean, VA.
`
`For Bandwidth.com, Inc., Defendant: William Rueger
`For Bandwidth.com, Inc., Defendant: William Rueger
`Poynter, Williams Mullen (Norfolk), Norfolk, VA.
`Poynter, Williams Mullen (Norfolk), Norfolk, VA.
`
`For Telesphere Networks Ltd., Consolidated Defendant:
`For Telesphere Networks Ltd., Consolidated Defendant:
`Edward Alan Pennington, LEAD ATTORNEY, John
`Edward AlaI1 Pennington, LEAD ATTORNEY, John
`Paul Moy, Smith Gambrell & Russell LLP (DC),
`Paul Moy, Smith Gambrell & Russell LLP (DC),
`Washington, DC.
`Washington, DC.
`
`For Vocalocity, Inc., Consolidated Defendant: Robert
`For Vocalocity,
`Inc., Consolidated Defendant: Robert
`Christian Bertin, LEAD ATTORNEY, Bingham
`Christian Bertin,
`LEAD ATTORNEY, Bingham
`McCutchen LLP (DC), Washington, DC.
`McCutchen LLP (DC), Washington, DC.
`
`For Bandwidth.com,
`Inc., Counter Claimant: William
`For Bandwidth.com, Inc., Counter Claimant: William
`Rueger Poynter, Williams Mullen (Norfolk), Norfolk,
`Rueger Poynter, Williams Mullen (Norfolk), Norfolk,
`
`VA.
`VA.
`
`For Straight Path IP Group, Inc., Counter Defendant:
`For Straight Path IP Group, Inc., Counter Defendant:
`Brent Lee VanNorman, LEAD ATTORNEY, Gregory N.
`Brent Lee VanNorman, LEAD ATTORNEY, Gregory N.
`Stillman, Hunton & Williams, Norfolk, VA; Sona
`Stillman, Hunton & Williams, Norfolk, VA; Sona
`Rewari, Hunton & Williams, McLean, VA.
`Rewari, Hunton & Williams, McLean, VA.
`
`For Vocalocity, Inc., Counter Claimant: Robert Christian
`For Vocalocity, Inc., Counter Claimant: Robert Christian
`Bertin, LEAD ATTORNEY, Bingham McCutchen LLP
`Bertin, LEAD ATTORNEY, Bingham McCutchen LLP
`(DC), Washington, DC.
`(DC), Washington, DC.
`
`JUDGES: Anthony J. Trenga, United States District
`JUDGES: Anthony J. Trenga, United States District
`Judge.
`Judge.
`
`OPINION BY: Anthony J. Trenga
`OPINION BY: Anthony J. Trenga
`
`OPINION
`OPINION
`
`MEMORANDUM OPINION
`MEMORANDUM OPINION
`CONSTRUING CLAIlVIS
`CONSTRUING CLAIMS
`
`AND
`AND
`
`ORDER
`ORDER
`
`On January 16, 2014,
`On January 16, 2014,
`
`the Court held a claim
`the Court held a claim
`
`LG V. Straight Path, |PR2015-00209
`Straight Path - Exhibit 2029 - Page 1
`
`LG v. Straight Path, IPR2015-00209
`Straight Path - Exhibit 2029 - Page 1
`
`

`
`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25394, *1
`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25394, *1
`
`Page 2
`Page 2
`
`to certain claim
`construction hearing with respect
`to certain claim
`construction hearing with respect
`language of U.S. Patent Numbers 6,513,066 ("the '066
`language of U.S. Patent Numbers 6,513,066 ("the ’066
`[*2] and 6,701,365 ("the '365 patent"). Upon
`patent")
`patent")
`[*2] and 6,701,365 ("the ’365 patent"). Upon
`consideration of the parties' briefs setting forth their
`consideration of the parties’ briefs setting forth their
`proposed constructions and their presentations at
`the
`proposed constructions and their presentations at
`the
`claim construction hearing, the Court rules as follows
`claim construction hearing,
`the Court r111es as follows
`with respect to the disputed terms of the '066 and '365
`with respect to the disputed terms of the ’066 and ’365
`patents.
`patents.
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`I. INTRODUCTION
`
`the Patent and Trademark
`On January 28, 2003,
`the Patent and Trademark
`On January 28, 2003,
`the
`patent,
`entitled
`Office
`("PTO")
`issued
`'066
`the
`’066 patent,
`entitled
`Office
`("PTO")
`issued
`"Establishing a Point-to-Point Internet Communication."
`"Establishing a Point—to—Point Internet Communication."
`On March 2, 2004,
`the PTO issued the '365 patent,
`On March 2, 2004,
`the PTO issued the ’365 patent,
`entitled "Point-to-Point Internet Protocol." The patented
`entitled "Point-to-Point Internet Protocol." The patented
`invention purports to provide a solution to a problem
`invention purports to provide a solution to a problem
`associated with intemet communication between devices,
`associated with internet communication between devices,
`specifically, that such communication generally requires
`specifically, that such communication generally requires
`knowledge of
`the devices'
`respective
`"addresses,"
`knowledge of
`the
`devices’
`respective
`"addresses,"
`typically internet protocol ("IP") addresses, but
`those
`typically intemet protocol
`("IP") addresses, but those
`addresses may not be fixed. See '066 patent at 1:32-2:3;
`addresses may not be fixed. See ’066 patent at 1:32-2:3;
`'365 patent at 1:28-63. During prosecution of the '365
`’365 patent at 1:28-63. During prosecution of the ’365
`patent, the patentee compared this problem to that of
`patent,
`the patentee compared this problem to that of
`"trying to call someone whose telephone number changes
`"trying to call someone whose telephone number changes
`after each call." Straight Path IP Group's Markman Brief,
`after each call." Straight Path IP Group's Markman Brief,
`Ex. 7 at 4.
`Ex. 7 at 4.
`
`The invention comprises two alternative protocols
`The invention comprises two alternative protocols
`for establishing point-to-point communications. [*3] The
`for establishing point—to—point communications.
`[*3] The
`first uses
`a
`"connection server"
`to provide one
`first uses
`a
`"connection
`server"
`to provide one
`"processing unit" with the IP address of a second
`"processing unit" with the IP address of a second
`processing unit, while the second exchanges the IP
`processing unit, while the second exchanges the IP
`addresses via email, without the use of a connection
`addresses via email, without the use of a connection
`server. See '066 patent at 2:7-37;
`'365 patent at
`server. See
`’066 patent at 2:7-37;
`’365 patent at
`1:66-2:28. This case exclusively involves
`the first
`1:66-2:28. This case exclusively involves
`the first
`protocol that utilizes a "connection server," one of the
`protocol that utilizes a "connection server," one of the
`primary terms to be construed.
`primary terms to be construed.
`
`As disclosed in claim 1 of the '066 patent, the first
`As disclosed in claim 1 of the ’066 patent, the first
`protocol consists of: 1) "storing in a database a respective
`protocol consists of: 1) "storing in a database a respective
`Internet Protocol (IP) address of a set of processing units
`Internet Protocol (IP) address of a set of processing units
`that have an on-line status with respect to the Internet"; 2)
`that have an on-line status with respect to the Internet"; 2)
`transmitting a query from the first processing unit to a
`transmitting a query from the first processing unit to a
`connection server to determine the on-line status of a
`connection server to determine the on-line status of a
`second processing unit"; and 3) "retrieving the IP address
`second processing unit"; and 3) "retrieving the IP address
`of the second unit from the database using the connection
`of the second unit from the database using the connection
`server, in response to the determination of a positive
`server,
`in response to the determination of a positive
`on-line status of
`the second processing unit,
`for
`on-line
`status of
`the
`second processing unit,
`for
`establishing a point-to-point communication link between
`establishing a point—to—point communication link between
`the first and second processing units through the
`the first and second processing units through the
`
`Internet." The '365 patent has an identical specification
`Internet." The ’365 patent has an identical specification
`but
`its claims cover a "computer program product,"
`but
`its claims cover a "computer program product,"
`"computer data signal" [*4] and "computer system" for
`"computer data signal" [*4] and "computer system" for
`performing steps similar to those set out in the '066
`performing steps similar to those set out in the ’066
`patent.1
`patent.1
`
`1 The '365 patent also uses somewhat different
`1 The ’365 patent also uses somewhat different
`terminology than the '066 patent. Relevant for this
`terminology than the ’066 patent. Relevant for this
`case is that the '365 patent uses the term "process"
`case is that the ’365 patent uses the term "process"
`instead of
`"processing unit"
`and the
`term
`instead of
`"processing unit"
`and the
`term
`"network protocol
`address"
`instead of
`"IP
`"network protocol
`address"
`instead of
`"IP
`address." Defendants represented at the Markman
`address." Defendants represented at the Markman
`hearing that an IP address is a type of network
`hearing that an IP address is a type of network
`protocol address.
`protocol address.
`
`At this stage in the proceedings, the construction of
`At this stage in the proceedings, the construction of
`four terms remains in dispute:2
`four terms remains in dispute:2
`
`(a) "processing unit,"
`(a) "processing unit,"
`
`(b) "process,"
`0)) "process,"
`
`"point-to-point"/"point-to-point
`(c)
`"point-to-point"/"point-to-point
`(c)
`communication,"3 and
`communication,"3 and
`
`(c) "connection server."
`(c) "connection server."
`
`2 The parties initially disputed the meaning of
`2 The parties initially disputed the meaning of
`ten terms found in claims 1 through 3 and 6
`ten terms found in claims 1
`through 3 and 6
`through 8 of the '066 patent and claims 1 and 3 of
`through 8 of the ’066 patent and claims 1 and 3 of
`the
`'365 patent. However, only Defendant
`the
`’365 patent. However,
`only Defendant
`Bandwidth.com, Inc., which has been dismissed
`Bandwidth.com, Inc., which has been dismissed
`from the case, disputed the meaning of two of the
`from the case, disputed the meaning of two of the
`terms,
`"using
`the
`connection
`server"
`and
`terms,
`"using
`the
`connection
`server"
`and
`"database." Thus, those terms no longer need to
`"database." Thus, those terms no longer need to
`be construed. At
`the Markman hearing,
`the
`be construed. At
`the Markman hearing,
`the
`remaining defendants conceded that four other
`remaining defendants conceded that four other
`terms,
`"Internet,"
`"point-to-point
`Internet
`terms,
`"Intemet,"
`"point-to-point
`Internet
`communication," "point-to-point communications
`communication," "point-to-point communications
`over
`the Internet,"
`[*5] and "point-to-point
`over
`the Internet,"
`[*5]
`and "point-to-point
`communication link between the first and second
`communication link between the first and second
`processing units through the Internet," do not
`processing units through the Internet," do not
`need to be construed.
`need to be construed.
`3 The term "point-to-point," as used in the '066
`3 The term "point-to-point," as used in the ’066
`and '365 patents, was construed in an earlier case
`and ’365 patents, was construed in an earlier case
`filed in the Norfolk Division of this District. See
`filed in the Norfolk Division of this District. See
`Innovative Commc'ns Tech.,
`Inc.
`("ICTI") v.
`Innovative Commc’ns Tech.,
`Inc.
`(”ICTI"
`v.
`Vivox,
`Inc., Nos. 2:12-cv-7 & 2:12-cv-9, 2012
`Vivox, Inc., Nos. 2:12-cv-7 & 2:12-cv-9, 2012
`U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154311, 2012 WL 5331573
`U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154311, 2012 WL 5331573
`
`LG V. Straight Path, |PR2015-00209
`Straight Path - Exhibit 2029 - Page 2
`
`LG v. Straight Path, IPR2015-00209
`Straight Path - Exhibit 2029 - Page 2
`
`

`
`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25394, *5
`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25394, *5
`
`Page 3
`Page 3
`
`(E.D. Va. Oct. 26, 2012). That case settled before
`(E.D. Va. Oct. 26, 2012). That case settled before
`a final adjudication on the merits.
`a final adjudication on the merits.
`
`H. STANDARD
`II. STANDARD
`
`The construction or interpretation of a claim is a
`The construction or interpretation of a claim is a
`question of law. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`question of law. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370,
`52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995), afi"d, 517 U.S. 370,
`116 S. Ct. 1384, 134 L. Ed. 2d 577 (1996). The words of
`116 S. Ct. 1384, 134 L. Ed. 2d 577 (1996). The words of
`the claim "are generally given their ordinary and
`the claim "are generally given their ordinary and
`customary meaning," that is, the meaning they would
`customary meaning," that is,
`the meaning they would
`have "to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at
`have "to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at
`the time of the invention." Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415
`the time of the invention." Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415
`F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
`F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
`"Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is
`"Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is
`deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of
`deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of
`the particular claim in which the disputed term appears,
`the particular claim in which the disputed term appears,
`but in the context of the entire patent, including the
`but in the context of the entire patent,
`including the
`specification." Id. at 1313. Thus,
`[*6] in interpreting
`specification." Id. at 1313. Thus,
`[*6] in interpreting
`claim terms, "the court should look first to the intrinsic
`claim terms, "the court should look first to the intrinsic
`evidence of record, i.e., the patent itself, including the
`evidence of record,
`i.e., the patent itself, including the
`claims,
`the specification, and,
`if
`in evidence,
`the
`claims,
`the
`specification,
`and,
`if
`in evidence,
`the
`prosecution history." Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
`prosecution history." Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
`Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). However, the
`Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). However, the
`court may also consider extrinsic evidence, including, for
`court may also consider extrinsic evidence, including, for
`example,
`treatises, dictionaries, and expert
`testimony.
`example,
`treatises, dictionaries, and expert
`testimony.
`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317-18.
`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317-18.
`
`"If the claim language is clear on its face, then [the
`"If the claim language is clear on its face, then [the
`Court's] consideration of the rest of the intrinsic evidence
`Court's] consideration of the rest of the intrinsic evidence
`is restricted to determining if a deviation from the clear
`is restricted to determining if a deviation from the clear
`language of the claims is specified." Interactive Gift
`language of the claims is specified." Interactive Gift
`Express, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331
`Express, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331
`(Fed. Cir. 2001). "If, however, the claim language is not
`(Fed. Cir. 2001 ). "If, however, the claim language is not
`clear on its face, then [the Court's] consideration of the
`clear on its face, then [the Court's] consideration of the
`rest of the intrinsic evidence is directed to resolving, if
`rest of the intrinsic evidence is directed to resolving, if
`possible, the lack of clarity." Id. "In some cases, the
`possible,
`the lack of clarity." Id. "In some cases,
`the
`ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a
`ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a
`person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to
`person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to
`lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves
`lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves
`little more than the application of the widely accepted
`little more than the application of the widely accepted
`meaning of commonly [*7] understood words." Phillips,
`meaning of commonly [*7] understood words." Phillips,
`415 F.3d at 1314.
`415 F.3d at 1314.
`
`A claim term should be interpreted more narrowly
`A claim term should be interpreted more narrowly
`than its ordinary and customary meaning under only two
`than its ordinary and customary meaning under only two
`circumstances: "1) when a patentee sets out a definition
`circumstances: ''I) when a patentee sets out a definition
`and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the
`and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the
`patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in
`patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in
`the specification or during prosecution." Thorner v. Sony
`the specification or during prosecution." Thorner v. Sony
`Computer Entm't Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.
`Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2012). "To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee
`Cir. 2012). "To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee
`must clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim
`must clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim
`term other than its plain and ordinary meaning. It is not
`term other than its plain and ordinary meaning. It is not
`enough for a patentee to simply disclose a single
`enough for a patentee to simply disclose a single
`embodiment or use a word in the same manner in all
`embodiment or use a word in the same manner in all
`embodiments, the patentee must clearly express an intent
`embodiments, the patentee must clearly express an intent
`to redefine the term." Id. (internal citation and quotation
`to redefine the term." Id. (internal citation and quotation
`marks omitted). "The standard for disavowal of claim
`marks omitted). "The standard for disavowal of claim
`scope is similarly exacting." Id. at 1366. "The patentee
`scope is similarly exacting." Id. at 1366. "The patentee
`may demonstrate intent to deviate from the ordinary and
`may demonstrate intent to deviate from the ordinary and
`accustomed meaning of a claim term by including in the
`accustomed meaning of a claim term by including in the
`specification expressions of manifest
`exclusion or
`specification expressions of manifest
`exclusion or
`restriction,
`representing a clear disavowal of claim
`restriction,
`representing a clear disavowal of claim
`scope." Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d
`scope." Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d
`1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
`1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
`
`Title [*8] 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 requires that every
`Title [*8] 35 U.S.C. § 112, ‘H 2 requires that every
`patent's specification "conclude with one or more claims
`patent's specification "conclude with one or more claims
`particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the
`particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the
`subject matter which the inventor .
`.
`. regards as the
`subject matter which the inventor .
`.
`. regards as the
`invention." A claim that fails to satisfy this particularity
`invention." A claim that fails to satisfy this particularity
`requirement is invalid for indefiniteness. "The primary
`requirement is invalid for indefiniteness. "The primary
`purpose of the definiteness requirement is to ensure that
`purpose of the definiteness requirement is to ensure that
`the claims are written in such a way that they give notice
`the claims are written in such a way that they give notice
`to the public of the extent of the legal protection afforded
`to the public of the extent of the legal protection afforded
`by the patent, so that interested members of the public,
`by the patent, so that interested members of the public,
`e.g., competitors of the patent owner, can determine
`e.g., competitors of the patent owner, can determine
`whether or not they infringe." All Dental Prodx, LLC v.
`whether or not they infringe." All Dental Prodx, LLC v.
`Advantage Dental Prods., Inc., 309 F.3d 774, 779-80
`Advantage Dental Prods., Inc., 309 F.3d 774, 779-80
`(Fed. Cir. 2002).
`(Fed. Cir. 2002).
`
`"In the face of an allegation of
`indefiniteness,
`"In the face of an allegation of indefiniteness,
`general
`principles
`of
`claim construction
`apply."
`general
`principles
`of
`claim construction
`apply."
`Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d
`Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software,
`Inc., 417 F.3d
`1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2005). "Only claims not amenable
`1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2005). "Only claims not amenable
`to construction or insolubly ambiguous are indefinite."
`to construction or insolubly ambiguous are indefinite."
`Source Search Techs., LLC v. LendingTree, LLC, 588
`Source Search Techs., LLC v. LendingTree, LLC, 588
`F.3d 1063, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
`F.3d 1063, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
`marks omitted). Patents are presumed valid, and an
`marks omitted). Patents are presumed valid, and an
`alleged infringer asserting that a claim term is
`[*9]
`alleged infringer asserting that a claim term is
`[*9]
`indefinite must prove "by clear and convincing evidence
`indefinite must prove "by clear and convincing evidence
`that a skilled artisan could not discern the boundaries of
`that a skilled artisan could not discern the boundaries of
`the claim based on the claim language, the specification,
`the claim based on the claim language, the specification,
`and the prosecution history, as well as her knowledge of
`and the prosecution history, as well as her knowledge of
`the relevant art area." Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v.
`the relevant art area." Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v.
`M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1249-50 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
`M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1249-50 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
`
`IH. CLAIlVIS
`III. CLAIMS
`
`A. "processing unit"
`A. "processing uni "
`
`LG V. Straight Path, |PR2015-00209
`Straight Path - Exhibit 2029 - Page 3
`
`LG v. Straight Path, IPR2015-00209
`Straight Path - Exhibit 2029 - Page 3
`
`

`
`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25394, *9
`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25394, *9
`
`Page 4
`Page 4
`
`The term "processing unit" is found in claims 1
`The term "processing unit" is found in claims 1
`through 3 and 6 through 8 of the '066 patent. Straight
`through 3 and 6 through 8 of the ’066 patent. Straight
`Path contends that no construction is necessary as the
`Path contends that no construction is necessary as the
`term has a plain and ordinary meaning. The defendants
`term has a plain and ordinary meaning. The defendants
`contend that the term should be construed to mean "a user
`contend that the term should be construed to mean "a user
`device."
`device."
`
`The defendants do not seem to dispute that the term
`The defendants do not seem to dispute that the term
`"processing unit" has an ordinary and customary meaning
`"processing unit" has an ordinary and customary meaning
`that is readily apparent even to a layperson. See Phillips,
`that is readily apparent even to a layperson. See Phillips,
`415 F.3d at 1314. They nonetheless contend that the term
`415 F.3d at 1314. They nonetheless contend that the term
`must be construed, although it is unclear to the Court how
`must be construed, although it is unclear to the Court how
`their proposed construction differs from that ordinary and
`their proposed construction differs from that ordinary and
`customary meaning. To the extent
`the defendants'
`customary meaning. To the extent
`the defendants‘
`proposed construction would limit the scope of the term
`proposed construction would limit the scope of the term
`"processing unit," that limitation is unsupported. While
`"processing unit," that limitation is unsupported. While
`the specification frequently employs the term "user"
`the specification frequently employs the term "user"
`[*10] in connection with the term "processing unit,"4 the
`[*l0] in connection with the term "processing unit,"4 the
`patentee did not clearly disavow the ordinary and
`patentee did not clearly disavow the ordinary and
`customary meaning of the term.5 See Teleflex, Inc., 299
`customary meaning of the term.5 See Teleflex, Inc., 299
`F.3d at 1325. The Court will therefore construe the term
`F.3d at 1325. The Court will therefore construe the term
`"processing unit" according to its ordinary and customary
`"processing unit" according to its ordinary and customary
`meaning, without further restrictions.
`meaning, without further restrictions.
`
`See, e.g., '066 patent at 5:67-6:4 ("The first
`4
`See, e.g., ’066 patent at 5167-614 ("The first
`4
`user operating the first processing unit 12 is thus
`user operating the first processing unit 12 is thus
`established in the database 34 as an active on—line
`established in the database 34 as an active on-line
`party available for communication using the
`party available for communication using the
`disclosed point-to-point Internet protocol.").
`disclosed point—to—point Internet protocol.").
`5 In their briefs and at the Markman hearing, the
`5 In their briefs and at the Markman hearing, the
`defendants argued that construction is necessary
`defendants argued that construction is necessary
`because
`the
`requires
`that
`the
`'066 patent
`because
`the
`’066 patent
`requires
`that
`the
`processing units be "positioned at either ends of
`processing units be "positioned at either ends of
`point-to-point
`communications." Defendants
`point—to—point
`communications."
`Defendants
`Bandwidth.com, Inc.'s and Vocalocity, Inc.'s Joint
`Bandwidth.com, Inc.'s and Vocalocity, Inc.'s Joint
`Opening Claim Construction Brief at 23. But the
`Opening Claim Construction Brief at 23. But the
`defendants have failed to explain how the
`defendants have failed to explain how the
`specification or prosecution history supports this
`specification or prosecution history supports this
`proposed limitation in any way that is not already
`proposed limitation in any way that is not already
`apparent from the claims themselves, or how the
`apparent from the claims themselves, or how the
`term "user" connotes "endpoint."
`term "user" connotes "endpoint."
`
`B. "process"
`B. "process"
`
`The term "process" is found in claims 1 and 3 of the
`The term "process" is found in claims 1 and 3 of the
`'365 patent. Straight Path [*11] would construe the term
`’365 patent. Straight Path [*1l] would construe the term
`as "a running instance of a computer program or
`as
`"a running instance of a computer program or
`application." The defendants propose as the appropriate
`application." The defendants propose as the appropriate
`construction "an addressable program running on a user
`construction "an addressable program running on a user
`device."6
`device."6
`
`6 Defendants originally seemed to argue that the
`6 Defendants originally seemed to argue that the
`term "process" is indefinite, and to propose the
`term "process" is indefinite, and to propose the
`above construction only as an alternative in the
`above construction only as an alternative in the
`event the Court decided to construe the term. At
`event the Court decided to construe the term. At
`the Markman hearing, however, the defendants
`the Markman hearing, however,
`the defendants
`clarified that their position is not that the term
`clarified that their position is not that the term
`cannot be construed, but
`that Straight Path's
`carmot be construed, but
`that Straight Path's
`construction of
`"process"
`renders
`the
`term
`construction of
`"process"
`renders
`the
`term
`indefinite.
`indefinite.
`
`in the
`appear
`term "process" does not
`The
`in the
`appear
`term "process"
`does not
`The
`specification. However, in their respective claims, the
`specification. However,
`in their respective claims,
`the
`'365 patent uses the term "process" in essentially the
`’365 patent uses the term "process" in essentially the
`same manner in which the '066 patent uses the term
`same manner in which the ’066 patent uses the term
`"processing unit." Compare, e.g., '066 patent claim 1,
`"processing unit." Compare, e.g.,
`’066 patent claim 1,
`with '365 patent claim 3. Further, the parties seem to
`with ’365 patent claim 3. Further,
`the parties seem to
`agree that a "process" is the running of a program on a
`agree that a "process" is the running of a program on a
`processing unit, essentially the plaintiff's proposed
`processing unit,
`essentially the plaintiffs proposed
`construction, and the Court finds that that construction
`construction, and the Court finds that that construction
`reflects the ordinary and customary meaning of the term,
`reflects the ordinary and customary meaning of the term,
`when read in light of the claims. See '365 patent claim 1
`when read in light of the claims. See ’365 patent claim 1
`(claiming a "computer
`[*12] program product" for
`(claiming a "computer
`[*12] program product" for
`performing the relevant steps); id. claim 3 (claiming, in a
`performing the relevant steps); id. claim 3 (claiming, in a
`"computer system," a method for performing the relevant
`"computer system," a method for performing the relevant
`steps). The issue,
`then,
`is whether that ordinary and
`steps). The issue,
`then,
`is whether that ordinary and
`customary meaning should be restricted as defendants
`customary meaning should be restricted as defendants
`propose.
`propose.
`
`As discussed above, the Court rejects the defendants'
`As discussed above, the Court rejects the defendants’
`attempt to construe "processing unit" as "a user device,"
`attempt to construe "processing unit" as "a user device,"
`and for the same reasons the Court rejects their attempt to
`and for the same reasons the Court rejects their attempt to
`insert the term "user" into the definition of "process." The
`insert the term "user" into the definition of "process." The
`remaining question, then, is whether, as the defendants
`remaining question, then, is whether, as the defendants
`contend, "process" must be limited to an "addressable
`contend, "process" must be limited to an "addressable
`program." The defendants explain that, based on the
`program." The defendants explain that, based on the
`claims, a process "needs to be addressable by a network
`claims, a process "needs to be addressable by a network
`protocol address." Defendants Bandwidth.com, Inc.'s and
`protocol address." Defendants Bandwidth.com, Inc.'s and
`Vocalocity,
`Inc.'s Joint Opening Claim Construction
`Vocalocity,
`Inc.'s Joint Opening Claim Construction
`Brief at 13. Based on this explanation, however,
`the
`Brief at 13. Based on this explanation, however,
`the
`limitation would seem to be redundant with the claims
`limitation would seem to be redundant with the claims
`themselves. Moreover, to the extent the limitation would
`themselves. Moreover, to the extent the limitation would
`narrow the term, the defendants have not pointed to any
`narrow the term, the defendants have not pointed to any
`clear disclaimer of the full scope of the claim language.
`clear disclaimer of the full scope of the claim language.
`Finally, the Court rejects the defendants' argument that
`Finally, the Court rejects the defendants‘ argument that
`Straight Path's construction, which simply reflects the
`Straight Path's construction, which simply reflects the
`[*13] ordinary and customary meaning of the term, is
`[*13] ordinary and customary meaning of the term, is
`"insolubly ambiguous." See Source Search Techs., LLC,
`"insolubly ambiguous." See Source Search Techs., LLC,
`588 F.3d at 1076.7
`588 F.3d at 1076.7
`
`7 Further, even if the term were ambiguous, the
`7 Further, even if the term were ambiguous, the
`
`LG V. Straight Path, |PR2015-00209
`Straight Path - Exhibit 2029 - Page 4
`
`LG v. Straight Path, IPR2015-00209
`Straight Path - Exhibit 2029 - Page 4
`
`

`
`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25394, *l3
`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25394, *13
`
`Page 5
`Page 5
`
`fails to see how Defendants' proposed
`Court
`fails to see how Defendants‘ proposed
`Court
`limitations would remedy any ambiguity.
`limitations would remedy any ambiguity.
`
`the Court will construe the term
`Accordingly,
`the Court will construe the term
`Accordingly,
`"process," as used in claims 1 and 3 of the '365 patent, as
`"process," as used in claims 1 and 3 of the ’365 patent, as
`"a
`running instance of
`a
`computer program or
`"a
`running instance of
`a
`computer program or
`application."
`application. "
`
`"point-to-point"
`C.
`"point-to-point"
`C.
`communication"8
`communication"8
`
`and
`and
`
`"point-to-point
`"point-to-point
`
`8 In the patents, the term "point-to-point" always
`8
`In the patents, the term "point—to—point" always
`appears
`in
`connection with
`the
`term
`appears
`in
`connection
`with
`the
`term
`"communication,"
`sometimes with the
`term
`"communication,"
`sometimes with the
`term
`"Intemet" in between. The Court will therefore
`"Internet" in between. The Court will therefore
`refer to the terms "point-to-point" and "point to
`refer to the terms "point-t