throbber
Paper No.
`Filed: January 16, 2015
`
`Naveen Modi
`Paul Hastings LLP
`875 15th Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Telephone: (202) 551-1990
`Facsimile: (202) 551-0490
`E-mail: naveenmodi@paulhastings.com
`
`
`
`
`Filed on behalf of: VirnetX Inc.
`By:
`
`Joseph E. Palys
`Paul Hastings LLP
`875 15th Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Telephone: (202) 551-1996
`Facsimile: (202) 551-0496
`E-mail: josephpalys@paulhastings.com
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`
`
`APPLE INC.
`Petitioner
`v.
`VIRNETX INC.
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`Case IPR2015-00187
`Patent 7,490,151
`
`
`
`
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`to Petition for Inter Partes Review
`of U.S. Patent No. 7,490,151
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

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`
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`
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`Case No. IPR2015-00187
`
`Table of Contents
`Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
`I.
`II. Apple Remains Time-Barred and Institution Is Precluded by Statute ............ 2
`III. Apple’s Petition Should Be Denied Under 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(d) and
`325(d), Consistent with Board Precedent and Policy ...................................... 3
`A. Apple’s Petition Is the Seventh Inter Partes Office Challenge to
`the ’151 Patent ....................................................................................... 3
`B. Denial of the Petition Under 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(d) and 325(d) Is
`Authorized and Appropriate .................................................................. 6
`Institution Would Prejudice VirnetX, Yet Denial of Institution Would
`Not Unduly Prejudice Apple .........................................................................12
`Conclusion .....................................................................................................15
`
`
`
`IV.
`
`V.
`
`i
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`

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`Case No. IPR2015-00187
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Federal Cases
`Butamax Adv. Biofuels LLC v. Gevo, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00581, Paper No. 8 (Oct. 14, 2014) ...................................................... 2
`Conopco, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
`IPR2014-00507, Paper No. 17 at 2 (July 7, 2014) ........................................... 7, 8
`Conopco, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
`IPR2014-00628, Paper No. 21 at 11 (Oct. 20, 2014) ......................................... 11
`Medtronic, Inc. v. Nuvasive, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00487, Paper No. 8 (Sept. 11, 2014) ................................................. 8, 9
`Prism Pharma Co., Ltd. v. Choongwae Pharma Corp.,
`IPR2014-00315, Paper No. 14 (July 8, 2014) .................................................... 10
`SAS Institute, Inc. v. Complementsoft, LLC,
`IPR2013-00581, Paper No. 15 (Dec. 30, 2013) .................................................. 14
`Standard Innovation Corp. v. Lelo, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00907, Paper No. 10 (Dec. 1, 2014) .............................................. 11, 14
`Unified Patents, Inc. v. Personal Web Techs., LLC et al.,
`IPR2014-00702, Paper No. 13 (July 24, 2014) .............................................. 9, 10
`VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................................................................ 3
`Federal Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 311 .......................................................................................................... 2
`35 U.S.C. § 314 .......................................................................................................... 2
`35 U.S.C. § 315(b) ....................................................................................... 2, 3, 4, 12
`35 U.S.C. § 315(c) ................................................................................................. 2, 3
`35 U.S.C. § 315(d) ............................................................................................passim
`
`ii
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`Case No. IPR2015-00187
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`35 U.S.C. § 325(d) ............................................................................................passim
`Regulations
`37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b) .................................................................................................. 12
`37 C.F.R. § 42.11 ..................................................................................................... 12
`
`iii
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`

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`
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`I.
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`
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`Case No. IPR2015-00187
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`Introduction
`Board decisions and sound policy support denying Apple’s Petition, which
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`is the seventh Office challenge to U.S. Patent No. 7,490,151 (“the ’151 patent”).
`
`Apple itself initiated four of these challenges, either by itself or, as the Board
`
`found, through its “proxy” RPX Corporation. (IPR2014-00173, Paper No. 56 at 7
`
`(redacted) (June 5, 2014) (finding that “RPX is Apple’s proxy”).) Apple filed a
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`first IPR petition, which was denied as time-barred. RPX filed another IPR
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`petition, which was denied because Apple was an unnamed and time-barred real
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`party-in-interest. Apple also initiated an inter partes reexamination of the ’151
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`patent.
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`Three proceedings involving the ’151 patent are now pending before the
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`Office. These include Apple’s own inter partes reexamination, a separate inter
`
`partes reexamination initiated by Cisco Systems, Inc., and an IPR filed by
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`Microsoft Corporation.1 Because Apple’s Petition here seeks to essentially
`
`replicate issues and evidence already before the Office, they should be denied
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`under 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(d) and 325(d).
`
`
`1 Microsoft and VirnetX have settled and have filed a joint motion to
`
`terminate in the IPR. The motion to terminate is pending.
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`
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`

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`
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`II. Apple Remains Time-Barred and Institution Is Precluded by Statute
`Apple’s earlier petition challenging the ’151 patent in IPR2013-00354 and
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`Case No. IPR2015-00187
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`
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`the one filed by RPX in IPR2014-00173 were correctly denied as time-barred
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`under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). (IPR2013-00354, Paper No. 20 (December 13, 2013);
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`IPR2014-00173, Paper No. 56 at 3 (redacted) (June 5, 2014).) This is a deficiency
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`that Apple cannot cure by filing a further petition and motion for joinder in this
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`matter.
`
`Apple’s joinder motion does not alter the outcome dictated by 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 315(b). Under the plain language of that statute, because Apple was served with
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`a complaint on August 11, 2010—more than one year before filing its Petition
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`here—institution is barred. See Paper No. 7 at 3-7. And under 35 U.S.C. § 315(c),
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`joinder is only permitted if the Board first determines that Apple’s petition
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`warrants institution. See id.; 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (“the Director, in his or her
`
`discretion, may join . . . any person who properly files a petition under section 311
`
`that the Director . . . determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review
`
`under section 314”). The Board has acknowledged this fact, stating that “[t]he
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`statute does, however, set forth at least one circumstance in which we do not have
`
`the discretion to join a party: if the Board determines that the second petition does
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`not warrant institution.” Butamax Adv. Biofuels LLC v. Gevo, Inc., IPR2014-
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`00581, Paper No. 8 at 7 (Oct. 14, 2014) (citing and quoting 35 U.S.C. § 315(c))
`
`2
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`

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`
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`(emphasis in original). Because Apple remains time-barred to challenge the ’151
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`Case No. IPR2015-00187
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`patent via inter partes review, its Petition does not warrant institution generally
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`and institution is also impossible under 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). See Paper No. 7 at 3-7.
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`For the threshold reason of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)’s time-bar, and 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 315(c)’s precondition for joinder that a petition must warrant institution, Apple’s
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`Petition must be denied.
`
`III. Apple’s Petition Should Be Denied Under 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(d) and
`325(d), Consistent with Board Precedent and Policy
`Given the number of serial challenges filed against the ’151 patent, and the
`
`fact that three are currently pending at the Office—including one initiated by
`
`Apple itself—the Board should invoke its authority under 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(d) and
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`325(d) to deny institution of this seventh challenge.
`
`A. Apple’s Petition Is the Seventh Inter Partes Office Challenge to
`the ’151 Patent
`Apple challenged the validity of the ’151 patent in a litigation that included a
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`jury trial. In that litigation, VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Sys. Inc. et al., Case No. 6:10-cv-
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`00417 (E.D. Tex.), Apple failed to establish that any claim of the ’151 patent was
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`invalid. (Ex. 2003, Jury Verdict Form (E.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2012).) Apple appealed
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`to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which affirmed that “none of
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`the asserted claims are invalid[.]” VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308,
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`1313-14 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In addition to these litigation challenges involving the
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`3
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`’151 patent, seven inter partes challenges have been filed within the Officethree
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`by Apple itselfas discussed below.
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`Before the trial noted above, Apple filed a request for inter partes
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`reexamination of the ’151 patent, which the Office assigned Control No.
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`95/001,697 (“the ’1,697 reexamination”). That reexamination remains pending.
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`A second request for inter partes reexamination of the ’151 patent was filed
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`by Cisco and accorded Control No. 95/001,714 (“the ’1,714 reexamination”). That
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`proceeding is currently pending at the Office, and involves the same Kiuchi
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`reference asserted in Apple’s Petition here and in Microsoft’s IPR2014-00610
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`proceeding.
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`The first IPR petition against the ’151 patent was filed by New Bay Capital,
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`LLC on June 23, 2013. That proceeding was terminated in favor of VirnetX,
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`pursuant to New Bay’s request for adverse judgment. (IPR2013-00376, Paper No.
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`17 (Nov. 12, 2013).)
`
`Apple filed an IPR petition against the ’151 patent on July 1, 2013, in
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`IPR2013-00354. The Board denied this petition because Apple was time-barred
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`under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) from seeking IPR of the ’151 patent. (IPR2013-00354,
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`Paper No. 20 (Dec. 13, 2013), reh’g denied Paper No. 24 (Feb. 12, 2014).)
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`RPX Corporation, which the Board found was acting as a proxy for time-
`
`barred Apple, filed another IPR petition against the ’151 patent on November 20,
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`4
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`2013, in IPR2014-00173. Apple paid RPX to file IPR petitions against several
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`Case No. IPR2015-00187
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`VirnetX patents, including the ’151 patent, but failed to identify itself as a real
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`party-in-interest in those petitions. (IPR2014-00173, Paper No. 56 at 4-5, 10
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`(redacted) (June 5, 2014).) As VirnetX explained, Apple tried to hide its
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`involvement in the RPX proceedings in several ways, giving the false impression
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`that Apple and RPX were unconnected entities without a privity or real party-in-
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`interest relationship. (IPR2014-00173, Paper No. 54 at 6-8 (redacted) (Mar. 6,
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`2014).) Despite these efforts, the Board found that Apple was a real party-in-
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`interest for RPX’s petitions, and accordingly denied institution given Apple’s time-
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`barred status. (IPR2014-00173, Paper No. 56 at 10 (redacted) (June 5, 2014).)
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`More recently, Microsoft filed a petition in IPR2014-00610 challenging the
`
`’151 patent. On October 15, 2014, the Board instituted trial. (IPR2014-00610,
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`Paper No. 9 (Oct. 15, 2014).)
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`Finally, on October 30, 2014, Apple filed the Petition in this case. Apple
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`acknowledges
`
`that
`
`its petition raises grounds “identical”
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`to Microsoft’s
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`corresponding petition. (Paper No. 2 at 3.) In fact, not only are the grounds
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`identical, the declarations submitted in each proceeding are also duplicates. (See
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`Exs. 1003 in each proceeding.) Thus, for Apple’s own fourth Office challenge to
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`the ’151 patentthe seventh challenge overallApple replicates issues and
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`evidence that the Office is considering in ongoing proceedings. If the Board grants
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`the pending motion to terminate IPR2014-00610, Apple’s petition would still be
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`Case No. IPR2015-00187
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`duplicative of the ongoing Office challenges to the ’151 patent, including Apple’s
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`own ongoing inter partes reexamination.
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`B. Denial of the Petition Under 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(d) and 325(d) Is
`Authorized and Appropriate
`In situations less duplicative, with fewer prior challenges, and with less
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`burden for the Board and the parties, the Board has exercised its discretion under
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`35 U.S.C. §§ 315(d) and 325(d) to deny IPR petitions. The Board should likewise
`
`do so here.
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`Discretionary authority to avoid an avalanche of proceedings comes from
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`35 U.S.C. § 315(d), which allows the Board to “terminat[e]” one proceeding when
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`another proceeding “involving the patent is before the Office.” Under 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 325(d), the Board has similar authority to “terminate[e]” a serial proceeding, and
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`may also consider, as part of “determining whether to institute” a proceeding,
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`whether “the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were
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`presented to the Office.”
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`The Board’s discretionary authority to deny institution of this Petition is
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`amply justified. Not one, but three pending proceedings are in progress before the
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`Office involving the ’151 patent. These three proceedings include two inter partes
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`reexaminations (the ’1,697 and ’1,714 reexaminations) and one IPR trial
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`(IPR2014-00610). Moreover, the grounds advanced by Apple in its petition are
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`6
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`admittedly “identical” to those involved in the pending IPR2014-00610 trial. The
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`Case No. IPR2015-00187
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`’1,697 and ’1,714 reexaminations also involve one of the same primary references,
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`Kiuchi, that Apple identifies in its petition. Accordingly, each of 35 U.S.C.
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`§§ 315(d)’s and 325(d)’s preconditions for the Board to deny Apple’s Petition is
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`present. Declining to do so will encourage serial challenges to the same patent
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`through inter partes reviews—as Apple has done here—which unnecessarily
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`burdens the resources of the Board and patent owners.
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`This case presents even more compelling reasons for the Board to exercise
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`its discretion than in prior cases where the Board has denied institution. Here,
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`there is (i) a longer line of serial Office challenges to the ’151 patent, (ii) more
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`involvement by the petitioner (Apple) itself in those previous challenges, and
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`(iii) more duplicative proposed grounds than in prior cases where the Board has
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`denied serial petitions.
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`For example, in Conopco, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., IPR2014-00507,
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`Paper No. 17 at 2 (July 7, 2014), the Board considered a petition directed to a set
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`of challenged claims for which the Board denied institution based on an earlier
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`petition. The second petition asserted 11 prior art references, seven of which were
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`not asserted in the earlier petition. Id. at 6. Like Apple here, the petitioner sought
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`joinder based on the second petition with an instituted proceeding that was based
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`on claims from the earlier petition. Id. at 2. The Board denied institution under
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`7
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`35 U.S.C. § 325(d), finding that “the instant Petition presents ‘the same or
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`Case No. IPR2015-00187
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`substantially the same prior art or arguments’ that were advanced in the” previous
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`petition. Id. at 7-8.
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`Even though most of the prior art references were newly raised, the Board
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`denied institution. Here, Apple raises zero references, grounds, or pieces of
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`evidence that were not in Apple’s and Microsoft’s prior petitions for IPR. Id. at 6.
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`And while the petition in Conopco was directed to different claims than those in
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`the instituted proceeding, here Apple seeks to challenge the same claims of the
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`’151 patent already involved in IPR2014-00610. Id. Further, in Conopco, there
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`was only one prior Office proceeding that raised “the same or substantially the
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`same prior art or arguments”—here, there are six prior Office proceedings, plus
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`Apple’s earlier jury trial. Id. at 5-8.
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`The Board similarly rejected a serial petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) in
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`Medtronic, Inc. v. Nuvasive, Inc., IPR2014-00487, Paper No. 8 (Sept. 11, 2014).
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`In that case, similar to Apple here, the petitioner had filed two previous IPR
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`petitions. Id. at 2. One petition was instituted and the other was denied. Id. The
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`petitioner then filed a third petition, similar to the rejected petition, but with
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`purported “new evidence and argument” allegedly “not redundant” in view of the
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`grounds in the instituted proceeding. Id. at 6. The Board rejected the third
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`petition, because the petitioner (like Apple here) “does not provide any specific
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`reasoning to support” a finding of non-redundancy. Id. at 6-7.
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`The same reasons that warranted denial of the petition in Medtronic are
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`more strongly present here. While the grounds at issue in Medtronic were
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`characterized as providing “new evidence and argument,” here Apple admits that
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`its proposed grounds are wholly redundant of the grounds involved in IPR2014-
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`00610. The primary reference in Apple’s petition is also already before the Board
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`in an inter partes reexamination. Apple’s grounds fall more squarely within
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`35 U.S.C. § 325(d)’s authorization to deny grounds based on “the same or
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`substantially the same prior art or arguments” raised in a previous Office
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`proceeding than those at issue in Medtronic. Medtronic also involved only one
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`prior Office proceeding in contrast to the multitude of prior proceedings present
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`here.
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`The Board also denied a serial petition in Unified Patents, Inc. v. Personal
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`Web Technologies, LLC et al., IPR2014-00702, Paper No. 13 at 2-3 (July 24,
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`2014). The Board considered whether to institute an IPR where three other IPR
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`petitions, and one request for ex parte reexamination, had previously been filed by
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`other parties. Id. Like Apple did here, the petitioner in Unified Patents filed a
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`motion seeking joinder to an instituted IPR. Id. at 3. The Board denied institution
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`under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), reasoning that the prior IPRs involved “the same
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`reference being asserted in this proceeding,” and that one or more of the prior IPRs
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`Case No. IPR2015-00187
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`would thus address the same issues. Id. at 7-8.
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`While one of the IPRs addressed in Unified Patents was already at the
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`appeal stage, the facts present here provide even stronger reasons to deny
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`institution. First, Apple’s petition is the seventh Office challenges to the ’151
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`patenttwo times the number of serial proceedings addressed in Unified Patents.
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`Id. at 2-3. And while the petitioner in Unified Patents had not filed any of the prior
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`serial petitions itself, here Apple itself filed three of the prior Office challenges
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`involving the ’151 patent. Just as the petition in Unified Patents was denied in
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`view of “the efficient administration of the Office,” here the same factors present a
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`stronger basis for denying Apple’s Petition.
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`The Board has also exercised its discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to deny
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`IPR petitions based on prior examination (as opposed to reexamination or IPR) of
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`the challenged patent. See, e.g., Prism Pharma Co., Ltd. v. Choongwae Pharma
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`Corp., IPR2014-00315, Paper No. 14 at 2, 12-13 (July 8, 2014) (denying IPR
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`petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because “[t]he same prior art . . . and arguments
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`substantially the same as Petitioner’s current contention” were raised during
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`prosecution.) Here, an even stronger basis to invoke 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(d) and
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`325(d) is present, as the previous Office proceedings involving the ’151 patent
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`were all inter partes in nature, permitting the challenger, including Apple itself in
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`its ongoing reexamination, a full opportunity to participate in the proceedings and
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`be heard.
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`The Board has further noted that “the interests of fairness, economy, and
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`efficiency support” denying institution (though it is not statutorily barred) where a
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`petitioner, in similar situations, files a second petition relying on references and
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`arguments it could have raised in a first, unsuccessful petition. See Conopco, Inc.
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`v. Procter & Gamble Co., IPR2014-00628, Paper No. 21 at 11 (Oct. 20, 2014); see
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`also Standard Innovation Corp. v. Lelo, Inc., IPR2014-00907, Paper No. 10 at 4
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`(Dec. 1, 2014) (denying institution where “[n]either the Petition nor the Motion for
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`Joinder presents cogent argument or evidence to explain why the grounds of
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`unpatentability asserted in the Petition could not have been asserted in the
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`[previous] IPR.”). To allow otherwise would encourage the filing of requests that
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`“hold[] back prior art for use in successive attacks, should the first petition be
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`denied.” Conopco, IPR2014-00628, Paper No. 21 at 11. This is Apple’s fourth
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`successive Office attack on the ’151 patent. Here too, “the interests of fairness,
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`economy, and efficiency” support denying institution.
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`These decisions demonstrate that the Board has appropriately used its
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`statutory authority to prevent serial harassment of patent owners and to preclude
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`petitioners from pursuing unnecessarily burdensome and duplicative proceedings
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`before the Office. In exercising its discretion whether to institute a trial here, the
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`Board should also consider Apple’s conduct in the prior proceedings filed by RPX.
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`Case No. IPR2015-00187
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`Not only was Apple not named as a real party-in-interest in the RPX petitions, it
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`tried to hide its involvement in those proceedings. Denial of Apple’s new petition
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`pursuant to the Board’s discretionary authority would further the Office’s policies
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`requiring candor by parties and accuracy in parties’ mandatory notices under
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.11, and promote the goal of “just” proceedings stated in 37 C.F.R.
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`§ 42.1(b).
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`Given the extreme facts present here, the Board should similarly exercise its
`
`discretion to deny institution.
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`IV.
`
`Institution Would Prejudice VirnetX, Yet Denial of Institution Would
`Not Unduly Prejudice Apple
`Instituting this proceeding would prejudice VirnetX in several ways. First,
`
`allowing another party (especially one who is time-barred) to join the already
`
`instituted IPR2014-00610 proceeding would further tip the scale of resources in
`
`favor of the petitioner. Second, by joining Apple despite the time-bar of 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 315(b), an unjust outcome could occur where Microsoft is terminated from the
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`proceeding, leaving Apple as sole petitioner. This is not permitted by statute for
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`the reasons VirnetX explained above and in its opposition to Apple’s motion for
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`joinder, but if the Board permits it to occur, it would wholly circumvent the 35
`
`U.S.C. § 315(b) time-bar. Third, VirnetX is faced with devoting time and money
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`to yet another serial challenge involving the ’151 patent. This is all despite
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`Apple’s previous jury trial, Federal Circuit appeal, inter partes reexamination, and
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`two IPR petitions, and its inability to pursue its own IPR proceeding because it is
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`time-barred.
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`If Congress’s statements about avoiding serial harassment of patent owners
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`are to have any meaning, given the extreme facts of this case, the Board must
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`utilize the tools Congress gave it to deny this IPR. As the Board recognized when
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`denying Apple’s previous IPR petitions filed by RPX, underlying the AIA is
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`“express legislative intent concerning the need for quiet title.” (IPR2014-00173,
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`Paper No. 56 at 10 (redacted) (June 5, 2014).) With Apple now filing its fourth
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`inter partes Office challenge to the ’151 patent, Apple asks for its private interests
`
`to trump Congressional intent.
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`Although VirnetX would be unduly prejudiced, Apple would face no undue
`
`prejudice from denial of the Petition. Apple has now filed four inter partes Office
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`challenges to the ’151 patent, either by itself or as a real party-in-interest through
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`proxy RPX. One of these proceedings (the ’1,697 reexamination) is ongoing.
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`Apple also deployed a litigation attack to the validity of the ’151 patent, but
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`Apple’s validity arguments were rejected by both the jury and the Federal Circuit.
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`While Apple contends that denial of institution would prejudice Apple, its
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`assertion is irrational. Apple asserts prejudice based on being “unable to
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`participate” in IPRs involving the ’151 patent. (Paper No. 2 at 4.) This could only
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`make sense if Apple had some right to participate in the IPRs, which it does not,
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`Case No. IPR2015-00187
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`given its time-barred status. The Board has rejected similar arguments of prejudice
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`based on a petitioner’s inability to challenge certain claims of a patent. See, e.g.,
`
`Standard Innovation Corp. v. Lelo, Inc., IPR2014-00907, Paper No. 10 at 10 (Dec.
`
`1, 2014). Moreover, Apple has participated all along in its reexamination of the
`
`’151 patent, so denying institution here would not leave Apple without its own
`
`challenge to the ’151 patent.
`
`Apple also argues it would be prejudiced because denying institution would
`
`not allow “Apple to ensure the Board does not resolve an issue in this proceeding
`
`that would impact” the pending reexaminations involving the ’151 patent. (Paper
`
`No. 2 at 5.) Apple’s supposition that it may “ensure” the Board does or does not
`
`do something is both an affront to the Board and an overstatement of Apple’s
`
`capabilities.
`
`Beyond the prejudice VirnetX would suffer from institution and Apple’s
`
`lack of prejudice, “the efficient administration of the Office” and the strong
`
`concern about “serial petitions challenging claims already involved in an instituted
`
`proceeding” underpinning 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(d) and 325(d) should control in this
`
`case. See SAS Institute, Inc. v. Complementsoft, LLC, IPR2013-00581, Paper No.
`
`15 at 22-23 (Dec. 30, 2013). Consistent with these principles and the cases
`
`applying them discussed above, Apple’s Petition should be denied.
`
`14
`
`

`
`
`
`V. Conclusion
`For all of the above reasons, VirnetX respectfully requests that the Board
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00187
`
`
`
`deny Apple’s Petition.2
`
`Dated: January 16, 2015
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`By: /Joseph E. Palys/
`Joseph E. Palys
`Registration No. 46,508
`
`Counsel for VirnetX Inc.
`
`
`
`
`
`2 If trial is instituted, VirnetX may raise additional arguments as to why
`
`Apple has failed to carry its burden and why the claims should be confirmed.
`
`15
`
`

`
`
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00187
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e), I hereby certify that I caused to be served
`
`on the counsel for Petitioner a true and correct copy of the foregoing,
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response to Petition for Inter Partes Review of
`
`U.S. Patent No. 7,490,151, by electronic means on January 16, 2015 at the
`
`following addresses of record:
`
`Jeffrey P. Kushan
`Joseph A. Micallef
`Sidley Austin LLP
`jkushan@sidley.com
`jmicallef@sidley.com
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`By: /Joseph E. Palys/
`Joseph E. Palys
`Counsel for VirnetX Inc.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Dated: January 16, 2015

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