`
`lN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`LUFKlN DIVISION
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`ALLURE ENERGY, lNC.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`V.
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`NEST LABS, lNC., et al.,
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`Defendants.
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`CIVIL ACTION No. 9-13-CV-102
`
`JUDGE RON CLARK
`
`ORDER CONSTRUING CLAIMS OF UNITED STATES PATENT NOS. 8,509,954 AND
`8.571.518
`
`Plaintiff Allure Energy, Inc. sued Defendants Nest Labs, Inc., Green Mountain Energy
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`Co., and Reliant Energy Holdings, LLC (collectively "Defendants"), alleging infringement of
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`United States Patent Nos. 8,442,695,1 8,509,954, and 8,571 ,518. The court construed several of
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`the terms o f the '518 patent during a preliminary injunction hearing. On November 6, 2014, the
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`court conducted a Mar/..?nan hearing to assist in interpreting the meanings of the remaining
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`disputed claim terms.2 Having considered the patents, the parties' contentions as presented in
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`their briefs, and the arguments of counsel, the court now construes the disputed claim terms as
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`follows.
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`1The court found the only independent claim of the '695 patent to be indefinite.
`Doc.# 143.
`
`:The transcript of the November 6, 2014 Markman hearing contains a number of
`representations by, and agreements of, the parties, as well as answers by their experts to technical
`questions from the court, all of which will not be repeated here, but which may assist in
`understanding the issues presented. This Order governs in the event of any conflict between the
`Order and the court's preliminary analysis at the hearing. Several Court' s Exhibits were
`discussed at the hearing and are part of the record at Doc. # 140. These exhibits will be cited in
`this Order as "Ct. Mkmn. Ex. _ ." The transcript of the Mar/mum hearing is Doc. # 147 and
`references to it will be cited as "Doc. # 147, Mkmn. Tr. p. _ ."
`1
`
`EXHIBIT 2013
`
`1
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`
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`Case 9:13-cv-00102-RC Document 150 Filed 12/01/14 Page 2 of 14 PageiD #: 10298
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`Patent Background and Tcchnology3
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`The patents-in-suit share a specification with, and claim priority to, two provisional
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`patent applications. U.S. Provisional Patent Application Series No. 611255,678 (filed Oct. 28,
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`2009); U.S. Provisional Patent Application Series No. 61 /235,798 (filed Aug. 21, 2009). The
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`'518 patent relates to a thermostat that automatically determines the presence of a user at home
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`through a proximity detection module housed on the thermostat itself. The '954 patent relates to
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`a demand response method that manages energy use by determining that a user is away from a
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`site and implementing the user's preference about whether to participate in a scheduled reduction
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`in energy use.
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`Claim Construction Standard of Review
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`Claim construction is a matter of law. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman
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`II), 517 U.S. 3 70, 388-91, 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1395-96 ( 1996). "Because the patentee is required to
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`'define precisely what his invention is,' ... it is 'unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of
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`the law, to construe it in a manner different from the plain import of its terms."' Phillips v. AWH
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`C01p., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane) (quoting White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47,
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`52,7 S. Ct. 72, 75 (1886)).
`
`l The court appointed Dr. Frank Shipman as a technical advisor. Doc.# 119. Dr.
`Shipman received his doctorate in computer science from the University of Colorado in 1993.
`He also has an M.S. in computer science from the University of Colorado and a B.S. in Electrical
`Engineering from Rice University. He has been on the faculty of Texas A&M University since
`1995, where his research interests include intelligent user interfaces, hypertext, computers and
`education, multimedia, new media, computers and design, computer-human interaction, and
`computer-supported cooperative work. More information about his publications and awards may
`be found on his curriculum vitae, which is available at
`http://www.csdl.tamu.edu/-shipman/vitae.pdf.
`
`2
`
`2
`
`
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`Case 9:13-cv-00102-RC Document 150 Filed 12/01/14 Page 3 of 14 Page!D #: 10299
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`Words in a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning as
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`understood by a person having ordinary skill in the art in question as of the effective filing date
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`of the patent application. !d. at 1313. However, a patentee may demonstrate an express intent to
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`impart a novel meaning by redefining a tenn "with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and
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`precision" in the patent specification or prosecution history. Telejlex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am.
`
`Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). A patentee may also limit scope by an express
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`disclaimer or disavowal. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316.
`
`The intrinsic evidence, that is, the patent's specification and, if in evidence, the
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`prosecution history, is important in claim construction. !d. at 1315-17. A court may also review
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`extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries, inventor testimony, and learned treatises. !d. at 1317.
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`However, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence in
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`order to result in a reliable interpretation of claim scope. /d. at 1319.
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`Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art
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`A person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention ("PHOSIT A") is
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`neither the judge, nor a layperson, nor a genius. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d
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`693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983 ). The qualifications or viewpoint of the inventor do not define the
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`PHOSIT A. KSR Jut'/ Co. v. Telejlex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420, 127 S.Ct. 1727, 1742 (2007);
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`Arkie Lures. Inc. v. Gene Larew Tackle, Inc., 119 F.3d 953, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Rather, the
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`court considers such factors as the sophistication of the technology, the rapidity with which
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`innovations are made, and the educational level of active workers in the field. Envtl. Designs,
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`713 F.2d at 696.
`
`3
`
`3
`
`
`
`Case 9:13-cv-00102-RC Document 150 Filed 12/01/14 Page 4 of 14 PageiD #: 10300
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`The parties agreed to following definition ofPHOSITA, which had been discussed at the
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`preliminary injunction hearing. Doc.# 136, Pr. lnj. Tr. 20; Doc.# 140, Ct.'s Mkm. Ex. I; Doc.
`
`# 147, Mkmn. Tr. p. 5. A PHOSITA would have:
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`at least 4 years of experience in the field of energy management and control
`systems, or have a Bachelor's of Science degree in mechanical or electrical
`engineering and at least 2 years of experience in the field of electronic and
`mechanical systems related
`to energy management and control systems.
`Additional education might substitute for some of the experience and substantial
`experience might substitute for some of the educational background.
`
`Claim Constructions of the '518 Patent
`
`I. Agreed Terms
`
`Based on the parties' agreement in the October 21,2014 Final Joint Construction Chart
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`[Doc.# 128], the court enters the following agreed claim constructions:
`
`Claim Term
`"disposed nt n site"
`"disposed thereon"
`"during the away mode"
`
`Construction
`"put in place at a site"
`"put in place thereon"
`"while operating in the away
`mode"
`
`Term Found In
`Claim 1
`Claim 1
`Claim 1
`
`2. Disputed Terms
`
`At the preliminary injunction hearing, the court was required to construe several terms in
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`the '518 patent. Because one purpose of a preliminary injunction is to provide a prompt, albeit
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`sometimes temporary, ruling on key issues, it is the custom of this court to announce its decision
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`at the end the hearing. In this case, the court heard evidence and argument on the preliminary
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`injunction on March 24, 2014. Doc. # 136. The next morning, the court announced on the
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`record its analysis of the disputed claim language, and its construction of each disputed term,
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`4
`
`4
`
`
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`Case 9:13-cv-00102-RC Document 150 Filed 12/01/14 Page 5 of 14 PageiD #: 10301
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`together with its reasons for denying the preliminary injunction. Doc.# 137.4
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`Prior to issuing this order, the court reviewed the earlier briefing and its prior analysis,
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`and considered the additional briefing and Markmtm hearing arguments of the parties concerning
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`the '518 patent. Little in the way of new argument was raised, and there is no need to repeat the
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`full claim construction analysis set out in the transcript from the preliminary injunction hearing.
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`Doc. # 13 7. This Order will discuss the revisions Defendants made to their arguments and
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`summarize parts of the previous ruling as needed for clarity. The court previously construed
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`terms of the '518 patent as set out in the following chart:
`
`Claim
`I
`
`Term
`"proximity detection module"
`
`I
`
`1,. 8
`
`"mode"
`
`1, 8
`
`"home mode"
`
`I, 8
`
`"away mode"
`
`'
`
`--
`
`Previous Construction
`"software or firmware operating on a server,
`controller, or mobile device that determines the
`presence of a user or device, or the proximity of a user
`or device, based on data received" See Doc. 13 7, Pr.
`Inj. Tr. p. 281, I. 21 - p. 286,1. 2.
`
`Ordinary meaning: "a particular function,
`arrangement, or condition." See Doc. 137, Pr. Inj. Tr.
`p. 278, I. 20 - p. 279, I. 20.
`
`"operating under parameters defined by: 1. the
`presence of a person or a device; or 2. the calculation,
`based on data received, that a person or device is
`: approaching or is within a predefined distance." Doc.
`I 137, p. Pr. lnj. Tr. 277, I. 6 - p. 278, I. 19.
`
`"operating under parameters defined by: 1. the absence
`of a person or a device; or 2. the calculation, based on
`data received, that a person or device is moving away
`or is beyond a predefined distance." Doc. 13 7, p. Pr.
`Inj. Tr. 280, l. 7 - p. 281, l. 11.
`
`~ Citation will be to preliminary injunction transcript page numbers, found at the top right
`of each page, rather than to PACER document page numbers: "Doc. # 136, Pr. lnj. Tr. p. _ " or
`" Doc. # 137, Pr. Inj . Tr. p. _ ." References to the slides the court used to facilitate discussion
`with counsel and to ask for specific objections to the constructions the court was considering will
`be to the slide number: "Doc.# 74-1 , slide _ ."
`
`5
`
`5
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`
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`Case 9:13-cv-00102-RC Document 150 Filed 12/01/14 Page 6 of 14 PageiD #: 10302
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`"mode"
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`As the court noted at the preliminary injunction hearing, "mode" is given no special
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`definition in the specification, and neither party pointed to a special meaning implied in the art
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`by the use in the specification of tenns such as "proximity mode," "vacation mode," and
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`"energy saving mode." Doc.# 137, Pr. lnj. Tr. p. 278-9. The term is used in its plain and
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`ordinary meaning of a particular function, arrangement, or condition. In the context of these
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`system claims, a definition that would be clear to jurors is: mode, n., OED Online,
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`http://www.oed.com/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2014) ("[a]ny of a number of distinct ways of
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`operating a device or system").
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`Defendants continue to argue for a definition based on "selectable states" but provide no
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`authority for the proposition that the word "mode" itself has such a connotation in these claims.
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`To avoid any later confusion, or argument by experts at trial, the court will instruct the jury that:
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`"mode" means "any of a number of distinct ways of operating a device or system."
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`"home mode" and "away mode"
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`Defendants argue that the court's construction of these terms is flawed because it does
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`not require one of two specific conditions of the "proximity detection," either "on" or "off."
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`Doc. # 116, p. 30.
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`At the preliminary injunction hearing, Defendants presented a number of arguments, but
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`were unable to cite to the court a part of the specification that supported, let alone compelled,
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`their proposed construction. Instead, Defendants relied upon the patent's abstract, the ipse dixit
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`opinion of their expert witness, and the theory that the court should define these terms as they
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`were set out in a claim that was withdrawn before the patent issued. Doc. # 136, Pr. lnj. Tr. p.
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`22, I. 4 - p. 50, I. 6. These arguments are not well founded. Doc. # 137, Pr. lnj. Tr. p. 277, I. 6 -
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`6
`
`6
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`
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`Case 9:13-cv-00102-RC Document 150 Filed 12/01/14 Page 7 of 14 PageiD #: 10303
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`p. 278, I. 19; p. 279, I. 21 - p. 281, 1. 11; Doc.# 136, Pr. lnj. Tr. p. 37, I. 7-16; p. 49, I. 6 - p. 50,
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`1.1.
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`At the Markman hearing, Defendants pointed to Claim 8 of the '518 patent and argued
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`that claim differentiation requires the home mode and the away mode to be two, and only two,
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`distinct states. See Doc.# 147, Mkmn. Tr. p. 8-13, 18-19. However, what Claim 8 teaches is the
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`system of Claim 1, where a "home setting" or an "away setting" can be selected with a mobile
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`device, which then enables the "home mode" or the "away mode" respectively. This, in effect,
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`becomes an override that puts the proximity detection module described in Claim 1 into either
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`"home" or "away" mode, regardless of the actual presence of a user. Therefore, Claim 8
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`provides additional limitations to the independent Claim I, which is a broadly worded
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`"comprising" claim. As a comprising claim, Claim 1 permits enablement in many ways, so long
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`as one of those ways involve detection by the proximity detection module. Defendants argue
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`that dependent Claim 8's teaching of an additional enablement mechanism, "selection," requires
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`the court's definition of"home mode" and "away mode" to always include "selection." This
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`stands claim differentiation on its head. Claim 8 is simply narrower in scope than Claim 1,
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`which comports with Claim 8 being dependent on Claim I.
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`Defendants could not, when pressed by the court, provide specific intrinsic evidence to
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`support their argument that "home mode" and "away mode" are the only two "different states."
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`Neither did they explain the impact of'518 patent, 9:10-29 (discussing effects ofuser's absence
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`from site) or '518 patent, 12:49-58 (describing embodiment where distance ofuser from site
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`affects mode). Likewise, Defendants could not explain how the court's constructions, announced
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`at the preliminary injunction hearing, fail to properly distinguish between "away mode" and
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`"home mode. See Doc. # 14 7, Mkmn. Tr. p. 5-9, 17-19.
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`7
`
`7
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`
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`Case 9:13-cv-00102-RC Document 150 Filed 12/01/14 Page 8 of 14 PageiD #: 10304
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`Defendants pointed to some additional portions of the prosecution history, in an attempt
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`to bolster their previous arguments. Primarily, they relied on language from July 12, 2013
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`Amendments and Reply to Office Action. Doc. # 99-11. The prosecution history for Claim 12,
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`which became Claim 1, refers to the away mode being a different limitation than the detection of
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`a presence of a user at a site. Doc.# 99-11, p. 15. It is not clear how this affects the court's
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`construction. This language does not constitute an express disclaimer, and therefore does not
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`narrow the scope of the claim language to the point that there can only be an "on" and an "off'
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`setting. Te/ejlex, 299 F.3d at 1325.
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`Defendants' briefing and argument regarding the impact of Claim 8 emphasized that the
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`construction should make clear to the jury that the actual presence of a person is not required for
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`"home mode." Accordingly, the court will modify its previous construction to avoid the
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`somewhat awkward language" ... parameters defined by: 1. the presence of a person ... "
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`The court defines these terms as follows.
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`"home mode" means "operating: 1.) under parameters consistent with the
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`presence of a person; or 2.) based on the calculation, made from data
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`received, that a person or device is approaching, or is within, a predefined
`
`distance."
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`"away mode" means "operating: 1.) under parameters consistent with the absence
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`of a person; or 2.) based on the calculation, made from data received, that a person or
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`device is moving away or is beyond a predefined distance."
`
`"proximity detection module"
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`Defendants also argued that the court's construction of .. proximity detection module" is
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`purely functional when placed into the language of Claim 1, and therefore is indefinite under a
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`mean-plus-function analysis, pursuant to 35 U.S.C § 112, ~ 6. Doc. # 147, Mkmn. Tr. p. 21-24.
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`8
`
`8
`
`
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`Case 9:13-cv-00102-RC Document 150 Filed 12/01/14 Page 9 of 14 PageiD #: 10305
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`Determining the applicability of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ~ 6 is a two-step process. First, the
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`court must "detenninc if the claim limitation is drafted in the means-plus-function format."
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`Robert Bosch, LLC v. Snap-On, Inc., 769 F.3d 1094, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2014). If so, the court then
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`proceeds to "the second step and attempt[s] to construe the disputed claim term by identifying
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`the 'corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification' to which the claim
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`term will be limited." !d. (citing Welker Bearing Co. v. PHD, Inc., 550 F.3d 1090, 1097 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2008)).
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`As to the first prong, the failure to use the word "means" in a claim term creates a strong,
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`but rebuttable, presumption that the drafter did not intend to invoke 35 U .S.C. § 112, ~ 6.
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`EnOcean GmbH v. Face bun'/ Corp., 742 F.3d 955, 958 (Fed. Cir. 2014). This claim does not
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`contain "means," and therefore, it is presumed that this is not a means-plus-function claim.
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`In making their argument, Defendants quoted only a portion of the limitation, omitting
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`the rest of the claim language that provides structure. The specification provides additional
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`structure. While the majority of embodiments of the proximity detection module involve a
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`mobile device, the specification discusses several other possible forms of detection, such as heat
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`or motion, which supports the broad construction of "proximity detection module." See '518
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`patent, 3:34-64 (discussing broad scope of claimed invention, including heat and motion
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`sensors). Defendants have not met the burden for rebutting the presumption that this is not a
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`means-plus-function claim. Additionally, none of the arguments they have advanced persuade
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`the court that the construction adopted during the preliminary injunction hearing is incorrect.
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`"detect a presence of a user at the site"
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`Plaintiff proposed that "detect a presence of a user at the site" means "determine or
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`calculate, based on data received, that a person or device is at the site, is approaching the site, or
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`9
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`9
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`
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`Case 9:13-cv-00102-RC Document 150 Filed 12/01/14 Page 10 of 14 PageiD #: 10306
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`is within a predefined distance of the site." Defendants have agreed to stipulate to Plaintiffs
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`proposed construction, in light of the court's construction of"proximity detection module." This
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`definition comports with the specification. See, e.g., '518 patent, 8:14-19; '518 patent, 15:54-58.
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`"detect a presence of a user at the site" means "determine or calculate, based on data
`
`received, that a person or device is at the site, is approaching the site, or is within a
`
`predefined distance of the site."
`
`Claim Constructions of the '954 Patent
`
`"energy management information"
`
`Claim 2 is an independent claim of the '954 patent, that states, in part:
`
`2. A method of managing a demand response system comprising:
`
`detecting energy management information from a utility
`company associated with the site;
`
`altering an operating condition of a network device associated
`with the site in response to the user being disposed
`away from the site and the energy management information
`and detecting the always participate selection;
`not altering the operating condition in response to detecting
`the never participate selection and the energy management
`information; and
`initiating a communication with the user in response to
`detecting the request to participate selection and the
`energy management information.
`
`Plaintiff originally argued that this term did not need to be construed, whereas
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`Defendants argued that it needed construction, and suggested the following:
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`"energy management information" means "information that is used to inform an energy
`management decision."
`
`The specification provides a lengthy list of types of energy management information,
`
`including data related to energy sources, demand, and capacity. '954 patent, 5:63 to 6:39. It also
`
`10
`
`10
`
`
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`Case 9:13-cv-00102-RC Document 150 Filed 12/01/14 Page 11 of 14 PageiD #: 10307
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`discusses this infonnation being used, in concert with other infonnation, to create schedules.
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`"Various other environmental conditions, grid conditions, user profiles, device profiles, energy
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`pricing, or any combination of energy management infonnation can be used to schedule or create
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`an event." '954 patent, 19:34-37.
`
`The prosecution history confinns that it is infonnation that is provided by the utility
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`company and that can be used to infonn energy management decisions. "Correspondingly, the
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`method independent claim 32 has been amended to more clearly distinguish over the cited prior
`
`art by requiring the steps of detecting energy management infonnation from a utility company
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`and generating a curtailment action in response to a location of a user and the energy
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`management infonnation." Doc.# 99-12, p. 11 (Claim 32 in the application became Claim 2 in
`
`the '954 patent).
`
`At the Markman hearing, the court proposed changing "is used" to "can be used,"
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`because nothing in the claim, the specification, or the prosecution history requires that the
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`infonnation actually be used in this manner. Doc.# 140, Ct. Mkmn. Ex. 11. Plaintiff agreed to
`
`this construction. Doc.# 147, Mkmn. Tr. p. 166. Defendants argued that the claim language
`
`does not support "user" in the construction. Doc. # 14 7, Mkrnn. Tr. p. 171-72. While
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`infonnation can be used by "the user," Defendants are correct that the claim does not require that
`
`limitation. The court construes this tenn as:
`
`"energy management information" means "information that can be used to make an
`energy management decision."
`
`"in response to"
`
`Claim 2 is an independent claim of the '954 patent, that states, in part:
`
`2. A method of managing a demand response system comprising:
`
`11
`
`11
`
`
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`Case 9:13-cv-00102-RC Document 150 Filed 12/01/14 Page 12 of 14 PageiD #: 10308
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`altering an operating condition of a network device associated
`with the site in response to the user being disposed
`away from the site and the energy management information
`and detecting the always participate selection;
`not altering the operating condition in response to detecting
`the never participate selection and the energy management
`information; and
`initiating a communication with the user in response to
`detecting the request to participate selection and the
`energy management information.
`
`The parties disagree as to whether "in response to" needs to be construed. Defendants
`
`argue that it should be construed as "based on," whereas Plaintiff argues that it does not require
`
`construction.
`
`The Federal Circuit has stated that "district courts are not (and should not be) required to
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`construe eve1y limitation present in a patent's asserted claims." 02 Micron Int '/ v. Beyond
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`Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd., 521 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis original). When the
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`meaning "is clear in the context of the claim" and "will be readily understandable to the jury," no
`
`construction is necessary, particularly when the court has addressed the concerns of the party
`
`seeking construction with other claim terms. SFA Sys., LLC, v. 1-800-F/owers.com, Inc., 940 F.
`
`Supp. 2d 433,442 (E.D. Tex. 2013) (citing 02 Micron /nt'l, 521 F.3d at 1362). Finally, "[t]here
`
`is no reason to import claim limitations that are not required by the claim language or the
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`intrinsic record." SFA Sys., LLC, 940 F. Supp. 2d at 442.
`
`Nothing in the claim language or the specification suggests that "in response to" is used
`
`in anything other than its plain and ordinary meaning. When read in light of the entire claim, the
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`jury will readily be able to determine what the meaning of "in response to is." Therefore, it
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`needs no construction.
`
`12
`
`12
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`
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`Case 9:13-cv-00102-RC Document 150 Filed 12/01/14 Page 13 of 14 PageiD #: 10309
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`"an existence of a time interval for energy transmission pricing"
`
`Claim 3 of the '954 patent, which depends on Claim 2, states:
`
`3. The method of claim 2 wherein the step of detecting energy management information
`includes detecting one or more conditions including an increase in a price of
`energy due to an undersupply of energy within an energy market and an
`oversupply of energy purchased by utility company associated with the site and a
`high demand period of energy and an existence of n time interval for energy
`transmission pricing.
`
`Defendants have argued that this claim is indefinite because a literal reading of it is
`
`nonsensical, and that the specification provides no definition or guidance. "In place of the
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`'insolubly ambiguous' standard, we hold that a patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims,
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`read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to
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`inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention."
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`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014).
`
`While the language ofthe claim is not a model of clarity, it is not, as Defendants argue,
`
`indefinite. Additionally, the specification provides guidance as to a proper construction. "[A]
`
`favorable grid condition can include a time interval when transmission pricing to use an energy
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`transmission system may be determined." '954 patent, 11:53-55. Various factors affecting grid
`
`conditions can be used to determine the transmission pricing. '954 patent, 11:58-61. A
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`PHOSITA would interpret this claim language to mean that there is a period of time for which
`
`energy transmission cost can be predicted.
`
`At the Markman, the court and the parties' experts discussed the regulations and tariff
`
`schedules for energy pricing. Doc.# 147, Mkmn. Tr. p. 178-85. The experts for both sides
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`agreed that in Texas, as well as other states, rates are published. Doc.# 147, Mkrnn. Tr. p. 178-
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`79; see Tex. Util. Code. Ann. § 35.007 (West 2007). These posted rates provide periods oftime
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`Case 9:13-cv-00102-RC Document 150 Filed 12/01/14 Page 14 of 14 PageiD #: 10310
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`during which the energy transmission pricing is known. Doc. # 14 7, Mkmn. Tr. p. 179-81.
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`Defendants' expert attempted to make a somewhat strained argument that these published rates
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`bolster their claims of indefiniteness, because if the rates are published and known, there can be
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`no period where a time interval does not exist. Doc. # 14 7, Mkmn. Tr. p. 184 l. 20 to p. 185 l. 1.
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`That argument fails to support their claims of indefiniteness. The point is that a posted tariff or
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`rate schedule, will, in most cases, have a "good until" date, or the statute will have a notice
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`period before the tariff can be changed. See e.g.,. Tex. Utilities Code§ 36.101 et seq. That
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`provides a time interval during which transmission pricing will be known.
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`Therefore, the court construes this claim as follows:
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`"an existence of a time interval for energy transmission pricing" means "a period of
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`time during which the price charged to transmit energy can be determined."
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`So ORDERED and SIGNED this 1 day of December, 2014.
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`Ron Clark, United States District Judge
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