Case 2:09-cv-00289-CE Document 240 Filed 09/02/11 Page 1 of 51 PageID #: 3324
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`SIMPLEAIR, INC.,
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`vs.
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`APPLE INC., et al.
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
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`CASE NO. 2:09-CV-289-CE
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`The court held a Markman hearing on June 17, 2011. After considering the submissions
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`and the arguments of counsel, the court issues the following order concerning the claim
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`construction issues.
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`II.
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`OVERVIEW OF THE PATENTS AND TECHNOLOGY
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`Plaintiff SimpleAir, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) filed this suit against defendants Apple, Inc.
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`(“Apple”), Disney Online (“Disney”), American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (“ABC”), ESPN
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`Enterprises, Inc. (“ESPN”), Handmark, Inc. (“Handmark”), Research In Motion Limited, and
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`Research In Motion Corporation (collectively, “RIM”), alleging infringement of U.S. Patent Nos.
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`6,021,433 (the “‘433 Patent”), 7,035,914 (the “‘914 Patent”), 6,167,426 (the “‘426 Patent”), and
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`6,735,614 (the “‘614 Patent”).
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`
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`The ‘433 Patent and its child, the ‘914 Patent, are entitled “System and Method for
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`Transmission of Data” and generally relate to methods of processing and transmitting internet-
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`based content and real time notifications (e.g., breaking news alerts, financial news, e-mail
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`notifications, sports scores, weather alerts, etc.) to remote computing devices.1 The Abstract of
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`the ‘433 Patent explains the invention as follows:
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`1 The ‘433 and ‘914 Patents have substantially identical specifications, and therefore, for
`convenience purposes, all future citations will be to the specification of the ‘433 Patent.
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`SIMPLEAIR EXHIBIT 2003
`Google v. SimpleAir
`IPR2015-00179
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`

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`Case 2:09-cv-00289-CE Document 240 Filed 09/02/11 Page 2 of 51 PageID #: 3325
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`A system and method for data communication connecting on-line networks with
`on-line and off-line computers. The present system provides for broadcast of up to
`the minute notification centric data thereby providing an instant call to action for
`users who are provided with the ability to instantaneously retrieve further detailed
`information. Information sources transmit data to a central broadcast server,
`which preprocesses the data for wireless broadcast. The notification centric
`portions of data are wirelessly broadcast to wireless receiving devices that are
`attached to computing devices. Upon receipt of the data at the computing device,
`the user is notified through different multimedia alerts that there is an incoming
`message. Wirelessly broadcasted URL’s, associated with the data, are embedded
`in data packets and provide an automated wired or wireless connection back to the
`information source for obtaining detailed data.
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`‘433 Patent at Abstract.
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`
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`The ‘426 Patent and its child, the ‘614 Patent, are entitled “Contact Alerts for
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`Unconnected Users” and generally relate to a computerized communication system for initiating
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`contact with a user who is not currently connected to an interactive on-line communication
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`network such as the internet.2 The Abstract of the ‘426 Patent explains the invention as follows:
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`Users access an on-line address service to register their name…and a unique
`contact address that may be used directly or indirectly to address a message over
`another communication network to an associated listening device. Once a
`potential user has registered his on-line identity and contact information, other
`users accessing the address service can then designate one of the listed
`names,…whereupon the computer hosting the address service will broadcast a
`message addressed to the identified person’s associated listening device. Once the
`message is received, the listening device notifies the associated user by causing
`the user’s computer to initiate an appropriate visual and/or audio alert display
`concerning the contact attempt. The user is then given an opportunity to connect
`to the on-line network and access a designated site to obtain further information
`about the attempted contact and/or to establish a direct connection with the
`interactive on-line activity from which the contact attempt originated, at the same
`time automatically launching any required browser or application software.
`
`
`‘426 Patent at Abstract.
`
`
`III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`
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`“A claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right which the patent confers
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`2 The ‘426 and ‘614 Patents have substantially identical specifications, and therefore, for
`convenience purposes, all future citations will be to the specification of the ‘426 Patent.
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`
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`2
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`on the patentee to exclude others from making, using or selling the protected invention.” Burke,
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`Inc. v. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc., 183 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Claim construction
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`is an issue of law for the court to decide. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,
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`970-71 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
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`
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`To ascertain the meaning of claims, the court looks to three primary sources: the claims,
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`the specification, and the prosecution history. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. The specification must
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`contain a written description of the invention that enables one of ordinary skill in the art to make
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`and use the invention. Id. A patent’s claims must be read in view of the specification, of which
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`they are a part. Id. For claim construction purposes, the description may act as a sort of
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`dictionary, which explains the invention and may define terms used in the claims. Id. “One
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`purpose for examining the specification is to determine if the patentee has limited the scope of
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`the claims.” Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 882 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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`
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`Nonetheless, it is the function of the claims, not the specification, to set forth the limits of
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`the patentee’s invention. Otherwise, there would be no need for claims. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita
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`Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). The patentee is free to be his own
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`lexicographer, but any special definition given to a word must be clearly set forth in the
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`specification. Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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`Although the specification may indicate that certain embodiments are preferred, particular
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`embodiments appearing in the specification will not be read into the claims when the claim
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`language is broader than the embodiments. Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc.,
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`34 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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`
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`This court’s claim construction decision must be informed by the Federal Circuit’s
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`decision in Phillips v. AWH Corporation, 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). In Phillips,
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`the court set forth several guideposts that courts should follow when construing claims. In
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`particular, the court reiterated that “the claims of a patent define the invention to which the
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`patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” 415 F.3d at 1312 (emphasis added) (quoting
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`Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Systems, Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir.
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`2004)). To that end, the words used in a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary
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`meaning. Id. The ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term “is the meaning that the term
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`would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as
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`of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Id. at 1313. This principle of patent law
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`flows naturally from the recognition that inventors are usually persons who are skilled in the
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`field of the invention and that patents are addressed to and intended to be read by others skilled
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`in the particular art. Id.
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`
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`The primacy of claim terms notwithstanding, Phillips made clear that “the person of
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`ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular
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`claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the
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`specification.” Id. Although the claims themselves may provide guidance as to the meaning of
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`particular terms, those terms are part of “a fully integrated written instrument.” Id. at 1315
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`(quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 978). Thus, the Phillips court emphasized the specification as
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`being the primary basis for construing the claims. Id. at 1314-17. As the Supreme Court stated
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`long ago, “in case of doubt or ambiguity it is proper in all cases to refer back to the descriptive
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`portions of the specification to aid in solving the doubt or in ascertaining the true intent and
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`meaning of the language employed in the claims.” Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 38 (1878). In
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`addressing the role of the specification, the Phillips court quoted with approval its earlier
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`observations from Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir.
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`1998):
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`Ultimately, the interpretation to be given a term can only be determined and
`confirmed with a full understanding of what the inventors actually invented and
`intended to envelop with the claim. The construction that stays true to the claim
`language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention
`will be, in the end, the correct construction.
`
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`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. Consequently, Phillips emphasized the important role the
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`specification plays in the claim construction process.
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`
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`The prosecution history also continues to play an important role in claim interpretation.
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`Like the specification, the prosecution history helps to demonstrate how the inventor and the
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`PTO understood the patent. Id. at 1317. Because the file history, however, “represents an
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`ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the applicant,” it may lack the clarity of the
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`specification and thus be less useful in claim construction proceedings. Id. Nevertheless, the
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`prosecution history is intrinsic evidence that is relevant to the determination of how the inventor
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`understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention during prosecution by
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`narrowing the scope of the claims. Id.
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`
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`Phillips rejected any claim construction approach that sacrificed the intrinsic record in
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`favor of extrinsic evidence, such as dictionary definitions or expert testimony. The en banc court
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`condemned the suggestion made by Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193
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`(Fed. Cir. 2002), that a court should discern the ordinary meaning of the claim terms (through
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`dictionaries or otherwise) before resorting to the specification for certain limited purposes.
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`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319-24. The approach suggested by Texas Digital—the assignment of a
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`limited role to the specification—was rejected as inconsistent with decisions holding the
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`specification to be the best guide to the meaning of a disputed term. Id. at 1320-21. According
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`to Phillips, reliance on dictionary definitions at the expense of the specification had the effect of
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`“focus[ing] the inquiry on the abstract meaning of words rather than on the meaning of claim
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`terms within the context of the patent.” Id. at 1321. Phillips emphasized that the patent system
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`is based on the proposition that the claims cover only the invented subject matter. Id. What is
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`described in the claims flows from the statutory requirement imposed on the patentee to describe
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`and particularly claim what he or she has invented. Id. The definitions found in dictionaries,
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`however, often flow from the editors’ objective of assembling all of the possible definitions for a
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`word. Id. at 1321-22.
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`
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`Phillips does not preclude all uses of dictionaries in claim construction proceedings.
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`Instead, the court assigned dictionaries a role subordinate to the intrinsic record. In doing so, the
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`court emphasized that claim construction issues are not resolved by any magic formula. The
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`court did not impose any particular sequence of steps for a court to follow when it considers
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`disputed claim language. Id. at 1323-25. Rather, Phillips held that a court must attach the
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`appropriate weight to the intrinsic sources offered in support of a proposed claim construction,
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`bearing in mind the general rule that the claims measure the scope of the patent grant.
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`IV.
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`TERMS IN DISPUTE
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`a. ’433 and ’914 Patent
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`i. “a central broadcast server”
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`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`“a central broadcast server”: a central server that transmits to
`all receiving devices on its network
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`“server”: computer system that serves other devices in a network
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`
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`Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction
`“a central broadcast server”: one or more servers that
`are configured to receive data from a plurality of
`information sources and process the data prior to its
`transmission to a plurality of selected remote computing
`devices (where such transmission is not in direct
`response to a specific request from the user(s) of the
`remote computer devices)
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`“server”: one or more pieces of computer equipment
`and the software running on the equipment used to
`provide services for one or more other computers or
`computing devices
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`The parties dispute the meaning of the term “a central broadcast server” and “server.”
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`Claim 1 of the ‘433 Patent, which is representative of the use of these terms, recites:
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`A method for transmitting data to selected remote computing devices, comprising
`the steps of:
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`transmitting data from an information source to a central broadcast
`server;
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`preprocessing said data at said central broadcast server, further
`comprising the step of:
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`providing data to servers in said central broadcast server;
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`parsing said data with parsers corresponding to said servers…
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`‘433 Patent at Claim 1 (emphasis added). The parties’ primary dispute regarding the
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`construction of “central broadcast server” centers on the appropriate construction of the term
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`“broadcast.” Specifically, the parties dispute whether the term “broadcast:” (1) encompasses to
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`concept of “push” methods of transmission; and (2) requires the “central broadcast server” to
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`transmit to “a plurality of selected remote computing devices,” as Plaintiff contends, or to “all
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`receiving devices,” as Defendants contend.
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`1. Broadcast – Push Technology
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`With regard to whether the term “broadcast” encompasses “push” transmission
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`technology, Plaintiff first argues that the term “broadcasting” in the context of sending on-line
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`content means transmitting data to remote devices at the initiation of a central server or other
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`network element (i.e., “pushing”) rather than in response to a user requesting the data just before
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`its transmission. Plaintiff then argues that the term “broadcast” as used in the patents-in-suit
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`means internet broadcasting – i.e., “push” methods for disseminating on-line information to
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`remote users. In support of its argument, Plaintiff notes that the ‘433 Patent explains that with
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`prior systems, “users are required to search through the myriad of information, rather than having
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`the information come to them.” ‘433 Patent at 2:6-19. The specification goes on to explain that
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`these shortcomings were “overcome by the present invention,” which provides for a “sender
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`initiated paradigm” in which “information sources” provide “real time data feeds” to a “central
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`broadcast server” that processes data for the “broadcast of up to the minute notification centric
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`information” sent “immediately or on a scheduled basis.” Id. at 2:42-58, 6:61-7:3, 7:43-50.
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`Plaintiff further argues that the prosecution history of the patents-in-suit supports its
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`contention that the patents are directed to “push” methods of transmission. Specifically, during
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`the prosecution of the ‘433 Patent application, the inventors distinguished the Rossman reference
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`by explaining that it only transmitted data in response to a user’s request to the server, whereas
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`the ‘433 Patent’s method required broadcasting data at the initiation of the server, not in response
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`to a user request. See Exhibit 6 at SA 872, attached to Dkt. No. 192. In fact, the patentee
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`emphasized that:
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`a fundamental difference between the present invention and Rossman is that the
`present invention provides a one-way Internet address location communication
`system where Internet address locations are broadcasts [sic] from a server to a
`plurality of receivers. At no time are the Internet address locations “broadcast” to
`a user in response to a specific request from the user. In contrast, Rossman
`provides a user-initiated two-way Internet address location communication system
`where Internet address locations are initiated and sent by a user to a server which
`then must access the information associated with the Internet address location
`and transmit it back to the user per the user’s request. The direction that the
`Internet address flows in the present invention is thus from the server to user,
`whereas in Rossman, the Internet address flows from the user to server.
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`Id. (emphasis in original); see also id. at SA 871 (“The present invention generates URLs at a
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`server which are then broadcast to plurality of receivers. In contrast, Rossman requires a user to
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`generate URL’s which then must be sent … to a server”). Plaintiff thus argues that the patents
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`use the term “broadcast” to refer to a transmission initiated by an information source or the
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`central broadcast server – i.e., a transmission that “is not in direct response to a specific request
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`from the user(s) of the remote computer devices.”
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`
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`In response, Defendants argue that while prosecuting the patent underlying the ‘433
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`Patent, the patentees disclaimed the method of pushing data to a client system. Defendants rely
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`on the prosecution history surrounding the patentees’ attempt to distinguish the Rossman
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`reference. According to Defendants, the patentee amended its application to add new claims
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`directed to a method of pushing data to a client and in so doing sought to distinguish the
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`Rossman reference using the explanation discussed above. See Exhibit 6 at 15-21, attached to
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`Dkt. No. 198. The examiner, however, issued a restriction requirement, stating that the new
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`claims were directed to “a method of pushing data to a client system.” See Exhibit 7 at 2-3,
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`attached to Dkt. No. 198. The examiner thus concluded that the claims were directed to an
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`invention wholly distinct from that of the original claims. Id. In response, the applicants
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`cancelled all the new claims, and never sought to add them back into any of the applications
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`from which the patents-in-suit issued. See Exhibit 8 at 1-2, attached to Dkt. No. 198. The
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`patentee explained that “in order to facilitate the immediate issuance [of the original claims of
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`the patent application]..., the remainder of the pending claims [(including those directed to
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`“push” technology)] have been canceled and presented in continuation applications.” Id. As
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`such, Defendants argue that the issued claims do not cover push technology.
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`The prosecution history must contain a “clear and unmistakable disavowal of scope”
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`before it “may affect the construction of a claim term.” Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 525
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`F.3d 1200, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although the patentees did withdraw claims that the examiner
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`concluded were directed to “push” technology, the patentees never explicitly stated that the
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`remainder of their claims did not cover “push” technology. In fact, all of the application claims,
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`both those issued and those withdrawn, included a “broadcast” limitation. And in seeking to
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`distinguish the Rossman reference the patentees relied on language that presently exists in the
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`specification of the ‘433 Patent. The patentees explained that Rossman does not indicate “that it
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`can be modified to provide an Internet resource location which essentially operates as an ‘alert’
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`for a user to access further information if desired.” Rather, the patentees explained that Rossman
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`“teaches away from the present invention by requiring a user to formulate an idea, identify an
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`Internet resource location and then initiate a transmission protocol.” The patentees then cited to
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`the following sections of the specification of the ‘433 Patent to support its contention that the
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`present invention is distinguishable from Rossman because it is directed to “push” technology
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`that “alerts” a user to access further desired information:
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`In accordance with the present invention, the notification centric portions of that
`information that lives in an electronic medium is wirelessly broadcast on a
`nationwide basis to wireless receiving devices which are attached to personal
`computers or other computing devices. Upon receipt of the information at the
`personal computer, the user is notified through different multimedia alerts that
`there is an incoming message. Wirelessly broadcasted URL’s, [sic] associated
`with the data, are embedded in data packets and provide an automated wired or
`wireless connection back to the information source for obtaining detailed data.
`‘433 Patent at 2:53-64.
`
`Wirelessly broadcasted Uniform Resource Locator’s (URL’s) [sic] 22, associated
`with the data, are embedded in multimedia data packets and provide an automated
`wired or wireless connection or link 22 back to the information source 12 for
`obtaining detailed data. A network path to an information source 12 is identified
`by the URL having a known syntax for defining a network. ‘433 Patent at 6:45-
`51.
`
`Referring to FIG. 1, the URL broadcast and hot links 22 back to the information
`source 12 is shown. In accordance with the present invention, very short
`notification centric messages such as news headlines from information sources
`12, such as Internet, on-line services and other information providers, are
`transmitted to the computer 14 by wireless transmission. A user, from a computer
`14, can make a wired connection 24 back to the information source 12 to obtain
`more detailed information. In accordance with the present invention, attached to
`each of the notification centric messages is a universal resource locator (URL)
`code 22 as well as related Internet address information…. The present invention
`
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`allows a user to pinpoint and locate the specific information the user was alerted
`to. The user can thus hit one button which establishes the connection 24 and takes
`the user directly to the location where the information is located. ‘433 Patent at
`30:35-53.
`
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`The claims at issue here explicitly require that the computing device be instantaneously notified
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`(i.e., alerted) of the receipt of data whether the computing device is on or off. As such, there is
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`significant support in the claim language itself, the specification, and the prosecution history for
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`construing the claims of the ‘433 and ‘914 Patents to cover “push” technology. See, e.g., ‘433
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`Patent at 2:42-64, 6:45-51, 6:61-7:3, 7:43-50, 30:35-53. In light of this, the court concludes that
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`the patentees did not make a “clear and unmistakable disavowal of scope” during the prosecution
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`of the ‘433 Patent. See Honeywell Intern., Inc. v. ITT Industries, Inc., 452 F.3d 1312, 1319 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2006) (the Federal Circuit did not “assign much weight to the patent examiner’s restriction
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`requirement” because “the examiner did not construe the claim term … [at issue] … or
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`determine its meaning in light of the written description. He merely required that the applicant
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`elect one aspect of his invention for prosecution without applying it to the specification.”);
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`Colorquick, LLC v. Eastman Kodak Co., Civil Action No. 6:06–CV–390, 2008 WL 5771324 at
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`*9-10 (E.D. Tex. June 25, 2008) (“…restriction requirements are, at best, of limited value as a
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`claim construction tool.”).
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`
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`The court, however, is not convinced that the patentees intended to limit the claims of the
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`patents-in-suit to cover only “push” methods of transmission. Although the specification of the
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`patents indicates that the invention is directed at “push” technology, the patentees knew how to
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`draft claim language expressly limiting the scope of the invention to “push” transmission. For
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`example, as discussed above, during prosecution the applicants added claims requiring the
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`following: “broadcasting said data including said Internet address location to a user in
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`communication with one of said plurality of receivers, wherein said Internet address location is
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`not broadcast in response to a request for said Internet address location by said user.” See
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`Exhibit 6 at 15, attached to Dkt. No. 198. The applicants, however, withdrew these claims. See
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`Exhibit 8 at 1-2, attached to Dkt. No. 198. Considering this, although the claims of the patents-
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`in-suit encompass “push” technology, the court concludes that the patentees did not intend to
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`limit the claims of the patents-in-suit to “push” methods of transmission. Accordingly, the court
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`rejects Plaintiff’s proposed “(where such transmission is not in direct response to a specific
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`request from the user(s) of the remote computer devices)” limitation.
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`2. “Broadcast” – Transmit to “All”
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`The parties next dispute whether the term “broadcast” requires that the “central broadcast
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`server” transmit to all receivers on its network, as Defendants contend, or only to selected
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`remote computing devices, as Plaintiff contends. Defendants argue that the patentees acted as
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`their own lexicographer in defining “broadcast” when they made the following statement:
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`The present invention unlike other wireless systems provides for a combination of
`broadcast, narrowcast, and pointcast transmission. That is, information can be
`transmitted wirelessly to everyone (broadcast), to a subset of users (narrow cast)
`or to one user (pointcast).
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`‘433 Patent at 2:65-3:2. According to Defendants, by use of the parenthetical, the inventors have
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`specifically defined the term “broadcast” to mean transmitting wirelessly to everyone.
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`Although a patentee is free to be his own lexicographer, any special definition given to a
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`word must be clearly set forth in the specification. Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952
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`F.2d 1384, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In this case, the court is not convinced that the patentees acted
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`as their own lexicographer in defining “broadcast” to require transmission to all receivers. In
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`fact, the claim language itself indicates that the patentee did not intend to require broadcast to all
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`receivers. For example, the claims of the ‘426 and ‘614 Patents use “broadcasting” to refer to
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`transmitting a message addressed to an individual user (not all users). The claims recite
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`“designating a name registered on the address service” (which may be just one name), and then
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`“broadcasting a message over the second communication network to the registered address
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`associated with the selected name.” ‘426 Patent at Claim 1; ‘614 Patent at Claim 1.
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`Furthermore, the claims of the ‘433 and ‘914 Patents recite a “central broadcast server” used for
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`“transmitting data to selected remote computing devices” including the step of “transmitting
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`preprocessed data to receivers communicating with said computing devices [i.e., selected
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`computing devices].” ‘433 Patent at Claim 1; ‘914 Patent at Claim 1 (emphasis added).
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`Accordingly, the claims expressly require that the data emanating from the “central broadcast
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`server” is addressed to “selected” devices – not everyone.
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`Moreover, the specifications of all of the patents-in-suit support the contention that the
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`“broadcast” need not go to all receivers. For example, the specification of the ‘433 Patent
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`describes in detail an embodiment where the “central broadcast server” is specifically designed
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`to transmit its messages to a subset of subscribers, rather than to everyone, using “subscriber
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`database 130 which is utilized by the central broadcast server to determine 25 which subscribers
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`receive which types of content.” ‘433 Patent at 8:15-25 (emphasis added). Similarly, in the
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`“Selection Addressing” section, the ‘433 Patent explains that data packets “are transmitted to the
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`central broadcast server 34, where they are internally processed 25 before being wirelessly
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`transmitted through a carrier 36 to one or more personal computers 14.” Id. at 12:21-27
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`(emphasis added). The “internal[] process[ing]” includes “selection addressing” whereby the
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`data packets are addressed for transmission only to “selective receivers.” Id. Finally, the
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`specification of the ‘426 Patent describes a service that “broadcasts messages to individual
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`subscribers and groups of subscribers.” ‘426 Patent at 3:6-7 (emphasis added).
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`Considering the intrinsic evidence presented above, the court concludes that the patentee
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`did not clearly define “broadcast” to require that the “central broadcast server” transmit to all
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`receivers on its network. Rather, when the claims of all of the patents-in-suit (i.e., the ’433,
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`’914, ’426, and ’614 Patents) are read in light of the entire specification, the patentees used the
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`term “broadcast” to require transmission to one or more selected remote computing devices.
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`3. Other Disputes
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`The parties also disagree as to whether there can be “one or more” central broadcast
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`servers. Plaintiff argues that the correct construction of “a central broadcast server” and “server”
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`must include its proposed “one or more” language. Plaintiff relies on the Federal Circuit’s
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`decision in Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
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`which explained that “[a]n indefinite article ‘a’ or ‘an’ in patent parlance carries the meaning of
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`‘one or more’ in open-ended claims containing the transitional phrase ‘comprising.’”
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`Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that both the claims and the specification of the ‘433 and ’914
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`Patents confirms that one central broadcast server may consist of multiple servers (i.e., multiple
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`pieces of hardware acting in concert with each other). See, e.g., ‘433 Patent at 7:43-46 (“a
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`network of servers 33 in the central broadcast server 34”); id. at Fig. 1.; id at Claim 1
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`(“providing data to servers in said central broadcast server”). In response, Defendants argue that
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`Plaintiff’s “one or more” limitation is inappropriate because the claim recites “a server,” and
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`then later refer to “said server” or “the