`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`_________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_________________
`
`
`Hyundai Motor Company
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`American Vehicular Sciences LLC
`Patent Owner
`
`
`Patent No. 7,650,210
`Filing Date: August 14, 2006
`Issue Date: January 19, 2010
`Title: REMOTE VEHICLE DIAGNOSTIC MANAGEMENT
`_________________
`
`
`Inter Partes Review No. Unassigned
`
`__________________________________________________________________
`
`
`MOTION FOR JOINDER
`UNDER 35 U.S.C. §§ 42.22 AND 42.122(b)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Hyundai Motor Company (“Hyundai”) submits at the same time as this
`
`motion a Petition for Inter Partes Review of claims 1-3, 5, 7-9, 13, 15, 16, 18, and
`
`19 of U.S. Patent No. 7,650,210 (“the ‘210 patent”) (“Petition”). Hyundai
`
`respectfully requests that its Petition be granted and that the proceedings be joined
`
`in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 315(c), 37 C.F.R. § 42.22, and 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.122(b) with the pending inter partes review initiated by Honda Motor Co.
`
`(“Honda”) concerning the same patent: American Honda Motor Co. Inc., v.
`
`American Vehicular Sciences, LLC, Case No. IPR2014-00633 (the “Honda IPR”).
`
`The Board recently granted a similar motion filed by Hyundai requesting
`
`joinder with another IPR initiated by Honda involving a related American
`
`Vehicular Sciences, LLC (“AVS”) patent. Hyundai Motor Co. v. Am. Veh. Scis.,
`
`Case No. IPR2014-01543, Paper No. 11 at 3-6 (Oct. 24, 2014). The present
`
`motion presents the same set of circumstances as Hyundai’s earlier motion that
`
`was granted by the Board, namely: (i) each ground proposed by Hyundai is
`
`identical to a ground that has been instituted for trial in the Honda IPR; (ii)
`
`Hyundai did not even propose all of the grounds that have been instituted for trial
`
`in the Honda IPR; (iii) Hyundai’s arguments are identical to those made by Honda
`
`in the Honda IPR; (iv) with respect to the grounds it has proposed, Hyundai relies
`
`on the same declaration testimony of Mr. Christopher Wilson, albeit submitted in a
`
`separate declaration, as was relied on by Honda for those same grounds; (v)
`
`
`
`- 1 -
`
`
`
`
`
`Hyundai agrees to have consolidated filings with Honda, and to be limited to
`
`separate filings, if any, of no more than seven pages directed only to points of
`
`disagreement with Honda with the understanding that it will not be permitted any
`
`separate arguments in furtherance of those advanced in Honda’s consolidated
`
`filings; and (vi) because Hyundai does not expect that it will have any points of
`
`disagreement with Honda, it does not believe that it is likely to make any separate
`
`filings.
`
`Given these circumstances, joinder is appropriate here for the same reasons
`
`found by the Board in its earlier decision in Case No. IPR2014-01543.
`
`Specifically, the Board found that the impact of joinder on the Honda IPR would
`
`be minimal, joinder would enhance efficiency, avoid duplication of efforts, and
`
`reduce the potential of inconsistency among proceedings.
`
`I.
`
`BACKGROUND AND RELATED PROCEEDINGS
`
`AVS is the owner of the ’210 patent. On October 15, 2012, AVS sued
`
`Hyundai Motor Company, Hyundai Motor America, and Hyundai Motor
`
`Manufacturing Alabama, LLC (collectively “Hyundai”) in the Eastern District of
`
`Texas for allegedly infringing the ’210 patent (the “Underlying Litigation”). On
`
`April 15, 2014, Honda filed a petition for inter partes review of the ’210 patent.
`
`The Board instituted trial in the Honda IPR on September 29, 2014 (Honda IPR,
`
`Paper No. 8, at 27-28) on claims 1-3, 5, 7-9, 13, 15, 16, 18, and 19. The Board set
`
`
`
`- 2 -
`
`
`
`
`
`December 1, 2014, as the date for AVS’s response to the petition (Honda IPR,
`
`Paper No. 9, at 6). Concurrently with this Motion, Hyundai is filing a Petition for
`
`inter partes review of the ’210 patent.
`
`II. ARGUMENT
`Hyundai’s Petition and this motion for joinder are timely under 35 U.S.C. §
`
`315(c) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b), as they are being submitted within one month of
`
`September 29, 2014, the date that the Honda IPR was instituted. A party may file a
`
`motion requesting joinder “no later than one month after the institution date of any
`
`inter partes review for which joinder is requested.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). The
`
`one-year time limitation prescribed by 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) does not apply when a
`
`party moves to join another IPR proceedings. See 35 U.S.C. § 315 (b) (“The time
`
`limitation set forth in the preceding sentence shall not apply to a request for joinder
`
`under subsection (c).”); see also Dell Inc. v. Network-1 Solutions, Inc., IPR2013-
`
`00385, Paper No. 17, at 5 (“The one-year bar, therefore, does not apply to Dell
`
`because it filed a motion for joinder with its Petition”).
`
`A.
`
`Joinder will not impact the Board’s ability to complete the review
`in a timely manner
`
`Joinder in this case will not impact the Board’s ability to complete its review
`
`in a timely manner. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) and associated rule 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.100(c) provide that inter partes review proceedings should be completed and
`
`the Board’s final decision issued within one year of institution of the review. The
`
`
`
`- 3 -
`
`
`
`
`
`same provisions provide the Board with flexibility to extend the one-year period by
`
`up to six months for good cause, or in the case of joinder.
`
`In this case, joinder should not affect the Board’s ability to issue its final
`
`determination within one year because Petitioner does not raise any issues that are
`
`not already before the Board. Hyundai’s Petition is based on the same grounds and
`
`same combinations of prior art as those on which trial has been instituted in the
`
`Honda IPR. Indeed, Hyundai has not raised one of the grounds on which a trial was
`
`instituted (anticipation of Claims 1, 8, 15, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) by Fry,
`
`discussed at pages 24-26 of Paper 8 in the Honda IPR), thereby further minimizing
`
`any impact of Hyundai’s joinder. Hyundai’s arguments regarding the asserted
`
`prior art references are identical to those made by Honda in its petition (Compare
`
`Pet. 8-23, with IPR2013-00633, Paper 1 at 9-24, 36-40). Further, Hyundai has
`
`retained and submitted a declaration from the same declarant as Honda,
`
`Christopher Wilson, with the only difference being that Hyundai has removed
`
`testimony regarding prior art references on which a trial was not instituted in the
`
`Honda IPR and testimony relating to the Fry prior art reference. Compare Ex.
`
`1008, with IPR2014-00633, Ex. 1011. Accordingly, AVS should not need any
`
`additional discovery of Mr. Wilson beyond what it has already asked for in the
`
`Honda IPR. As noted above, the Board recently granted Hyundai’s request to join
`
`an IPR initiated by Honda involving a different AVS patent under the same
`
`
`
`- 4 -
`
`
`
`
`
`circumstances. Hyundai Motor Co. v. Am. Veh. Scis., Case No. IPR2014-01543,
`
`Paper No. 11 at 3-6 (Oct. 24, 2014).
`
`The first deadline in Honda’s IPR is the due date for AVS’s response to
`
`Honda’s petition (37 C.F.R. § 42.120) and any motion to amend the patent (37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.121), which is currently set for December 1, 2014, more than one
`
`month after the date of this motion. Because Hyundai’s IPR petition does not raise
`
`any new issues, AVS’s response would not require any analysis beyond what AVS
`
`is already required to undertake to respond to Honda’s petition.
`
`Hyundai respectfully submits that briefing and discovery in the joined
`
`proceeding can be simplified to minimize any impact to the schedule or the volume
`
`of materials to be submitted to the Board. Hyundai is willing to adopt the same
`
`procedures ordered by the Board in IPR2014-01543 and IPR2014-00634, limiting
`
`Hyundai to separate filings, if any, of no more than seven pages directed only to
`
`points of disagreement with Honda, with the understanding that Hyundai will not
`
`be permitted any separate arguments in furtherance of those advance in Honda’s
`
`consolidated filings. Hyundai Motor Corp. v. Am. Veh. Scis., IPR2014-01543,
`
`Paper No. 11, at 4-6 (Oct. 24, 2014). See also, Dell, IPR2013-00385, Paper No. 17,
`
`at 8 (adopting similar procedures); Motorola Mobility LLC v. Softview LLC,
`
`IPR2013-00256, Paper No. 10, at 9 (same). Given that Hyundai and Honda will be
`
`addressing the same prior art and the same bases for rejection using the same
`
`
`
`- 5 -
`
`
`
`
`
`expert, Hyundai does not envision any differences in position with Honda, and
`
`does not believe that it is likely to make any separate filings.
`
`B.
`
`Joinder would enhance efficiency by consolidating issues, avoiding
`duplicate efforts, and preventing inconsistencies among the
`pending proceedings
`
`The validity of the ’210 patent is squarely at issue in, as described above,
`
`both the Underlying Litigation and the Honda IPR, and a final written decision in
`
`the consolidated inter partes review has the potential to resolve the Underlying
`
`Litigation with respect to the ’210 patent. Allowing a consolidated inter partes
`
`review would also avoid potential inconsistency and avoid prejudice to Hyundai in
`
`the event that Honda and AVS reach a resolution of their disputes during the
`
`pendency of the IPR. 35 U.S.C. § 317(a) provides that an inter partes review “shall
`
`be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner
`
`and the patent owner” unless the Board has already reached its decision on the
`
`merits. If no petitioner remains after settlement, “the Office may terminate the
`
`review.” Id. Thus, if AVS and Honda were to reach a settlement, the Honda IPR
`
`could terminate without proceeding to a final written decision.
`
`Indeed, if the Board terminated the Honda IPR, Hyundai and Kia would be
`
`forced to start over before the District Court with the exact same arguments that
`
`Honda has already shown it is reasonably likely to prevail on. (See Honda IPR,
`
`Paper No. 8.) The potential for inconsistency would be also heightened because
`
`
`
`- 6 -
`
`
`
`
`
`Hyundai and Kia would face a higher burden before the District Court of proving
`
`the invalidity of claims 1-3, 5, 7-9, 13, 15, 16, 18, and 19 by clear and convincing
`
`evidence, as opposed to the lower burden here of a preponderance of the evidence.
`
`See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Having to overcome a higher burden to get the same result
`
`is prejudicial to Hyundai, especially since Hyundai has complied with the statute
`
`and regulations in filing its Petition and the instant motion.
`
`Additionally, if the Board permits Hyundai to join the Honda IPR, and AVS
`
`is correct in its belief that claims 1-3, 5, 7-9, 13, 15, 16, 18, and 19 of the ’210
`
`patent are patentable, Hyundai will be estopped from further challenging the
`
`validity of the patent in the Underlying Litigation, avoiding duplication of efforts
`
`at least as to Hyundai. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1). Accordingly, to avoid duplicate
`
`efforts, the possibility of inconsistencies, and prejudice to Hyundai, joinder is
`
`appropriate.
`
`Joinder will not prejudice AVS or Honda
`
`C.
`Permitting joinder will not prejudice AVS or Honda. Hyundai raises no
`
`issues that are not already before the Board, such that joinder would not affect the
`
`timing of the Honda IPR or the content of AVS’s Patent Owner response due on
`
`December 1, 2014. Hyundai also believes any additional costs to AVS and Honda
`
`associated with its participation in the Honda IPR will be minor, and certainly not
`
`
`
`- 7 -
`
`
`
`
`
`so great as to justify the potential prejudice to Hyundai if the Honda IPR were to
`
`be otherwise terminated before a final written decision by the Board.
`
`Finally, even if the Board were to determine that joinder will require a minor
`
`extension of the schedule, such an extension is permitted by law and is not a reason
`
`for denying joinder. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11); 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(c).
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`
`For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that its Petition for
`
`Inter Partes Review of U.S. Patent No. 7,650,210 be granted and that the
`
`proceedings be joined with Honda Motor Co. v. American Vehicular Sciences
`
`LLC, Case IPR2014-00633.
`
`The undersigned attorney may be reached by telephone at (202) 408-4365.
`
`Although Petitioner believes that no fee is required for this Motion, the
`
`Commissioner is hereby authorized to charge any additional fees which may be
`
`required for this Motion to Deposit Account No. 06-0916.
`
`Dated: October 28, 2014
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/ Ed Naidich /
`Ed Naidich
`Registration No. 43,826
`Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett and
`Dunner, LLP
`901 New York Ave. NW
`Washington DC 20001
`
`Lead Counsel for Petitioners
`
`- 8 -
`
`
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of the foregoing Motion for
`
`Joinder was served on October 28, 2014, upon the following parties via UPS
`
`overnight delivery:
`
`Thomas J. Wimbiscus
`McAndrews, Held & Malloy, Ltd.
`500 West Madison St., 34th Floor
`Chicago, IL 60661
`
`
`Courtesy Copies to:
`
`
`Brian Roffe, Esq.
`8170 McCormick Boulevard, Suite 223
`Skokie, IL 60076-2914
`
`Demetrios Anaipakos
`Ahmad, Zavitsanos, Anaipakos, Alavi & Mensing, P.C.
`1221 McKinney Street, Suite 3460
`Houston, TX 77010
`
`
`
`/ Ed Naidich /
`Ed Naidich
`Registration No. 43,826
`Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett and
`Dunner, LLP
`901 New York Ave. NW
`Washington DC 20001
`
`
`
`
`
`Dated: October 28, 2014
`
`
`
`