throbber
IPR2015-00059, Paper No. 41
`March 31, 2016
`
`trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`
`
`RECORD OF ORAL HEARING
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`- - - - - -
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`- - - - - -
`HUGHES NETWORK SYSTEMS LLC and
`HUGHES COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
`Petitioner
`vs.
`CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
`Patent Owner
`- - - - - -
`Case IPR2015-00059
`Patent 7,916,781
`Application 12/165606
`Technology Center 2600
`- - - - - -
`Oral Hearing Held: February 10, 2016
`
`Before: GLENN J. PERRY, KALYAN K. DESHPANDE,
`TREVOR M. JEFFERSON, Administrative Patent Judges
`
`
`
`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Wednesday,
`February 10, 2016 at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 600 Dulany
`Street, Alexandria, Virginia in Hearing Room A, at 10:00 a.m.
`REPORTED BY: Karen Brynteson, RMR, CRR, FAPR
`
`

`
`APPEARANCES:
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`MATTHEW A. ARGENTI, ESQ.
`Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, LLP
`650 Page Mill Road
`Palo Alto, CA 94304-1050
`650-354-1154
`Margenti@wsgr.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`APPEARANCES (continued):
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PATENT OWNER:
`
`RICHARD TORCZON, ESQ.
`
`Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati
`
`1700 K Street, N.W.
`
`Fifth Floor
`Washington, D.C. 20006
`202-973-8911
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ELIOT D. WILLIAMS, ESQ.
`HOPKINS GUY, ESQ.
`Baker & Botts LLP
`1001 Page Mill Road
`Building One, Suite 200
`Palo Alto, CA 94304-1007
`650-739-7511
`Eliot.williams@bakerbotts.com
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PATENT OWNER:
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`MICHAEL T. ROSATO, ESQ.
`Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati
`701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5100
`Seattle, WA 98104
`
`206-881-2529
`mrosato@wsgr.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`Case No. IPR2015-00059
`Patent No. 7,916,781
`
`
`P R O C E E D I N G S
`
`(10:00 a.m.)
`JUDGE PERRY: We're on the record. We're
`convened this morning after our snow delay for oral argument
`in IPR2015- 00059, Hughes versus California Institute of
`Technology.
`The patent at issue is 7,916,781. Per our trial
`order, each side gets 60 minutes to argue from the record.
`Petitioner, of course, has the ultimate burden of proof and will
`argue first and Petitioner may reserve time for rebuttal.
`If you haven't done so already, counsel, please
`give your card to the court reporter so we get your names
`correct. I'm aware of one outstanding motion by Patent
`Owner, a motion to strike and exclude, which is Paper 32,
`opposed at Paper 35.
`Are there any other outstanding motions? Okay.
`So, Petitioner, when ready, you may begin.
`MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you very much, Your
`
`Honor.
`
`minutes --
`
`JUDGE PERRY: Do you want to reserve any time?
`MR. WILLIAMS: I would like to reserve 30
`
`JUDGE PERRY: Okay.
`MR. WILLIAMS: -- of my time. And I have hard
`copies of the demonstratives, if the Board would like them.
`
`
`
`3
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00059
`Patent No. 7,916,781
`
`
`JUDGE PERRY: I would appreciate a copy.
`MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, if I could begin, let
`me introduce myself. My name is Eliot Williams. I represent
`the Petitioner in this proceeding. With me is co- counsel,
`Hopkins Guy. Jamie Lin is also here as co-counsel for
`Hughes. And in- house corporate counsel for intellectual
`property is Cory Myers, is also here with us today as well.
`Your Honor, I am going to begin with the
`substantive challenge to claims 1 and 2 of the challenged
`patent. And essentially what has occurred here is the Patent
`Owner has simply overclaimed.
`They have claimed activity that was in the prior
`art, activity that was published in a paper by one of the
`co-inventors of the challenged patent, actually, more than a
`year before the patent was filed.
`The Board has already provided some preliminary
`claim constructions in the case, which I will make reference to
`in a moment, and the Patent Owner has attempted to challenge
`some of those claim constructions, or at least it appears that's
`what the Patent Owner is doing.
`Really the focus of the claim is on these two steps.
`There is a first encoding operation and a second encoding
`operation. And I am referring here to slide 2 of the
`demonstratives, which shows claim 1.
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`
`Case No. IPR2015-00059
`Patent No. 7,916,781
`
`
`With respect to the first encoding operation, as the
`Board knows, this limitation requires that there be a linear
`transform operation. And the Board did interpret "linear
`transform operation."
`The Board's Institution decision's construction is
`shown in slide 3. Essentially a linear transfer operation is one
`that obeys the laws of linear algebra.
`The Patent Owner has proposed a different
`construction. They say that this first encoding operation
`cannot be just any linear transform but must have some
`specific properties and, in particular, they say it must involve
`the irregular repetition and scrambling of bits. Although they
`don't always use this formulation in their response, that
`appears to be their argument.
`So we would contend that the Board's construction
`was correct. It was the plain meaning of "linear transform
`operation." This was confirmed during the deposition of
`Patent Owner's expert, who was asked about the idea of linear
`transformation, whether it had an ordinary meaning in the art,
`and he admitted that it did. And it was the meaning that the
`Board had gave it in the Institution decision. It is just a linear
`transform operation. That's what that term means.
`So the Patent Owner turns to the specification in
`an attempt to narrow that construction. As set forth in our
`reply brief, we think those arguments are defective. The
`
`
`
`5
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00059
`Patent No. 7,916,781
`
`Patent Owner's expert really was just cherry-picking portions
`of the specification to try to make this argument that somehow
`the claimed linear transformation was limited to something
`more narrow than that.
`But even if you were to look to the specification to
`try to interpret what is an otherwise very clear claim, it
`doesn't help the Patent Owner because the specification made
`clear that when they used the term "irregular repeat and
`accumulate codes" in the specification or IRA, they are
`meaning to include also regular repeat-accumulate.
`And they say that in the specification as shown on
`slide 5, that regular can be considered a version,
`non- systematic type of an IRA. And the Patent Owner's expert
`concedes, essentially, that that's what that specification
`discussion is saying.
`So in addition to the specification, the related
`patents in the same patent family tend to show the same thing.
`They make -- both the parent and grandparent application
`include claims that do include irregularity in them. So it is
`clear the patent, the inventors knew how to claim irregularity
`when they wanted to.
`By not doing so in claims 1 and 2, they were
`showing an intent to claim more broadly, which is precisely
`what the claim says.
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00059
`Patent No. 7,916,781
`
`
`Similarly, there is a file history and claim
`differentiation argument that shows the Patent Owner's claim
`construction is not correct. So, in particular, claim 9 in the
`patent originally recited that the number of information bits
`that appear is irregular.
`The examiner objected to that formulation as being
`indefinite, and the Patent Owner rewrote the claim in the way
`that it appears now.
`But Dr. Pfister, who is our expert, has said that,
`you know, one of ordinary skill in the art reading claim 9,
`even as written now, would understand that that is requiring
`irregularity and, therefore, such a requirement is not present in
`the claims that precede it.
`So for all those reasons, we think the Patent
`Owner's claim construction arguments should be rejected.
`Once you reject that argument, there is really no dispute that
`Divsalar has a linear transformation in the first two steps
`shown in figure 3 of Divsalar.
`So I will turn now to the second encoding
`operation.
`This claim requires that you perform an
`accumulation operation on the bits that were kind of the output
`of the first encoding operation. And the Patent Owner has
`made the argument that this second encoding operation that's
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`
`Case No. IPR2015-00059
`Patent No. 7,916,781
`
`in the claims is really supposed to be the inner coder that is
`described in the specification.
`And, therefore, it is a specific type of inner coder
`that must be the accumulation operation. And, in particular,
`there, they argue that it requires the addition of a previously
`generated parity bit and more than one input bit to generate
`the second parity bit.
`So the problem for Patent Owner is that none of
`this is in the specification. And, in fact, the specification
`shows quite the opposite.
`The specification defines an accumulator that
`doesn't do that at all. It wouldn't meet the claim construction
`that the Patent Owner is proposing. This is the description
`from the specification that defines this encoder, and it defines
`the accumulator that is used there.
`And it is very clear that it doesn't meet the
`construction proposed by Patent Owner. Even Patent Owner's
`expert admits that. During his deposition he conceded that
`this description of the accumulator embodiment wouldn't
`satisfy the claim construction that the Patent Owner is
`proposing, so we think that this, you know, clearly this
`construction of the Patent Owner should be rejected.
`We do go on in the reply to try to explain what we
`think got the Patent Owner to the wrong answer here, and it
`was their expert's misinterpretation of this figure 3 of the
`
`
`
`8
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00059
`Patent No. 7,916,781
`
`patent which shows essentially a factor graph that is supposed
`to be an embodiment of the invention.
`The Patent Owner's expert divided up that factor
`graph in a particular way that yields an inner coder that has
`rate A. And the specification makes clear A is a number that
`is going to be one or larger.
`And that's inconsistent with the specification's
`description of the inner coder, which requires that that have a
`rate close to one, and preferably, you know, one or within
`1 percent of one.
`And Petitioner has shown the proper way to sort of
`decompose that figure in figure 3 in the specification, which
`leads to an accumulator with rate 1, and that is exactly the
`claim construction that we apply in determining that Divsalar
`anticipates.
`So then just looking at, then comparing the
`specification embodiment of an accumulator with what the
`prior art accumulator is, you know, the Board can see the
`language is almost identical. It looks like that language was
`probably borrowed when the specification description of
`accumulator was generated.
`So we think the evidence is clear that as properly
`construed, the Divsalar reference has both the first and second
`encoding steps.
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`
`Case No. IPR2015-00059
`Patent No. 7,916,781
`
`
`Okay. That's essentially the essence of the
`substantive presentation, unless the Board has questions, and
`then I was going to move on to a couple of the evidentiary
`matters that have been raised.
`JUDGE PERRY: We understand the substance.
`MR. WILLIAMS: Great. So I do want to talk
`about the publication of Divsalar. Because there is a dispute,
`as the Board knows, about whether Petitioner has met its
`burden of showing Divsalar is a prior art publication.
`So the interesting thing to note about that is that
`Divsalar is a publication by one of the inventors of this patent.
`He was -- it is not the same inventive entity, obviously. There
`is different combinations of inventors, but at least Mr.
`McEliece, for instance, is on -- is a named inventor and is an
`author of the Divsalar paper.
`So the other interesting thing to note is that Mr.
`McEliece is obviously still or he is affiliated with CalTech and
`is someone who, if he had evidence that would tend to show
`that Divsalar was not a publication, it is very likely he would
`have been brought in to present that evidence.
`He has not been brought in to present that
`evidence. We as Petitioners did attempt to get that evidence,
`as the Board knows, and that was, that was denied.
`But the fact remains that the person who would
`very likely have the evidence that it is not a publication has
`
`
`
`10
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`

`
`Case No. IPR2015-00059
`Patent No. 7,916,781
`
`never shown up to say that it is not. CalTech has never argued
`that Divsalar is not a publication. They have never made such
`a statement.
`I don't think they are going to make such a
`statement today. I think, if pushed, they wouldn't agree that it
`was not a publication. It would just be factually untrue.
`So let's just talk about what the evidence is for the
`publication of Divsalar. Obviously, there is the Fradenburgh
`declaration and the attachment to the Fradenburgh declaration.
`So Ms. Fradenburgh is a librarian at the University
`of Texas. She looked in the record. She gave us a copy of the
`Divsalar publication from the University of Texas's library,
`from the shelves. And she gave us a copy of the internal
`record at the University of Texas library that shows when that
`document was made available to the public, which was in
`April of 1999. So we have that. It is clear that the document
`--
`
`JUDGE PERRY: How does that declaration,
`counsel, show that the publication was made available and
`isn't simply residing in a warehouse box?
`MR. WILLIAMS: Well, her paragraph 7 was the
`library's records reflect that the reference was made available
`to members of the public on April 30th, 1999.
`JUDGE PERRY: Which happens to be the date of
`the acquisition records creation?
`
`
`
`11
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00059
`Patent No. 7,916,781
`
`
`MR. WILLIAMS: That's the date that shows, as
`the UT created date in their acquisition record, that's correct.
`That's correct.
`But let me put aside the Fradenburgh declaration
`for a moment. Let's pretend we didn't have that evidence.
`There is still overwhelming evidence in the record before the
`Board that Divsalar is a prior art publication that is available
`here. And let me go through quickly what that evidence is.
`So first obviously we have the IDS that was filed
`during prosecution history by the inventors, showing they were
`aware of the reference. They sent it to the Patent Office with
`a date of publication in September of 1998.
`Robert McEliece, the inventor, lists Divsalar as a
`publication on his CV, Exhibit 1075. Dr. Pfister, who is our
`expert, in opening declaration in paragraph 41 says he has
`reviewed the Divsalar reference and believes it is prior art --
`predates the May 18th, 2000 priority date. In particular, he
`says, that Divsalar was published in the Allerton Proceedings
`no later than September of 1998.
`They never took his deposition. They had an
`opportunity to, obviously. They said they wanted to take his
`deposition and then they decided not to.
`They have never challenged his testimony to that
`
`effect.
`
`
`
`12
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00059
`Patent No. 7,916,781
`
`
`JUDGE PERRY: Did Dr. Pfister explain how he
`knew that it was published in the Allerton Conference?
`MR. WILLIAMS: He didn't explain how he knew,
`but what he did say is he, himself, wrote a paper that cited to
`Divsalar a few months later. Clearly he had access to it.
`I mean, the test is not whether the thing is indexed.
`The test is whether it is accessible to members of the public,
`in this case of level of skill in the art. So this is a very
`narrow field. These people are Ph.D.s. they all know what is
`going on in the research space.
`We know he had access to the paper because he
`cited it himself a few months later and presented it at the
`paper -- at a paper cited to Divsalar at the next year's Allerton
`Conference, which was still before the filing date of the
`patent-in- suit.
`JUDGE JEFFERSON: What exhibit number was
`Dr. Pfister's testimony?
`MR. WILLIAMS: I'm sorry?
`JUDGE JEFFERSON: What exhibit number was
`Dr. Pfister's testimony?
`MR. WILLIAMS: So his declaration is
`Exhibit 1010. The paper is Exhibit 1057. And he discusses it
`at, I believe, paragraphs 32 and 41 of his declaration.
`JUDGE JEFFERSON: Thank you.
`
`
`
`13
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00059
`Patent No. 7,916,781
`
`
`MR. WILLIAMS: We have additional evidence as
`well, so let me get to that. So we also submitted a declaration
`of David MacKay, I think is how you pronounce his name.
`That's -- his declaration is Exhibit 1060. He talks about two
`papers that he wrote and published on his own web site, both
`of which cite to Divsalar.
`For instance, Exhibit 1042 is a paper entitled
`Sparse Graph Codes. He testified that he placed that document
`on his web site by June 2nd, 1999. So by that time he had
`already written this brief paper that cites to the Divsalar
`reference.
`Clearly he had access to the Divsalar reference by
`that date, which is just a few weeks after the 102(b) date,
`proving that he obviously had access to this document before
`the critical period.
`JUDGE PERRY: Counsel, were all these exhibits
`discussed in your original petition?
`MR. WILLIAMS: The exhibits were discussed,
`yes. I mean, this particular argument for the publication date
`and that the evidence proves publication date, no, not all of
`them were.
`They were raised in the reply, obviously. With the
`petition, we relied primarily on the Fradenburgh declaration,
`which makes clear that the document was, you know, a
`
`
`
`14
`
`

`
`Case No. IPR2015-00059
`Patent No. 7,916,781
`
`publication in a library by that date, but the other evidence
`was in the record and we just didn't address that at that point.
`So unless you have other questions about the
`publication date, I can move on. The motion to exclude, that
`was really -- I mean, I will address the motion to exclude very
`briefly.
`
`I think the challenge is mainly to the Fradenburgh
`declaration. They also challenge one of the declarations
`relating to real party in interest, which I can get to in just a
`moment.
`
`But the point I wanted to make about the
`Fradenburgh declaration is even if it were to be excluded, it
`wouldn't change the fact that the evidence is overwhelming
`that Divsalar was available as a prior art reference.
`But we do think it would be error to exclude the
`Fradenburgh declaration. We did our best to make her
`available for deposition. We didn't suggest a procedure by
`which she could be deposed. The Patent Owner never took us
`up on that opportunity.
`JUDGE PERRY: The motion to exclude also
`moved to exclude a number of exhibits that were, according to
`Patent Owner, not discussed in the original petition. Would
`you briefly address that aspect of the motion?
`MR. WILLIAMS: Yeah. I mean, frankly, you
`know, just to put all the cards on the table, what happened
`
`
`
`15
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00059
`Patent No. 7,916,781
`
`here is we filed multiple petitions at once that were using a lot
`of the same exhibits. In an attempt to try to simplify the
`reference between the petitions, we used the same exhibit
`numbers where they were the same exhibit, they were being
`used in multiple petitions.
`JUDGE PERRY: So in that case you wouldn't have
`any problem with our expunging those exhibits from this
`particular case record?
`MR. WILLIAMS: Well, I mean, largely the ones
`that are actually not cited, I would not have a problem with
`that in this proceeding, but, frankly, I am not sure what the
`benefit to anybody would be.
`I mean, the references were already of record in
`the other petitions, which were never expunged. There is no
`prejudice to the presence of those exhibits in the record.
`The ones we do have problems with, obviously,
`relate to the particular prior art publication issue that I just
`mentioned. So, you know, in our reply, we cite to Exhibits
`1031, 1041, 1042, 1057, and 1060, which is Dr. MacKay's
`declaration.
`I think I forgot to tell you, by the way, a moment
`ago that there was another paper that cited to Divsalar before
`the priority date, which was Viterbi. That is Exhibit 1031 that
`I just listed.
`
`
`
`16
`
`

`
`Case No. IPR2015-00059
`Patent No. 7,916,781
`
`
`So, yeah, those obviously we would have a clear
`objection to having expunged because we do rely on them in
`our reply. They were submitted with the petition. And they
`tend to show the availability of the Divsalar reference as prior
`art. So they are clearly relevant to the proceeding.
`So, yeah, let me just move on to the real party in
`interest issue, because I did want to mention that before I sit
`down.
`
`So there is two arguments that are being made with
`respect to real party in interest. First is that somehow we
`didn't properly name EchoStar, which is the parent company of
`Hughes. We obviously completely disagree with that. And we
`think the Board resolved that issue in the Institution decision
`already. We think that was the correct decision.
`There is no magic words for, required for
`identifying a real party in interest. That's clear from other
`panels' decisions and the statute itself.
`So that gets us then to DISH, which is an entity
`that is a completely separate entity from Hughes and EchoStar.
`The only connection between the two that seems to be hinted
`at is two.
`
`One is that there is a common shareholder of both
`corporations, which we have never denied. It is a true
`statement, but the problem is that the common shareholder is
`not alleged to be the real party in interest and he is not. He
`
`
`
`17
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`

`
`Case No. IPR2015-00059
`Patent No. 7,916,781
`
`had no input into the decision to make -- to file these
`proceedings, as the evidence shows. No evidence has been
`presented that he did.
`We submitted testimony of Tim Jezek, who is
`in- house counsel that said he didn't and that the decision was
`made entirely at the in- house counsel level within Hughes.
`There is another allegation that DISH somehow,
`because its products were at issue in the litigation, and there
`was an indemnification obligation to DISH, that that makes
`DISH a real party in interest.
`That argument would be somewhat interesting if
`not for the fact that there was absolutely no evidence
`presented in the District Court that any DISH product was
`actually infringing. And for that reason those claims were
`dismissed on summary judgment, several months before the
`Patent Owner response was filed in this case.
`So we contend that we have named the real parties
`in interest correctly, and there is no evidence to the contrary.
`JUDGE PERRY: I have just one more question, if
`I can relate back to the Fradenburgh declaration --
`MR. WILLIAMS: Sure.
`JUDGE PERRY: -- one more time.
`MR. WILLIAMS: Absolutely.
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`
`
`
`18
`
`

`
`Case No. IPR2015-00059
`Patent No. 7,916,781
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`
`JUDGE PERRY: Why didn't your side apply for a
`subpoena to make Robin Fradenburgh available for
`cross-examination?
`MR. WILLIAMS: Yeah, it is a good question.
`And I expected to get that question. And I have thought about
`it, what my answer would be many times.
`I think the best answer is, I mean, in hindsight, we
`probably would have, if we knew that this was the direction
`things were going to go, that they were intending actually to
`strike her testimony.
`If we realized that that's where this was headed, we
`would have asked for a conference with the Board to figure out
`what the best procedure is, but at the time this occurred when
`we found out that she wasn't ready to appear voluntarily, we
`did look to the Board's precedent. And there was a
`precedential, not a precedential, but there was a prior panel
`decision on the almost identical facts where the Patent Owner
`requested the subpoena.
`I mean, after all, they are the one who wanted to
`question her. It wasn't us. We had her declaration testimony
`already. So it made sense to us that it would be the Patent
`Owner that would issue the subpoena, which we suggested to
`the Patent Owner twice, and never heard back.
`
`
`
`19
`
`

`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`Case No. IPR2015-00059
`Patent No. 7,916,781
`
`
`JUDGE PERRY: Doesn't our Trial Practice Guide
`specifically put the onus on the party proffering the
`testimony?
`MR. WILLIAMS: So the Trial Practice Guide, I
`would say, is actually ambiguous on these facts as to what to
`do when you have a witness who gave you a declaration
`voluntarily, but who is not going to volunteer for a deposition,
`was requiring a subpoena.
`I can see that any costs associated with that would
`be borne by us. The rules, I think, make that clear. The Trial
`Practice Guide makes that, I think, clear.
`And we were doing the best we could with the facts
`we had. We were cooperating with the Patent Owner,
`suggesting a very simple procedure for obtaining her
`testimony. So, I mean, that's my answer.
`I mean, also the Trial Practice Guide is not a
`binding rule. The words used around the testimony of a
`witness to speak in languages of "should" and things like that,
`so we didn't view it as a necessary requirement that we had to
`subpoena her.
`It didn't frankly make a lot of sense to us, given
`that typically a subpoena would be used by someone who
`actually wanted to question her, which was not what was
`happening.
`
`
`
`20
`
`

`
`Case No. IPR2015-00059
`Patent No. 7,916,781
`
`
`So, I mean, that's how we wound up here. But,
`yeah, if they had responded and said, no, we're going to move
`to strike her testimony before their response was due, then I
`think we would have clearly -- the issue would have been
`flagged for us. We would have called the Board and tried to
`get some guidance.
`JUDGE PERRY: Thank you.
`MR. WILLIAMS: With that, I will reserve the
`remainder of my time.
`JUDGE PERRY: Okay.
`MR. ROSATO: So we have hard copies of the
`demonstrative exhibits. Can we approach?
`JUDGE PERRY: Yes.
`MR. ROSATO: Mike Rosato for CalTech, the
`Patent Owner. I have at counsel table Matthew Argenti,
`co-counsel, Richard Torczon, also co- counsel. And at our law
`firm here for entertainment purposes is Mr. Mata in the back
`of the room.
`It is a pleasure to be here, Your Honors. We do
`emphasize our appreciation to the Board for time today, efforts
`throughout the proceeding, rescheduling due to snowstorms
`and general attention to this matter.
`So I would like to first turn to this threshold issue
`of whether the Divsalar reference qualifies as prior art to this
`proceeding in the first place.
`
`
`
`21
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`

`
`Case No. IPR2015-00059
`Patent No. 7,916,781
`
`
`This is a threshold issue, of course, because if the
`Petitioner has not established that a reference, the only
`reference at issue is prior art as asserted, there is no need for
`the Board to reach these issues of application of the teachings
`of that reference to the claims and so forth.
`In particular, there are several issues surrounding
`that evidence, that issue of whether the reference qualifies.
`There are procedural aspects, and there are substantive
`aspects.
`
`The procedural aspects are covered in the briefing,
`and I am happy to talk about those. And we will reach them.
`I do want to spend some time on the content of the
`evidence and the deficiencies that are there, because I think
`the content of that evidence forms a basis for a finding that the
`Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the reference is prior
`art as asserted.
`So what is that evidence? And turning to slide 5 of
`the demonstrative exhibits, back in the petition, the original
`petition submitted in this case on page 2 of that petition,
`Petitioner complies with Board Rule 104(b)(2), to the extent
`that it specifically identifies the Divsalar reference as
`allegedly being prior art under 102(b), and specifically
`identifies the date of April 30th, 1999.
`They are doing what they are supposed to do under
`the rules, to the extent they are identifying with particularity
`
`
`
`22
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`

`
`Case No. IPR2015-00059
`Patent No. 7,916,781
`
`how they believe the reference is prior art and when it was
`believed publicly available.
`One other thing -- well, and then the extent of that
`discussion is what you find on page 2 of the petition. There is
`one sentence identifying the reference as prior art. There is an
`incorporation to Exhibit 1064, which is the declaration of
`Ms. Fradenburgh. There is no discussion in that declaration,
`there is no discussion of anything else. That is the one
`sentence offered by the Petitioner on this issue.
`Now, the Board in its Institution decision did raise
`another issue in addition to identifying the Fradenburgh
`declaration as being the only piece of evidence submitted by
`Petitioner. And the Board further posed the question of
`whether the Divsalar reference was published at the Allerton
`Conference.
`So the latter question is certainly a fair and
`relevant question, but it is also one that is easily resolved.
`And we want to make sure we address that.
`To be clear, the Divsalar reference was not
`published at the Allerton Conference. Petitioner never made
`that assertion. In fact, to the contrary, they made an assertion
`just the opposite.
`They specifically indicated that the reference was
`not published at the conference. They submitted testimony of
`two witnesses, Dr. Pfister and Dr. MacKay, both testifying as
`
`
`
`23
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`

`
`Case No. IPR2015-00059
`Patent No. 7,916,781
`
`to the procedure for how the Allerton Conference handles their
`publications.
`That process is the conference occurs, papers are
`submitted after the conference, the papers, to the extent they
`are accepted for publication, are published sometime
`thereafter.
`So we know that the paper was not published at the
`conference. It is a fair question. We should address that, and
`it has been addressed. I just wanted to make sure that point
`was covered.
`And if there is any further information or interest
`in that issue, it is covered at pages 23 and 24 of the Patent
`Owner's response. It is also summarized at slide 9 of the
`demonstrative exhibits.
`I would like to turn to --
`JUDGE PERRY: Counsel, even if we accept that
`the paper was not published at the Allerton Conference,
`mustn't it have been published by the time the University of
`Texas acquired it the following April?
`MR. ROSATO: Well, we don't know when they
`acquired it or if they ever did. And I would like to look at --
`it is absolutely worthwhile looking at the Fradenburgh
`declaration and trying to evaluate what that actually tells us, if
`anything.
`
`But that is a valid point. Let me turn to that.
`
`
`
`24
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket