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`Paper No. 27
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`MICROSOFT CORPORATION
`Petitioner,
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`v.
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`BISCOTTI INC.
`Patent Owner
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`Patent No. 8,144,182
`Issued: March 27, 2012
`Filed: September 16, 2009
`Inventors: Matthew B. Shoemake and Nadeem Ahmed
`Title: REAL TIME VIDEO COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
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`___________________
`Case IPR2014-01458
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`PETITIONER MICROSOFT’S REPLY
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`Petitioner Microsoft’s Reply
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`I.
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`Kenoyer Discloses All the Elements of Claim 6
`A. Kenoyer Discloses the Claimed Input Interfaces
`Claim 6 requires audio and video input interfaces “to receive” input from a set
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`top box (“STB”). Ex. 1001 at 32:64-67. It does not require interfaces “typically”
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`used to connect a STB, as Patent Owner suggests. See Resp., 22. Kenoyer
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`discloses a codec with multiple audio and video interfaces that can connect to a
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`STB, teaches connecting an STB to the codec and, in Figure 5, shows multiple
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`audio and video input interfaces through which such a connection may be made.
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`Pet., 17-18; Ex. 1003 ¶¶95, 234; Ex. 1006, Fig. 5, 8:56-9:34.1 Despite Patent
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`Owner’s suggestion otherwise, Kenoyer’s disclosure of the codec’s functionality in
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`one paragraph and the codec’s interfaces in another is sufficient to satisfy the
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`claim. Ex parte Luck, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1875-76.
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`Patent Owner ignores that claim 6 requires only an “interface” (Resp., 21), i.e.,
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`“the point at which a connection is made between two elements so that they can
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`1 Kenoyer also discloses other input interfaces for the codec that are capable of
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`receiving audio and video from a STB. Pet., 13-14; Ex. 1003 ¶81; Ex. 1006, 9:29-
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`34; Ex. 1052 (Houh Reply Dec.), ¶12, 30, 39; Ex. 1050 (July 30, 2015, Bovik Dep.
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`Tr.), 32:3-21. Kenoyer also discloses “coupl[ing]” the codec to the STB. Pet., 16,
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`citing Ex. 1006, 10:25-30; 1:65-2:1. Kenoyer then describes multiple video and
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`audio interfaces for that coupling. Ex. 1006, 11:2-4; Fig. 7b.
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`Petitioner Microsoft’s Reply
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`work with each other or exchange information.” Ex. 1005 (Microsoft Computer
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`Dict.), at 279-80; Ex. 1050 (July 30, 2015 Bovik Dep. Tr.), 56:1 – 57:6. When
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`Kenoyer discloses “coupling” (i.e., connecting) the STB and the codec, it discloses
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`an “interface” – i.e., a point at which those devices can connect.
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`Patent Owner also focuses improperly on one embodiment to argue that Fig. 5
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`shows interfaces from the codec to a computer, not to a STB (Resp., 22), ignoring
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`that Kenoyer also teaches connecting the codec to a STB. Pet. 13-14; Ex. 1006,
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`1:65-2:1, 10:25-28. Indeed, Patent Owner implicitly concedes the VGA port of Fig.
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`5 can connect to a STB, by arguing only that VGA “is not ordinarily used for
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`transmission of a cable or satellite signal.” Resp., 22; Ex. 2006 ¶81. The evidence
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`shows STBs with VGA outputs that could interface with Kenoyer’s “VGA In.”
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`See Ex. 1052, ¶25-29; Ex. 1055, ¶ 5; Ex. 1055, 6:51-61; Ex. 1046 at 7, 9, 11; Ex.
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`1047 at 15, 21; Ex. 2012 at 42; Ex. 1033 at 63; Ex. 1050, 79:2-9.
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`Patent Owner also argues that Kenoyer “fails to identify whether the ‘pass-
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`through’ content consists of both audio and video, or only one of the two.” Resp.,
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`13; see also id. at 15. But the “regular programming/games” disclosed in Kenoyer
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`includes both audio and video. Ex. 1052, ¶32, 42; Ex. 1006, 11:2-4 (STB with
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`audio and video output interfaces); also, Ex. 1009 at 2 (TV with audio and video
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`inputs for STB); Ex. 2013 at 11 (same); Ex. 2012 at 14 (same); Ex. 1033 (Briere)
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`at 73 (“you also need some separate cables to carry the audio signals that
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`2
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`Petitioner Microsoft’s Reply
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`correspond with your TV video”). Indeed, Biscotti’s expert agrees that
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`“programming” includes both video and audio. See, e.g., Ex. 1050, 14:2-21
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`(video); id., 15:3-16 (audio).
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`In addition, the claim requires just an audio “interface,” and Fig. 5 shows audio
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`input interfaces, including “microphone-in 513” and “alternate input 315.” Ex.
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`1003, ¶235. And Kenoyer describes the STB as both coupled to the codec and
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`having “audio ports (e.g., audio ports 713a-b ).” Ex. 1006, 11:3-4. Kenoyer also
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`explains that in some embodiments the audio interfaces of its codec are “Radio
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`Corporation of America (RCA) (L+C+R analog) input,” Ex. 1006, 12:62-66; see
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`Ex. 1003 ¶81, which is a typical audio input interface, see Ex. 1052, ¶39; Ex. 1050,
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`39:4-12, 114:4-8, and one which the ’182 patent explicitly says can be an audio
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`input interface, see Ex. 1001, 10:24-26; id., 10:41-47.
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`B. Kenoyer Discloses The Claimed Audio Output Interface
`Claim 6 requires “an audio output interface to provide audio output to an audio
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`receiver”. The claim does not require an audio receiver, as Patent Owner suggests,
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`but instead requires only an interface to an audio receiver, and Kenoyer discloses
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`several, including a headphone jack, Ex. 1006 at Fig. 5; Ex. 1052, ¶44, 48, and a
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`“RCA output,” Ex. 1003 ¶81; Ex. 1006, 12:67-13:3; Ex. 1052, ¶44, 49.
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`Patent Owner also mistakenly interprets an “audio receiver” as a home theater
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`“stereo receiver.” Resp., 16. That definition is inconsistent with the ’182 patent,
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`3
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`Petitioner Microsoft’s Reply
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`where an audio receiver is alternatively described as internal to a display, Ex.
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`1001, 10:59-64, & claim 17.2 This, under the broadest reasonable interpretation
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`consistent with the specification, the claim requires an interface to something that
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`receives audio–an “audio receiver,” such as the speaker port and RCA output
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`disclosed by Kenoyer. Pet., 15; Houh Tr. at 148:19-25.
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`In any event, the headphone jack of Kenoyer’s Fig. 5 is a common audio
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`interface to a stereo receiver. Ex. 1052, ¶48; Ex. 1048 at 16, 23 (receiver with
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`headphone jack for input); Ex. 1056, 1:34-38; Ex. 1057, ¶ 5 (headphone jack input
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`in car audio receivers). The “RCA output” of Kenoyer’s codec is also a typical
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`interface to a stereo receiver, Ex. 1003 ¶ 81; Ex. 1052, ¶49, and one which the ’182
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`patent explicitly says can be an audio output interface, Ex. 1001, 10:24-27.
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`C. Kenoyer Discloses The Claimed Storage Medium
`Claim 6 also requires a “storage medium” having encoded thereon certain
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`computer instructions, Ex. 1001, 33:9-25, which Kenoyer discloses through its
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`description of functionality and its later statement that “[e]mbodiments of a subset
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`or all (and portions or [sic] all) of the above may be implemented by program
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`2 Biscotti incorrectly argues that Dr. Houh’s deposition testimony limits this term
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`to home theater stereo receivers because that interpretation is inconsistent with the
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`‘182 patent’s specification.
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`4
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`Petitioner Microsoft’s Reply
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`instructions stored in a memory medium or carrier medium and executed by a
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`processor.” Ex. 1006 at 15:21-24; Pet. at 18-21. Patent Owner contends this
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`passage refers only to a few of the immediately preceding paragraphs, and not to
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`the earlier described functionality of Kenoyer. Resp., 26-28. The passage,
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`however, literally refers to the entire disclosure by using the phrase “a subset or all
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`… of the above.” See Ex. 1052, ¶53; Ex. 1006, 15:21-24. Indeed, the same column
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`later notes that “[f]urther modifications and alternative embodiments of various
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`aspects of the invention may be apparent to those skilled in the art in view of this
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`description.” Ex. 1006, 15:55-57. The statement that “further” modifications of
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`aspects of “the invention” confirms that the earlier passage in column 15 refers to
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`the disclosure as a whole, not just to the top of column 15. Patent Owner also
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`contends that a “handle for carrying the videoconferencing system or a fan for
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`cooling its components” could be the disclosed instructions. Resp., 28-29. But the
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`average artisan would know that a “handle” or “fan” would not be implemented in
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`program instructions and Kenoyer’s statement is not fairly interpreted to mean that
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`such ordinary structures would be implemented in computer instructions. Ex. 1052,
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`¶57, Ex. 1050 223:22 – 227:17. 3
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`3 Patent Owner repeats this argument for some dependent claims with
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`“instructions” elements, Resp., 36-37, 39-41, 44, 45, 47 and is wrong with respect
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`to those claims for the same reasons demonstrated here. Kenoyer teaches
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`5
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`Petitioner Microsoft’s Reply
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`D. Kenoyer Discloses Instructions For Encoding And Transmitting
`Kenoyer discloses both using (1) the Internet Protocol (IP) to encode and
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`transmit data and (2) transmitting the encoded audio and video. Ex. 1006, Fig. 5,
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`4:17-27, 8:10-15, 9:27-28, 15:8-20; Ex. 1003, ¶¶246-47. Specifically, Kenoyer’s
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`description of the codec using an IP interface discloses encoding into packets for
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`transmission. Pet., 20-21; Ex. 1006 at Ex. 1006, Fig. 5, 8:10-14, 8:56-9:34, 9:27-
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`28; Ex. 1050, 144:4 – 148:2. And Kenoyer discloses transmitting audio and video,
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`which it previously disclosed as encoded using IP. Pet. at 21; Ex. 1003, ¶246-47;
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`Ex. 1006, 15:11-12. Kenoyer need not disclose both within one paragraph to
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`satisfy the claim, Ex parte Luck, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1875-76, and Petitioner is not
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`solely relying on inherency as Patent Owner suggests.
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`Patent Owner argues that Kenoyer discloses networks that might not use IP
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`(Resp., 31), which is irrelevant because Kenoyer specifically discloses
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`embodiments that use IP rather than these alternate network types. Ex. 1003 ¶246;
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`Ex. 1050, 144:10-20, 145:4-21. Patent Owner also argues that the “IP link [is]
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`connected to a computer system 355, and not to the codec 309” (Resp., 31),
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`ignoring that the IP link can connect the codec directly to a network. Ex. 1006,
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`implementing all codec-related functionality as instructions. See Ex. 1006 at 15:21-
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`24.
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`6
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`Petitioner Microsoft’s Reply
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`8:11-15. Patent Owner further contends that “Kenoyer only discloses that ‘signals
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`may be sent/received through a network connection 351,’ without disclosing which
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`signals are transmitted by IP.” Resp., 31. But Kenoyer teaches processing and
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`sending audio and video signals over the network connection: “the local video and
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`audio may be processed in codec 309 for transmission to a remote conference site,”
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`Ex. 1006, 15:11-14; see also Fig. 22; 5:55-64, 8:10-14, which it elsewhere explains
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`uses IP in some embodiments, Ex. 1006, 8:10-15; Ex. 1003, ¶246.
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`II. Claim 7
`Kenoyer discloses receiving signals transmitted by a remote control. Pet. at 22;
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`Ex. 1003, ¶ 250. Patent Owner, however, contends that Kenoyer does not disclose
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`a “remote control receiver” because Kenoyer could (hypothetically) use something
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`else to receive signals from the remote control. Resp., 32. But under the broadest
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`reasonable interpretation, whatever circuitry receives signals from the remote
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`control would be a “remote control receiver,” i.e., something that receives signals
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`from a remote control. See, e.g., Ex. 1052, ¶66-67. Moreover, Kenoyer discloses a
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`“wireless remote sensor” that works with a “wireless remote,” Ex. 1006, 8:39-42,
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`which is also a “remote control receiver.” See, e.g., Ex. 1052, ¶68.
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`III. Claim 18
`Patent Owner argues that Kenoyer does not disclose a “a high-definition
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`television,” only an “HD display.” Resp., 33. But, claim 18, via parent claim 6,
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`7
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`Petitioner Microsoft’s Reply
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`does not require a HDTV, only an “interface” to a HDTV. Compare Ex. 1001 at
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`32:64-65 and 33:61-62. Patent Owner never explains how the interfaces would
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`differ for an HDTV from those disclosed for the HD display, see, e.g., Resp. at 33,
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`which it admits Kenoyer discloses, Ex. 1050, 50:3-20. Indeed, Patent Owner’s
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`exhibit confirms that a VGA output (like in Kenoyer) is a HDTV interface because
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`it shows HDTVs with VGA inputs (Ex. 2013 at 16) that can receive content from a
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`VGA output like Kenoyer’s. see, e.g., Ex. 1006, 9:9-12; Ex. 1050, 79:2-9; Ex.
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`1052, ¶72-77. And Kenoyer discloses outputting to an HDTV, which requires an
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`HDTV interface. See, e.g., Ex. 1006 at 5:39-40; Ex. 1052, ¶71. As does
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`incorporated by reference Ex. 1014. See, e.g., Ex. 1014, ¶ 0010; Ex. 1052, ¶71.
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`IV. Claim 21
`The Petition demonstrated that Kenoyer discloses a video communication
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`device implemented using a personal computer with a video chat application. Pet.
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`at 26. Patent Owner argues that the computer only encodes and decodes, and thus
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`asserts that Kenoyer is missing the video chat application. Resp., 34. Kenoyer,
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`however, discloses that "[t]he codec functionality (along with other functionality
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`of the MCVCS 300) may be included in the camera base 601 and/or computer
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`system 355.” Pet., 26, quoting Ex. 1006 at 9:59-61 (emphasis added), see, e.g., Ex.
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`1052, ¶81. Kenoyer also discloses that a computer can implement the entire
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`functionality of the codec. See Pet., 26-27 (citing Ex. 1006, 9:59-61, 15:21-24; Ex.
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`8
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`Petitioner Microsoft’s Reply
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`1003, ¶¶ 94, 100, 288-289). Thus, Kenoyer discloses the claimed chat application.
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`V. Claim 23
`Patent Owner argues that Kenoyer does not disclose the “private content
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`delivery network” of claim 23, but Kenoyer discloses transmitting audio/video
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`over a non-public network (Pet., 27-28), which meets the broadest reasonable
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`interpretation of “a private content delivery network.” Pet., 27-28, 6-8. Kenoyer
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`also teaches “a private network for delivering content” in the form of cable
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`networks (Ex. 1006, 4:24), corporate networks (Ex. 1010, 3:27-34)4, and local area
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`networks (Id.), each of which are also “private content delivery network” under the
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`broadest reasonable construction. Ex. 1003, ¶296; see Ex. 1052, ¶¶86-89, _ Patent
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`Owner says that a “private content delivery network” “typically consists of a
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`network of servers with the purpose of delivering content, designed for high-speed
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`4 Exhibit 1006 incorporates Exhibit 1010 by reference. Pet., 13-14 (citing Hariri v.
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`Lee, 656 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In Hariri, “[t]he disclosures of the two
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`applications are hereby incorporate[d] by reference” “unequivocal[ly]”
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`incorporated the references in their entirety. 656 F.3d at 1335. Kenoyer expressly
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`incorporates Ex. 1010 (and others) in their “entirety.” See Ex. 1006, 3:40-61.
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`Patent Owner relies on an older, unpublished district court opinion rather than later
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`Federal Circuit precedent. Resp., 8 (citing SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen, Inc., 2011
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`WL 2066619 at *7 (S.D. Cal May 24, 2011)).
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`9
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`Petitioner Microsoft’s Reply
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`content delivery.” Resp., 37. This definition, however, ignores the claim itself
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`because it would cover a public “network of servers.”
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`VI. Claim 50
`Patent Owner contends that Kenoyer’s disclosed compression standards do not
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`“necessarily include[] the claimed instructions." Resp., 41. But Kenoyer expressly
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`discloses using the H.261, H.263, and H.264 compression standards to process
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`video data, as claimed. See Pet., 34; Ex. 1006, 4:60-64; Ex. 1050, 133:2-1; Ex.
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`1003, ¶¶ 108, 426. And these compression standards “process[]” video data as
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`claimed. Ex. 1050, 135:16-19. Moreover, this processing occurs before the
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`encoding into IP packets. Ex. 1003, ¶ 426; Pet., 34. And Kenoyer discloses
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`implementing “all” of its functionality in program instructions. Ex. 1006, 15:21-24.
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`VII. Claims 52, 53
`For these claims, Patent Owner repeats its arguments for parent claim 6.
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`Because Kenoyer anticipates claim 6, it anticipates these claims as well.
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`VIII. Claim 22
`For claim 22, the Board instituted under Sections 102(e) (Kenoyer) and 103
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`(Kenoyer and the Internet Protocol). Kenoyer discloses transmitting over the
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`Internet (Ex. 1006, 4:33-34) and using the Internet Protocol (IP), which includes
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`packetizing data for transmission over the Internet. Ex. 1015, at 1; Ex. 1003, ¶ 294.
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`Kenoyer also discloses transmitting audio and video data. Ex. 1003, ¶ 246-47; Ex.
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`1006, 15:11-12. These disclosures do not need to be in the same paragraph, as
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`10
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`Petitioner Microsoft’s Reply
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`Patent Owner suggests. Ex parte Luck, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1875-76.
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`Because Kenoyer teaching using IP, combining Kenoyer with Ex. 1015, which
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`defines the Internet Protocol, would have been obvious. The IP protocol discloses
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`packetizing data and transmitting it over the Internet. Ex. 1015, at 1; Ex. 1003, ¶
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`294. Although Patent Owner argues that “Kenoyer also does not disclose that the
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`IP link transmits the audio and video stream” (Resp., 43), Kenoyer discloses both
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`transmitting audio and video and using the IP protocol to transmit data, as
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`explained above. Ex. 1003, ¶¶246-47, 294; Ex. 1006, 15:11-12.
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`IX. Claim 39
`Patent Owner does not dispute that Asmussen (Ex. 1008) discloses the claimed
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`audio mixing. Resp. 44-46. Patent Owner’s arguments about Kenoyer alone (Resp.,
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`46; also 45) are therefore irrelevant because Asmussen adds audio mixing to the
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`combination underlying this ground. See Paper No. 10 at 24-26; Pet. at 39-40. Both
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`Asmussen and Kenoyer disclose displaying conferencing and STB video on the
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`screen simultaneously, allowing the combination where Asmussen adds mixing
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`audio. Ex. 1003 ¶¶369-72; Ex. 1006, 10:28-30; Ex. 1008, 50:44-54, 55:5-59:6.
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`One of skill in the art, if combining video streams as in Kenoyer, would look to
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`other art that also mixes video streams, such as Asmussen, for how to mix the
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`associated audio. Ex. 1003, ¶¶369-72. Moreover, both references are in the same
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`field, in that both describe both video conferencing and STBs and are in the “video
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`11
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`Petitioner Microsoft’s Reply
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`communications” field. See, e.g., Ex. 1003, ¶370; Ex. 1008, 50:44-54, 55:5-59:6;
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`Ex. 1006, 7:59-60.
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`Patent Owner argues that Kenoyer “teaches away” from this combination.
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`Resp. at 45. Kenoyer combines video streams but is silent about the associated
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`audio streams, see, e.g., Ex. 1006, 10:28-30, (as Patent Owner’s expert admits, see
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`Ex. 2006, ¶ 202). Mentioning video but not audio, however, is not teaching away
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`from mixing audio, since a mere failure to mention is not “teaching away”.
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`X. Claims 42, 44, and 45
`Patent Owner argues again that Kenoyer does not incorporate Ex. 1010 by
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`reference, which is refuted above. See supra § V n.1. Patent Owner also tries to
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`differentiate Ex. 1010 alone (Resp., 47) even though the Board did not institute on
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`Ex. 1010 alone, and Patent Owner does not dispute that the combination on which
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`the Board did institute discloses all claim elements.
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`Patent Owner instead argues against combining Kenoyer with Ayoub (Ex.
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`1024), asserting they are not in the same field of endeavor. Resp., 48. Both
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`references, however, relate to, or are at least reasonably pertinent to, the field of
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`video and audio communications, as is the ‘182 patent. Ex. 1024, ¶ 0007, 0048 (“a
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`device of the present disclosure includes broadly any electronic device that
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`provides voice, video or data communication or presentations”); Ex. 1001 at 1:31-
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`33; Ex. 1006 at 1:21-24; Ex. 1003, ¶392. Kenoyer describes audio with video, and
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`12
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`Petitioner Microsoft’s Reply
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`one of skill in the art would look to other sources for how to configure that audio,
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`like Ayoub. Kenoyer (via incorporated Ex. 1011, 3:40-43) also discloses detecting
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`issues with audio playback, which Ayoub does as well. . See Ex. 1003, ¶¶391-92.
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`Patent Owner cites Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314,
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`1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Resp., 49), but that case held that the district court erred by
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`not considering a secondary reference not in the same field of endeavor. Id. at
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`1322. It is incorrect to “assum[e] that a person of ordinary skill attempting to solve
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`a problem will be led only to those elements of prior art designed to solve the same
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`problem.” KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 402 (2007). Kenoyer
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`suggests that a videoconferencing device would want to evaluate its audio
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`playback components, and is properly combined with Ayoub and Yoshino, which
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`teach evaluating audio components.
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`XI. Secondary Indicia
`A.
`Patent Owner Misstates When Petitioner Must Respond to
`Secondary Indicia Arguments
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`The Board has rejected Patent Owner’s argument (Resp., 48) that Petitioner
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`must address secondary indicia in the Petition. See, e.g., Petroleum Geo-Servs. v.
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`Western Geco L.L.C., IPR2014-01475, Paper 18 at 27-28 (PTAB Mar. 17, 2015);
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`Sega of America, Inc., et al. v. Uniloc USA, Inc., et al., IPR2014-01453, Paper 11
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`at 20 (PTAB Mar. 10, 2015). The Board has also stated Omron case cited by Patent
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`Owner does not stand for that proposition. See, e.g., Owens Corning v.
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`13
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`Petitioner Microsoft’s Reply
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`CertainTeed Corp., IPR2014-01403, Paper 10 at 16 (PTAB Mar. 9, 2015).
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`Petitioner may therefore rebut Patent Owner’s secondary considerations
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`arguments. See, e.g., Owens Corning, IPR2014-01403, paper 10 at 16; Chums,
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`Inc., IPR2014-01240, paper 10 at 7-8.
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`B.
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`Patent Owner Fails To Show Any Nexus Between the Claims and
`Petitioner’s Xbox One Product
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`The Board instituted on claims 22, 39, 42, 44, and 45 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
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`Patent Owner makes no attempt to show that Xbox One (X1) falls within claims
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`22, 39, 44, and 45 and thereby fails to show any nexus between X1 and these
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`claims. And for claim 42, Patent Owner fails to show the elements of parent claim
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`6 in X1, instead just baldly stating that X1 has the “instructions for” elements.
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`Resp., 54. Patent Owner also does not show that X1 practices claim 42’s other
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`parent, claim 41. Resp., 54-55. Patent Owner cannot show the nexus necessary to
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`show copying or commercial success for claim 42.
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`Patent Owner’s Commercial Success Argument Fails
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`C.
`Patent Owner’s commercial success contention also fails because it provides no
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`evidence comparing X1 sales to its overall market. In re Applied Materials, Inc.,
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`692 F.3d 1289, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012). And Even if Patent Owner had shown that
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`claims 22, 39, 42, 44, and 45 cover X1, it must still show that these claims’
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`allegedly novel elements are responsible for X1’s commercial success. See,
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`Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F. 2d 1387, 1392 (Fed.
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`14
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`Petitioner Microsoft’s Reply
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`Cir. 1988). And “the asserted commercial success of the product must be due to the
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`merits of the claimed invention beyond what was readily available in the prior art.”
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`J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atlantic Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir.
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`1997). Patent Owner identifies no evidence that X1’s commercial success relates to
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`any features allegedly corresponding to claim 42. Nor does it do so for claims 22,
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`39, 44, and 45, which it never even tries to show cover X1.
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`Patent Owner’s Copying Argument Fails
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`D.
`Patent Owner identifies no nexus between the alleged copying and the
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`allegedly novel elements in claims 22, 39, 42, 44, and 45. MotivePower, Inc. v.
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`Cutsforth, Inc., IPR2013-00274, paper 31 at 30 (PTAB Oct. 30, 2014). Patent
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`Owner fails to identify what functionality Petitioner allegedly copied, much less
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`demonstrate any nexus to the allegedly novel elements of claims 22, 39, 42, 44,
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`and 45. See id. Even more importantly, Patent Owner never shows that its
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`commercial products contains any novel elements of claims 22, 39, 42, 44, and 45
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`(or any other claim). See Resp., 57-58. As such, there is no evidence that Petitioner
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`copied any patented functionality of Patent Owner’s product.
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`Dated: August 19, 2015
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`Respectfully Submitted,
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`Joseph Micallef/
`Joseph Micallef
`Registration No. 39,772
`Sidley Austin LLP
`1501 K Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
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`15
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`Petitioner Microsoft’s Reply
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`PETITIONER MICROSOFT’S REPLY
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`Attachment A:
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`Proof of Service of the Reply
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`16
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`Petitioner Microsoft’s Reply
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that on this 19th day of August 2015, a copy of this Reply,
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`including all attachments, appendices and exhibits, has been served in its entirety
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`by E-mail on the following counsel of record for patent owner:
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`Amanda Hollis
`Kirkland & Ellis LLP
`300 North LaSalle
`Chicago, IL 60654
`amanda.hollis@kirkland.com
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`Adam Alper
`Kirkland & Ellis LLP
`555 California Street
`San Francisco, CA 94104
`adam.alper@kirkland.com
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`Michael W. De Vries
`Kirkland & Ellis LLP
`333 South Hope Street
`Los Angeles, CA 90071
`michael.devries@kirkland.com
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`Dated:
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`August 19, 2015
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`17
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/Joseph Micallef/
`Joseph Micallef
`Registration No. 39,772
`Attorney for Petitioner
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