Paper 30
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`Entered: March 10, 2016
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`Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`PAICE LLC & THE ABELL FOUNDATION, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2014-01415
`Patent 8,214,097 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`Before SALLY C. MEDLEY, KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, and
`CARL M. DEFRANCO, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`DEFRANCO, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
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`

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`IPR2014-01415
`Patent 8,214,097 B2
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`
`I. INTRODUCTION
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`
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`Paice LLC & The Abell Foundation, Inc. (collectively, “Paice”) are
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`the owners of U.S. Patent No. 8,214,097 B2 (“the ’097 patent”). Ford Motor
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`Company (“Ford”) filed a Petition (Paper 3, “Pet.”) for inter partes review
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`of the ’097 patent, challenging the patentability of claims 1–6, 8–16, 18–26,
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`28–30, and 34 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. In a preliminary proceeding, we
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`instituted trial because Ford demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it
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`would prevail in proving unpatentability of the challenged claims. Once
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`trial was instituted, Paice filed a Patent Owner Response (Paper 21, “PO
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`Resp.”), and Ford followed with a Reply (Paper 25, “Reply”). The parties
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`waived oral argument here, choosing instead to rely on arguments presented
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`during a prior, consolidated hearing conducted in several related
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`proceedings, namely, IPR2014-00570, -571, -579, -875, -884, and -904.1
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`Pursuant to our jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(c), we conclude that Ford
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`has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged claims
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`are unpatentable.
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`A.
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`Related Cases
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`II. BACKGROUND
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`
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`The instant Petition challenges a claim of the ’097 patent that was
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`adjudicated previously in IPR2014-00570 (“the -570 proceeding”), only on
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`different grounds. Specifically, that prior proceeding led to final written
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`decision that claim 30 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103, along with
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`other claims of the ’097 patent. 2015 WL 5782083 (PTAB Sept. 28, 2015).
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`We granted institution of trial in the instant proceeding in March 2015, well
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`before our final written decision in the -570 proceeding.
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`
`1 Transcripts have been entered into the record in those earlier proceedings.
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`2
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`IPR2014-01415
`Patent 8,214,097 B2
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`
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`The ’097 patent is also the subject of co-pending district court actions,
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`including Paice, LLC v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:14-cv-00492 (D. Md.), filed
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`Feb. 19, 2014, and Paice LLC v. Hyundai Motor Co., No. 1:12-cv-00499
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`(D. Md.), filed Feb. 16, 2012. Pet. 1; PO Resp. 4 (referencing the district
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`courts’ claim constructions).
`
`B.
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`The ’097 Patent
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`
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`The ’097 patent describes a hybrid vehicle with an internal
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`combustion engine, an electric motor, and a battery bank, all controlled by a
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`microprocessor that controls the direction of torque transfer between the
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`engine, the motor, and the drive wheels of the vehicle. Ex. 1101, 16:61–
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`17:5, Fig. 4. The microprocessor monitors the vehicle’s instantaneous
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`torque requirements, also known as “road load (RL),” to determine whether
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`the engine, the electric motor, or both, will be used to propel the vehicle. Id.
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`at 11:50–52. Aptly, the ’097 patent describes the vehicle’s various modes of
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`operation in terms of an engine-only mode, an all-electric mode, or a hybrid
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`mode. Id. at 35:14–36:4, 36:39–37:22.
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`
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`As summarized in the ’097 patent, the microprocessor selects the
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`appropriate mode of operation “in response to evaluation of the road load,
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`that is, the vehicle’s instantaneous torque demands and input commands
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`provided by the operator of the vehicle.”2 Id. at 17:16–21. “[T]he
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`microprocessor can effectively determine the road load by monitoring the
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`response of the vehicle to the operator’s command for more power.” Id. at
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`36:57–64. “[T]he torque required to propel the vehicle [i.e., road load]
`
`
`2 The ’097 patent contrasts the claimed invention to prior control strategies
`“based solely on speed,” which are “incapable of responding to the
`operator’s commands, and will ultimately be unsatisfactory.” Ex. 1101,
`13:24–28.
`
`3
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`IPR2014-01415
`Patent 8,214,097 B2
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`varies as indicated by the operator’s commands.” Id. at 37:23–25. For
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`example, the microprocessor “monitors the rate at which the operator
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`depresses pedals [for acceleration and braking] as well as the degree to
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`which [the pedals] are depressed.” Id. at 26:59–27:4. These operator input
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`commands are provided to the microprocessor “as an indication that an
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`amount of torque” from the engine “will shortly be required.” Id. at 27:6–
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`22.
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`The microprocessor then compares the vehicle’s torque requirements
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`against a predefined “setpoint (SP)” and uses the results of the comparison
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`to determine the vehicle’s mode of operation. Id. at 36:39–37:21, 39:27–59.
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`The microprocessor utilizes a hybrid control strategy that runs the engine
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`only in a range of high fuel efficiency, such as when the torque required to
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`drive the vehicle, or road load (RL), reaches a setpoint (SP) of
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`approximately 30% of the engine’s maximum torque output (MTO). Id. at
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`20:37–45, 36:39–59; see also id. at 13:48–50 (“the engine is never operated
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`at less than 30% of MTO, and is thus never operated inefficiently”).
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`The microprocessor also limits the rate of increase of the engine’s
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`torque output so that combustion of fuel occurs at a substantially
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`stoichiometric air-fuel ratio and utilizes the electric motor to meet any
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`shortfall in torque required to operate the vehicle in response to the
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`operator’s command. See, e.g., id. at 27:31–35, 29:63–30:12, 37:2–6,
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`38:62–39:14. Other operating parameters may also play a role in the
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`microprocessor’s choice of the vehicle’s mode of operation, such as the
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`battery’s state of charge and the operator’s driving history over time. Id. at
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`19:40–47; see also id. at 36:34–38 (“according to one aspect of the
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`invention, the microprocessor 48 controls the vehicle’s mode of operation at
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`4
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`any given time in dependence on ‘recent history,’ as well as on the
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`instantaneous road load and battery charge state”). According to the ’097
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`patent, this microprocessor control strategy maximizes fuel efficiency and
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`reduces pollutant emissions of the hybrid vehicle. Id. at 15:38–41.
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`
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`C.
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`The Challenged Claims
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`
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`Of the challenged claims, claims 1, 11, 21, and 30 are independent.
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`Claim 1 is illustrative:
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`A method for controlling a hybrid vehicle, said
`1.
`vehicle comprising a battery, a controller, wheels, an internal
`combustion engine and at least one electric motor, wherein both
`the internal combustion engine and motor are capable of
`providing torque to the wheels of said vehicle, and wherein said
`engine has an inherent maximum rate of increase of output
`torque, said method comprising the steps of:
`
`
`
`operating the internal combustion engine of the hybrid
`vehicle to provide torque to operate the vehicle;
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`
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`operating said at least one electric motor to provide
`additional torque when the amount of torque provided by said
`engine is less than the amount of torque required to operate the
`vehicle; and
`
`
`
`employing said controller to control the engine such that
`a rate of increase of output torque of the engine is limited to
`less than said inherent maximum rate of increase of output
`torque, and wherein said step of controlling the engine such that
`the rate of increase of output torque of the engine is limited is
`performed such that combustion of fuel within the engine
`occurs at a substantially stoichiometric ratio; and comprising
`the further steps of:
`
`
`
`operating said internal combustion engine to provide
`torque to the hybrid vehicle when the torque required to operate
`the hybrid vehicle is between a setpoint SP and a maximum
`torque output (MTO) of the engine, wherein the engine is
`operable to efficiently produce torque above SP, and wherein
`SP is substantially less than MTO;
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`5
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`operating both the at least one electric motor and the
`engine to provide torque to the hybrid vehicle when the torque
`required to operate the hybrid vehicle is more than MTO; and
`
`
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`operating the at least one electric motor to provide torque
`to the hybrid vehicle when the torque required to operate the
`hybrid vehicle is less than SP.
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`
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`Ex. 1101, 56:47–57:14.
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`D.
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`The Instituted Grounds
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`
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`In the preliminary proceeding, we instituted trial because Ford made a
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`threshold showing of a “reasonable likelihood” that:
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`(1) claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 8–12, 15, 16, 18–22, 25, 26, 28, and
`29 were unpatentable as obvious over Severinsky3 and
`Anderson4;
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`
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`(2) claims 3, 13, and 23 were unpatentable as obvious
`over Severinsky, Anderson, and Yamaguchi5;
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`
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`(3) claims 4, 14, and 24 were unpatentable as obvious
`over Severinsky, Anderson, Yamaguchi, and Takaoka6; and
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`
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`(4) claims 30 and 34 were unpatentable as obvious over
`Severinsky and Takaoka.
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`
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`Dec. to Inst. 11–12. We now decide whether Ford has proven the
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`unpatentability of these same claims by a “preponderance of the evidence.”
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`35 U.S.C. § 316(e).
`
`
`3 U.S. Patent No. 5,343,970, iss. Sept. 6, 1994 (Ex. 1104, “Severinsky”).
`4 C. Anderson & E. Pettit, The Effects of APU Characteristics on
`the Design of Hybrid Control Strategies for Hybrid Electric Vehicles, SAE
`TECHNICAL PAPER 950493 (1995) (Ex. 1105, “Anderson”).
`5 U.S. Patent No. 5,865,263, iss. Feb. 2, 1999 (Ex. 1106, “Yamaguchi”).
`6 T. Takaoka et al., A High-Expansion Ratio Gasoline Engine for the Toyota
`Hybrid System, TOYOTA TECHNICAL REVIEW, vol. 47, no. 2 (Apr. 1998) (Ex.
`1107, “Takaoka”).
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`6
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`Patent 8,214,097 B2
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`A.
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`Claim Construction
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`III. ANALYSIS
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`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are given
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`their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the
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`patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Ford proposes a
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`construction for three claim terms, namely, “rate of change,” “setpoint,” and
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`“road load.” Pet. 13–19. Paice takes issue with Ford’s proposed
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`construction of “setpoint,” and is silent on the other two terms. PO Resp. 3–
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`7. We address all three terms, beginning with the parties’ dispute over the
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`meaning of “setpoint.”
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`1.
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`“Setpoint” or “SP”
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`
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`The term “setpoint” or “SP” is found in independent claims 1, 11, and
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`21, as well as dependent claims 8, 18, and 34. Ford proposes that “setpoint”
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`be construed, in the context of the claims, as a “predetermined torque value.”
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`Pet. 15, 17. In that regard, Ford correctly notes that the claims compare the
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`setpoint against a torque value. Id. at 15–16. For example, claims 1 and 11
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`speak of “setpoint” or “SP” as being the lower limit at which the engine can
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`produce torque efficiently, i.e., “when the torque required to operate the
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`hybrid vehicle is between a setpoint (SP) and a maximum torque output
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`(MTO) of the engine, wherein the engine is operable to efficiently produce
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`torque above SP.”7 Ex. 1101, 57:1–6, 58:11–16 (emphases added). Claim
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`21 similarly compares the setpoint “SP” against the torque required to propel
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`the vehicle “RL.” Id. at 59:7–11. These express recitations suggest that
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`7 Paice’s declarant, Mr. Neil Hannemann, similarly testified that under the
`“most straightforward” approach for the claimed “comparison,” the “setpoint
`is a torque value.” Ex. 1132, 79:16–80:25.
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`7
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`“setpoint” is not just any value, but a value that—per the surrounding claim
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`language—equates to a measure of “torque.” See Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
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`415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[T]he claims themselves
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`provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular claim terms . . .
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`[T]he context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can be highly
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`instructive”).
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`
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`Paice, on the other hand, argues that “setpoint” is synonymous with a
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`“transition” point, not a torque value. PO Resp. 4–7. Citing the
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`specification, Paice urges that “setpoint” must be construed to indicate a
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`point “at which a transition between operating modes may occur.” Id. at 4,
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`7. Paice’s argument is misplaced. Although Paice is correct that sometimes
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`the specification describes the setpoint in terms of a “transition point” (see
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`id. at 5), the claim language itself makes clear that setpoint relates simply to
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`a torque value, without requiring that it be a transition point. Indeed, the
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`specification acknowledges that the mode of operation does not always
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`transition, or switch, at the setpoint, but instead depends on a number of
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`parameters. For instance,
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`the values of the sensed parameters in response to which the
`operating mode is selected may vary . . . , so that the operating
`mode is not repetitively switched simply because one of the
`sensed parameters fluctuates around a defined setpoint.
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`
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`Ex. 1101, 19:45–51 (emphasis added). That disclosure suggests that a
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`transition does not spring simply from the recitation of “setpoint.” Thus, we
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`will not import into the meaning of “setpoint” an extraneous limitation that
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`is supported by neither the claim language nor the specification. As such,
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`we reject Paice’s attempt to further limit the meaning of setpoint to a
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`transition between operating modes.
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`We also regard as meaningful that nothing in the specification
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`precludes a setpoint from being reset, after it has been set. The specification
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`states that the value of a setpoint may be “reset . . . in response to a repetitive
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`driving pattern.” Ex. 1101, 39:60–63. But, just because a setpoint may be
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`reset under certain circumstances does not foreclose it from being “set,” or
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`“fixed,” at some point in time.8 A setpoint for however short a period of
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`time is still a setpoint. Thus, we construe “setpoint” as a “predetermined
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`torque value that may or may not be reset.”
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`
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`Finally, Paice argues that any construction limiting the meaning of
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`setpoint to a “torque value” is inconsistent with the construction adopted by
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`two district courts in related litigation.9 PO Resp. 4. Although, generally,
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`we construe claim terms under a different standard than a district court, and
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`thus, are not bound by a district court’s prior construction, Paice’s emphasis
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`on the district court’s construction compels us to address it. See Power
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`Integrations, Inc. v. Lee, 797 F.3d 1318, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Given that
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`[patent owner’s] principal argument to the board . . . was expressly tied to
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`the district court’s claim construction, we think that the board had an
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`obligation, in these circumstances, to evaluate that construction”).
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`
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`In that regard, the district court held:
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`there is nothing in the claims or specification that indicate a
`given setpoint value is actually represented in terms of torque.
`
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`8 The definition of “set” is “determined . . . premeditated . . . fixed . . .
`prescribed, specified . . . built-in . . . settled.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
`Dictionary (10th ed. 2000). Ex. 3001.
`9 Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:07-cv-00180, 2008 WL 6822398
`(E.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2008); Paice LLC v. Hyundai Motor Co., No. 1:12-cv-
`00499, 2014 WL 3725652 (D. Md. July 24, 2014).
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`In fact, the specification clearly indicates that the state of
`charge of the battery bank, ‘expressed as a percentage of its full
`charge’ is compared against setpoints, the result of the
`comparison being used to control the mode of the vehicle.
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`
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`Ex. 1120, 13 (discussing “setpoint” in the context of related U.S. Patent No.
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`7,104,347 B2). But, as discussed above, although claims are read in light of
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`the specification, it is the use of the term “setpoint” within the context of the
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`claims themselves that provides a firm basis for our construction. See
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`Phillips, supra. Here, the claims instruct us that “setpoint,” when read in the
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`context of the surrounding language, is limited to a torque value. Thus, we
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`construe “setpoint” as representing a torque-based value.
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`2.
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`“Road load” or “RL”
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`
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`The term “road load” or “RL” appears in independent claim 21, as
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`well as dependent claims 8, 18, and 26. Both Ford and Paice appear to agree
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`that “road load” means the instantaneous torque required to propel the
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`vehicle. Pet. 18–19; PO Resp. 22, 29–30. That proposed construction
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`comports with the specification, which defines “road load” as “the vehicle’s
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`instantaneous torque demands, i.e., that amount of torque required to propel
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`the vehicle at a desired speed.” Ex. 1101, 12:28–32.
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`
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`In further defining “road load,” the specification notes that:
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`the operator’s depressing the accelerator pedal signifies an
`increase in desired speed, i.e., an increase in road load, while
`reducing the pressure on the accelerator or depressing the brake
`pedal signifies a desired reduction in vehicle speed, indicating
`that the torque being supplied is to be reduced or should be
`negative.
`
`
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`Id. at 12:35–41 (emphases added). As such, the specification states that road
`
`load “can be positive or negative.” Id. at 12:41–47. Thus, consistent with
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`the specification, we construe “road load” or “RL” as “the amount of
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`instantaneous torque required to propel the vehicle, be it positive or
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`negative.”
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`3.
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`“Rate of Change”
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`Finally, Ford asks that the term “rate of change,” found in claims 21
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`and 30, be construed to mean “rate of increase” because that construction is
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`consistent with an amendment that was requested during prosecution of the
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`’097 patent, but “mistakenly failed” to get entered, even though the
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`amendment was entered with respect to other occurrences of the “rate of
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`change” term found elsewhere in the claims. Pet. 13–14 (citing Ex. 1103,
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`234). Without that construction, Ford argues, the term “rate of change” in
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`claims 21 and 30 is left with “no antecedent basis.” Id. at 14. Paice does not
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`oppose Ford’s proposed construction, and we see merit in reconciling the
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`“rate of change” term with applicant’s clear intention that it be “rate of
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`increase,” as evidenced by the prosecution history. Ex. 1103, 234. Thus, we
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`conclude that the term “rate of change” is properly construed to mean “rate
`
`of increase.”
`
`Ground 1—Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 8–12, 15, 16, 18–22, 25, 26, 28, and
`29—Obviousness over Severinsky and Anderson
`
`Ford relies on Severinsky and Anderson as together teaching the
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`B.
`
`
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`limitations of independent claims 1, 11, and 21, and dependent claims 2, 5,
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`6, and 8–10, 12, 15, 16, 18–20, 22, 25, 26, 28, and 29. Pet. 20–44. Ford
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`also advances a reason why a skilled artisan would have combined their
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`teachings to arrive at the claimed invention. Id. at 44–45. Specifically, like
`
`the claimed invention, Severinsky discloses the essential components of a
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`hybrid electric vehicle, including an internal combustion engine, an electric
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`motor, a battery, and a microprocessor for controlling operation of the
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`11
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`engine and motor.10 Compare Ex. 1104, Fig. 3 (Severinsky) with Ex. 1101,
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`Fig. 4 (the ’097 patent). Also, Severinsky teaches that “stoichiometric
`
`combustion” is important “[t]o lower the toxic hydrocarbon and carbon
`
`monoxide emissions” of the engine. Ex. 1104, 12:13–17.
`
`
`
`Acknowledging that Severinsky does not disclose achieving
`
`stoichiometric combustion by limiting the “rate of increase,” or “rate of
`
`change,” of the engine’s output torque, as required by independent claims 1,
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`11, and 21, Ford relies on Anderson as teaching this limitation. Pet. 22–23
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`(citing Ex. 1105, 7). Notably, Anderson discloses a hybrid control strategy
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`that “maintains the stoichiometric air fuel ratio” of the engine by limiting
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`“engine starts and transients,” and more specifically, by performing “slow
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`transients” so the “speed of the transient” is not “too fast.”11 Ex. 1105, 7.
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`The benefit of this strategy, according to Anderson, is that “[hydrocarbon
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`and carbon monoxide] emissions are minimized.” Id. In combining
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`Severinsky and Anderson, Ford submits that supplementing Severinsky’s
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`engine control strategy with Anderson’s “slow transients” strategy would
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`have been obvious to a skilled artisan because both references correlate
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`“stoichiometric” combustion with minimizing carbon emissions. Pet. 44
`
`(citing Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 546–550). We agree.
`
`
`10 Ford’s declarant, Dr. Jeffrey L. Stein, whose testimony we credit,
`confirms the teachings of Severinsky with respect to the basic elements and
`functions recited by claims 1, 11, and 21, i.e., the engine, motor, battery, and
`controller. Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 128–134, 266–272, 400–406.
`11 The term “transients” is used to describe relatively short-term events
`between steady-state conditions. The engine “transients” disclosed in
`Anderson refer to the relatively rapid changes in the output torque of the
`engine due to a change in the amount of torque requested. The speed of the
`transient refers to its rate of increase over time. Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 81–83, 152.
`
`12
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`Paice, in turn, argues several points in response to Ford’s reliance on
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`the combination of Severinsky and Anderson: first, the references fail to
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`teach or suggest the claimed “controller” and its associated functional
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`limitations; and, second, the references cannot be combined because
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`Severinsky’s “parallel” hybrid control strategy “teaches away” from
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`Anderson’s “series” hybrid control strategy. PO Resp. 2, 12–32, 37–47. We
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`are not persuaded by Paice’s arguments.
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`
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`
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`1.
`
`The Claimed “Controller”
`
`Paice starts out by arguing that Ford has failed to prove that the
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`combination of Severinsky and Anderson discloses or suggests a controller
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`“responsive to an operator command.” PO Resp. 15, 17, 18. This argument
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`fails for the simple reason that none of claims 1, 11, and 21 requires that the
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`controller be responsive to an operator command; instead, this limitation is
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`found in claim 30, which is part of a different ground.
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`In any event, Severinsky discloses a controller in much the same way
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`as the challenged claims, stating that “microprocessor 48 controls the flow
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`of torque between the motor 20, the engine 40, and the wheels 34 responsive
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`to the mode of operation of the vehicle.” Ex. 1104, 10:27–30. Likewise,
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`Severinsky discloses that “microprocessor 48 is provided with all
`
`information relevant to the performance of the system, and appropriately
`
`controls torque transfer unit 28, internal combustion engine 40, switching
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`unit 28, and electric motor 20 to ensure that appropriate torque is delivered
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`to the wheels 34 of the vehicle.” Id. at 12:64–13:2. And, although not
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`required by claims 1, 11, and 21, Severinsky further discloses that
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`“microprocessor 48 . . . responds to operator commands received over
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`control line 68.” Id. at 12:60–64; see also id., Fig. 3 (depicting input of
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`“Operator Commands” to “µP Controller 48”). Based on these explicit
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`disclosures, we find that Severinsky teaches the “controller” limitation of the
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`challenged claims. See Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 138–148.
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`2.
`
`Operating the Electric Motor “To Provide Additional Torque”
`When the Engine’s Torque is Inefficient or Insufficient
`
`Paice next argues that the combination of Severinsky and Anderson
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`does not teach “a controller that supplements engine torque with motor
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`torque.” PO Resp. 15. According to Paice, “[t]here is no disclosure in
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`Severinsky that the electric motor is used to provide additional torque to
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`propel the vehicle when the rate of increase of engine output torque is
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`limited or when the engine is operating below its capabilities.” Id. at 17
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`(emphasis added). We disagree.
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`As required by claims 1, 11, and 21, the controller activates the
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`electric motor “to provide additional torque” when the torque required to
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`propel the vehicle exceeds the amount of torque provided by the engine. Put
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`simply, the electric motor helps the engine drive the vehicle when the engine
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`cannot do it alone. Severinsky teaches this limitation, expressly recognizing
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`that the “[m]icroprocessor 48 monitors the operator’s inputs and the
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`vehicle’s performance, and activates electric motor 20 when torque in
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`excess of the capabilities of engine 40 is required.” Ex. 1104, 14:15–18
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`(emphasis added). For example, “[t]he electric motor . . . is used to supply
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`additional power as needed for acceleration and hill climbing, and is used to
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`supply all power at low speeds, where the internal combustion engine is
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`particularly inefficient, e.g., in traffic.” Id. at 9:52–57 (emphasis added); see
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`also id. at 10:36–38 (“[i]f the vehicle then starts to climb a hill, the motor 20
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`is used to supplement the output torque of engine 40”). Likewise,
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`Severinsky specifies “a highspeed acceleration and/or hill climbing mode,
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`wherein both internal combustion engine 40 and electric motor 20 provide
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`torque to road wheels 34.” Id. at 14:22–25 (emphasis added). Those
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`express disclosures by Severinsky are no different than what the claims
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`require—that the controller activate the motor “to provide additional torque”
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`when the torque provided by the engine is insufficient to drive the vehicle.
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`See Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 143–147, 424–430. We find that Severinsky’s teaching of
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`supplementing the torque of the engine with that of the motor meets squarely
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`the functional limitation of the electric motor recited by challenged claims 1,
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`11, and 21.
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`3.
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`Limiting the “Rate of Increase” of the Engine’s Output Torque
`To Achieve “Substantially Stoichiometric” Combustion
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`Ford relies on the combination of Severinsky and Anderson for
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`teaching that the controller limits the “rate of increase” of the engine’s
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`output torque so that fuel combustion “occurs at a substantially
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`stoichiometric ratio,” as required by claims 1, 11, and 21. Pet. 22–24; see
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`also Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 148–161. To begin, Severinsky teaches that the
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`“microprocessor controller 48 controls the rate of supply of fuel to engine
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`40.” Ex. 1104, 10:4–6. According to Ford’s declarant, Dr. Stein, that
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`teaching by Severinsky is “one way the microprocessor 48 limits the rate of
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`increase of output torque of the engine 40.” Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 149–150; Ex. 1129
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`¶¶ 41–42.
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`With that foundation in mind, Ford proffers Anderson as teaching an
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`additional hybrid control strategy—one that actively limits the rate of
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`increase of the engine’s output torque “by only allowing slow engine
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`transients,” with the objective of optimizing fuel economy and reducing
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`harmful emissions. Pet. 23, 44–45 (emphasis added). Ford then surmises
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`that supplementing Severinsky’s microprocessor strategy, which already
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`limits the rate of increase of the engine’s output torque by controlling the
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`rate of fuel supply to the engine, with Anderson’s “slow transients” strategy,
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`would have been obvious to a skilled artisan because both references are
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`concerned with hybrid control strategies for improving fuel economy and
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`reducing harmful emissions. Id. at 44–45 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 541–550). We
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`find Ford’s argument persuasive.
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`Anderson is clearly focused on a hybrid control strategy that slows
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`engine transients in an effort to reduce the carbon emissions associated with
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`engine combustion. For instance, in describing an optimum hybrid control
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`strategy for the engine (or “APU”), Anderson explains that “slower
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`transients are desirable for reducing emissions” because:
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`[t]ransients present an emissions problem that is largely
`related to the speed of the transient. . . . If the transient is too
`fast, the engine may run rich, increasing CO and HC emissions,
`or lean, increasing NOx emissions. Some of this effect can be
`reduced using a hybrid strategy that only allows slow
`transients, but this places greater strain on the LLD [battery].12
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`12 We do not find persuasive Paice’s argument that Anderson’s recognition
`of certain tradeoffs (such as strain on the battery) would have discouraged a
`skilled artisan from using her “slow transients” control strategy. See PO
`Resp. 19. Recognizing that her “slow transients” strategy comes with
`certain tradeoffs, Anderson emphasizes that “the design of an optimum
`control strategy for that [hybrid] system should be concurrent to allow
`tradeoffs to be made while the designs are still fluid. An efficient
`optimization process must involve all aspects of the system . . . from the
`beginning.” Ex. 1105, 3. And, she later recognizes that “[t]he APU control
`strategy must be robust,” despite “[t]radeoffs . . . made between engine
`complexity, cost, fuel efficiency, and battery lifetime.” Id. at 7. Thus, while
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`Ex. 1105, 7 (emphasis added). That disclosure of slower engine transients
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`suggests limiting the rate of increase of the engine’s output torque. Ex. 1102
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`¶ 153. Importantly, Ford’s declarant, Dr. Stein, testifies that a skilled artisan
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`“would know that slowing engine transients means slowing the rate of
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`increase of engine output torque to something less than the [engine’s]
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`maximum rate of increase.” Ex. 1102 ¶ 666; see also id. ¶ 154. Thus, we
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`find that Anderson’s “slow transients” strategy would have suggested to a
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`skilled artisan a hybrid control strategy that limits the engine’s output torque
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`“to less than [its] inherent maximum rate of increase of output torque,” as
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`required by claims 1, 11, and 21. Ex. 1129 ¶¶ 32, 33, 43–45.
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`With respect to limiting the engine’s output torque to achieve
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`combustion at “a substantially stoichiometric ratio,” Anderson explains that
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`engine transients make it “difficult” to maintain a “stoichiometric air fuel
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`ratio”—the ratio at which complete combustion occurs. Ex. 1105, 7. On
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`that point, Anderson elaborates as follows:
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`Frequently, one of the principle aims of a hybrid vehicle is to
`reduce vehicle emissions to ULEV (Ultra Low Emission
`Vehicle) levels. Consequently, APU [engine] emissions are
`very important for system success. In general, emissions are
`minimized when a stoichiometric air to fuel ratio is maintained
`by a closed loop feedback system (using an oxygen sensor for
`feedback). In some operating regimes, such as engine starts
`and transients, the stoichiometric ratio is very difficult to
`maintain resulting in an increase in emissions.
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`Id. (emphases added).
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`Anderson recognizes certain tradeoffs in the design process, nowhere does
`she discourage the use of “slow transients” in her hybrid control strategy.
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`As a result, to resolve this difficulty, Anderson’s control strategy
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`“maintains the stoichiometric air fuel ratio” by purposefully slowing “the
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`speed of the transient” so it is not “too fast.” Id. Ford’s declarant, Dr. Stein,
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`confirms as much, testifying that Anderson’s disclosure of slower engine
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`transients (i.e., limiting a rate of increase of the engine’s output torque)
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`“helps the vehicle’s closed loop feedback system maintain operation near the
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`stoichiometric air/fuel ratio, thereby reducing emissions.” Ex. 1102 ¶ 161.
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`Dr. Stein further testifies that “the slower engine transients provide more
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`time for the closed loop feedback system to react to sensed oxygen levels
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`and adjust the fuel rate so that stoichiometric combustion can occur.” Id.
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`Paice responds that Anderson’s disclosure of “slow transients” is
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`linked to “engine speed, not engine torque.” Ex. 2102 ¶ 129. But Paice fails
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`to account for Anderson’s description of the engine’s “transient capabilities”
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`i