`571-272-7822
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`Paper 7
`Entered: February 9, 2015
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`LG ELECTRONICS, INC.,
`LG ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC., and
`LG ELECTRONICS MOBILECOMM U.S.A., INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`CYPRESS SEMICONDUCTOR CORP.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2014-01405
`Patent 6,493,770 B1
`
`
`
`Before SALLY C. MEDLEY, DONNA M. PRAISS, and
`PATRICK M. BOUCHER, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`PRAISS, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
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`
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`IPR2014-01405
`Patent 6,493,770 B1
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`LG Electronics, Inc., LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc., and LG Electronics
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`Mobilecomm U.S.A., Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) to
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`institute an inter partes review of claims 1–3, 5, 7, 10–13, and 15–20 of U.S.
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`Patent No. 6,493,770 B1 (“the ’770 patent”) pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-
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`319. A Preliminary Response (Paper 6, “Prelim. Resp.”) was filed by
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`Cypress Semiconductor Corporation (“Patent Owner”). We have
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`jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314. For the reasons that follow, we
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`authorize institution of an inter partes review.
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`
`
`I.
`
`BACKGROUND
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`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an
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`inter partes review may be authorized only if “the information presented in
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`the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a
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`reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least
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`1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
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`Petitioner challenges claims 1–3, 5, 7, 10–13, 15–20 of the ’770
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`patent under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) and claims 18–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).
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`Pet. 3–4. We institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–3, 5, 7, 10–13,
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`and 15–20 as discussed below.
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`Related Proceedings
`A.
`The ’770 patent was asserted in a complaint filed in the U.S. District
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`Court for the Northern District of California in Cypress Semiconductor,
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`Corp. v. LG Electronics, Inc., No. 4:13-cv-04034. Id. at 2. U.S. Patents
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`6,012,103 and 6,249,825 B1, which are related to the ’770 patent through
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`continuation applications, are also asserted in the litigation and are the
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`2
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`IPR2014-01405
`Patent 6,493,770 B1
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`subject of concurrently-filed inter partes review proceedings IPR2014-
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`01386 and IPR2014-01396, respectively. Id.
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`
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`B.
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`The ’770 patent (Ex. 1001)
`
`The ’770 patent, titled “System for Reconfiguring a Peripheral Device
`
`by Downloading Information from a Host and Electronically Simulating a
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`Physical Disconnection and Reconnection to Reconfigure the Device,” is
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`directed to a system and method for reconfiguring, from a first configuration
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`to a second manufacturer specific configuration through an electronic reset,
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`a peripheral device connected by a computer bus and port to a host
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`computer. Ex. 1001, Abstr. A peripheral interface device for a standardized
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`computer peripheral device bus and port emulates a physical disconnection
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`and reconnection of the peripheral device. Id. Reconfiguring the peripheral
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`device without physically disconnecting it is solved by a switch connected to
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`a data line in the peripheral device. Id. at 6:59–7:6, 7:12–22. The switch
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`changes the voltage state of the data lines, which the host computer monitors
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`and uses to detect the connection of a peripheral device. Id. at 6:27–43.
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`C.
`Illustrative Claims
`Independent claims 1, 11, and 18 are illustrative of the claims at issue:
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`1. A system for reconfiguring a peripheral device having
`a first configuration connected by a computer bus to a host
`computer, the system comprising:
`
`a first circuit configured to download information for a
`second configuration from the host computer into the peripheral
`device over the computer bus; and
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`a second circuit configured to electronically simulate a
`physical disconnection and reconnection of the peripheral
`device to reconfigure the peripheral device to said
`
`
`
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`3
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`IPR2014-01405
`Patent 6,493,770 B1
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`second configuration while supplying electrical power to
`said peripheral device.
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`11. A method for reconfiguring a peripheral device
`having a first configuration connected by a computer bus to a
`host computer, the method comprising the steps of:
`
`(A) downloading information for a second configuration
`from the host computer into the peripheral device over the
`computer bus; and
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`(B) electronically simulating a physical disconnection
`and reconnection of the peripheral device to reconfigure the
`peripheral device to said second configuration while supplying
`electrical power to said peripheral device.
`
`18. A system for reconfiguring a peripheral device
`having a configuration connected by a computer bus to a host
`computer, the system comprising:
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`a first circuit configured to detect the peripheral device
`connected to the computer bus; and
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`a second circuit configured to electronically simulate a
`physical disconnection and reconnection of the peripheral
`device to reset said configuration of said peripheral device
`while supplying electrical power to said peripheral device.
`
`D.
`The Prior Art
`Petitioner relies on the following prior art in addition to asserted
`
`admitted prior art in the ’770 patent (“APA”):
`
`Reference
`Michelson
`Davis
`Yap
`PCCextend
`
`Date
`Publication
`May 6, 1997
`US 5,628,028
`Jan. 19, 1999
`US 5,862,393
`June 6, 2000
`US 6,073,193
`PCCextend 100 User’s Manual Apr. 3, 1995
`
`Exhibit
`1003
`1005
`1002
`1004
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`Petitioner also relies on the Declaration of Geert Knapen dated August 27,
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`2014 (“Knapen Declaration,” Ex. 1012).
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`E.
`The Asserted Grounds
`Petitioner challenges claims 1–3, 5, 7, 10–13, and 15–20 of the ’770
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`patent on the following grounds:
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`Reference(s)
`Basis
`Claims Challenged
`APA and Yap
`§ 103(a)
`1, 5, 7, 10, 11, 15–17
`APA, Yap, Michelson
`§ 103(a)
`2, 3, 12, 13
`Michelson, PCCextend, Davis
`1–3, 10–13, 16–18, 20 § 103(a)
`5, 7, 15, 19
`§ 103(a) Michelson, PCCextend, Davis, APA
`18–20
`§ 102(e)
`Yap
`
`F.
`Claim Interpretation
`As a first step in our analysis, we determine the meaning of the
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`claims, for purposes of this decision, using the “broadest reasonable
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`construction in light of the specification of the patent in which [they]
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`appear[].” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, claim terms are
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`given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one
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`of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re
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`Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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`Petitioner proposes a construction for the claim term “electronically
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`[simulate/simulating] a physical disconnection and reconnection of the
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`peripheral device” (claims 1 and 11) that is broad enough not to exclude the
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`reset circuit of dependent claims 10 and 17. Pet. 7–8. Patent Owner does
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`not address the proposed claim construction in the Preliminary Response.
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`Regarding the claim term “electronically [simulate/simulating] a
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`physical disconnection and reconnection of the peripheral device,” we
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`determine at this preliminary stage that the broadest reasonable
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`interpretation includes the reset operation of dependent claims 10 and 17.
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`Accordingly, based on the current record, we construe this term to mean
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`“using an electronic circuit to perform an action, such as an electronic reset,
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`5
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`Patent 6,493,770 B1
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`associated with physical disconnection and reconnection of a peripheral
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`device” as proposed by Petitioner.
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`
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`II. ANALYSIS
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`We turn now to Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability under
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`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) to determine whether Petitioner has met the threshold
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`standard of 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). We first consider Petitioner’s grounds based
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`on Michelson as the primary reference.
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`A. Claims 1–3, 10–13, 16–18, and 20
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`Based on our review of Petitioner’s analysis and supporting evidence,
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`we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown, on the current record, that there
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`is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in its obviousness challenge
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`to claims 1–3, 10–13, 16–18, and 20 over the combination of Michelson,
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`PCCextend, and Davis.
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`Regarding independent claim 1, Petitioner asserts that Michelson
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`teaches reconfiguring a peripheral device connected by a bus to a port of a
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`host computer where the peripheral device is a Personal Computer Memory
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`Card International Association (PCMCIA) peripheral device, the bus is a
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`PCMCIA bus, and the computer includes a PCMCIA adapter circuit
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`connected to a PCMCIA card connector on the PCMCIA card. Pet. 37–38.
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`Petitioner further asserts that the peripheral device has a first configuration
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`that is a generic configuration and a second configuration that comprises a
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`unique manufacturer configuration. Id. at 33–35, 38. Michelson also
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`discloses programming data from the host computer is received by the
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`interface chip through a standard PCMCIA bus, which Petitioner contends is
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`an example of “information for a second configuration” recited in claim 1.
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`Id. at 39–40 (citing Ex. 1003, 4:13–15, Ex. 1012 ¶ 145.) Petitioner argues
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`that “a second circuit configured to electronically simulate a physical
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`disconnection and reconnection of the peripheral device” recited in claim 1
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`is also taught by Michelson’s electronic circuit that operates in response to
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`an electrical reset signal. Id. at 40–41. Additionally, Petitioner asserts that
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`the use of a switch, in particular, to simulate a card removal and insertion
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`was also known, as evidenced by PCCextend. Id. at 41–43. More
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`specifically, Petitioner asserts that an electronic switch, namely a transistor,
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`in the card detect line was known to electronically simulate a physical
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`disconnection and reconnection of a peripheral device over a PCMCIA bus,
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`as evidenced by Davis. Id. at 43–44. Petitioner supports its analysis of the
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`combination of Michelson, PCCextend, and Davis, as applied to claim 1,
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`with the Knapen Declaration (Ex. 1012), as evidence that the selection of the
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`type of switch to simulate a physical disconnection would be within the level
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`of skill of one of ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 40–44; Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 147–
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`154.
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`Regarding independent claim 11, Petitioner contends the claimed
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`method is equivalent to the system of independent claim 1, and, therefore,
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`would have been obvious over the combination of Michelson, PCCextend,
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`and Davis for the same reasons explained with respect to claim 1. Pet. 45.
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`Regarding independent claim 18, Petitioner contends that Michelson
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`teaches a system for reconfiguring a peripheral device having a
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`configuration connected by a computer bus to a host computer for the same
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`reasons provided with respect to claim 1. Id. at 51. Petitioner contends that
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`the PCMCIA adapter in the host computer of Michelson is the first circuit
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`required by claim 18 and detects the insertion of the PCMCIA card by
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`recognizing the insertion. Id. (citing Ex. 1003, Fig. 2, step 44, 3:34–37, Ex.
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`1012 ¶¶ 180-181). Petitioner also asserts that Michelson teaches the
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`required “second circuit configured to electronically simulate a physical
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`disconnection and reconnection of the peripheral device to reset said
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`configuration of said peripheral device” because the FPGA programming
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`data file that is downloaded through the PCMCIA adapter to the PCMCIA
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`interface chip is “reset” to enable reprogramming. Id. at 51–52 (citing Ex.
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`1003, 4:17–22, Ex. 1012 ¶ 183).
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`Petitioner further argues that if the required second circuit requires a
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`switch to simulate disconnection and reconnection, such a switch is taught
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`by PCCextend to simulate card removal and insertion for PCMCIA cards to
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`be reprogrammed. Id. at 52 (citing Ex. 1003, 3–4, Ex. 1012 ¶ 185).
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`Alternatively, Petitioner argues that if the claim requires an electronic
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`switch, Davis discloses a field effect transistor (FET) that electronically
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`simulates a physical disconnection and reconnection of a peripheral device.
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`Id. (citing Ex. 1005, 8:31–34, Ex. 1012 ¶ 187). According to Petitioner and
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`the Knapen Declaration, it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill
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`to substitute the FET switch in Davis for the manual switch in PCCextend
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`for the reasons that Davis teaches the need for avoiding physically
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`disconnecting and reconnecting, either type of switch would be a design
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`choice, and it would cause the device to be reconfigured. Id. at 43–44
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`(citing Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 153–154).
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`Petitioner further contends that “while supplying electrical power to
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`said peripheral device” as recited in claim 18 is also taught by Michelson
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`because a circuit in the peripheral device drives the reset line to reprogram
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`the device. Id. at 44 (citing Ex. 1003, 4:17–22, 5:45–51, Fig. 3, Ex. 1012 ¶
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`157). Additionally, PCCextend is cited by Petitioner for disclosing that
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`power is supplied to the PCCextend100 board, which is part of the
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`peripheral device, through VCC supply pins, and that power optionally may
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`be removed from the socket when the card is removed. Id. at 45 (citing Ex.
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`1004, 3, 15–16, Ex. 1012 ¶ 158).
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`Regarding claims 2, 3, 10, 12, 13, 16, 17, and 20, which depend
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`directly or indirectly from claims 1, 11, or 18, Petitioner identifies where
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`these further limitations also are disclosed in Michelson, PCCextend, or
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`Davis. Id. at 45–53.
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`Patent Owner requests that if the Board determines that trial should be
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`instituted in this proceeding, it do so on this ground in the Petition. Prelim.
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`Resp. 2. Patent Owner does not make arguments, at this time, regarding the
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`merits of this ground of unpatentability against the challenged claims.
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`Based on the cited disclosures, Petitioner persuades us that, on the
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`current record, there is a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in showing
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`that claims 1–3, 10–13, 16–18, and 20 would have been obvious over the
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`combination of Michelson, PCCextend, and Davis.
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`B.
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`Claims 5, 7, 15, and 19
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`Based on our review of Petitioner’s analysis and supporting evidence,
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`we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown, on the current record, that there
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`is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in its obviousness challenge
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`to dependent claims 5, 7, 15, and 19, which require that the peripheral device
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`use a universal serial bus (claims 5, 15, and 19) and that the second set of
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`configuration information comprises configuration data and executable code
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`(claim 7).
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`Petitioner asserts that the substitution of a USB for a PCMCIA bus
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`would have involved only routine engineering and that the advantages of a
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`USB were known. Pet. 54, 55–57. Petitioner relies on the background
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`section of the ’770 patent as an admission that the advantages of USB were
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`known, and provides further evidence with the Knapen Declaration. Id. The
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`Knapen Declaration further supports the substitution being routine. Ex.
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`1012 ¶¶ 201, 206, 207.
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`Petitioner also asserts that the programming data file disclosed in
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`Michelson is a combination of both “configuration data” and “executable
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`code” recited in dependent claim 7. Pet. 55 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶ 203, Pet. 48–
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`49). Petitioner also argues that it would have been obvious to program the
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`peripheral device in Michelson with software containing data and code
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`instead of the FPGA programming data file, because both were known ways
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`of programming a peripheral device, and, therefore, known substitutes that
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`yielded predictable results. Id. at 48–49. In support of its argument,
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`Petitioner relies on the Knapen Declaration. Id. (citing Ex. 1012 ¶ 171).
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`In the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner contends that a prima
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`facie case of obviousness has not been established because PCMCIA and
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`USB technology are structurally different and the Petition fails to explain the
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`difference when combining teachings from these two technologies or why
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`the combination would involve only routine engineering. Prelim. Resp. 18–
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`22. Patent Owner also argues that “the ’770 patent does not provide the
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`prior art admissions that Petitioner alleges.” Id. at 12. Regarding
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`Petitioner’s challenge to claims 5, 7, 15, and 19, Patent Owner contends that
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`the need to physically disconnect and reconnect a USB cable to the host
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`computer in order to alter the configuration of a peripheral device “is
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`actually a recognition of [a] previously unknown problem with the USB
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`standard.” Id. at 16.
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`We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments because if a
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`person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation in either the
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`same field or a different one, the combination is likely obvious. KSR Int’l
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`Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). Additionally, Petitioner
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`provides both the APA and the Knapen Declaration as support for the state
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`of the prior art.
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`In sum, given the cited disclosures, Petitioner persuades us that, on the
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`current record, there is a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in showing
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`that claims 5, 7, 15, and 19 would have been obvious in view of the
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`combination of Michelson, PCCextend, Davis, and APA.
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`
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`C.
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`Other Grounds
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`Petitioner also asserts the following grounds of unpatentability:
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`1.
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`Claims 1, 5, 7, 10, 11, and 15–17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over APA
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`and Yap;
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`2.
`
`Claims 2, 3, 12, and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over APA, Yap, and
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`Michelson; and
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`3.
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`Claims 18–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) over Yap.
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`Pet. 19–37, 57–59. We exercise our discretion and decline to institute
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`review based on these grounds. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).
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`
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`D. Conclusion
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`For the foregoing reasons, we determine that the information
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`presented in the Petition establishes that there is a reasonable likelihood that
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`11
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`Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of claims 1–3, 5,
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`7, 10–13, and 15–20 of the ’770 patent.
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`The Board has not made a final determination on the patentability of
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`any challenged claim.
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`Accordingly, it is
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`III. ORDER
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`ORDERED that inter partes review is instituted with respect to the
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`following grounds of unpatentability:
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`(1) claims 1–3, 10–13, 16–18, and 20 as obvious over Michelson,
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`PCCextend, and Davis under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a); and
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`(2) claims 5, 7, 15, and 19 as obvious over Michelson, PCCextend,
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`Davis, and APA under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
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`FURTHER ORDERED that no ground other than those specifically
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`instituted above is authorized for the inter partes review; and
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`FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), inter
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`partes review of the ’770 patent is hereby instituted commencing on the
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`entry date of this Order, and pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(c) and 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of a trial.
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`PETITIONER:
`
`Jason M. Shapiro
`Soumya Panda
`ROTHWELL, FIGG, ERNST & MANBECK P.C.
`jshapiro@rothwellfigg.com
`spanda@rothwellfigg.com
`
`PATENT OWNER:
`
`Robert R. Laurenzi
`Robert S. Magee
`KAYE SCHOLER LLP
`Robert.Laurenzi@kayescholer.com
`Robert.Magee@kayescholer.com
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