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`

`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25394, *4
`
`As disclosed in claim 1 of the ’066 patent, the first protocol
`consists of: 1) ″storing in a database a respective Internet
`Protocol (IP) address of a set of processing units that have
`an on-line status with respect to the Internet″; 2) transmitting
`a query from the first processing unit to a connection server
`to determine the on-line status of a second processing unit″;
`and 3) ″retrieving the IP address of the second unit from the
`database using the connection server, in response to the
`determination of a positive on-line status of the second
`processing
`unit,
`for
`establishing
`a
`point-to-point
`communication link between the first and second processing
`units through the Internet.″ The ’365 patent has an identical
`specification but its claims cover a ″computer program
`product,″ ″computer data signal″
`[*4] and ″computer
`system″ for performing steps similar to those set out in the
`’066 patent.1
`
`At this stage in the proceedings, the construction of four
`terms remains in dispute:2
`
`(a) ″processing unit,″
`
`(b) ″process,″
`
`″point-to-point″/″point-to-point
`(c)
`communication,″3 and
`
`(c) ″connection server.″
`
`II. STANDARD
`
`The construction or interpretation of a claim is a question of
`law. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,
`979 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S. Ct. 1384,
`134 L. Ed. 2d 577 (1996). The words of the claim ″are
`generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,″ that
`is, the meaning they would have ″to a person of ordinary
`skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.″
`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir.
`2005) (citation omitted). ″Importantly, the person of ordinary
`
`skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in
`the context of the particular claim in which the disputed
`term appears, but
`in the context of the entire patent,
`including the specification.″ Id. at 1313. Thus,
`[*6] in
`interpreting claim terms, ″the court should look first to the
`intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent itself, including
`the claims,
`the specification, and,
`if in evidence,
`the
`prosecution history.″ Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,
`90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). However, the court
`may also consider extrinsic evidence, including, for example,
`treatises, dictionaries, and expert testimony. Phillips, 415
`F.3d at 1317-18.
`
`″If the claim language is clear on its face, then [the Court’s]
`consideration of the rest of the intrinsic evidence is restricted
`to determining if a deviation from the clear language of the
`claims is specified.″ Interactive Gift Express,
`Inc. v.
`CompuServe Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001). ″If,
`however, the claim language is not clear on its face, then
`[the Court’s] consideration of the rest of the intrinsic
`evidence is directed to resolving, if possible, the lack of
`clarity.″ Id. ″In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim
`language as understood by a person of skill in the art may be
`readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction
`in such cases involves little more than the application of the
`widely accepted meaning of commonly [*7] understood
`words.″ Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314.
`
`A claim term should be interpreted more narrowly than its
`ordinary and customary meaning under only two
`circumstances: ″1) when a patentee sets out a definition and
`acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee
`disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the
`specification or during prosecution.″ Thorner v. Sony
`Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
`2012). ″To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must
`clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term other
`than its plain and ordinary meaning. It is not enough for a
`patentee to simply disclose a single embodiment or use a
`
`1 The ’365 patent also uses somewhat different terminology than the ’066 patent. Relevant for this case is that the ’365 patent uses the
`term ″process″ instead of ″processing unit″ and the term ″network protocol address″ instead of ″IP address.″ Defendants represented at
`the Markman hearing that an IP address is a type of network protocol address.
`
`2 The parties initially disputed the meaning of ten terms found in claims 1 through 3 and 6 through 8 of the ’066 patent and claims
`1 and 3 of the ’365 patent. However, only Defendant Bandwidth.com, Inc., which has been dismissed from the case, disputed the meaning
`of two of the terms, ″using the connection server″ and ″database.″ Thus, those terms no longer need to be construed. At the Markman
`hearing, the remaining defendants conceded that four other terms, ″Internet,″ ″point-to-point Internet communication,″ ″point-to-point
`communications over the Internet,″ [*5] and ″point-to-point communication link between the first and second processing units through
`the Internet,″ do not need to be construed.
`
`3 The term ″point-to-point,″ as used in the ’066 and ’365 patents, was construed in an earlier case filed in the Norfolk Division of this
`District. See Innovative Commc’ns Tech., Inc. (″ICTI″) v. Vivox, Inc., Nos. 2:12-cv-7 & 2:12-cv-9, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154311, 2012
`WL 5331573 (E.D. Va. Oct. 26, 2012). That case settled before a final adjudication on the merits.
`
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`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25394, *7
`
`word in the same manner in all embodiments, the patentee
`must clearly express an intent to redefine the term.″ Id.
`(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). ″The
`standard for disavowal of claim scope is similarly exacting.″
`Id. at 1366. ″The patentee may demonstrate intent to deviate
`from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term
`by including in the specification expressions of manifest
`exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of
`claim scope.″ Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d
`1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
`
`Title [*8] 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 requires that every patent’s
`specification ″conclude with one or more claims particularly
`pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter
`which the inventor . . . regards as the invention.″ A claim
`that fails to satisfy this particularity requirement is invalid
`for indefiniteness. ″The primary purpose of the definiteness
`requirement is to ensure that the claims are written in such
`a way that they give notice to the public of the extent of the
`legal protection afforded by the patent, so that interested
`members of the public, e.g., competitors of the patent
`owner, can determine whether or not they infringe.″ All
`Dental Prodx, LLC v. Advantage Dental Prods., Inc., 309
`F.3d 774, 779-80 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
`
`″In the face of an allegation of indefiniteness, general
`principles of claim construction apply.″ Datamize, LLC v.
`Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir.
`2005). ″Only claims not amenable to construction or
`insolubly ambiguous are indefinite.″ Source Search Techs.,
`LLC v. LendingTree, LLC, 588 F.3d 1063, 1076 (Fed. Cir.
`(internal quotation marks omitted). Patents are
`2009)
`presumed valid, and an alleged infringer asserting that a
`[*9] indefinite must prove ″by clear and
`claim term is
`convincing evidence that a skilled artisan could not discern
`the boundaries of the claim based on the claim language, the
`specification, and the prosecution history, as well as her
`knowledge of the relevant art area.″ Halliburton Energy
`Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1249-50 (Fed. Cir.
`2008).
`
`III. CLAIMS
`
`A. ″processing unit″
`
`The term ″processing unit″ is found in claims 1 through 3
`and 6 through 8 of the ’066 patent. Straight Path contends
`that no construction is necessary as the term has a plain and
`ordinary meaning. The defendants contend that the term
`should be construed to mean ″a user device.″
`
`the term
`The defendants do not seem to dispute that
`″processing unit″ has an ordinary and customary meaning
`that is readily apparent even to a layperson. See Phillips,
`415 F.3d at 1314. They nonetheless contend that the term
`must be construed, although it is unclear to the Court how
`their proposed construction differs from that ordinary and
`customary meaning. To the extent the defendants’ proposed
`construction would limit the scope of the term ″processing
`unit,″ that limitation is unsupported. While the specification
`frequently employs the term ″user″ [*10] in connection with
`the term ″processing unit,″4 the patentee did not clearly
`disavow the ordinary and customary meaning of the term.5
`See Teleflex, Inc., 299 F.3d at 1325. The Court will therefore
`construe the term ″processing unit″ according to its ordinary
`and customary meaning, without further restrictions.
`
`B. ″process″
`
`The term ″process″ is found in claims 1 and 3 of the ’365
`patent. Straight Path [*11] would construe the term as ″a
`running instance of a computer program or application.″
`The defendants propose as the appropriate construction ″an
`addressable program running on a user device.″6
`
`The term ″process″ does not appear in the specification.
`However, in their respective claims, the ’365 patent uses the
`term ″process″ in essentially the same manner in which the
`’066 patent uses the term ″processing unit.″ Compare, e.g.,
`’066 patent claim 1, with ’365 patent claim 3. Further, the
`parties seem to agree that a ″process″ is the running of a
`program on a processing unit, essentially the plaintiff’s
`proposed construction, and the Court
`finds that
`that
`construction reflects the ordinary and customary meaning of
`
`4 See, e.g., ’066 patent at 5:67-6:4 (″The first user operating the first processing unit 12 is thus established in the database 34 as an
`active on-line party available for communication using the disclosed point-to-point Internet protocol.″).
`
`5
`
`In their briefs and at the Markman hearing, the defendants argued that construction is necessary because the ’066 patent requires that
`the processing units be ″positioned at either ends of point-to-point communications.″ Defendants Bandwidth.com, Inc.’s and Vocalocity,
`Inc.’s Joint Opening Claim Construction Brief at 23. But the defendants have failed to explain how the specification or prosecution
`history supports this proposed limitation in any way that is not already apparent from the claims themselves, or how the term ″user″
`connotes ″endpoint.″
`
`6 Defendants originally seemed to argue that the term ″process″ is indefinite, and to propose the above construction only as an
`alternative in the event the Court decided to construe the term. At the Markman hearing, however, the defendants clarified that their
`position is not that the term cannot be construed, but that Straight Path’s construction of ″process″ renders the term indefinite.
`
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`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25394, *11
`
`the term, when read in light of the claims. See ’365 patent
`claim 1 (claiming a ″computer [*12] program product″ for
`performing the relevant steps); id. claim 3 (claiming, in a
`″computer system,″ a method for performing the relevant
`steps). The issue,
`then,
`is whether
`that ordinary and
`customary meaning should be restricted as defendants
`propose.
`the Court rejects the defendants’
`As discussed above,
`attempt to construe ″processing unit″ as ″a user device,″ and
`for the same reasons the Court rejects their attempt to insert
`the term ″user″ into the definition of ″process.″ The
`remaining question, then, is whether, as the defendants
`contend, ″process″ must be limited to an ″addressable
`program.″ The defendants explain that, based on the claims,
`a process ″needs to be addressable by a network protocol
`address.″ Defendants Bandwidth.com, Inc.’s and Vocalocity,
`Inc.’s Joint Opening Claim Construction Brief at 13. Based
`on this explanation, however, the limitation would seem to
`be redundant with the claims themselves. Moreover, to the
`extent the limitation would narrow the term, the defendants
`have not pointed to any clear disclaimer of the full scope of
`the claim language. Finally, the Court rejects the defendants’
`argument that Straight Path’s construction, which simply
`reflects the [*13] ordinary and customary meaning of the
`term, is ″insolubly ambiguous.″ See Source Search Techs.,
`LLC, 588 F.3d at 1076.7
`Accordingly, the Court will construe the term ″process,″ as
`used in claims 1 and 3 of the ’365 patent, as ″a running
`instance of a computer program or application.″
`
`C. ″point-to-point″ and ″point-to-point communication″8
`The term ″point-to-point . . . communication″ is found in
`claims 1 through 3 and 6 through 8 of the ’066 patent and
`
`claims 1 and 3 of the ’365 patent. Straight Path proposes the
`construction of ″point-to-point″ adopted in ICTI, viz.,
`″communications between two processes over a computer
`network that are not intermediated by a connection server.″
`See ICTI, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154311, 2012 WL 5331573,
`at *10. The defendants propose
`[*14] the construction
`″communication between two user processes, established by
`one of the processes using the network protocol address of
`the other process, that is not intermediated by a connection
`server.″9 Thus,
`the parties agree that ″point-to-point
`communication″ should be construed as communication
`between two ″processes″ that is not intermediated by a
`″connection server,″ a construction the Court finds consistent
`with the claims and the specification. See generally ICTI,
`2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154311, 2012 WL 5331573, at *7-*8.
`The issue, then, is whether the term should be further
`limited, as defendants propose, by inserting the word ″user″
`before ″processes″ and indicating that communication is
`″established by one of the processes using the network
`protocol address of the other process.″ Embedded in this
`issue is whether the Court should defer to, and on that basis
`adopt, the Court’s construction in ICTI.
`
`Straight Path contends that, unless the defendants can show
`that the Court’s construction in ICTI is incorrect as a matter
`of law, this Court is bound to follow that claim construction,
`which, according to Straight Path, effectively rejected
`Defendants’ proposed limitations here.10 See Straight Path
`IP Group’s Markman Brief at 9 (citing DE Techs., Inc. v.
`ISHOPUSA, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 2d 937, 941 (W.D. Va. 2011)
`(″[A]bsent a showing by DE that
`the court’s original
`construction of a disputed term was incorrect as a matter of
`law, the court will apply its prior Markman rulings in the
`instant action.″)). But
`in DE Technologies, on which
`
`7 Further, even if the term were ambiguous, the Court fails to see how Defendants’ proposed limitations would remedy any ambiguity.
`
`8
`
`In the patents, the term ″point-to-point″ always appears in connection with the term ″communication,″ sometimes with the term
`″Internet″ in between. The Court will therefore refer to the terms ″point-to-point″ and ″point to point communication″ collectively as
`″point-to-point. . . communication″ or ″point-to-point communication.″
`
`9 Defendant Vocalocity originally proposed this construction, while Telesphere proposed an identical construction except that it used
`the term ″client″ instead of the term ″user.″ See Defendant Telesphere Networks Ltd.’s Opening Claim Construction Brief at 4. Telesphere
`
`subsequently indicated that it supports [*15] Vocalocity’s proposed construction. See Joint Claim Construction Statement Ex. A. The
`
`Court’s analysis would apply equally to Telesphere’s original proposed construction.
`
`10 The defendants in ICTI did not propose to limit the construction of the term ″point-to-point″ in the same way Defendants propose
`here, but the ICTI court did entertain similar arguments when construing the terms ″establishing a point-to-point communication″ and
`″to allow the establishment of a packet-based point-to-point communication.″ The ICTI defendants proposed the construction ″using the
`network protocol address retrieved by the server from its database to create a direct communication, initiated solely by one of the
`processes, and not intermediated by a connection server, gateway, or similar device.″ See ICTI, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154311, 2012
`WL 5331573, at *10. The court rejected that proposed construction, ruling that, ″[h]aving already construed the term ’point-to-point,’
`. the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms ″establishing a point-to-point communication″ and ″to allow the
`.
`.
`establishment of a packet-based point-to-point communication,″ as understood by a person of skill in the art when read in the context
`of the entire patent, is readily apparent even to a layperson.″ 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154311, [WL] at *9.
`
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`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25394, *14
`
`to preclude the
`the defendants sought
`Defendants rely,
`plaintiff from relitigating terms the court had construed in a
`previous suit
`the plaintiff initiated. Here, by contrast,
`Straight Path attempts to give preclusive effect to terms
`construed in its favor in a case in which none of the
`defendants participated. Thus, the Court finds it appropriate
`to independently assess the parties’ claim [*16] construction
`arguments.11
`
`Consistent with their other proposed constructions,
`Defendants first contend that, based on the specification and
`prosecution
`history,
`the
`processes
`between which
`communication takes place must be ″user processes.″ The
`Court rejects this argument for the reasons discussed above.
`
`″point-to-point″
`that
`contend
`also
`defendants
`The
`communication must be ″established by one of the processes
`using the network protocol address of the other process.″
`Straight Path opposes such a construction on several grounds.
`First, Straight Path contends that, while a network protocol
`address is used in some embodiments of the invention to
`establish ″point-to-point communication,″
`the
`[*18]
`construction of that term should not be so limited because
`the patentee did not act as its own lexicographer with
`respect to the term or clearly disavow its scope. The Court
`″point-to-point
`cannot
`conclude,
`however,
`that
`communication″ has a plain and ordinary meaning that is
`apparent on the face of the claims. The Court must therefore
`consider the claims in the context of the specification to
`determine how the patents use the term. See Interactive Gift
`Express, Inc., 256 F.3d at 1331 (″If the claim language is
`clear on its face, then [the Court’s] consideration of the rest
`of the intrinsic evidence is restricted to determining if a
`deviation from the clear language of the claims is specified
`. . . . If, however, the claim language is not clear on its face,
`then [the Court’s] consideration of the rest of the intrinsic
`evidence is directed to resolving, if possible, the lack of
`clarity.″).
`
`the Invention″ section of
`The ″Background of
`the
`specification explains that, ″[g]enerally, devices interfacing
`to the Internet and other online services may communicate
`with each other upon establishing respective device
`addresses,″ and notes that ″[p]ermanent IP addresses of
`[*19] accessing the Internet readily
`users and devices
`support point-to-point communications of voice and video
`
`signals over the Internet.″ ’066 patent at 1:32-35, 61-63. By
`contrast, ″[d]ue to the dynamic nature of temporary IP
`addresses of
`some devices
`accessing the
`Internet,
`point-to-point communications in realtime of voice and
`video have been generally difficult to attain.″ Id. at 1:67-2:3.
`Thus, the problem the patents seek to remedy is that of
`establishing the device address of another user or device
`when that address is not fixed. The ″Summary of the
`Invention″ section of the specification then goes on to
`the ″first point-to-point Internet protocol″
`explain that
`includes the steps of:
`
`(a) storing in a database a respective IP address of
`a set of processing units that have an on-line status
`with respect to the Internet;
`
`(b) transmitting a query from a first processing unit
`to a connection server to determine the on-line
`status of a second processing unit; and
`
`(c) retrieving the IP address of the second unit from
`the database using the connection server,
`in
`response to the determination of a positive on-line
`status of the second processing unit, for establishing
`a point-to-point communication link between
`[*20] the first and second processing units through
`the Internet.
`
`’066 patent at 2:6-25. The crux of the invention, then, is
`furnishing the IP address of one processing unit to another
`processing unit to allow the processing units to communicate
`directly with one another. Based on the specification, a
`person of ordinary skill in the art would therefore understand
`″point-to-point communication″ to be communication
`established by one processing unit using the IP address of
`another processing unit.
`
`Straight Path contends, however, that requiring the use of a
`network protocol or IP address to establish point-to-point
`communication is inconsistent with certain of the patent
`claims, referencing in particular claim 6 of the ’066 patent.
`to ″[a]
`Claim 6 applies
`system for point-to-point
`communications over the Internet comprising″:
`
`a database for storing a set of Internet Protocol (IP)
`addresses of at least one processing unit that has
`on-line status with respect to the Internet;
`
`11
`
`In any event, this Court’s construction of the term ″point-to-point communication,″ [*17] which is set forth below, is essentially
`
`consistent with that in ICTI, differing only in that it adds clarification on a point that is disputed between the parties in this case. See
`generally O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (″A determination that a claim term
`’needs no construction’ or has the ’plain and ordinary meaning’ may be inadequate when a term has more than one ’ordinary’ meaning
`or when reliance on a term’s ’ordinary’ meaning does not resolve the parties’ dispute.″).
`
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`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25394, *20
`
`a first processing unit including:
`
`And Claim 8 applies to:
`
`a first program for performing a first
`point-to-point Internet protocol; and
`
`a first processor for executing the first
`program and for transmitting a query;
`
`a connection server, responsive to [*21] the query,
`for determining the on-line status of a second
`processing unit by searching the database, and for
`transmitting an online message to the first
`processing unit for establishing a point-to-point
`communication link between the first and second
`processing units through the Internet.
`
`Because this claim does not explicitly indicate that one
`processing unit uses the IP address of the other to establish
`communication, but rather refers to an online message sent
`to the first processing unit by the connection server after
`determining the online status of a second processing unit,
`″this
`Straight Path argues
`that
`claim recites how
`point-to-point communication is established—an ’online
`message’ is transmitted for establishing ’point-to-point’
`communication.″ Straight Path IP Group’s Rebuttal
`to
`Defendants’ Opening Markman Briefs at 10. However,
`when claim 6 is read in the context of the specification and
`its dependent claims, claims 7 and 8,
`it
`is clear that
`communication is actually established with the use of an IP
`address. In that regard, Claim 7 applies to:
`
`The system of claim 6 wherein the connection
`server, responsive to a positive determination of
`the online status of the second [*22] processing
`unit, retrieves the respective IP address of the
`second processing unit from the database and
`transmits the on-line message, including the IP
`address, to the first processing unit; and wherein
`the
`first
`processing
`unit
`establishes
`the
`point-to-point communication link between the
`first and second processing units through the
`Internet in response to receiving the IP address of
`the second processing unit from the connection
`server.
`
`The system of claim 6 wherein the connection
`server, responsive to a negative determination of
`the on-line status of the second processing unit,
`generates an off-line message, and transmits the
`off-line message to the first processing unit.
`
`The most logical reading of these claims is that claim 6
`applies to the initial steps of determining the online status of
`the second processing unit and transmitting to the first
`processing unit a message regarding that status, while
`claims 7 and 8 deal more specifically with the outcomes that
`result depending on whether the second processing unit is
`online. If the second processing unit is online, the connection
`server transmits the IP address of the second processing unit
`[*23] unit in order to facilitate
`to the first processing
`point-to-point communication.12
`
`rejects the defendants’
`the Court
`these reasons,
`For
`construction insofar as it inserts ″user″ before ″processes,″
`but
`concludes
`that
`the
`construction of
`the
`term
`″point-to-point
`communication″
`requires
`that
`such
`communication be ″established by one of the processes
`using the network protocol
`[*24] address of the other
`process.″ The Court
`further concludes that
`the terms
`″processing units″ and ″IP address,″ which are used in the
`’066 patent, should also be referenced,
`together with
`″processes″ and ″network protocol address.″ The Court will
`therefore construe the term ″point-to-point communication″
`as ″communication between two processing units or
`processes, established by one of the processing units or
`processes using the IP or network protocol address of the
`other processing unit or process, that is not intermediated by
`a connection server.″
`
`D. ″connection server″
`
`The term ″connection server″ is found in claims 1 through
`3 and 6 through 8 of the ’066 patent and claim 3 of the ’365
`patent. Straight Path contends that no construction is
`
`12 Straight Path also argues that the defendants’ proposed construction is inconsistent with claim 1 of the ’365 patent, which recites
`a
`
`program code configured to receive queries for one of the network protocol address and the associated identifier of said one
`of the processes from other processes over the computer network at the server, and to allow the establishment of a
`packet-based point-to-point communication between said one of the processes and one of said other processes.
`
`The claim covers one process requesting the network protocol address of another process in order to establish point-to-point
`communication. This embodiment is entirely consistent with that portion of the defendants’ proposed construction indicating that
`communication is ″established by one of the processes using the network protocol address of the other process.″
`
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`2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25394, *24
`
`necessary as the term has a plain and ordinary meaning,
`while the defendants would construe the term as ″a server
`that furnishes a network protocol address needed to establish
`communications.″
`
`As reflected in Defendants’ proposed construction, the term
`″server″ has a plain and ordinary meaning; and, in the
`context of the specification and the claims, it is clear that the
`term ″connection″ is meant to convey only that the server
`facilitates point-to-point
`[*25] communication. See, e.g.,
`’066 patent at 2:7-25 (reciting, in the ″Summary of the
`Invention″ section of the patent, that the connection server
`receives a query from the first processing unit and is used to
`retrieve the IP address of the second processing unit ″for
`establishing a point-to-point communication link between
`the first and second processing units through the Internet″).
`In light of
`the Court’s
`construction of
`the
`term
`″point-to-point,″ and the fact that the claims themselves
`describe the specific functions performed by the connection
`server, the Court finds it unnecessary to impose further
`limitations on the term. The Court will therefore construe
`″connection server″ according to its plain and ordinary
`″a server
`meaning as
`that
`facilitates point-to-point
`communication.″
`
`2. The term ″process,″ as used in claims 1 and 3 of
`the ’365 patent, will be construed as ″a running
`instance of a computer program or application.″
`
`term ″point-to-point
`.
`.
`.
`3. The
`[*26]
`communication,″ as used in claims 1 through 3 and
`6 through 8 of the ’066 patent and claims 1 and 3
`of
`the
`’365 patent, will be
`construed as
`″communication between two processing units or
`processes, established by one of the processing
`units or processes using the IP or network protocol
`address of the other processing unit or process, that
`is not intermediated by a connection server.″
`
`4. The term ″connection server,″ as used in claims
`1 through 3 and 6 through 8 of the ’066 patent and
`claim 3 of the ’365 patent, will be construed as ″a
`server
`that
`facilitates
`point-to-point
`communication.″
`
`The Clerk is directed to forward copies of this Order to all
`counsel of record.
`
`/s/ Anthony J. Trenga
`
`Anthony J. Trenga
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`
`For the foregoing reasons,
`disputed terms as follows:
`
`the Court will construe the
`
`United States District Judge
`
`1. The term ″processing unit,″ as used in claims 1
`through 3 and 6 through 8 of the ’066 patent, will
`be given its ordinary and customary meaning.
`
`February 25, 2014
`
`Alexandria, Virginia
`
`Page 7 of 7
`
`Samsung v. Straight Path, IPR2014-01366
`Straight Path - Ex. 2004 - Page 7
`
`