IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`
`
`
`
`DELAWARE DISPLAY GROUP LLC
`and INNOVATIVE DISPLAY
`TECHNOLOGIES LLC,
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`Plaintiffs,
`
`
`v.
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`LENOVO GROUP LTD.,
`LENOVO HOLDING CO., INC., and
`LENOVO (UNITED STATES) INC.,
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`C.A. No. 13-cv-2108-RGA
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`C.A. No. 13-cv-2109-RGA
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`C.A. No. 13-cv-2111-RGA
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`
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`
`
`§
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`DELAWARE DISPLAY GROUP LLC
`and INNOVATIVE DISPLAY
`TECHNOLOGIES LLC,
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`Plaintiffs,
`
`
`v.
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`LG ELECTRONICS, INC.,
`LG ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC.,
`LG DISPLAY CO., LTD., and
`LG DISPLAY AMERICA, INC.,
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`
`Defendants.
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`
`
`DELAWARE DISPLAY GROUP LLC
`and INNOVATIVE DISPLAY
`TECHNOLOGIES LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`LGD_001925
`
`LG Display Ex. 1027
`
`

`
`C.A. No. 13-cv-2112-RGA
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
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`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
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`
`
`SONY CORPORATION, SONY
`CORPORATION OF AMERICA, SONY
`ELECTRONICS INC., and SONY
`MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS (USA)
`INC.
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`DELAWARE DISPLAY GROUP LLC
`AND INNOVATIVE DISPLAY
`TECHNOLOGIES LLC
`
`
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`
`v.
`
`VIZIO, INC.,
`
`
`Defendant.
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`
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`
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`PLAINTIFFS’ OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Plaintiffs Innovative Display Technologies LLC and Delaware Display Group LLC
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`(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) hereby serve their opening claim construction brief.
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`LGD_001926
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`

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`PRIOR CLAIM CONSTRUCTIONS
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`Almost all of the disputed terms have already been construed in two groups of
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`I.
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`consolidated cases filed by plaintiffs: (1) Acer, Inc. et al., No. 2:13-cv-522, (E.D. Tex., filed June
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`28, 2013) (the “First Texas Litigation”) and (2) Hyundai Motor Co. et al., No. 2:14-cv-00201
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`(E.D. Tex., filed March 10, 2014) (the “Second Texas Litigation”). On August 26, 2014,
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`Magistrate Judge Payne issued an order in the First Texas Litigation construing twelve sets of
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`terms (the “First Claim Construction”).1 The defendants filed objections to the First Claim
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`Construction,2 and Judge Gilstrap overruled all of the objections.3 On May 4, 2015, in the
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`Second Texas Litigation, Judge Gilstrap issued an order construing thirteen sets of terms from
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`these patents-in-suit (the “Second Claim Construction”).4 Defendant LG’s attorneys in this case
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`have represented parties in each of the First and Second Texas Litigations, including Dell, HP,
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`Hyundai, and Kia. Between the First and Second Claim Constructions, twelve of the terms in
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`dispute here have already been construed. The following sub-sections discuss those twelve terms.
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`A. “transition region.” For this term, Plaintiffs adopt the First Claim Construction, Ex.
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`A at 22, whereas Defendants adopt the Second Claim Construction. Ex. B at 16. The difference
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`is that Defendants add the language “from a light source to a light emitting area.” But the
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`specification does not require the additional language, and “unless required by the specification,
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`limitations that do not otherwise appear in the claims should not be imported into the claims.” N.
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`Am. Container, Inc. v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc., 415 F.3d 1335, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The
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`1 Ex. A. (First Texas Litigation, Claim Construction Memorandum and Order (D.I. 101))
`Exhibits referenced herein are attached to the Joint Appendix, which has been filed concurrently
`herewith.
`2 First Texas Litigation, Defendants’ Objections to the August 26, 2014, Claim Construction
`Memorandum and Order (D.I. 118) (filed Sept. 10, 2014).
`3 First Texas Litigation, Order (D.I. 219) (Dec. 15, 2014).
`4 Ex. B. (Second Texas Litigation, Memorandum Opinion and Order (D.I. 244))
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`LGD_001927
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`

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`claims themselves do not require the “transition region” to transmit light from a light source to a
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`light emitting area. For example, claim 1 of the ’660 patent simply recites “a transition region
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`disposed between the light source and the output region.” Not until dependent claim 2 does the
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`claim language approach Defendants’ construction: “The assembly of claim 1 wherein the
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`transition region is configured to spread and transmit the light generated by the light sources to
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`the output region.” “[T]he presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation raises a
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`presumption that the limitation in question is not found in the independent claim.” Liebel-
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`Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 910 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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`B. “predetermined.” In both the First and Second Claim Constructions, the Court
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`construed this term as “fixed.” Ex. A at 42; Ex. B at 21. Here, Defendants want to add the word
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`“beforehand.” In the First Claim Construction, the Court explained why it should not add a word
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`like “beforehand” to this construction: “Likewise, the phrase ‘in advance’ may raise issues as to
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`‘in advance’ of what.” Ex. A at 42. Unlike method claims, the apparatus claims in the ’370 and
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`’660 patents do not consist of discrete steps that could require that an event occurs “beforehand”
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`of a claimed step. Cf. Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls, Div. of Dover Res., Inc. v. Mega
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`systems, LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (construing “predetermined plunger
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`performance” in method claims). Moreover, in the First Texas Litigation, the Court noted that its
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`construction comported with the dictionaries cited by the prior defendants and reasoned that
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`construing the word “predetermined” as “fixed” “gives meaning to the prefix ‘pre-’ by requiring
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`a degree of immutability that the word ‘determined’ might not by itself demand.” Ex. A at 42.
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`C. “pattern of light extracting deformities.” The issue here is whether to reject the two
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`prior claims construction decisions and introduce a new limitation—the phrase “light extracting
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`deformities”—back into the claim as Defendants suggest or whether to simply use the phrase
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`“deformities” as Plaintiffs propose. Plaintiffs follow the exact definition adopted by the Court in
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`2
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`LGD_001928
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`the First Claim Construction. Ex. A at 11. In the Second Claim Construction, the defendants
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`agreed to that same construction. Ex. B at 10. Yet the Defendants, with many of the same
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`attorneys, now propose a new construction that adds unnecessary redundancy that the Court need
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`not add to the construction. See U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed.
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`Cir. 1997) (“Claim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and technical
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`scope … It is not an obligatory exercise in redundancy.”).
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`D. “optical elements of well defined shape.” In the two prior claim constructions, the
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`Courts rejected the defendants’ arguments that this term is indefinite and found that “well
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`defined” means “distinct,” as confirmed by the specification and plain definition of the words.
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`Ex. A at 46-47 (citing the specification discussed below); Ex. C (The Merriam-Webster
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`Dictionary 599 (1998)); Ex. D (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1338 (10th ed. 2002))
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`(“having clearly distinguishable limits, boundaries, or features”)); Ex. B at 23. Nevertheless,
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`Defendants again argue here that the term is indefinite. But the specification gives one of skill
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`more than “reasonable certainty” as to what was meant by this term. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
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`Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014). This term appears in the ’196 patent, whereas in
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`the previous cases it appeared in 7,300,194 (the “’194 patent”). Ex. E (the ’194 patent). The ’196
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`patent has much of the same relevant, explanatory written description as the ’194 patent, plus
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`much more. Relying on passages in the ’194 patent that are very similar to ones in the ’196
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`patent, see e.g., D.I. 60, Ex. F at 10:31-3; 53-58, Judge Payne held that the “best reading of the
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`claims, in light of the above-quoted passages from the specification, is that the patentee used
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`‘well defined’ to mean ‘distinct.’” Ex. A at 46.
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`
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`The ’196 patent’s additional written description confirms the definiteness of this term.
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`For example, the ’196 patent’s written descriptions states, “Light redirecting film 2 comprises a
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`thin transparent film or substrate 8 having a pattern of discrete individual optical elements 5 of
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`3
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`LGD_001929
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`well defined shape on the light exit surface 6 of the film,” D.I. 60, Ex. F at 5:62-64 (emphasis
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`added); and “FIGS. 31-39 are enlarged schematic perspective views of backlight surface areas
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`containing various patterns of individual optical deformities of other well defined shapes;” Id. at
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`4:53-55 (emphasis added); see also id. at Abstract; 2:52-56; 5:13-17; 11:9-14; 11:43-52; 13:29-
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`51; Figs. 5a-n, 25-28, and 31-39. Given the many examples of “optical elements” (or
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`deformities) “of well defined shape” in the ’196 patent, the term is not indefinite. DDR Holdings,
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`LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“For other terms like, for
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`example, terms of degree, specific and unequivocal examples may be sufficient to provide a
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`skilled artisan with clear notice of what is claimed.”). And during prosecution, the examiner used
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`the “well defined” limitation in the reasons for allowance. D.I. 60, Ex. L at 3 (“The following is
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`an examiner’s statement of reasons for allowance: Applicant teaches a light redirecting film
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`system including … a pattern of individual optical elements of well defined shape”).
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`E. “pass through a liquid crystal display with low loss.” The prior defendants twice
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`argued that this term is indefinite, and lost both times. Ex. A at 54; Ex. B at 25. Instead, the
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`Courts found that this term does not limit the claims in which it appears. Ex. A at 54; Ex. B at
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`25. Plaintiffs agree. In the First Texas Litigation, the Court noted that “surplusage may exist in
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`some claims.” Ex. A at 53 (citing Decisioning.com, Inc. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 527
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`F.3d 1300, 1312 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). The Court then acknowledged that a “‘whereby’ clause
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`that merely states the result of the limitations in the claim adds nothing to the patentability or
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`substance of the claim.” Id. at 53-54 (citing Tex. Instruments Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
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`988 F.2d 1165, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). The Court in the First Texas Litigation correctly
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`concluded “that the ‘low loss’ term is analogous to a whereby clause and does not limit the
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`claims in which it appears.” Id. at 54. Alternatively, this term is a functional limitation that
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`cannot limit an apparatus claim because it merely describes an intended or preferred use of the
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`4
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`LGD_001930
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`

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`claimed apparatus. Textron Innovations Inc. v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 498 F. App’x 23, 28 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2012). Even if this Court finds that the “low loss” term somehow limits the claims, the fact
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`remains that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood it with reasonable certainty.
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`As stated in Nautilus, “One must bear in mind, moreover, that patents are not addressed to
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`lawyers, or even to the public generally, but rather to those skilled in the relevant art.” 134 S. Ct.
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`2120, 2128 (citation omitted). One of ordinary skill would have read the specification’s
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`discussion of low loss, D.I. 60, Ex. E at 5:17-23, and would have understood the term to cover
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`the situation in which a more efficient light output is created by using deformities to cause light
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`rays to emit at predetermined ray angles from the backlight panel. One of ordinary skill would
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`have further understood the scope of “low loss” in view of efficient use of light, which is one of
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`the goals of the invention. Id. at 1:24-28.
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`F. “in close proximity.” The First Texas Litigation defendants understood this term—
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`they did not even argue indefiniteness. The defendants in the Second Texas Litigation argued
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`indefiniteness and lost. Ex. B at 31. Claim terms “bear a ‘heavy presumption’ that they mean
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`what they say and have the ordinary meaning that would be attributed to those words by persons
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`skilled in the relevant art.” Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2002). “In close proximity” means what it says; it is easily understood by laypersons and
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`those of ordinary skill alike. In claim 7 of the ’177 patent, this term appears in the following
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`larger phrase: “each light source is positioned in close proximity to a group of the refractive or
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`reflective surfaces.” The specification of the ’177 patent shows reflective surfaces in close
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`proximity to light sources. For example, Fig. 6 of the ’177 patent shows reflectors 37 in close
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`proximity to light sources 3. D.I. 60, Ex. A. Whether or not reflectors 37 are “secondary” does
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`not change the fact that the patent provides examples of light sources in close proximity to
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`reflective surfaces. One of skill in the art is also a person of ordinary creativity, and can
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`5
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`LGD_001931
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`understannd that an
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`example oof a proximmate generaal reflector
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`also informms proximitty of
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`“secondaary” reflectorrs.
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`For the ’9733 patent, thee term appeears in claimm 1: “the ddeformities tthat are in
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`close
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`proximityy to the inpuut edge incrrease in denssity, size, deepth and/or
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`deformitiies from the
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`respective llight sourcess increases aacross the wiidth of the p
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`wherein
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`the density,
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`size, depth
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`and/or height of the de
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`formities in
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`close proxiimity to the
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`input
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`edge is ggreatest at aapproximatee midpoints
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`between addjacent pairss of the lighht sources.”” The
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`height as thhe distance oof the
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`anel membeer and
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`specificaation of the
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`’973 patent
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`as the ation, such af this limitaexamples ofprovides unnequivocal e
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`followingg: “FIG. 39BB shows thee deformities in close prroximity to
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`the input eddge increasi
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`ng in
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`light
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`density,
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`size and deepth or heighht as the diistance of thhe deformitiies from thee respective
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`sources iincreases acrross the widdth of the paanel surfacee.” D.I. 60, EEx. C at 12::49-52 (empphasis
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`added); ssee also id.
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`at 12:32-36
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`(describing
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`duced 9B is reprodce, Figure 39Fig. 39A). FFor referenc
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`below, rootated 90°, aand showing an unequivoocal examplee of this claiim term:
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`By proviiding unequuivocal exammples of thiis claim termm, the speccification off the ’973 ppatent
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`informs oone of ordinnary skill in
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`the art of thhe scope of tthis term witth reasonablle certainty.
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`Holdingss, LLC v. Hootels.com, L.PP., 773 F.3dd 1245, 12600 (Fed. Cir. 22014).
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`Inn the ’196 ppatent, the term also apppears in claaim 1: “a ligght redirectiing film in
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`DDR
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`close
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`proximityy to the [baacklight’s] llight output
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`surface.” TThe ’196 paatent’s speciification inccludes
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`exampless of a film iin close proxximity to thee backlight’
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`s light outpuut surface. SSee, e.g., D.
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`I. 60,
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`Ex. F att Abstract; FFigs. 1-4. MMoreover, thhe examinerr included tthis term inn the reasonns for
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`allowancce: “The folllowing is ann examiner’s statement
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`of reasons
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`for allowannce: … The
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`light
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`6
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`LGD_001932
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`redirecting film system further includes a light redirecting film positioned in close proximity to
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`the light output surface for receiving light from such output surface.” D.I. 60, Ex. L at 3.
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`The term “in close proximity” is a commonly understood term. As the Federal Circuit has
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`stated, “[i]n some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person of
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`skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases
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`involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly
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`understood words.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The same or
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`similar phrases have withstood indefiniteness challenges in the courts for years. See, e.g., Young
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`v. Lumenis, Inc., 492 F.3d 1336, 1345–46 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman
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`Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Power–One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs, Inc.,
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`599 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Accentra, Inc. v. Staples, Inc., 500 Fed. Appx. 922, 930–
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`31 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Even after Nautilus, a court found that the phrases “proximate to” and “in
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`proximity to” are appropriate constructions for terms despite protests of indefiniteness by the
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`defendant. Largan Precision Co, Ltd v. Genius Elec. Optical Co., No. 13-CV-02502-JD, 2014
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`WL 5358426, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2014).
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`G. “positioned near.” The defendants in the First Texas Litigation understood this term
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`and did not argue indefiniteness. The defendants in the Second Texas Litigation argued
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`indefiniteness and failed. Ex. B at 33. The analysis of “positioned near” is similar to “in close
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`proximity.” Many of the same cases cited above for “in close proximity” also address “near”
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`terms and find them definite. See Young, 492 F.3d at 1345–46 (finding “near” sufficient for a
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`construction); Power–One, 599 F.3d at 1348 (finding the term “near” definite); Accentra, 500
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`Fed. Appx. at 930–31 (“Consistent with its ordinary meaning, we construe [near] to mean ‘at or
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`in the vicinity of.’ Whatever play remains in that construction is not enough to render the patent
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`indefinite.”).
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`7
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`LGD_001933
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`Depending on the claim, the term “positioned near” refers to different elements
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`“positioned near” each other. In claim 1 of the ’974 patent, the arrangement is “at least one LED
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`light source positioned near or against the light entrance surface.” In Figs. 1-3 and 15, the light
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`source(s) 3 are depicted near the light entrance surface, which is sufficient to permit one of
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`ordinary skill to understand the scope of this term with reasonable certainty. See, e.g., DDR
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`Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1260. Claim 5 of the ’974 patent recites “a film positioned near the light
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`emitting surface of the panel member.” For this arrangement, there are several examples in the
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`specification. See, e.g., D.I. 60, Ex. D at 4:55-61; 6:20-24; 6:30-44; Abstract; and Figs. 3 and 5.
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`Indeed, Figure 5 of the ’974 patent shows film 27 positioned near the light emitting surface of
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`panel 14.
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`During prosecution of the ’974 patent, the examiner identified several prior art references
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`that purportedly disclosed “positioned near.” In one office action the examiner stated, “Schoniger
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`et al (particularly figure 5) discloses at least a light emitting panel member 10 having a light
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`entrance surface and a light emitting surface, at least one LED light source 15 positioned near or
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`against the light entrance surface.” D.I. 60, Ex. O at 3. In another office action, the examiner
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`stated, “the tray provides a support [that] is capable of providing support for a film near the panel
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`member.” D.I. 60, Ex. N at ¶5. “The examiner’s use of the term without objection provides
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`further support for finding that [this term] has a readily understandable meaning in the context of
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`the claims.” Ex. A at 47 (citing Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350,
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`1359 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (Examiners are “assumed . . . to be familiar from their work with the level
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`of skill in the art”); PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1304 (Fed. Cir.
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`2008) (citing American Hoist); Salazar v. Procter & Gamble Co., 414 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
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`2005) (“Statements about a claim term made by an Examiner during prosecution of an
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`application may be evidence of how one of skill in the art understood the term at the time the
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`8
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`LGD_001934
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`application was filed.”)).
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`H. “optical elements.” The defendants in the First Texas Litigation understood this term.
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`The defendants in the Second Texas Litigation argued indefiniteness and failed. Ex. B at 37. Any
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`similar indefiniteness argument here should also fail. First, the specification clearly describes
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`“elements,” which one of ordinary skill would understand as “optical elements.” D.I. 60, Ex. E at
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`5:34-42 (“Print patterns of light extracting deformities … are desirably 0.006 square inch per
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`deformity/element or less … thereby eliminating the detection of gradient or banding lines that
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`are common to light extracting patterns utilizing larger elements”). Second, the specification
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`need not define optical elements in the first place because one of ordinary skill in the art would
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`already know this term. See, e.g., Ex. F (McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical
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`Terms (6th Ed. – 2003)) (defining “optical element”). “This Court has repeatedly explained that a
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`patent applicant does not need to include in the specification that which is already known to and
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`available to one of ordinary skill in the art.” Koito Mfg. Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC, 381 F.3d
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`1142, 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re Howarth, 654 F.2d 103, 105 (CCPA 1981) (“An
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`inventor need not, however, explain every detail since he is speaking to those skilled in the
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`art.”)).
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`I. “to facilitate better mixing of light rays within the cavity or recess.” The
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`defendants in the First Texas Litigation understood this term. The defendants in the Second
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`Texas Litigation argued indefiniteness and lost. Ex. B at 39. The ’177 patent provides an
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`example of better mixing at Fig. 10 and at this accompanying description: “The light sources 3
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`may be oriented at different angles relative to each other and offset to facilitate better mixing of
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`the light rays 67 in the transition area 63 as schematically shown in FIG. 10 … ” D.I. 60, Ex. A
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`at 8:12-16. The claim requires a “reflective or refractive surface to facilitate better mixing.” As
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`the Court said in the Second Texas Litigation, “a plain reading of the claim language,
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`LGD_001935
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`particularrly in light
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`of the use
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`of ‘better mmixing’ in ththe specificaation, is tha
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`t ‘better miixing’
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`means thhat the mixinng is better tthan the mixxing would bbe without thhe secondaryy surface.” EEx. B
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`at 38.
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`the First TTexas Litiggation
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`understoood this termm. The deffendants in
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`the Secondd Texas Littigation empployed a fllawed
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`argumentt to persuadee the Texas
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`court that thhis term is inndefinite. Exx. B at 44. T
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`initial arggument was
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`that “[f]irst,, the specificcation fails tto specify whhich dimens
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`here, defenddants’
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`ion is the ‘wwidth’
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`dimensioon.” Ex. G (GGillespie Deeclaration at
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`¶ 176). Yett defendants
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`dimensioons shown inn the annotatted figures below are corrrect. Ex. B aat 45.
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`DDefendants sswitched to
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`their seconndary argumment, i.e., tthat there aare three al
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`leged
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`“reasonabble interprettations” of ““more in thee width direcction”: (1) tthan the heigght directionn; (2)
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`than the
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`length direcction; and (33) than the
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`light was ottherwise travveling after
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`exiting the
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`light
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`The Court i
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`d Texas Litiigation founnd that interppretations (1
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`and Plainttiff has failled to adeqquately demmonstrate thhat its prefferred
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`source. EEx. B at 42.
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`(3) “are
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`B at 44. But t one.” Ex. By the corrects necessarilyretation 1] iinterpretaation [interp
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`is not plaausible, and iinterpretatioon (1) is neceessarily the oonly correct
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`interpretatioon (3)
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`one.
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`Innitially, interrpretation (22) is implausible becausee light only rrefracts alonng the dimennsions
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`of the innput edge, i..e., width annd height hhere. Said diifferently, thhe light passsing throug
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`h the
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`refractivee surface willl continue too travel in thhe same direection along
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`the length o
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`OOne of ordinaary skill would have inttuitively choosen interpreetation (1) ovver interprettation
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`LGD_001936
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`(3) because interpretation (1) follows the simple physics of the invention. In the invention, the
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`input edge has two dimensions – width and height. And one of ordinary skill would have known
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`that “more than width” means “more in the width than height” because height is the only other
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`dimension in which the refraction could occur. By contrast, choosing interpretation (3) would
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`introduce unnecessary confusion into the term, e.g., (a) how does one determine the magnitude
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`of the width direction of “otherwise traveling” light in the entirety of space after “exiting the
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`light source”?; or (b) how does one determine magnitude of the width direction of the refracted
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`light?; or (c) how would you compare the two to determine which is “more?” When faced with
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`the choice between the simple physics of interpretation (1) and the manifest confusion that
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`accompanies interpretation (3), one of skill would not have even considered interpretation (3).
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`Interpretation (1) is also more plausible than interpretation (3) because interpretation (1)
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`follows the context of the claim language. Immediately before the limitation in question, claim 1
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`of the ’816 patent recites that “the panel member has a greater width than height.” Therefore one
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`of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the input edge refracts light under that same
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`dimensional comparison, i.e., more in the width direction than the height direction.
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`Lastly, an examination of the prosecution history reveals that this limitation was the basis
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`for allowance of the claim. The application that led to the ’816 patent included five original
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`claims. D.I. 60, Ex. Q at 14. Original claim 4 included the limitation at issue here. Id. In the first
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`office action, the only reason the Examiner had for rejecting original claim 4 was double-
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`patenting. D.I. 60, Ex. P at 3. In the reply to that office action, the inventor used that fact to put
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`the claims in a position for allowance. The inventor moved the limitations from independent
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`claim 1 down to dependent claim 4. D.I. 60, Ex. S at 42. The inventor then argued that new claim
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`4 was allowable because the examiner never applied a § 102 or § 103 rejection to it when it
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`originally only contained the limitation at issue here. Id. at 4. In response, the examiner allowed
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`the claims. D.I. 60, Ex. R. Thus, given that this term was a reason for allowance, the Court
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`should not find that it is indefinite. Cf. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir.
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`2005) (noting that prosecution history, which is part of the intrinsic evidence, should be
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`considered for claim construction purposes because it can inform the meaning of the claim
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`language).
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`K. “output distribution defined by a greater width component than height
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`component.” The defendants in the First Texas Litigation understood this term. The defendants
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`in the Second Texas Litigation argued indefiniteness and failed. Ex. B at 47. Defendants there
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`claimed not to know where to measure the output distribution of the light source(s). That
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`argument is contrary to the plain language of the claims. For example, claim 1 of the ’660 patent
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`includes this limitation: “a plurality of light sources configured to generate light having an
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`output distribution defined by a greater width component than height component” (emphasis
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`added). The plain reading of that term shows that the output distribution is measured at the light
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`sources – the light sources themselves are “generating light having an output distribution defined
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`by a greater width component than height component.”
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`In the First Claim Construction, the Court noted that the “examiner’s use of the term
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`without objection provides further support for finding that [the term] has a readily
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`understandable meaning in the context of the claims and the specification.” Ex. A at 47 (see
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`“positioned near” term above for case citations). Here, not only did the examiner use the term
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`without objection, the examiner relied on the term to allow the claims. D.I. 60, Ex. T at 2 (“The
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`prior art when taken separately or combined fails to teach and/or show a light emitting panel
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`assembly as set forth in Claim 1 having a plurality of light sources configured to generate light
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`having an output distribution defined by a greater width component than height component ….”).
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`L. “to fit a particular application.” The defendants in the First Texas Litigation argued
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`indefiniteness for this term and lost. Ex. A at 57. The defendants in the Second Texas Litigation
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`apparently did not even consider this argument worthwhile, and didn’t pursue it. The Court in the
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`First Texas Litigation noted that the “specification discloses examples of applications,” Ex. A at
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`56 (citing 6,755,547 at 8:66-9:10, which has a counterpart passage at D.I. 60, A at 9:1-12), and
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`the Court concluded that “[o]n balance, the claim language adequately explains that the recited
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`apparatus must be tailored for an application, regardless of what that application may be.” Id.
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`II.
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`CLAIM TERMS PREVIOUSLY UNADDRESSED
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`A. “relatively low angles.” The ’196 patent was asserted in the Second Texas Litigation,
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`and the defendants there understood this term. This term is not indefinite for several reasons.
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`First, the claim itself provides the necessary information for one of ordinary skill in the art to
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`determine the scope with reasonable certainty; claim 1 itself gives context to “relatively low
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`angles.” As claimed, the light emits from the backlight at “relatively low angles” and then the
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`deformities on the film “redistribute the light emitted from the light output surface toward a
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`direction normal to the film.” D.I. 60, Ex. F at claim 1. Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art
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`would understand that, after the light is redistributed “toward a direction normal to the film,” the
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`light is no longer at a “relatively low angle.” One of ordinary skill in the art would also review
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`Figs. 1 and 2 of the ’196 patent, which show light emitting from the backlight at relatively low
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`angles with a film redistributing the light toward a direction normal to the film. The specification
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`of the ’196 patent also explains that “the backlight BL itself may be designed to emit more of the
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`light rays at lower angles to increase the amount of light emitted by the backlight and rely on the
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`light redirecting film to redistribute more of the emitted light within a desired viewing
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`angle . . . .” Id. at 7:33-41. And the file history of the ’196 patent shows that this term was a
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`reason for allowance of the claim. In the Notice of Allowability, the examiner stated, “[t]he
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`following is an examiner’s statement of reasons for allowance: … IN [sic] a first embodiment,
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`LGD_001939
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`the light is outputted from the light output surface at relatively low angles”. D.I. 60, Ex. L at 3.
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`B. “substantially smaller.” The intrinsic evidence related to this term is more than
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`sufficient for one of ordinary skill in the art to determine the reasonable scope of this claim. The
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`claim language itself provides an objective anchor: “wherein each of the deformities has a length
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`and width substantially smaller than the length and width of the panel surface.” D.I. 60, Ex. C at
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`claim 1 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the specification explains that
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`Print patterns of light extracting deformities 21 … are desirably 0.006 square inch
`per deformity/element or less. Also, print patterns that are 60 lines per inch or
`finer are desirably employed, thus making the deformities or shapes 21 in the
`print patterns nearly invisible to the human eye in a particular application thereby
`eliminating the detection of gradient or banding lines that are common to light
`extracting patterns utilizing larger elements.
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`Id. at col. 7, ll. 4-12. Also, the examiner of the ’973 patent found at least two prior art references
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`that allegedly disclosed the “substantially smaller” limitation. D.I. 60, Ex. M at 3, 6, and 8.  
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`C. “greatest at approximate midpoints between adjacent pairs of light sources.” This
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`term is not indefinite for many of the same reasons as discussed for the “in close proximity”
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`term. Fig. 39B shows an unequivocal example of the deformities being “greatest at approximate
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`midpoints between adjacent pairs of light sources.” Also, the examiner specifically mentioned
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`this limitation as the reas