UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`
`
`ORACLE CORPORATION, NETAPP INC. and
`HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD.,
`Petitioners,
`v.
`CROSSROADS SYSTEMS, INC.
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`Case IPR2014-01209
`Patent No. 7,051,147
`____________
`
`
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`PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS’
`MOTION TO EXCLUDE
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`
`
`
`____________
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
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`
`
`ORACLE CORPORATION, NETAPP INC. and
`HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD.,
`Petitioners,
`v.
`CROSSROADS SYSTEMS, INC.
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`Case IPR2014-01209
`Patent No. 7,051,147
`____________
`
`
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`PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS’
`MOTION TO EXCLUDE
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`Along with this response, Patent Owner files Exhibits 2350 and 2351 which
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`were timely served as supplemental evidence on June 16, 2015. See Attachment A.
`A. Exhibit 2311
`Exhibit 2311 is Admissible
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`Ex. 2311 is a “demonstrative chronology
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`detailing Verrazano development milestones from the date of conception to the
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`constructive reduction to practice as shown in the foregoing exhibits.” Patent
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`Owner’s Resp., Paper 29 (“POR”) at 30-31. Ex. 2311 illustrates—in a way that
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`helps the Board identify and understand—the facts that are independently set forth
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`in the referenced exhibits. All of the exhibits referenced in Ex. 2311 were
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`specifically discussed in Patent Owner’s Response, generally with either specific
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`page references (where appropriate), or parentheticals explaining the significance.
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`POR at 30-32. The Board has the discretion to allow the exhibit as a demonstrative
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`under FRE 611(a). Fed. R. Evid. 611(a), 1972 Advisory Committee Notes; U.S. v.
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`McElroy, 587 F.3d 73, 81-82 (1st Cir. 2009) (“Our case law permits the use of
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`summary tools to clarify complex testimony and evidence . . . Rule 611(a)
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`testimony and exhibits typically are used as pedagogical devices to clarify and
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`simplify complex testimony or other information and evidence or to assist counsel
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`in the presentation of argument to the court or jury.”) (internal quotation marks and
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`citations omitted). Ex. 2311 is merely a helpful and convenient reference in
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`understanding the timeline of events as set forth in the underlying evidence.
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`1
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`The statements in the “Event” column do not “improperly characterize the
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`evidence,” (Mot. at 2); in any event, the Board, which has access to the substantive
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`evidence cited, may readily determine this without excluding the entire exhibit.
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`No Improper Incorporation By Reference “The prohibition against
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`incorporation by reference minimizes the chance that an argument would be
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`overlooked . . . incorporation is a pointless imposition on the court’s time as it
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`requires the judges to play archeologist with the record.” Rules of Practice for
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`Trials Before PTAB, Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,612, 48,617 (Aug. 14, 2012)
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`(emphasis added). The rule prevents the improper incorporation of arguments, not
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`citations to evidence. 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a). Petitioners characterization of the
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`“Events” column in Ex. 2311 as argument is proven false by a cursory review. Ex.
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`2311 is merely a summary demonstrative exhibit, which does the exact opposite of
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`improper incorporation—it illumines the argument in Patent Owner’s Response,
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`while saving the Board time by pointing to the exact location of the relevant
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`evidence in the voluminous record.1
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`1 Petitioners’ argument that it is improper incorporation to include specific page
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`citations in Ex. 2311 that are not found in the Patent Owner’s Response (Mot. at 2)
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`is unsupported by authority or even explanation, and Patent Owner cannot
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`accordingly respond. To the extent Petitioners introduce such an explanation or
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`authority in their reply, it is improper.
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`2
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`B.
`Exhibits 2300-2304, 2306-2310, and 2312-2323
`1.
`Documents Referenced in Bianchi Declaration
`Rule 803(6) – Business Records Exception
`Petitioners attack certain
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`exhibits collectively2 as not meeting the business records exception, apparently
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`based on the premise that they are laboratory notebooks. Of course, they are not all
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`laboratory notebooks; the only exhibits that could be considered such are Exhibits
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`2313 and 2322.3 Petitioners’ appeal to Corning, which relates to lab notebooks,
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`does not apply to the other exhibits. Nor does Petitioners’ appeal to Alpert v.
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`Slatin—none of the cited exhibits are “reports of scientific research and tests.”
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`Rather, these documents were created by Crossroads as it conducted its business—
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`the design and creation of new products. See Ex. 2350 ¶ 5.
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`Petitioners assert that Crossroads has not properly shown the elements of the
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`exception by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness. Mot. at 4.
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`Petitioners’ arguments are premised on the following implicit requirements: the
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`custodian/witness must (1) personally “create, store, or supervise the creation or
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`storage” of the records (Mot. at 5); (2) be “involved with – or [possess] first-hand
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`or personal knowledge relating to” the creation or storage of the records (id.), (3)
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`have been the records’ custodian at the time the records were made (Mot. at 5-6).
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`2 Exhibits 2303, 2307-09, 2312, 2314, 2316-21, and 2323. Mot. at 6.
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`3 Which Petitioners apparently exclude from this particular challenge. Mot. at 6.
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`3
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`Petitioners provide no citations to authority for these underlying premises. This is
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`not surprising, considering that they contradict well-established law.
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`First, “it is not necessary that a sponsoring witness be employed by the
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`business at the time of the making of each record.” United States v. Evans, 572
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`F.2d 455, 490 (5th Cir. 1978); see also United States v. Scallion, 533 F.2d 903, 915
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`(5th Cir. 1976) (“It is argued that some of the witnesses . . . were not employed
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`there at the time the records were made. However, in the case of each record
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`introduced, the present custodian testified that the record was kept in the regular
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`course of the hotel’s business”). There is also no requirement that the witness have
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`been personally involved with the creation or storage of the records:
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`Under Rule 803(6), a custodian or an otherwise “qualified witness”
`can lay the evidentiary foundation to ensure the records’
`trustworthiness. A “qualified witness” is not required to have
`“personally participated in or observed the creation of the
`document,” United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 574 (7th Cir.
`1986), or to have known who actually recorded the information, see
`United States v. Dominguez, 835 F.2d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 1987).
`There is no requirement that the witness be able to personally attest
`to its accuracy. See United States v. Duncan, 919 F.2d 981, 986
`(5th Cir. 1990). The term “qualified witness” is interpreted broadly.
`It requires only someone who understands the system used to
`record and maintain the information. See Moore, 791 F.2d at 574-
`75. “The witness ‘need only be someone with knowledge of the
`procedure governing the creation and maintenance of the type of
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`4
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`record sought to be admitted.’“ Dominguez, 835 F.2d at 698
`(quoting United States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678, 693 (7th Cir.
`1985)).
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`United States v. Sofidiya, No. 97-4681, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 27056, *8-9 (4th
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`Cir. Oct. 23, 1998) (emphasis added). Based on Petitioners’ objection that Mr.
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`Bianchi did not have knowledge of the procedures at the time of the records’
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`creation, Crossroads provided supplemental evidence showing that, in fact, he had
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`been instructed as to those procedures. Ex. 2351 ¶¶ 3-5. Crossroads also provided
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`the declaration of John Middleton, who provided additional testimony as to the
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`relevant procedures in place when the business records in question were created
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`and stored. Ex. 2350 ¶¶ 3-6. This testimony satisfies the rule. See, e.g., Better
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`Bags, Inc. v. Redi Bag USA LLC, C.A. No. H-09-3093, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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`130525, at *21-23 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2011) (explaining that declarant’s testimony
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`that she had been instructed on the standard practices during the time period the
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`records were made satisfied the rule, especially in light of a supporting declaration
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`from the witness at the time the records were made that it was the standard practice
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`of the business “to make and store contemporaneous records of the regularly
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`conducted business during the time period at issue.”)
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`Exhibits 2303 and 2323
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`Petitioners correctly point out that these letters
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`were not created by Crossroads, but by Crossroads’ patent counsel. The letters
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`enclosed draft patent applications. These letters are authenticated under FRE
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`5
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`
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`901(b)(4), which states that the “appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns,
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`or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all the
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`circumstances,” is sufficient authentication. In addition to the appearance and
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`distinctive characteristics of these letters, which indicate they come from
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`Crossroads’ counsel at Baker Botts, additional circumstances indicate their
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`authenticity. First, Mr. Bianchi testified that these were duplicates of documents
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`contained in Crossroads’ patent files and kept during the ordinary course of
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`business. Ex. 2324 ¶ 2(a). Second, Patent Owner provided the sworn testimony of
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`the author (prosecution counsel), taken much closer in time to the date of the letter
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`than the current proceeding, that the signature on Ex. 2303 was, in fact, his own.
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`Ex. 2304 at 20:23-22:2 (referencing Bates No. 41920). Overall, the circumstances
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`indicate these are authentic letters.4
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`Documents received by a business, although not themselves created by the
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`business, are properly considered business records under FRE 803(6). See, e.g.,
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`Falcon Jet Corp. v. King Enters., 678 F.2d 73, 77 (8th Cir. 1982) (explaining that
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`4 The fact that Ex. 2323 references two enclosures but includes only one does not
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`indicate a lack of trustworthiness as to the source of the information, or the method
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`or circumstances of their preparation, as Petitioners assert (Mot. at 6). FRE
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`803(6)(E). At worst, it indicates a mere oversight by the sender in failing to include
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`the second enclosure.
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`6
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`invoices received from businesses were admissible business records pursuant to
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`803(6)); Black Sea & Baltic Gen. Ins. Co. v. S.S. Hellenic Destiny, 575 F. Supp.
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`685, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (records properly admitted that were actually received
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`during the ordinary course of business). Here, the relevant record made by
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`Crossroads under FRE 803(6) was Crossroads’ receipt and storage in the ordinary
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`course of business. In such circumstances, the demands of the business records
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`exception for the admission of trustworthy evidence have been met.
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`Patent Owner relies on Ex. 2303 to prove complete conception prior to the
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`critical period. POR at 28. Patent Owner relies on Ex. 2323 to show that its patent
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`counsel was working on constructively reducing the invention to practice during
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`the critical period. Id. at 24-25. Thus, the material facts for which these documents
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`are relevant is that they were in existence and sent by prosecution counsel on the
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`indicated dates. The fact that Crossroads received and kept these records in its
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`patent files pursuant to its normal procedures for such documents is therefore
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`sufficient to satisfy the business records exception.
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`If this is not sufficient, these exhibits should be admitted pursuant to the
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`residual exception of FRE 807. The documents and circumstances, as discussed,
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`have equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, are offered as
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`evidence of a material fact, are more probative on the point for which offered (the
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`very existence and dates of the documents themselves) than any other evidence,
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`7
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`and admitting them best serves the purposes of both the rules and the interests of
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`justice. The documents themselves provide the declarant’s names and addresses.
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`Exhibits 2307 and 2308
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`Exhibits 2307 and 2308 are Crossroads’
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`business records, admissible pursuant to the testimony of Brian Bianchi. Ex. 2324
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`¶ 2(b). The fact that the documents contain legends bearing the name of Infinity
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`CommStor, LLC,5 is irrelevant given this testimony. Petitioners took the deposition
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`of Mr. Bianchi, and had ample opportunity to explore any confusion as to why or
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`how these documents were Crossroads’ business records; however, they did not
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`ask any questions regarding these documents. See Exs. 1221-22. Petitioners also
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`failed to specify this grounds of objection (that the documents appear to be Infinity
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`CommStor records) with sufficient particularity to allow Crossroads an opportunity
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`to correct it in the form of supplemental evidence, and have therefore waived this
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`grounds pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1). See Ex. 1236 at 6 (failing to specify
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`particular grounds).
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`Exhibits 2312
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`Petitioners’ objections are (1) relevance pursuant to FRE
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`402, and (2) inadmissible hearsay. Mot. at 7. Petitioners did not object on the basis
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`of relevance and have waived the objection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1).
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`See Ex. 1236 (failing to specify relevance objection to Ex. 2312). Patent Owner
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`5 Infinity CommStor is Crossroads’ precursor company. Ex. 2301 at p. 5 of 46
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`(internal page/line 111:15-25)
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`8
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`also provided supplemental evidence as to the meaning of drawing revision
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`updates. Ex. 2350 ¶ 4. As to hearsay, the document is a Crossroads business record
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`admissible pursuant to the testimony of Mr. Bianchi. Ex. 2324.
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`Exhibits 2318 and 2321
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`Petitioners cite no requirement that business
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`records bear an author’s name or that the proponent of a business record identify
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`the author, and no such requirements exist. See FRE 902(11) and 803(6). These
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`documents are authenticated and admissible pursuant to the testimony of Mr.
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`Bianchi. Ex. 2324 ¶ 2(b).
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`Exhibits 2312, 2316-2320
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`Petitioners seek exclusion pursuant to FRE
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`401-402. Mot at 7-8. Petitioners did not object on these bases, waiving the
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`objection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1). See Ex. 1236. Moreover, Patent
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`Owner’s Response cites these documents as evidence. POR at 30. Petitioners cite
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`no basis for their unexplained “meaningful discussion” requirement (Mot. at 7-8),
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`and therefore Patent Owner has no way to distinguish or otherwise analyze case
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`law on the issue, to the extent any exists.
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`2.
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`Documents “not specifically referenced” in Bianchi
`Declaration
`Exhibits 2301, 2302, 2304, 2306, and 2310
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`Exhibit 2301 contains
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`trial transcripts of the suit brought by Crossroads against Chaparral Network
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`Storage, Inc., for infringement of the ‘972 Patent at issue with regards to
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`Crossroads’ conception and reduction to practice arguments. Exs. 2302, 2306, and
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`9
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`2310 contain excerpts from the depositions of inventors Geoff Hoese and Jeffry
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`Russell from the same case. Ex. 2304 contains excerpts from the deposition of
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`Anthony Peterman, Crossroads’ prosecution counsel that wrote the ‘972 Patent
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`Application.
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`With the exception of Mr. Peterman’s deposition, Patent Owner offered this
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`testimony to provide context for its conception and reduction to practice
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`arguments. See POR at 28-32. Essentially, this testimony supplements Patent
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`Owner’s other evidence and provides context for the Board, but is not the sole
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`basis for Patent Owner’s arguments. Accordingly, the Board should admit it
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`pursuant to FRE 611 as pedagogical in nature.
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`Ex. 2304, the Peterman deposition, relates to Ex. 2303, the letter and draft
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`patent application sent by Peterman to Crossroads which itself proves complete
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`conception before the critical date. At his deposition, taken approximately three
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`years after he sent Ex. 2303 to Crossroads, Peterman testified that he could not
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`remember sending the letter. Ex. 2304 at 21:24-22:2 (“Q. So did you forward a
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`draft of the application . . . on July 11th, 1997? A. You know, I don’t remember
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`that I did, but the letter says I did. I have no reason to think that I would – I mean,
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`the letter says I sent him a draft. I guess I did.”). Peterman’s only relevant
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`testimony for purposes of the instant proceeding is that the signature on Ex. 2303
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`was, in fact, his. Ex. 2304 at 21:2-4. Under FRE 804(a)(3), accordingly, Mr.
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`Peterman is considered unavailable because he testified as to not remembering the
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`10
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`subject matter—the circumstances surrounding the letter. FRE 804(a)(3). Mr.
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`Peterman testified that, in November 2000, he had no memory of sending a letter
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`in 1997. Peterman’s sworn testimony that he could not remember in November
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`2000 makes him unavailable under the rule fifteen years later.
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`Because Peterman must be considered unavailable under 804(a)(3), the only
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`question is whether Patent Owner offers his testimony against “a party who had—
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`or, in a civil case, whose predecessor in interest had—an opportunity and similar
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`motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination.” FRE 804(b)(1).
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`Petitioners assert that merely because they are not corporate “successors-in-interest
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`to the parties against whom the testimony was being offered in those earlier cases,”
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`they are not considered “predecessors in interest” by Rule 804(b)(1). This is not
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`the law.
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`Those circuit courts that have considered the issue have explained that a
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`“predecessor in interest” pursuant to the rule is any party having (1) a motive,
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`similar to the one held by the present party, to cross-examine the witness about the
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`same matter; and (2) an adequate opportunity for such examination. For example,
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`the Third Circuit explained that:
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`While we do not endorse an extravagant interpretation of who or
`what constitutes a “predecessor in interest,” we prefer one that is
`realistically generous over one that is formalistically grudging. We
`believe that what has been described as “the practical and expedient
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`11
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`view” expresses the congressional intention: “if it appears that in
`the former suit a party having a like motive to cross-examine about
`the same matters as the present party would have, was accorded an
`adequate opportunity for such examination, the testimony may be
`received against the present party.” Under these circumstances, the
`previous party having like motive to develop the testimony about
`the same material facts is, in the final analysis, a predecessor in
`interest to the present party.
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`Lloyd v. American Export Lines, Inc., 580 F.2d 1179, 1187 (3d Cir. 1978). See
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`Horne v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 4 F.3d 276, 282-283 (4th Cir. 1993)
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`(“[P]rivity is not the gravamen of the analysis. Instead, the party against whom the
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`deposition is offered must point up distinctions in her case not evident in the earlier
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`litigation that would preclude similar motives of witness examination.”); Clay v.
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`Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 722 F.2d 1289, 1294-1295, (6th Cir. 1983) (adopting
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`the Third Circuit’s position in Lloyd); Rule v. International Association of Bridge,
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`Structural Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 396, 568 F.2d 558, 569 (8th Cir.
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`1977); see also Culver v. Asbestos Defendants (BP), No. C 10-03484 SI, 2010 U.S.
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`Dist. LEXIS 125130, *11-12, (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2010) (“It does not appear that
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`any circuit court has expressly disavowed this interpretation of Rule 804.”).
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`Here, because the context and issue in the prior proceedings was identical to
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`that here—swearing behind the Kikuchi reference in a patent infringement action—
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`the prior parties had the exact same motives as Petitioners, and of course
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`12
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`opportunity to do so in the deposition. Accordingly, Mr. Peterman’s prior
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`testimony should be admitted.
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`Even if not admitted under FRE 804, Mr. Peterman’s testimony—along with
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`the additional prior testimony in Exhibits 2301, 2302, 2306, and 2310—should be
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`admitted under the residual exception in FRE 807. The fact that this evidence is
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`sworn testimony given in a court of law provides “equivalent circumstantial
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`guarantees of trustworthiness.” It is offered as evidence of material facts. In the
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`Peterman deposition, the specific material fact is whether it is his signature on Ex.
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`2303. For the other transcripts, as evidence corroborative of Crossroads’
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`conception and reduction to practice. The Peterman deposition is more probative
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`on the point—whether it is his signature—than any other evidence Patent Owner
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`could obtain through reasonable efforts, and admitting it will serve the purposes of
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`these rules and the interests of justice. Courts in similar situations have found prior
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`sworn testimony also admissible under FRE 870. See, e.g., Dartez v. Fibreboard
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`Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 462-63 (5th Cir. 1985) (“If these defendants had been present
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`at the deposition, it is unlikely that any additional material information would have
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`been elicited. . . . [W]e conclude that this sworn testimony taken at an adversary
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`proceeding presents the ‘equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness’ required by [the
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`residual exception] . . . .).”
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`Exhibits 2300, 2313, and 2322
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`Exhibit 2300 is Crossroads’ business
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`record authenticated by Mr. Bianchi and is thus admissible. Ex. 2324. Exhibits
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`13
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`2313 and 2322 are an inventor’s notebooks and authentication testimony from the
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`inventor was cited in Ex. 2301 at 44-45 (referencing Exhibits 263 and 274).
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`However, as with the preceding exhibits, these exhibits are not critical to Patent
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`Owner’s arguments on conception and diligence. However, given the
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`circumstances they should be admitted pursuant to FRE 807. Petitioner failed to
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`preserve its FRE 401-402 objections to Ex. 2313. See Ex. 1236 at 6.
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`C. Exhibit 2050 (Schedule of License Agreements)
`Regarding the first six columns of Ex. 2050, Ms. Crane testified that she
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`prepared them all based on the settlement agreements in Ex. 2052. Ex. 1223 at
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`24:24-25:10. These columns are thus an admissible summary under FRE 1006.
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`However, Petitioners challenge the entirety of the schedule based on issues with
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`the last two columns. One of these two columns provide Bates numbers for the
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`license agreements in Ex. 2052, and were added by counsel purely for the
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`convenience of the Board and Petitioners in identifying the relevant agreements.
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`The other column indicates whether or not there was litigation with the licensee
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`regarding the ‘972 patent family, and is completely consistent with whether or not
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`the licenses in Ex. 2052 reflect on their face the existence of such litigation. These
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`columns were provided for the convenience of the Board, and their content is
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`completely contained and may be verified from the face of the licenses in Ex.
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`2052. Accordingly, these last two columns should also be admitted under FRE
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`1006. However, to the extent the Board believes they are improper, Patent Owner
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`14
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`requests the Board, in the interest of justice pursuant to FRE 102, permit Patent
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`Owner to file a corrected version omitting these two columns.
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`D. Exhibits 2044-45 (Sales Information) and Ex. 2043 (Bianchi
`Declaration) ¶ 6
`Exhibit 2044 contains a summary of Crossroads’ shipment and sales records.
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`Ex. 1221 at 159:3-161:2. It is thus admissible pursuant to FRE 1006. The underlying
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`records were available pursuant to the rule, but Petitioners have never requested
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`examination or copying, nor did they ever object to the lack of availability of the
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`records. Ex. 1236 at 3-4. Accordingly, Ex. 2044 is admissible based on Mr. Bianchi’s
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`testimony in Ex. 2043. Ex. 2045 is merely a demonstrative based on the information
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`in Ex. 2044 and should be admitted pursuant to FRE 611(a). U.S. v. McElroy, 587
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`F.3d at 81-82. The remainder of Petitioners’ objections to these exhibits go to the
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`appropriate weight, and not admissibility of the evidence, and should be overruled.
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`Finally, paragraph 6 of Mr. Bianchi’s declaration does not purport to offer an
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`expert opinion, but his impression based on his personal knowledge and experience at
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`Crossroads, and is therefore admissible pursuant to FRE 701. Ex. 2043 ¶ 6.
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`
`/James H. Hall/
`James H. Hall
`Reg. No. 66,317
`Counsel for Patent Owner
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`Dated: October 6, 2015
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned certifies service of a copy of this Patent Owner’s Response
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`to Petitioners’ Motion to Exclude, Exs. 2350 and 2351, and Patent Owner’s Exhibit
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`List, on October 6, 2015 on counsel for Petitioners by e-mail (pursuant to
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`agreement) at the below e-mail addresses:
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`Greg Gardella
`CPDocketGardella@oblon.com
`Scott McKeown
`CPDocketMcKeown@oblon.com
`Oblon Spivak
`1940 Duke Street
`Alexandria, VA 22314
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`Dated: October 6, 2015
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`/James H. Hall/
`James H. Hall
`Reg. No. 66,317
`Counsel for Patent Owner
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`1
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`Attachment A
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`Attachment A
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`Hall, James H.
`
`From:
`Sent:
`To:
`Cc:
`Subject:
`Attachments:
`
`James Hall
`Tuesday, June 16, 2015 10:06 PM
`CP Docket Gardella; 'CP Docket McKeown'
`CrossroadsIPR; crossroadsipr
`Crossroads v. Oracle et. al. - IPR2014-01197, -1207, and -1209,
`2015 06 16 Final Signed Bianchi Declaration.pdf; 2015.06.08 Middleton_Declaration.pdf;
`2015.06.16 EBF Declaration.pdf; 2015.06.16 Walker Declaration.pdf; 2015-06-16
`Guaragna Declaration Final.PDF; IPR2014-01197 Adair Decl.pdf;
`IPR2014-01197-1207-1209 Levy Decl Final.pdf; Levy Appendix 5.pdf; Levy Appendix
`6.pdf; Levy Appendix 7.pdf; Levy Appendix 8.pdf; Levy Appendix 9.pdf; Levy Appendix
`1.pdf; Levy Appendix 2.pdf; Levy Appendix 3.pdf
`
`Counsel:
`Attached is your service copy of Patent Owner’s supplemental evidence in the referenced proceedings, pursuant to 37
`C.F.R. 42.64(b)(2).
`There will be multiple emails due to size limitations for your email server. I will confirm the total number of emails when
`sending is complete. There should be 15 attachments to this email.
`
`James H. Hall | Partner | Blank Rome LLP
`717 Texas Avenue, Suite 1400 | Houston, Texas 77002
`Direct: 832.446.2493 | Email: jhall@counselip.com
`
`Confidentiality Notice:
`The information in this email is protected by the attorney client privilege and/or the attorney work product doctrine.
`Any unauthorized review, dissemination, use or copying of this email and any attachments, or the information contained
`herein, is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient or an authorized representative of the intended recipient,
`please delete this email from your system without copying it and notify the sender by reply e-mail, so that our records
`can be corrected.
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