Case 9:08-cv-00164-RC Document 326 Filed 12/18/09 Page 1 of 31 PageID #: 3336
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`**NOT FOR PRINTED PUBLICATION**
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`LUFKIN DIVISION
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`AFFINITY LABS OF TEXAS, LLC,
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`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
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`BMW NORTH AMERICA, LLC, ET AL.,
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`Defendants.
`
`____________________________________
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`AFFINITY LABS OF TEXAS, LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
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`ALPINE ELECTRONICS OF AMERICA,
`INC., ET AL.,
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`Defendants.
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`§§§§§§§§§§_
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`§§§§§§§§§§§
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`CIVIL ACTION No. 9:08CV164
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`JUDGE RON CLARK
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`_____
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`____________________________________
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`CIVIL ACTION No. 9:08CV171
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`JUDGE RON CLARK
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`ORDER CONSTRUING CLAIM TERMS OF UNITED STATES PATENT NO. 7,324,833
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`Plaintiff Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC (“Affinity”) filed suit against Defendants BMW
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`North America LLC, et al. (Civil Action No. 9:08CV164) and Defendants Alpine Electronics of
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`America, Inc., et al. (Civil Action No. 9:08CV171), claiming infringement of United States
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`Patent No. 7,324,833 (“the ‘833 patent”). The court conducted a joint Markman hearing for these
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`two cases to assist in interpreting the meaning of the claim terms in dispute.1 Having carefully
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`considered the patent, the parties’ contentions as presented in their briefs, and the arguments of
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`counsel, the court now makes the following findings and construes the disputed claim terms.2
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`I. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION STANDARD OF REVIEW
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`Claim construction is a matter of law. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S.
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`370, 388-91, 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1395-96 (1996) (“Markman II”); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc.,
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`138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “The duty of the trial judge is to determine the meaning of
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`the claims at issue, and to instruct the jury accordingly.” Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol
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`1 These two related cases remain as separate actions on the court’s docket, and will be
`tried independently. However, because they involve the same patent, and the accused products in
`each case involve related technologies, the court conducted one claim construction hearing for
`both cases. The parties did not object to conducting a joint Markman hearing. [See 9:08CV164,
`Doc. #196, Tr. of Case Mgmt. Conference at p. 66, l. 11 to p. 68, l. 15.] The transcript of the
`Markman hearing contains a number of representations by and agreements of the parties, as well
`as answers by their experts to technical questions from the court, all of which will not be
`repeated here, but which may assist in understanding the issues presented. This order governs in
`the event of any conflict between the order and the court’s preliminary analysis at the hearing.
`Court’s Exhibit Nos. 1-15 were discussed at the hearing and are part of the record as
`[9:08CV164, Doc. #296-2] and [9:08CV171, Doc. #155-2]. These exhibits will be cited in this
`order as “Ct.’s Ex. No. ___.” The transcript of the claim construction hearing is found at
`[9:08CV164, Doc. #305], and will be cited in this order as “Tr. at p. ___, l. __.”
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`2 To become familiar with the technology underlying the ‘833 patent from the
`perspective of one skilled in the art, and to better understand the technical aspects of the parties’
`arguments, the court appointed Dr. Frank Shipman as technical advisor. [See 9:08CV164, Docs.
`#213 & 220; 9:08CV171, Docs. #124 & 125.] Dr. Shipman received his Ph.D. in computer
`science from the University of Colorado in 1993, his M.S. in computer science from the
`University of Colorado in 1990, and his B.S. in Electrical Engineering from Rice University in
`1988. He is currently a professor at Texas A&M University, where he has been on the faculty
`since 1995. His research interests include intelligent user interfaces, hypertext, computers and
`education, multimedia, new media, computers and design, computer-human interaction, and
`computer-supported cooperative work. His research has resulted in more than 100 refereed
`publications, including two Association for Computing Machinery best paper awards. Dr.
`Shipman’s curriculum vitae can be found at http://www.csdl.tamu.edu/~shipman/vitae.pdf.
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`Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1020, 116 S. Ct. 2554 (1996).
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`“‘[T]he claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to
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`exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting
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`Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir.
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`2004)), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1170, 126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006). “Because the patentee is required to
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`‘define precisely what his invention is,’ . . . it is ‘unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the
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`law, to construe it in a manner different from the plain import of its terms.’” Id. (quoting White
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`v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 52, 7 S. Ct. 72, 75 (1886)).
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`The words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning. Id.
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`“[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have
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`to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1313.
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`Analyzing how a person of ordinary skill in the art understands a claim term is the starting point
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`of claim interpretation. Id.
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`A person of ordinary skill in the art is “deemed to read the claim term not only in the
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`context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire
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`patent, including the specification.” Id. Where a claim term has a particular meaning in the field
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`of the art, the court looks to “‘those sources available to the public to show what a person of skill
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`in the art would have understood [the] disputed claim language to mean.’” Id. at 1314 (quoting
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`Innova, 381 F.3d at 1116). Those sources include “‘the words of the claims themselves, the
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`remainder of the specification, the prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning
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`relevant scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the state of the art.’” Id.
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`(quoting Innova, 381 F.3d at 1116).
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`The intrinsic evidence, that is, the patent’s specification and, if in evidence, the
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`prosecution history, is important in claim construction. Id. at 1315-17. “[T]he specification ‘is
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`always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the
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`single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Id. at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v.
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`Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The patent specification and the
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`prosecution history may clarify the definition of terms used in the claims, or may show that the
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`patentee has clearly disavowed the ordinary meaning of a term in favor of some special meaning.
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`See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979-80 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Markman
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`I”), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996). A claim term takes on its ordinary and
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`accustomed meaning unless the patentee demonstrated an express intent to impart a novel
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`meaning by redefining the term “with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision” in the
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`patent specification or prosecution history. Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313,
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`1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The patentee may demonstrate an intent to deviate from the ordinary
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`meaning “by redefining the term or by characterizing the invention in the intrinsic record using
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`words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim
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`scope.” Id. at 1327. If the patentee clearly intended to provide his own definitions for claim
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`terms, the “inventor’s lexicography governs.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316.
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`In addition to the intrinsic evidence, a court is also authorized to review extrinsic
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`evidence, such as dictionaries, inventor testimony, and learned treatises. Id. at 1317. For
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`instance, in some cases “the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person of
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`skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction . . . involves
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`little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words”;
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`a general purpose dictionary may be helpful in these instances. Id. at 1314. However, extrinsic
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`evidence is “in general less reliable” than the intrinsic evidence in determining how to read claim
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`terms. Id. at 1318. Therefore, while extrinsic evidence may be used to help educate the court
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`regarding the field of the invention and what a person of ordinary skill in the art would
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`understand claim terms to mean, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the
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`intrinsic evidence in order to result in a reliable interpretation of claim scope. Id. at 1319.
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`II. PATENT BACKGROUND AND TECHNOLOGY
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`The ‘833 patent is directed toward a system and method for connecting and integrating a
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`portable electronic device, such as an MP3 player, with a second electronic device, such as a
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`car’s sound system. The portable electronic device communicates metadata—i.e., information
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`about a particular data set that may describe how, when, and by whom the data set was created,
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`accessed, or modified; its size; and how it was formatted—to the second electronic device. This
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`metadata may include information about song, artist, album, and playlist names. The metadata is
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`used by the second electronic device to create a graphical user interface that is shown on the
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`device’s display. The second electronic device can then be used to select songs stored on the
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`portable electronic device, using “soft buttons” on the GUI. The ‘833 patent also claims a
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`mounting system to connect the two devices.
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`III. PERSON OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
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`After considering the parties’ proposals and arguments made by the parties at the
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`Markman hearing, the court finds that a person of ordinary skill in the art is an individual with
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`the equivalent of a four-year degree from an accredited institution (usually denoted in this
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`country as a B.S. or Bachelor’s degree) in Electrical Engineering (EE), Mechanical Engineering
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`(ME), or Computer Science (CS, with at least two semesters of coursework in EE and/or ME),
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`together with at least two years of experience working with, developing, or designing electronic
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`devices with user interfaces. Advanced education in EE, ME, or CS might substitute for some of
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`the experience, while extensive experience in working with, developing, or designing electronic
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`devices with user interfaces might substitute for some of the educational requirements. The
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`parties do not object to this definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. [See Tr. at p. 10,
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`l. 10 to p. 12, l. 21 (discussing Ct.’s Ex. No. 1).]
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`IV. DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS IN THE ‘833 PATENT
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`The disputed claim terms are found in claims 1, 17, 28, or 29 of the ‘833 patent. These
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`claims are set out below, with the disputed terms in bold.
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`1. An audio system, comprising:
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`a portable electronic device having a display, a memory, and an audio file
`player;
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`a first portion of software saved at the portable electronic device and configured
`to initiate a displaying of a graphical interface item on the display, the
`graphical interface item comprising a name associated with an audio file
`saved in the memory;
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`a mounting location on the portable electronic device that includes a physical
`interface configured to communicatively couple the portable electronic
`device to a different electronic device having an associated display; and
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`an other portion of software saved at the portable electronic device and
`configured to communicate a representation of the graphical interface
`item to the different electronic device via the physical interface to
`facilitate a displaying of the representation on the associated display,
`wherein the portable electronic device is configured to communicate
`interface information to the different electronic device in order to allow
`a user to view at least a partial representation of a graphical user
`interface that includes the graphical interface item on the associated display,
`wherein the graphical user interface comprises a plurality of preprogramed
`soft buttons that are linked to respective audio information sources.
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,324,833, col. 18, ll. 39-61 (filed Sept. 23, 2004).
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`17. An audio system, comprising:
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`a portable electronic device that has a display, a memory, and a processor;
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`software saved at the portable electronic device and configured to direct the
`portable electronic device to save an audio file in the memory, to associate
`the audio file with a name, to include the name in a graphical menu of
`available content, to present the name on the display of the portable
`electronic device, and to communicate a collection of information
`comprising the name to a different electronic device that has an associated
`display such that a user can interact with the different electronic device:
`(1) to navigate through a plurality of audio files; (2) to view at least a
`portion of the graphical menu on the associated display, wherein the
`portion comprises the name; and (3) to select an available audio file for
`processing; and
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`wherein the portable electronic device is configured to communicate interface
`information to the different electronic device in order to allow the user
`to view the graphical menu on the associated display in a graphical user
`interface that includes a plurality of preprogramed soft buttons that are
`linked to respective audio information sources.
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`‘833 patent, col. 19, l. 46 to col. 20, l. 3.
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`28. An audio system, comprising:
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`an automobile having a sound system that includes an electronic device with an
`associated display and a user interface mechanism;
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`a mount communicatively coupled to the electronic device and configured to
`engage a physical interface of a portable electronic device that has a
`display, a memory, a processor, and software saved at the portable electronic
`device and configured to direct the portable electronic device to save an
`audio file in the memory, to associate the audio file with a name, to include
`the name in a menu of available content, to present the name on the display
`of the portable electronic device, and to communicate a collection of
`information comprising the name to the electronic device such that a user
`can interact with the electronic device: (1) to navigate through a plurality
`of audio files; (2) to view at least a partial representation of the menu on
`the associated display; and (3) to select an available audio file for
`processing; and
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`wherein the electronic device is configured to receive the collection of
`information and to present the partial representation of the menu on the
`associated display, further wherein the partial representation of the menu is
`presented on the associated display in a graphical user interface that includes
`a plurality of preprogrammed soft buttons that are linked to respective
`audio information sources.
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`‘833 patent, col. 20, l. 41 to col. 21, l. 3.
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`29. The system of claim 28, wherein the electronic device is configured to receive
`the collection of information and to present the name on the associated display
`by software embedded in the electronic device as firmware.
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`‘833 patent, col. 21, ll. 4-7.
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`V. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`One or all of the parties stated in briefing or at the hearing that the meaning of certain
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`claim terms, or of phrases within a disputed term, was uncontested or did not require
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`construction. However, upon inquiry by the court, it became apparent that no clear agreement
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`regarding the meaning of some of these terms or phrases had actually been reached. [See, e.g.,
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`Tr. at p. 62, ll. 4-17; id. at p. 118, ll. 2-22; id. at p. 119, l. 23 to p. 120, l. 7 (parties agreed “audio
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`information source” does not require construction, but they later disagreed over exact scope of
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`what might be considered “audio information”).] Although the court need not construe terms
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`with ordinary meanings, when the parties raise an actual dispute regarding the proper scope of
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`the claims, the court must resolve that dispute. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech.
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`Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008). An assertion that a claim term “needs no
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`construction” may be inadequate when reliance on a term’s “ordinary” meaning does not resolve
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`the parties’ dispute. Id. at 1361. Therefore, out of an abundance of caution, the court has
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`construed certain of the terms for which the parties indicated no construction is necessary, in an
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`effort to avoid disputes over their precise meaning at trial, which might require a new
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`construction after the jury has been seated.
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`1. “Interface information.” ‘833 patent, claims 1 and 17.
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`The word “interface” in this claim term refers to a graphical user interface (“GUI”). [See
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`Tr. at p. 14, l. 23 to p. 16, l. 13.] The parties agree that “graphical user interface” means “[a]
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`presentation that contains selectable graphics (for example, text or icons).” [9:08CV164, Doc.
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`#285 Ex. B, Agreed Cl. Terms at 1; see also Tr. at p. 17, ll. 5-14 (discussing Ct.’s Ex. No. 2).]
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`The “interface information” is communicated from the portable electronic device to a second
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`electronic device.3 See, e.g., ‘833 patent, col. 18, ll. 54-56 (“wherein the portable electronic
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`device is configured to communicate interface information to the different electronic device”).
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`The parties dispute what is included in the information that is transmitted.
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`Plaintiff and Defendant Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (“Volkswagen”) suggested
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`that “interface information” does not require construction. [9:08CV164, Doc. #289 Ex. A,
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`Revised Joint Cl. Constr. Chart at 1.] Plaintiff suggests in the alternative that “interface
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`information” means “data for a graphical user interface.” [Doc. #289 Ex. A at 1.] The remaining
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`defendants proposed that “interface information” means “visual layout data for a graphical user
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`interface.” [Doc. #289 Ex. A at 1.]
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`3 Many of the patent claims refer to a “portable electronic device” and a “different
`electronic device.” As agreed by the parties, “portable electronic device,” “PED,” and “first
`electronic device” were used interchangeably at the claim construction hearing [see Tr. at p. 12,
`l. 22 to p.13, l. 19], and the court continues to use those phrases interchangeably throughout this
`order. Likewise, “different electronic device” is used interchangeably with “second electronic
`device.” Claim 28 refers to “an automobile having a sound system that includes an electronic
`device,” and the court may also refer to this electronic device in the automobile sound system as
`the “second” or “different” electronic device.
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`Defendants admit that the phrase “visual layout data” does not appear in the patent’s
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`specification. [See Tr. at p. 18, l. 16 to p. 19, l. 9.] Defendants argued that some kind of display
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`or layout information must be communicated from the first device to the second device in order
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`for the second device to display a GUI that is “familiar and consistent” with the GUI on the first
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`device. [See Tr. at p. 30, l. 7 to p. 31, l. 5.] The phrase “familiar and consistent” is neither a
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`requirement of the claims, nor is it found in the specification. Rather, this language was used by
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`the applicants in a Reply to Non-Final Office Action, in which the applicants expounded upon a
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`particular embodiment, namely the radio dial 412, which is shown at ‘833 Patent fig.4, and
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`described at ‘833 patent, col. 11, ll. 13-44. [See 9:08CV164, Doc. #267 Ex. I, Reply to Non-Final
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`Office Action at 9 (describing how the claimed invention allows a user to interact with a
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`“somewhat familiar and consistent interface” no matter what electronic device is being used to
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`access available audio content).]
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`This portion of the prosecution history provides some guidance regarding the meaning of
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`“interface information,” since it describes certain features of a GUI that might be communicated
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`between different devices. However, radio dial 412 is only one embodiment of the claimed
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`invention, and Defendants have not provided a basis in the specification for concluding that the
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`claim language excludes the situation where the format and appearance of the GUI on the second
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`electronic device is determined by that device rather than by the PED. See Abbott Labs. v.
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`Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (court should not limit broader claim
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`language to the embodiments disclosed in the specification unless patentee has demonstrated
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`clear intent to limit claim scope by using “words or expressions of manifest exclusion or
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`restriction”).
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`Defendants point to nothing in the specification or prosecution history that precludes the
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`name of a song from being displayed on the GUI of the second device in a truncated form or in a
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`slightly different format than it is displayed on the GUI of the PED. For example, the PED might
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`display “The Yellow Rose of Texas” from left to right in sans serif font, while this song appears
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`as “The Yellow Rose” reading from top to bottom in script font on the display of the second
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`electronic device. [See Tr. at p. 18, l. 16 to p. 27, l. 16.]
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`The claim language, read in light of the specification, requires only that “interface
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`information” be sufficient to allow at least some of the descriptive information associated with
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`an audio file, or some information that facilitates the selection of audio files, to be displayed on
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`the GUI of the second device. For instance, in claim 1, a “graphical interface item” is displayed
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`on the PED. ‘833 patent, col. 18, ll. 39-41. The “interface information” must be sufficient to
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`“allow a user to view [on the second electronic device] at least a partial representation of a [GUI]
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`that includes the graphical interface item.” ‘833 patent, col. 18, ll. 56-58. The “graphical
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`interface item” “comprises” merely “a name associated with an audio file.” ‘833 patent, col. 18,
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`ll. 41-43. So, the “interface information” must be sufficient to allow a user to view, on the
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`second device, a partial representation of the name associated with an audio file. This could
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`mean that details regarding the formatting of how the name or graphical interface item is
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`displayed on the second device are determined by the second device itself.
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`Defendants also suggest that the second or “different” electronic device is not actually
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`included in the audio systems claimed in claims 1 and 17. [Doc. #267, Defs.’ Cl. Constr. Br.
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`at 6.] Defendants point to dependent claims 19 and 20 [see Doc. #267 at 6], which modify
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`claim 17 with a limitation of “further comprising the different electronic device,” wherein the
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`different electronic device is a home stereo component in claim 19, ‘833 patent, col. 20, ll. 6-8,
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`and an automobile stereo component in claim 20, ‘833 patent, col. 20, ll. 9-11. This may give
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`rise to a presumption that claim 17, from which claims 19 and 20 depend, does not include the
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`different electronic device. However, while “dependent claims are presumed to be of narrower
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`scope than the independent claims from which they depend,” this presumption is rebuttable;
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`dependent claims “are only an aid to interpretation and are not conclusive” as to the scope of the
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`claims from which they depend. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Dakocytomation Cal., Inc.,
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`517 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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`Both claims 1 and 17 describe an audio system “comprising” several elements.
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`“Comprising” is an open-ended transitional phrase. CIAS, Inc. v. Alliance Gaming Corp., 504
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`F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“‘[C]omprising’ is well understood to mean ‘including but not
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`limited to.’”). This means that the scope of claims 1 and 17 could include the different electronic
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`device, especially since both claims specifically refer to it. See, e.g., ‘833 patent, col. 19, ll. 54-
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`56 (claim 17; PED is configured “to communicate a collection of information . . . to a different
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`electronic device”). Further, although dependent claims 19 and 20 may imply that the different
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`electronic device is not included in the audio system of claim 17, there are no equivalent claims
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`depending from claim 1. Building from the premise that the second electronic device is not
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`included in the audio system of claims 1 and 17, Defendants argue that the GUI displayed by the
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`second device is not created by the second device, and therefore “interface information” must, by
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`itself, permit the user to view a GUI including the same “graphical interface item” or “graphical
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`menu” display that is present on the PED. [See Doc. #267 at 6-7.] To the extent that the presence
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`of dependent claims might require particular display or layout information to be included in the
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`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., v. AFFINITY LABS OF TEXAS, LLC
`IPR2014-01182 EXHIBIT 2102 - 12
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`Case 9:08-cv-00164-RC Document 326 Filed 12/18/09 Page 13 of 31 PageID #: 3348
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`“interface information” of claim 17, such a requirement is not dispositive. Claim 1 does not
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`contain such a requirement, and claim terms should be interpreted consistently throughout
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`various claims of the same patent, Callicrate v. Wadsworth Mfg., Inc., 427 F.3d 1361, 1371-72
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`(Fed. Cir. 2005).
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`Defendants suggest that the prosecution history supports their construction. [See Doc.
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`#267 at 7-8.] During prosecution, the PTO rejected claims over U.S. Patent No. 6,232,539 to
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`Looney on the grounds that Looney permitted a user to navigate through files, view audio file
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`names, and select audio files for processing. [Doc. #267 at 7.] Defendants assert that the
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`applicants distinguished Looney on the grounds that the graphical user screens in Looney are not
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`shared by two different kinds of devices. [Doc. #267 at 7; see also Doc. 267 Ex. D, Resp. & Req.
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`for Continuing Examination & Amendment at 9-10.] Defendants assert that even if the claim
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`language could be interpreted more broadly than they propose, the applicants disavowed such
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`interpretations by describing the scope of the claimed invention as one where a single GUI was
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`displayed on multiple devices and arguing that the invention was patentable over Looney
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`because Looney does not teach the sharing of screens between two devices. [Doc. #267 at 8.]
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`Although statements supporting this assertion are found in the prosecution history, this is
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`only one ground upon which the applicants distinguished Looney. For example, the Looney
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`reference was also distinguished on the ground that the graphical interface elements in Looney
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`are not “preprogrammable” and do not allow the user to customize the display that appears on an
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`electronic device. [See Doc. #267 Ex. D at 9-10.] The court finds that the applicants did not
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`clearly and unmistakably disclaim the possibility that the “interface information” communicated
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`by the PED could be something other than “visual layout data,” or that the GUI displayed by the
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`Case 9:08-cv-00164-RC Document 326 Filed 12/18/09 Page 14 of 31 PageID #: 3349
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`second device could be created in part by the second device. See Elbex Video, Ltd. v.
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`Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., 508 F.3d 1366, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (no prosecution disclaimer
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`where alleged disavowal is ambiguous; disavowal of claim scope must be “clear and
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`unmistakable” to one of ordinary skill in the art).
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`Additionally, the court is of the opinion that the construction of “interface information”
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`need not specify that the information communicated includes “visual layout data” or other data
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`about the way the information is to be displayed on the GUI of the second device, because the
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`claim language itself clarifies what is to be included in the “interface information.” As discussed
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`above, claim 1 specifies that the “interface information” must be sufficient to allow a user to
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`view, on the second device, a partial representation of a graphical interface item comprising the
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`name associated with an audio file. See ‘833 patent, col. 18, ll. 39-58. Claim 17 specifies that the
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`“interface information” is communicated “in order to allow the user to view the graphical menu”
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`in a GUI on the display of the second device. ‘833 patent, col. 19, ll. 64-66. This indicates that
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`the “interface information” must include enough display or layout information for the second
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`device to display the “graphical menu.” The language of the claims makes clear that “interface
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`information” must include some kind of display information about what is to be displayed on the
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`GUI of the second device, and in fact, the two claims each describe slightly different
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`requirements regarding what is displayed on the GUI of the second device, therefore indicating
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`slightly different requirements for what display information must be included in the “interface
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`information.”
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`Since the claim language itself indicates that “interface information” includes some
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`information about what is to be displayed on the GUI of the second device, and since each claim
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`Case 9:08-cv-00164-RC Document 326 Filed 12/18/09 Page 15 of 31 PageID #: 3350
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`specifies the particular display or layout information that must be included in the “interface
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`information” communicated, it would be redundant to define “interface information” to include
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`display information or “visual layout data.” Therefore, the court construes “interface
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`information” as follows:
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`“Interface information” means “facts or instructions that are communicated for
`use by a graphical user interface.”
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`“Graphical user interface” means “a presentation that contains selectable
`graphics, for example, text or icons.”
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`Plaintiff does not object to this definition. [See Tr. at p. 27, ll. 19-25; id. at p. 43, ll. 20-23
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`(discussing Ct.’s Ex. No. 3).]
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`2. “Configured to communicate . . .” phrases.
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`a. “Configured to communicate a representation of the graphical interface item to
`the different electronic device via the physical interface to facilitate a displaying
`of the representation.” ‘833 patent, claim 1.
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`b. “Configured to communicate interface information to the different electronic
`device in order to allow a user to view at least a partial representation of a
`graphical user interface.” ‘833 patent, claim 1.
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`c. “Configured to . . . communicate a collection of information . . . such that a user
`can interact with the different electronic device: . . . to view at least a portion of
`the graphical menu on the associated display.” ‘833 patent, claim 17.
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`d. “Configured to communicate interface information to the different electronic
`device in order to allow the user to view the graphical menu on the associated
`display in