IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`Applicant:
`
`Dresti et al.
`
`Universal Remote Control, Inc.
`
`Case No.:
`
`IPR2014-01109
`
`v.
`
`Filing Date: November 6, 2002
`
`Universal Electronics, Inc.
`
`Patent No.:
`
`7,831,930
`
`Trial Paralegal: Cathy Underwood
`
`Attorney Doc.: 059489.143600
`
`Title:
`
`SYSTEM AND
`METHOD FOR
`DISPLAYING A USER
`INTERFACE FOR A
`REMOTE CONTROL
`APPLICATION
`
`
`PRELIMINARY RESPONSE OF PATENT OWNER
`PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.107
`
`
`
`Mail Stop PATENT BOARD
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`United States Patent and Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Certificate of Filing: I hereby certify that this correspondence is being electronically filed with the USPTO on this
`8th day of October 2014.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`By:
`
`/s/ Cynthia Tapia
`Cynthia Tapia
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE PURSUANT TO
`37 C.F.R. § 42.107 ..................................................................................................... 1
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`I.
`BACKGROUND OF THE ’930 PATENT ..................................................... 3
`II.
`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ............................................................................ 6
`IV. THE PETITION DOES NOT MEET THE STATUTORY
`REQUIREMENT OF 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) ....................................................... 8
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`The Petition Does Not Establish that Realistic and ProntoEdit
`Are Prior Art to the ’930 Patent Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) ................. 9
`There Is No Reasonable Likelihood that Claim 1 Is Obvious in
`View of Realistic and Evans (Ground 1) ............................................12
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`The Petition’s Obviousness Analysis under Ground 1
`Does Not Apply the Requisite Graham Factors at least
`Because the Petition Does Not Identify Any Differences
`Between the Claim Limitations and the Alleged Prior Art.......12
`The Petition Does Not Identify Why One Having
`Ordinary Skill in the Art Would Have Been Motivated to
`Combine Realistic and Evans ...................................................14
`Realistic and Evans Do Not Teach or Suggest Various
`Elements of Claim 1 ..................................................................18
`
`a.
`
`b.
`
`Realistic and Evans Do Not Describe Displaying
`At Least One of the Plurality of Lists of Favorite
`Channels in the Display of the Hand Held Device .........18
`Realistic and Evans Do Not Describe A Hand Held
`Device that Permits a User to Interact with A
`Favorite Channel List .....................................................24
`
`C.
`
`There Is No Reasonable Likelihood that Claim 1 Is Obvious in
`View of ProntoEdit and Realistic (Ground 2) .....................................28
`
`1.
`
`The Petition’s Obviousness Analysis under Ground 2
`Does Not Apply the Requisite Graham Factors at least
`Because the Petition Does Not Identify Any Differences
`Between the Claim Limitations and the Alleged Prior Art.......28
`
`i
`
`

`
`
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`The Petition Fails to Identify Why One Having Ordinary
`Skill in the Art Would Be Motivated to Combine
`ProntoEdit and Realistic ...........................................................30
`ProntoEdit and Realistic Fail to Teach or Suggest
`Various Elements of Claim 1 ....................................................34
`
`a.
`
`b.
`
`The Petition Fails to Explain How the
`Combination of ProntoEdit and Realistic Describe
`the Whereby Clause of Claim 1 ......................................34
`Neither ProntoEdit nor Realistic Describe An
`Electronically Readable Media Having Instructions
`that Allow a Plurality of Lists of Favorite Channels
`to Be Defined for Display in a Display of a Hand
`Held Device ....................................................................37
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................40
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Federal Cases
`Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc.,
`445 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .......................................................................... 11
`CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
`288 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ............................................................................ 6
`Graham v. John Deere,
`383 U.S. 1 (1966) .......................................................................................... 12, 13
`In ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc.,
`594 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ............................................................................ 11
`In re Klopfenstein,
`380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .................................................................... 10, 11
`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) ............................................................................................ 13
`Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n,
`545 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .......................................................................... 10
`Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc.,
`79 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ............................................................................ 10
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ............................................................................ 7
`In re Robertson,
`169 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 1999) .............................................................................. 9
`Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.,
`308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ............................................................................ 7
`Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,
`560 F. Supp. 2d 835 (N.D. Cal. 2008) ................................................................ 10
`
`P.T.A.B. Decisions
`3D-Matrix, Ltd. v. Menicon Co.,
`IPR2014-00398, Paper No. 11 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 1, 2014) ...................................... 9
`Dominion Dealer Solutions, LLC v. AutoAlert, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00222, Paper No. 12 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2013) ............................ 16, 32
`
`iii
`
`

`
`
`
`eBay, Inc. v. Paid, Inc.,
`CBM2014-00125, Paper 15 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 30, 2014) ...................................... 13
`Eizo Corp. v. Barco N.V.,
`IPR2014-00358, Paper 11 (P.T.A.B. July 23, 2014) .......................................... 13
`Fidelity Nat’l Info. Servs., Inc. v. DataTreasury Corp.,
`IPR2014-00489, Paper 9 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 13, 2014) ........................................... 38
`Heart Failure Techs., LLC v. CardioKinetix, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00183, Paper No. 12 (P.T.A.B. July 31, 2013) ................................... 16
`Moses Lake Indus., Inc. v. Enthone, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00243, Paper 6 (P.T.A.B. June 18, 2014) ........................................... 13
`OpenTV, Inc. v. Cisco Technology, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00329, Paper 9 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 29, 2013) ........................................... 17
`Printing Indus. of Am. v. CTP Innovations, LLC,
`IPR2013-00474, Paper 16 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 31, 2013) ......................................... 27
`SAS Institute, Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC,
`IPR2013-00581, Paper No. 15 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 30, 2013) .................................. 16
`Synopsis v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,
`IPR2012-00042, Paper No. 16 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 22, 2013) ................................... 10
`TRW Auto. US LLC v. Magna Elecs. Inc.,
`IPR2014-00296, -297, -298, Papers 15, 15, 19 (P.T.A.B. July 3,
`2014) ....................................................................................................... 32, 33, 37
`
`Federal Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102 ........................................................................................................ 12
`35 U.S.C. § 102(a) ................................................................................................... 10
`35 U.S.C. § 102(a) – (b) ........................................................................................... 11
`35 U.S.C. § 102(b) ................................................................................................... 10
`35 U.S.C. § 313 .......................................................................................................... 1
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) ..................................................................................................... 8
`
`Regulations
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) .............................................................................................. 38
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) ............................................................................................ 6, 7
`
`iv
`
`

`
`
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) ............................................................................................ 2
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) .......................................................................................... ..237 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) .......................................................................................... ..2
`37 C.F.R. § 42.107 ..................................................................................................... 1
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.107 ................................................................................................... ..137 C.F.R. § 42.107 ................................................................................................... ..1
`37 C.F.R. § 42.107(b) ................................................................................................ 1
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.107(b) .............................................................................................. ..137 C.F.R. § 42.107(b) .............................................................................................. ..1
`
`
`
`
`
`v
`
`

`
`
`
`2001.
`
`
`2002.
`
`
`2003.
`
`
`2004.
`
`
`2005.
`
`
`2006.
`
`
`2007.
`
`
`2008.
`
`
`2009.
`
`
`2010.
`
`
`2011.
`
`
`2012.
`
`
`2013.
`
`TABLE OF EXHIBITS
`
`3D-Matrix, Ltd. v. Menicon Co., IPR2014-00398, Paper No. 11
`(P.T.A.B. Aug. 1, 2014)
`
`Synopsis v. Mentor Graphics Corp., IPR2012-00042, Paper No. 16
`(P.T.A.B. Feb. 22, 2013)
`
`Eizo Corp. v. Barco N.V., IPR2014-00358, Paper 11 (P.T.A.B. July
`23, 2014)
`
`Moses Lake Indus., Inc. v. Enthone, Inc., IPR2014-00243, Paper 6
`(P.T.A.B. June 18, 2014)
`
`Moses Lake Indus., Inc. v. Enthone, Inc., IPR2014-00246, Paper 6
`(P.T.A.B. June 18, 2014)
`
`eBay, Inc. v. Paid, Inc., CBM2014-00125, Paper 15 (P.T.A.B. Sept.
`30, 2014)
`
`Dominion Dealer Solutions, LLC v. AutoAlert, Inc., IPR2013-00222,
`Paper No. 12 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2013)
`
`SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, IPR2013-00581, Paper No.
`15 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 30, 2013)
`
`Heart Failure Techs., LLC v. CardioKinetix, Inc., IPR2013-00183,
`Paper No. 12 (P.T.A.B. July 31, 2013)
`
`OpenTV, Inc. v. Cisco Tech., Inc., IPR2013-00329, Paper 9 (P.T.A.B.
`Nov. 29, 2013)
`
`Printing Indus. of Am. v. CTP Innovations, LLC, IPR2013-00474,
`Paper 16 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 31, 2013)
`
`TRW Auto. US LLC v. Magna Elecs. Inc., IPR2014-00296, Paper 15
`(P.T.A.B. July 3, 2014)
`
`TRW Auto. US LLC v. Magna Elecs. Inc., IPR2014-00297, Paper 15
`(P.T.A.B. July 3, 2014)
`
`vi
`
`

`
`TRW Auto. US LLC v. Magna Elecs. Inc., IPR2014-00298, Paper 19
`(P.T.A.B. July 3, 2014)
`
`Fidelity Nat’l Info. Servs., Inc. v. DataTreasury Corp., IPR2014-
`00489, Paper 9 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 13, 2014)
`
`Claim Construction Order from Universal Elecs., Inc. v. Peel Techs.,
`Inc., No. 8:13-cv-01484 (C.D. Cal.)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2014.
`
`
`2015.
`
`
`2016.
`
`
`
`vii
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`

`
`IPR2014-01109
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,831,930
`
`PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
`PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.107
`
`Universal Electronics Inc. (“UEI” or “Patent Owner”) respectfully submits
`
`this Preliminary Response in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 313 and 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 42.107 in response to the Petition for Inter Partes Review of Claim 1 of U.S.
`
`Patent No. 7,831,930 (the ‘930 Patent) filed by Universal Remote Control, Inc.
`
`(“URC” or “Petitioner”). Patent Owner timely filed its Preliminary Response
`
`under 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(b) within three months of the mailing date of the Notice
`
`of Filing Date Accorded to Petition and Time for Filing Patent Owner Preliminary
`
`Response (Paper 3), i.e., July 8, 2014.
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Petitioner alleges that the ’930 Patent is rendered obvious by several prior
`
`art references. Petitioner identifies three references. (Pet. at 4 – 5.) The first
`
`reference is “Realistic Universal Remote Control Owner’s Manual Cat. No. 15-
`
`1902” (“Realistic”). (Id. at 5.) The second reference is U.S. Patent No. 4,825,200
`
`(“Evans”). (Id.) Evans issued on April 25, 1989 (“Evans”). (Id.) The third
`
`reference is the “ProntoEdit User Guide Version 2.0” (“ProntoEdit”). (Id.) The
`
`Petition states that the USPTO did not consider any of these references during the
`
`prosecution of the ’930 Patent. (Id.) However, the USPTO did consider a “Pronto
`
`User Guide” before issuing the ’930 Patent. (’930 Patent, References Cited.)
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`1
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`

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`IPR2014-01109
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,831,930
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`The Petition identifies in Section III.B.2 two grounds on which it bases its
`
`request for inter partes review. “Ground 1” states that “Claim 1 is unpatentable as
`
`obvious over Realistic in view of Evans under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).” (Pet. at 5.)
`
`“Ground 2” states that “Claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over ProntoEdit in view
`
`of Realistic under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).” (Id.) Section III.B.2 of the Petition,
`
`including these two specific grounds upon which inter partes review is requested,
`
`does not identify any other reference.
`
`The Board should decline to institute an inter partes review proceeding
`
`because each ground suffers from numerous fatal defects. For example, the
`
`Petition fails to articulate sufficient reasons—and in some cases any reasons—why
`
`one having ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine
`
`Realistic and Evans, or ProntoEdit and Realistic. As a further example, each
`
`combination upon which Petitioner relies does not teach or suggest at least one
`
`limitation of Claim 1 of the ‘930 Patent. At the very least, the Board should not
`
`institute a trial because the Petition does not comply with 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)
`
`because it fails to identify where each element recited in Claim 1 of the ’930 Patent
`
`is found in the cited references. With respect to the combination of ProntoEdit and
`
`Realistic, for instance, the Petition omits an analysis of almost half of the
`
`limitations in Claim 1. Nevertheless, should the Board decide to institute a trial,
`
`the Patent Owner reserves the right to present additional arguments.
`
`2
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`

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`IPR2014-01109
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,831,930
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`II. BACKGROUND OF THE ’930 PATENT
`
`The ’930 Patent is generally directed to “a hand-held electronic device
`
`having a remote control application user interface that functions to display
`
`operational mode information to a user.” (’930 Patent col.1 ll.40-43.) According
`
`to at least one aspect of the invention, the application user interface allows a user
`
`to define one or more lists of favorite channels associated with one or more
`
`entertainment devices, such as a television, a satellite STB, or a CD jukebox.
`
`(’930 Patent col.19 ll.40-45.) One example of a way in which the user may define
`
`his or her favorite channels is by selecting a “customize icon 122” as shown in
`
`Figure 17b from the ’930 Patent, which has been reproduced below.
`
`3
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`

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`IPR2014-01109
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,831,930
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`
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`(See ’930 Patent col.19 ll.49-54 & Fig. 17b.) In some cases, selecting the
`
`customize icon 122 may invoke, or at least allow the user to access, a favorites
`
`setup wizard. (’930 Patent col.19 ll.56-59.) The favorites setup wizard may allow
`
`the user to configure one or more lists of favorite channels by selecting “Add
`
`Favorite” or “Edit Favorite” from the menu above. In the alternative, Figure 17a
`
`from the ’930 Patent, as reproduced below, shows “wrench overlays,” which allow
`
`a user to edit or add channels to favorite channel lists.
`
`4
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`

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`IPR2014-01109
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,831,930
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`
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`(See ’930 Patent, Fig. 17a, col.19 ll.46-59.) In addition, a user may interact with a
`
`list of favorite channels when the favorite channel list is displayed in the display of
`
`a remote control to cause an audio/video device to change channels.
`
`Moreover, the user may define multiple favorite channel lists to cover a
`
`variety of genres. (’930 Patent col.25 ll.51-53.) The ’930 Patent explains that
`
`“favorites pages may be specific to particular devices” in some instances, but may
`
`also “span multiple devices” in other instances. (’930 Patent col.19 ll.40-45.)
`
`5
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`IPR2014-01109
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,831,930
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`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`
`Here, the claims are construed using the “broadest reasonable construction in
`
`light of the specification.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Petitioner asks the Board to
`
`construe the following claim language from Claim 1:
`
`accepting input into the hand held device that specifies to
`the hand held device that the hand held device is to be
`placed into a mode to control at least one of a plurality of
`home appliances and in response, using the input to
`select at least one of the plurality of lists of favorite
`channels.
`
`(Pet. at 11.) Petitioner proposes that this claim language means “the hand held
`
`device receiving user input which puts it in a mode to control a specific home
`
`appliance and, in response to the same user input, the hand held device selects one
`
`of the favorite channel lists.” (Id. at 11 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 25 – 27).)
`
`Petitioner’s supporting Declaration of James T. Geier (the “Geier
`
`Declaration”), does not provide any explanation for the limitations that Petitioner
`
`attempts to add. Rather, the relevant paragraphs of the Geier Declaration merely
`
`restate what Petitioner already stated in the Petition. (See Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 25 – 27.)
`
`Contrary to Petitioner’s suggestion, the Board should construe the language
`
`identified from Claim 1 above according to its ordinary and customary meaning.
`
`Claim 1 is unambiguous. And the Petitioner has not overcome the “heavy
`
`presumption” that claim terms carry their ordinary and customary meaning. CCS
`
`Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Likewise,
`
`6
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`IPR2014-01109
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,831,930
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`limitations should not be imported into the claims. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH
`
`Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2005 (en banc) (citing Texas Digital Sys.,
`
`Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Along these lines,
`
`Petitioner recognizes that claim language should “be construed in accordance with
`
`the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification.” (Pet. at 11
`
`(citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)).) But Petitioner’s proposed construction hardly
`
`adheres to that standard because it attempts to add limitations, including “to control
`
`a specific home appliance and, in response to the same user input.” In particular,
`
`Petitioner’s proposed construction is more narrow than any “broadest reasonable
`
`construction” due to the limitations it attempts to import.
`
`While Petitioner attempts to read in limitations in some places, the Petitioner
`
`attempts to read out limitations in other places. For instance, Claim 1 states that
`
`the user input allows the hand held device to control “at least one of a plurality of
`
`home appliances.” (’930 Patent col.38 l.36-37 (emphasis added).) Indeed, the
`
`specification of the ’930 Patent demonstrates that in some instances “favorite pages
`
`may span multiple devices in order to allow access to all of a user’s favorite media
`
`content from a single point of access.” (’930 Patent col.19 ll.43-45 (emphasis
`
`added).) Notwithstanding, Petitioner attempts to read the “at least one of a
`
`plurality of home appliances” limitation out of Claim 1 by attempting to tie the
`
`user input to “a specific home appliance.” (Pet. at 11.)
`
`7
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`IPR2014-01109
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,831,930
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`In short, the Board does not need to construe any portion of Claim 1, and
`
`Petitioner has failed to show otherwise.1
`
`IV. THE PETITION DOES NOT MEET THE STATUTORY
`REQUIREMENT OF 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)
`
`“The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted
`
`unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition filed
`
`under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a
`
`reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of
`
`the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For at least the reasons
`
`set forth below, no reasonable likelihood exists that the Petitioner will establish
`
`that Claim 1 is unpatentable.
`
`As a preliminary matter, the Petition states at the outset and then again in
`
`conclusion that the asserted prior art references disclose the limitations of Claim 1
`
`of the ’930 Patent expressly “or inherently.” (Pet. at 12 & 33.) Yet the Petition
`
`and the supporting Geier Declaration do not identify any specific claim limitations
`
`that are allegedly disclosed inherently by any reference. (See generally Pet.; see
`
`also Geier Decl.)
`
`“To establish inherency, the extrinsic evidence must make clear that the
`
`missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the
`
`1 Patent Owner notes that an agreed construction regarding some of the terms in
`this phrase was entered by the court in Universal Elecs., Inc. v. Peel Techs., Inc.,
`No. SACV 13-01484 AG, Slip Op. (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2014) (Ex. 2016).
`
`8
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`IPR2014-01109
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,831,930
`
`reference.” 3D-Matrix, Ltd. v. Menicon Co., IPR2014-00398, Paper No. 11 at 6
`
`(P.T.A.B. Aug. 1, 2014) (Ex. 2001) (quoting In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745
`
`(Fed. Cir. 1999)) (internal quotations omitted). A showing of inherency requires
`
`more than mere “probabilities or possibilities.” 3D-Matrix, IPR2014-00398, Paper
`
`No. 11 at 6. The 3-D Matrix Board rejected the petitioner’s inherency analysis
`
`because it was conclusory and lacked persuasive detail. Specifically, the
`
`petitioner’s inherency analysis did “not explain or support, with specific citations”
`
`why the limitation at issue was inherently disclosed. Id. at 11.
`
`At least the petitioner in 3-D Matrix identified the specific limitations that
`
`were allegedly inherently disclosed and provided conclusory explanations. Id. at
`
`10-11. Here, Petitioner does even less. Petitioner does not identify a single
`
`limitation that it purports to be inherently disclosed, much less provide an
`
`explanation that would satisfy the standard for inherency recognized by the Board
`
`and the Federal Circuit. (See generally Pet.) As a result, the Petition fails to
`
`establish that any of the asserted references inherently discloses a limitation from
`
`Claim 1.
`
`A. The Petition Does Not Establish that Realistic and ProntoEdit Are
`Prior Art to the ’930 Patent Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
`As a threshold matter, it is Petitioner’s burden to establish that Realistic and
`
`ProntoEdit qualify as “printed publications” under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and (b).
`
`Synopsis v. Mentor Graphics Corp., IPR2012-00042, Paper No. 16 at 36 (P.T.A.B.
`
`9
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`IPR2014-01109
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,831,930
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`Feb. 22, 2013) (Ex. 2002); Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 560 F.
`
`Supp. 2d 835, 864 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (citing Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d
`
`1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (confirming that it is well settled that a party challenging the
`
`validity of a patent claim based on a document allegedly published before the
`
`patent’s earliest effective filing date bears the burden of persuasion by clear and
`
`convincing evidence on all issues relating to the status of the document as prior art,
`
`including public accessibility)). “The statutory phrase ‘printed publication’ has
`
`been interpreted to mean that before the critical date the reference must have been
`
`sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art; dissemination and public
`
`accessibility are the keys to the legal determination whether a prior art reference
`
`was ‘published.’” See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
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`see also Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2008). A reference is “publicly accessible” upon a satisfactory showing that:
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`(1) the “document has been disseminated”; or (2) “otherwise made available to the
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`extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art
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`exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it and recognize and comprehend
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`therefrom the essentials of the claimed invention without need of further research
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`or experimentation.” Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378
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`(Fed. Cir. 2006).
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`The Petition has not established that Realistic and ProntoEdit 1) are “printed
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`publications” and 2) are prior art to the ’930 Patent. The Petition simply states that
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`Realistic was published in 1989 and that ProntoEdit was published in September
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`2000. (Pet. at 5.) Petitioner does not offer any additional information to support
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`these alleged dates of publication. (See generally Pet.) Presumably, Petitioner
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`relies upon the internal copyright notices of Realistic and ProntoEdit to establish
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`their respective publication dates. (See Realistic, Ex. 1003 at 3 (stating “© 1989
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`Tandy Corporation”); see also ProntoEdit, Ex. 1005 at 2 (stating “version 2.0 –
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`September, 2000” and “© 2000 Philips Electronics N.V.”).) However, a copyright
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`notice, on its own, does not establish that either Realistic or ProntoEdit are “printed
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`publications” and, more specifically, that they were disseminated or made
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`available to the relevant public. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) – (b) (2010); see e.g., In
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`ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 866 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (stating that
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`public accessibility was the “touchstone” in a determination of whether a reference
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`was a “printed publication” within the meaning of § 102(b)); Bruckelmyer, 445
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`F.3d at 1378; In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1347.
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`Here, both Realistic and ProntoEdit are product user guides/manuals. But
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`Petitioner has not provided any testimony or other corroborating evidence to
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`establish that each of those references was publically disseminated, to whom and
`
`when. For example, Petitioner has not presented any evidence that the products
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`associated with those manuals were ever actually sold, much less when they were
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`sold. Indeed, it is just as likely that those manuals were printed and then sat on a
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`warehouse shelf for months or even years. There is just no way of telling based on
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`the current evidentiary record how and if and when Realistic and ProntoEdit
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`became “printed publications” within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 102.
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`Accordingly, the Board should decline to institute an inter partes review because
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`each of the alleged grounds of invalidity includes Realistic and/or ProntoEdit.
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`B.
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`There Is No Reasonable Likelihood that Claim 1 Is Obvious in
`View of Realistic and Evans (Ground 1)
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`1.
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`The Petition’s Obviousness Analysis under Ground 1 Does Not
`Apply the Requisite Graham Factors at least Because the
`Petition Does Not Identify Any Differences Between the Claim
`Limitations and the Alleged Prior Art.
`
`The Petition is deficient because its obviousness analysis does not comply
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`with the Graham v. John Deere framework. 383 U.S. 1 (1966). Obviousness is
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`resolved on a number of factual determinations “including (1) the scope and
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`content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and
`
`the prior art, and (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art.” E.g., Eizo Corp. v.
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`Barco N.V., IPR2014-00358, Paper 11 at 29 (P.T.A.B. July 23, 2014) (Ex. 2003)
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`(citing Graham, 383 U.S. at 17 – 18; KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
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`406 (2007)).
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`Petitions for inter partes reviews “must address the Graham factors.” Eizo
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`Corp., IPR2014-00358, Paper 11 at 29 – 30. For example, the Board faulted the
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`petitioner in Eizo Corp. for failing to identify the differences between the claimed
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`subject matter and the prior art. Id. at 29 – 30. In particular, the Board concluded
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`that insufficient the petitioner’s “conclusory assertion” that “[t]o the extent [the
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`first prior art reference] may not explicitly teach” the limitation, the second prior
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`art reference “explicitly teaches this limitation.” Id. at 30. The Board explained
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`that “such an assertion fails to resolve the exact differences sought to be derived
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`from” the second prior art reference. Id. (finding that petitioner had not shown a
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`reasonable likelihood of prevailing on that ground). Numerous other Board
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`decisions have similarly concluded. See, e.g., Moses Lake Indus., Inc. v. Enthone,
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`Inc., IPR2014-00243, Paper 6 at 18 (P.T.A.B. June 18, 2014) (Ex. 2004) (faulting
`
`petitioner for failing to “explain[] any differences between the claimed subject
`
`matter and the prior art”); Moses Lake Indus., Inc. v. Enthone, Inc., IPR2014-
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`00246, Paper 6 at 17 (P.T.A.B. June 18, 2014) (Ex. 2005) (same); eBay, Inc. v.
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`Paid, Inc., CBM2014-00125, Paper 15 at 21 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 30, 2014) (Ex. 2006)
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`(concluding similarly even where petitioner’s claim charts were “detailed”).
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`Here, the Petition fails to address the Graham factors by not identifying any
`
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art. The Petition’s
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`analysis under Ground 1 based on the combination of Realistic and Evans relies on
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`Evans in two places: the preamble and the “whereby clause.” (Pet. at 21 – 24 & 26
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`– 28.) Regarding the preamble, Petitioner first states that Realistic discloses the
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`limitations contained within the preamble. (Id. at 22.) Without suggesting where
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`Realistic may fall short, the Petition then quotes at length from Evans. (Id. at 22 –
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`24.) Unwilling to concede any shortcoming of Realistic or Evans in the context of
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`the preamble, the Petition then concludes with a catch-all: “Thus, Realistic alone or
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`in view in [sic] Evans discloses, to a person of ordinary skill, the preamble of
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`claim 1.” (Id. at 24 (citing Geier Decl. ¶¶ 17 – 23 & 36).) The Petition does not
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`identify any differences between Realistic or Evans and the preamble and therefore
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`violates the Graham obviousness framework.
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`The Petition also relies on Evans regarding the “whereby clause.” (Id. at 26
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`– 28.) Yet again, however, the Petition fails to identify any difference between
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`Realistic or Evans and the limitations of the “whereby clause.” (Pet. at 26 – 28.)
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`Thus, the Board should not institute an inter partes review on Ground 1 in view of
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`Petitioner’s inadequate obviousness analysis.
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`2.
`
`The Petition Does Not Identify Why One Having Ordinary Skill
`in the Art Would Have Been Motivated to Combine Realistic
`and Evans.
`
`The Petition offers one sentence why one having ordinary skill in the art
`
`would have allegedly been motivated to combine the teachings of Realistic and
`
`Evans. According to the Petition, “Since Realistic and Evans are directed to
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`remote controls from the same company, skilled artisans at the time understood
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`that it was obvious to implement the Realistic remote to use instructions executable
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`by a processing device for displaying information to a [(the)] user, as taught by
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`Evans.” (Pet. at 13 – 14 & 28 (citing Geier Decl. ¶¶ 34 – 39).) Further, the
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`Petition cites six paragraphs from the Geier Declaration as supporting this
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`statement, but only one sentence from one of those six paragraphs discusses the
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`purported motivation to combine Realistic and Evans—and that sentence
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`essentially repeats what Petitioner already stated in the Petition: “Since Realistic
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`and Evans are both directed to universal remote controls from the same company,
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`skilled artisans at the time understood that it was obvious to implement the
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`Realistic remote using a microprocessor and corresponding software, as taught by
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`Evans.” (Geier Decl. ¶ 34.) Thus Petitioner’s sum total of the alleged motivation
`
`to combine is that “Realistic and Evans are both directed to universal remote
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`controls from the same c