Page 1
`
`2014 WL 3704254 (Patent Tr. & App. Bd.)
`
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`Patent and Trademark Office (P.T.O.)
`
`*1 ZETEC, INC., PETITIONER
`v.
`WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, LLC, PATENT OWNER
`
`Case IPR2014-00384
`Patent 6,823,269 B2
`
`July 23, 2014
`
`For PETITIONER:
`Manny D. Pokotilow
`
`Nicholas Tinari
`CAESAR, RIVISE, BERNSTEIN, COHEN & POKOTILOW, LTD.
`mpokotilow@crbcp.com
`nmtinari@crbcp.com
`For PATENT OWNER:
`
`Alan G. Towner
`
`Douglas M. Hall
`PIETRAGALLO, GORDON, ALFANO, BOSICK & RASPANTI, LLP
`agt@pietragallo.com
`dmh@pietragallo.com
`
`Before LINDA E. HORNER, SCOTT R. BOALICK
`Vice Chief Administrative Patent Judges
`
`KEVIN F. TURNER, BARBARA A. BENOIT, and NEIL T. POWELL
`Administrative Patent Judges
`BENOIT
`Administrative Patent Judge
`
`DECISION
`
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`© 2014 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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`KOLCRAFT EXHIBIT 2005-1
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`Zetec, Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed an amended Petition (Paper 5, “Pet.”) requesting an inter partes review of claims 1-18 (the
`“challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 6,823,269 B2 (Exhibit 1001, “the ‘269 patent”). Patent Owner, Westinghouse
`Electric Company, filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 8 (“Prelim. Resp.”). For the reasons that follow, we deny institu-
`tion of an inter partes review.
`
`Related Matters
`
`Petitioner represents that the ‘269 patent was asserted in Westinghouse Electric Company LLC v. Zetec, Inc., Case No.
`2:13-cv-01124 (W.D. Pa.). Pet. 1; see also Paper 6 (Patent Owner's Mandatory Notice).
`
`The ‘269 Patent
`
`The ‘269 patent issued November 23, 2004, from an application filed April 12, 2002, and relates to methods of synthesiz-
`ing nondestructive examination data to be used for training data analysts and/or testing inspective techniques. Ex. 1001,
`Abstract, 4:40-44 (claim 1), 5:28-30 (claim 11), 6:10-12 (claim 14). The ‘269 patent explains that nondestructive exam-
`ination of components is important particularly in the periodic inspection of certain tubing in a pressurized water nuclear
`reactor steam supply system. Id. at 1:11-16. More specifically, inspection of the tubing “is essential to assure that radio-
`active coolant from the reactor does not contaminate” other parts of the system. Id. at 1:16-22.
`
`*2 To inspect the tubing, a probe is inserted into one of the hundreds of tubes to be inspected in a nuclear reactor, and
`signals from the probe then are analyzed to identify flaws in the tube. Id. at 1:32-44. If flaws are detected, then the
`“tubing is plugged and thus taken out of service to reduce the likelihood of failure during the forthcoming reactor operat-
`ing cycle.”Id. at 1:43-47. According to the ‘269 patent, “a great deal of experience” is needed to interpret the signal data
`and identify the existence, type, and extent of any flaws that may be present in the tubing. Id. at 1:40-44. Also, obtaining
`signal data representative of various kinds of flaws, for use in training data analysts and testing inspection techniques, is
`extremely difficult and expensive. Id. at 1:49-58.
`
`A purpose of the invention of the ‘269 patent is to provide signal data representative of various flaws and “suitable for
`training and qualifying analysts, and testing inspection techniques.”Id. at 1:59-62. To do so, the “269 patent describes
`techniques “for the injection of electronic nondestructive examination signals either from field data or data obtained from
`specimens, into a data stream to produce a data set that is the combination of the two data sets, i.e., the basic data stream
`plus the injected signal.”Id. at 2:50-54.
`
`Illustrative Claims
`
`The ‘ 269 patent includes independent claims 1, 11, and 14, which are reproduced below and are illustrative of the
`claimed subject matter:
`1. A method of synthesizing nondestructive examination data to be used for training data analysts and/or testing in-
`spection techniques comprising the steps of:
`generating data collected at a field site of a component from non-destructive examination of the component, which
`data collected at the field site includes noise;
`creating a specimen that simulates the component undergoing non-destructive examination with a selected flaw;
`generating nondestructive examination data at a laboratory site, remote from the field site, from the specimen of the
`component undergoing non-destructive examination; and
`combining at least some of the nondestructive examination data collected at the field site with at least some of the
`nondestructive examination data collected at the laboratory site to establish a combined data train that reflects the
`nondestructive examination response to the selected flaw in a background representative of data collected at the field
`
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`site.
`*3 Ex. 1001, 4:42-61. Independent claim 11 includes the limitations recited by claim 1 and additionally recites:
`separately calibrating the data collected at the field site and the data collected at the laboratory site so that the data
`collected at the field site and the data collected at the laboratory site have the same relative signal strengths corres-
`ponding to a first flaw, wherein the calibration is achieved by the steps of operating a first detector used at the field
`site to nondestructively test a first flaw and provide a first output indicative thereof and adjusting the first output re-
`ceived from the first detector in response to the first flaw by a first calibration factor to modify the first output to ex-
`hibit a first characteristic; and
`operating a second detector used at the laboratory site to non-destructively test a second flaw which is substantially
`identical to the first flaw and provide a second output indicative thereof and adjusting the second output by a second
`calibration factor to modify the second output to exhibit the first characteristic.
`Id. at 5:28-58. Independent claim 14 includes the limitations recited by claim 1 and additionally recites:
`separately calibrating the data collected at the field site and the data collected at the laboratory site so that the data
`collected at the field site and the data collected at the laboratory site have the same relative signal strengths corres-
`ponding to a first flaw;
`and storing the data collected at the field site along with a first calibration factor obtained from the step of calibrat-
`ing the data collected at the field site and storing data collected at the laboratory site along with a second calibration
`factor obtained from the step of calibrating the data collected at the laboratory site.
`Id. at 6:10-39.
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides as follows:
`THRESHOLD.--The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines
`that the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows
`that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims chal-
`lenged in the petition.
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The standard for institution is written in permissive terms--identifying when the United States Patent
`and Trademark Office (“the Office”) is authorized to institute an inter partes review. Thus, Congress has given the Of-
`fice discretion whether to institute a review or not institute a review.
`
`Congress has mandated that the Office must make a determination whether to institute an inter partes review within three
`months after receiving a Preliminary Response to the Petition (or, if no Preliminary Response is filed, three months after
`the last date on which such response may be filed) and, if instituted, the Office must issue a final written determination in
`an inter partes review not more than one year after institution, absent a showing of good cause or other circumstances
`not applicable here. 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(b), 316(a)(11).
`
`*4 To be considered, a petition for inter partes review must identify, “in writing and with particularity, each claim chal-
`lenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for the
`challenge to each claim.”35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3). The Board's rules further specify that a petition must include “[a] full
`statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence” and
`“where each element of [each challenged] claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon [and]
`the relevance of the evidence to the challenge raised.”37 C.F.R. §§ 42.22(a)(2), 42.104(b)(4), (5). These rules were pro-
`mulgated taking into consideration, among other things, “the efficient administration of the Office, and the ability of the
`Office to timely complete proceedings.”35 U.S.C. § 316(b).
`
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`KOLCRAFT EXHIBIT 2005-3
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`THE PETITION AND THE PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
`
`Claim Construction in the Petition
`
`Petitioner filed a Petition (Paper 2) that did not include any express claim construction for individual claim terms. The
`Board found that Petition defective for not identifying “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed,” and required cor-
`rection. Paper 4 at 2 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)). The Board also noted “[i]n most cases, claim construction is an
`important step in the determination of whether the challenged claims are unpatentable over the cited prior art.”Id.
`
`In response, Petitioner filed an amended Petition that proposed constructions for six claim terms “based on their ordinary
`meaning in view of the full disclosure of the ‘269 Patent.”Pet. 7-8. Petitioner's proposed constructions, however, do not
`cite any portion of the specification of the “269 patent or provide any other evidence as to why the proffered construc-
`tions reflect each term's ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in
`the context of the entire disclosure. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
`
`Numerous Asserted Grounds in the Petition
`
`The Petition lists, in a summary table, 68 grounds of unpatentability that rely on one or more of fourteen references, in-
`cluding Sullivan, [FN1] Begley, [FN2] Hölzl, [FN3] Junker, [FN4] Eberhard, [FN5] Hedengren, [FN6] Sapia, [FN7]
`Winslow, [FN8] and Holt. [FN9] Pet. 2-7. Many of the 68 listed grounds, however, represent groups of multiple grounds.
`For example, the Petition includes a ground asserting claim 1 would have been obvious “over Hedengren et al. in view of
`Hölzl, Junker et al., Begley et al., or Sullivan” (Pet. 4), which, in essence, is four grounds: Hedengren and Hölzl; Heden-
`gren and Junker; Hedengren and Begley; and Hedengren and Sullivan. In another example, the Petition includes a ground
`asserting claim 16 would have been obvious over “any of Hölzl, Holt, Eberhard et al., or Hedengren et al. in view of
`Junker et al. and Sullivan or Begley et al.” (Pet. 7), which is, in reality, eight grounds. Of the 68 grounds presented in the
`summary table, at least 22 are multiple grounds resulting, at least, in an additional 59 grounds. See Pet. 4-7. Thus, the Pe-
`tition presents no fewer than 127 asserted grounds of unpatentability.
`
`Anticipation Assertions in the Petition
`
`*5 Anticipation requires each limitation recited in a claim to be found, either expressly or inherently described, in a
`single prior art reference, arranged as in the claim. See Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed.
`Cir. 2008) (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); Verdegaal Bros. v. Union
`Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). In an apparent attempt to satisfy these requirements, the Peti-
`tion in this case presents underdeveloped arguments.
`
`Regarding the assertion that claim 1 is anticipated by Sullivan, for example, the Petition states only the following:
`Sullivan discloses each element of Claim 1 of the ‘269 patent. The specific references are listed with the claim ele-
`ments in the claim chart below. Sullivan refers to the process as “signal injection” p. 9. The “field site” data of the
`claim are taken from an “in-service tube” in Sullivan. Flawed tubes are created in the lab (p. 9), scanned and the flaw
`signal superimposed on the in-service tube data (p. 9) to create a combined data signal.
`Pet. 16-17. [FN10] An excerpt from the Petition's claim chart is set forth below, with elements of claim 1 appearing in
`the left column and the corresponding portion where the limitation allegedly is disclosed in Sullivan appearing in the
`right column:
`
`Claim 1
`creating a specimen that simulates the component un-
`
`Anticipated by Sullivan (Ex. 1002)
`“These laboratory measurements may consist of scans
`
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`dergoing non-destructive examination with a selected
`flaw;
`generating nondestructive examination data at a labor-
`atory site, remote from the field site, from the specimen
`of the component undergoing non[]destructive examin-
`ation;
`*6 Pet. 17.
`
`of the flawed tubes” (p. 9).
`
`“Laboratory methods have been developed that can in-
`duce real fatigue cracks and SCC [stress corrosion
`cracks] in SG [steam generator] tubes” (p.4).
`
`Neither the textual argument, nor the claim chart, explains adequately where each element of claim 1 is found in the ref-
`erence, much less how these elements are arranged as in the claim. For example, the Petition does not explain adequately
`how Sullivan's equivocating description that laboratory measurements may consist of scans of the flawed tubes discloses
`“creating a specimen that simulates the component undergoing nondestructive examination with a selected flaw,” as re-
`cited in claim 1. See Pet. 17. Nor does the Petition explain sufficiently how Sullivan's indication of the existence of
`laboratory methods to induce flaws discloses the specific claim element that requires generating data from a particular
`component--“from the specimen of the component undergoing nondestructive examination.”See id.
`
`The Petition also presents sparse analyses for the other grounds of anticipation asserted against claim 1. For example, the
`Petition includes an assertion that Begley anticipates claim 1, in part, because Begley's description of cutting sectors of
`flaw signals to provide a large database of flaw signals and Begley's description of preparing test data using signal flaws
`disclose the required combining step, as recited in claim 1. Pet. 24. The Petition, however, does not explain adequately
`how creating a database of flaw signals and preparing test data disclose the particular elements of the combining step in
`the manner claimed--combining nondestructive examination data collected at the field site with nondestructive examina-
`tion data collected at the laboratory site to establish a combined data train that reflects the nondestructive examination re-
`sponse to the selected flaw in a background representative of data collected at the field site.
`
`Moreover, the Petition includes a number of contentions that a claim element is inherent in a purportedly anticipating ref-
`erence, without sufficient explanation and evidence why such a feature necessarily would be present. See In re Crucifer-
`ous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Under the principles of inherency, if the prior art necessarily
`functions in accordance with, or includes, the claimed limitations, it anticipates.”(citations and internal quotation marks
`omitted)).
`
`For example, claim 2 depends from claim 1 and further recites “the steps of separately calibrating the data collected at
`the field site and the data collected at the laboratory site so that the data collected at the field site and the data collected at
`the laboratory site have the same relative signal strengths corresponding to a first flaw.”The Petition, without relying on
`expert testimony or including further analysis as to what one skilled in the art would understand Hölzl to disclose, con-
`tends claim 2 is anticipated by Hölzl, relying in part on a purportedly inherent disclosure by Hölzl. The argument regard-
`ing claim 2 is:
`*7 Claim 2 is anticipated by Hölzl (Ex. 1011). Claim 2 is directed to calibrating the lab and field data to the same
`signal strengths, i.e. amplitude. This is a common sense step for any measurement method. Hölzl discloses that fault
`signals are displayed as a function of amplitude and phase (c. 1, ll. 28-32).It is inherent in Hölzl that the two signals
`would have to be aligned as to signal strength to produce a consistent combined data stream.
`Pet. 28 (italic emphasis added).
`
`Similarly, claim 4, which depends from claim 1, additionally recites “separately calibrating the data collected at the field
`site and the data collected at the laboratory site so that the data collected at the field site and the data collected at the
`laboratory site have the same relative signal orientation.”The Petition asserts, without further support or evidence, that
`
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`“[i]t is inherent in Hölzl that the two signals would have to be aligned as to signal orientation to produce a consistent
`combined data stream that consistently reflects material thickness and therefore any damage.”Pet. 28.
`
`Obviousness Assertions in the Petition
`
`A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the
`prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
`person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
`406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the
`scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level
`of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18
`(1966).
`
`The Petition, however, addresses the issue of obviousness with perfunctory assertions. For example, turning again to the
`grounds asserted against claim 1, the Petition also includes eight grounds that claim 1 would have been obvious over
`various references. Many of those asserted grounds are analyzed together-- claim 1 would have been obvious over
`Hedengren in view of any of Hölzl, Junker, Begley, or Sullivan (Pet. 31-32), and claim 1 would have been obvious over
`Holt in view of Junker, Sullivan, or Begley (Pet. 32-34).
`
`The Petition does not include expert testimony or other evidence to support its allegations concerning reasons why one
`skilled in the art would have combined features of references to arrive at the claimed invention. See, e.g., Pet. 18
`(asserting claim 2 would have been obvious over Sullivan in view of any of Sapia, Winslow, or Junker); Pet. 19
`(asserting claim 3 would have been obvious over Sullivan in view of Winslow or Junker).
`
`*8 Moreover, many of the obviousness grounds in the Petition allege limitations are obvious, “common sense” steps
`without a specific prior art reference. For example, the Petition asserts independent claim 14 would have been obvious
`over Sullivan because, in part, two recited steps “are obvious common sense measures.” Pet. 45; see also Pet. 47
`(alleging the same with regard to the assertion that independent claim 14 would have been obvious over Begley); Pet. 49
`(alleging the same with regard to the assertion that independent claim 14 would have been obvious over Hölzl in view of
`Junker).
`
`The reliance on “common sense” is unhelpful in this case because the Petition fails to explain adequately or provide suf-
`ficient evidence as to why one skilled in the art “would store both data and the calibration factors to ensure integrity of
`the data and that the next user of the data was aware of the calibration factor used in obtaining the data” (Pet. 45).
`
`Patent Owner's Preliminary Response
`
`Patent Owner's remarks in its Preliminary Response similarly are sparse, presumably due to having to address many mul-
`tiple grounds in page limits assigned to that response. For example, Patent Owner presents only a single paragraph dis-
`cussion of the asserted ground that claim 3 would have been obvious over Sullivan in view of Winslow or Junker
`(Prelim. Resp. 12, ¶ D), and only a single paragraph discussion of the asserted ground that claim 3 would have been ob-
`vious over Sullivan in view of Sapia or Hölzl, and in further view of Sullivan (Prelim. Resp. 13, ¶ E).See also Prelim.
`Resp. passim § V, ¶¶ H-M, O-W, Z, AA-GG, LL, MM, OO, PP, RR, SS, ZZ, AAA, CCC-FFF, KKK-QQQ (each a single
`paragraph challenging a ground asserted in the Petition).
`
`ANALYSIS
`
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`“Although parties are given wide latitude in how they present their cases, the Board's experience is that the presentation
`of an overwhelming number of issues tends to detract from the argument being presented . . . . Thus, parties should . . .
`focus on concise, well-organized, easy-to-follow arguments supported by readily identifiable evidence of record.”Office
`Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,763 (Aug. 14, 2012).
`
`In contrast to that guidance, the Petition asserts a large number of grounds and presents underdeveloped arguments
`against each claim. Moreover, numerous grounds are presented and argued together in the Petition, thereby obfuscating
`the arguments as to each ground. Although the Petition includes proposed claim constructions, the bases of the proffered
`constructions are not stated. In addition, the sparse arguments and claim charts in the Petition do not adequately tie the
`evidence of the references to specific claim limitations. Further, sufficient evidence is not presented to support assertions
`that limitations were inherent in a particular reference or would have been “common sense” steps. Nor does the Petition
`include adequate supporting evidence for obviousness rationales for combining the teachings of the cited references.
`
`*9 For these reasons, the Petition does not comply with the Board's rules that a petition must include “[a] full statement
`of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence” and “where
`each element of [each challenged] claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon [and] the rel-
`evance of the evidence to the challenge raised.”37 C.F.R. §§ 42.22(a)(2), 42.104(b)(4),(5).
`
`Further, the Petition places a significant and unfair burden on the Patent Owner to respond adequately to underdeveloped
`arguments for numerous asserted grounds. The burden on the Patent Owner is evident in its cursory responses to the nu-
`merous grounds asserted in the Petition, presumably necessitated by the Petition's underdeveloped arguments. See, e.g.,
`Prelim. Resp. 12, ¶ D (presenting one paragraph challenging the asserted ground that claim 3 would have been obvious
`over Sullivan in view of Winslow or Junker); Prelim. Resp. 13, ¶ E (presenting one paragraph challenging the asserted
`ground that claim 3 would have been obvious over Sullivan in view of Sapia or Hölzl, and in further view of Sullivan).
`
`Moreover, under these circumstances, attempting to evaluate fully the numerous grounds and underdeveloped assertions
`in the Petition to determine whether Petitioner has shown that it would be likely to prevail in any unpatentability chal-
`lenge would place a significant burden on the Board and contravene the efficient administration of the Office. Cf. Heck-
`ler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (acknowledging an agency decision not to undertake permitted action “often in-
`volves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise”); Schumer v. Lab. Com-
`puter Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“It is not our task, nor is it the task of the district court, to attempt
`to interpret confusing or general testimony to determine whether a case of invalidity has been made out . . . .”).
`
`Therefore, we decline to expend our resources scouring the numerous grounds for one that demonstrates a reasonable
`likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing unpatentability of at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition
`(see35 U.S.C. § 314(a)). Nor will we attempt to fit evidence together into a coherent explanation that supports an argu-
`ment that demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail. See Stampa v. Jackson, 78 USPQ2d 1567,
`1571 (BPAI 2005) (quoting Ernst Haas Studio, Inc. v. Palm Press, Inc., 164 F.3d 110, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1999)
`(“Appellant's Brief is at best an invitation to the court to scour the record, research any legal theory that comes to mind,
`and serve generally as an advocate for appellant. We decline the invitation.”)).
`
`*10 Moreover, in the present circumstances, to attempt to determine, within the three-month period mandated by Con-
`gress, whether any of the grounds asserted by the Petitioner shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner
`would prevail on at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition undermines the Board's ability to complete determ-
`inations regarding other petitions awaiting decisions on institution and to complete instituted trials in the time periods
`mandated by Congress. See35 U.S.C. §§ 314(b), 316(a)(11); cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831 (indicating an
`
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`agency, when deciding whether to take action in a particular matter, must determine whether its resources are best spent
`on one matter or another).
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`The Office promulgated regulations concerning the requirements for a petition for inter partes review, taking into con-
`sideration “the efficient administration of the Office[] and the ability of the Office to timely complete proceedings insti-
`tuted,” among other factors. 35 U.S.C. § 316(b). Further, we are to construe our rules “to secure the just, speedy, and in-
`expensive resolution of every proceeding.”37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b).
`
`Therefore, we exercise our discretion and do not institute an inter partes review of any claim in the ‘269 patent for reas-
`ons of administrative efficiency. See37 C.F.R. § 42.108.
`
`For the foregoing reasons, it is:
`
`ORDERED that the Petition is denied as to all challenged claims, and no trial is instituted.
`
`ORDER
`
`FN1. S.P. SULLIVAN, Guidelines for Qualifying Eddy Current Technology for CANDU Steam Tube Inspection,
`CANDU Owners Group COG-98-371-I, March 1999 (Ex. 1002) (“Sullivan”).
`
`FN2. J.A. BEGLEY, ET AL.Depth Based Structural Analysis Methods for SG Circumferential Indications, Interim Re-
`port TR-107197-P1, Westinghouse Electric Corporation and Aptech Engineering Services, Inc., December 1997 (Ex.
`1018) (“Begley”).
`
`FN3. U.S. Patent No. 6,566,871 B2, issued May 6, 2003 (Ex. 1011) (“H olzl”).
`
`FN4. U.S. Patent No. 4,763,274, issued Aug. 9, 1988 (Ex. 1012) (“Junker”).
`
`FN5. U.S. Patent No. 4,920,491, issued Apr. 24, 1990 (Ex. 1007) (“Eberhard”).
`
`FN6. U.S. Patent No. 5,371,462, issued Dec. 6, 1994 (Ex. 1009) (“Hedengren”).
`
`FN7. U.S. Patent No. 4,942,545, issued July 17, 1990 (Ex. 1008) (“Sapia”).
`
`FN8. European Patent Application Publication EP 0 990 897 A2, published April 5, 2000 (Ex. 1014) (“Winslow”).
`
`FN9. U.S. Patent No. 4,194,149, Mar. 18, 1980 (Ex. 1005) (“Holt”).
`
`FN10. The Petition refers to the page numbers at the top of the page, not the exhibit page numbers appearing at the bot-
`tom of the page. For clarity, we will adopt the same convention.
`
`2014 WL 3704254 (Patent Tr. & App. Bd.)
`
`END OF DOCUMENT
`
`© 2014 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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`KOLCRAFT EXHIBIT 2005-8
`Artsana USA, Inc. v. Kolcraft Enterprises, Inc.
`IPR2014-01053