Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-TEM Document 475 Filed 10/31/13 Page 1 of 27 PageID 20031
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
`JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
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`PARKERVISION, INC.,
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`
`
`Plaintiff,
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`Civil Action No. 3:11-cv-719-J-37TEM
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`vs.
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`QUALCOMM INCORPORATED,
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`Defendant.
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`
`
`
`
`
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`PARKERVISION, INC.’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO QUALCOMM’S MOTION
`FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW OF NONINFRINGEMENT
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`McKool 936064v13
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`RPX-Farmwald Ex. 1021, p 1
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`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-TEM Document 475 Filed 10/31/13 Page 2 of 27 PageID 20032
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
`
`II.
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`LEGAL STANDARD..........................................................................................................1
`
`THE JMOL REGARDING DIRECT INFRINGEMENT SHOULD
`BE DENIED.........................................................................................................................1
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
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`D.
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`E.
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`F.
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`G.
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`ParkerVision Has Presented Substantial, Unrefuted
`Evidence That Qualcomm’s Products Infringe the Asserted
`Claims of the Patents-in-Suit ...................................................................................1
`
`There Is Substantial Evidence That the Accused Products
`Generate the Baseband Signal From Energy Transferred
`From the Carrier Signal ...........................................................................................6
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`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
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`Qualcomm applies an incorrect legal standard ............................................7
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`Qualcomm’s “baseband” argument is incorrect. .........................................8
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`is
`argument
`“energy-transfer”
`Qualcomm’s
`incorrect. ....................................................................................................10
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`The Accused Products Meet the “Sampling” Limitation.......................................12
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`The Alleged ‘50% Duty Cycle Products’ Infringe In the
`Same Manner As The Other Accused Products.....................................................14
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`ParkerVision Presented Substantial Evidence For All Claim
`Limitations .............................................................................................................14
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`Mr. Sorrells’ Opinion is Evidence of Infringement of the
`Accused Products...................................................................................................15
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`Circumstantial Evidence Also Supports the Jury’s Verdict
`that the Accused Products Infringe the Asserted Claims of
`the Patents-in-Suit..................................................................................................15
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`III.
`
`INFRINGEMENT
`INDIRECT
`JMOL REGARDING
`THE
`SHOULD BE DENIED .....................................................................................................17
`
`A.
`
`Qualcomm Was Aware of or Willfully Blind to Each of the
`Patents-in-Suit........................................................................................................17
`
`1.
`
`2.
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`Qualcomm had pre-suit knowledge of the patents-
`in-suit. ........................................................................................................17
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`Sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding. ........................................18
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`3.
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`Qualcomm’s “intended-use” argument fails..............................................18
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`B.
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`The 1998-99 Interactions Further Support the Jury’s
`Infringement Verdict..............................................................................................20
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`IV.
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`CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................20
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`
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`ii
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`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-TEM Document 475 Filed 10/31/13 Page 4 of 27 PageID 20034
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`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`
`CASES
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`Page(s)
`
`Action Marine, Inc. v. Cont’l Carbon Inc.,
`481 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2007) .............................................................................................1, 7
`
`Advanced Bodycare Solutions, LLC v. Thione Intern., Inc.,
`615 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2010) .................................................................................................1
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`Alloc, Inc. v. Pergo, LLC,
`2010 WL 3860382 (E.D. Wis. 2010).........................................................................................6
`
`Bell Commc’n Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Commc’n Corp.,
`55 F.3d 615 (Fed. Cir. 1995)....................................................................................................11
`
`Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp.,
`2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 20411 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 7, 2013).......................................................4, 11
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`Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys.,
`720 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013)................................................................................................19
`
`Eugene Baratto, Textures, LLC v. Brushstrokes Fine Art, Inc.,
`701 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (W.D. Wis. 2010) ...................................................................................6
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`Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,
`131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).............................................................................................................19
`
`Implicit Networks Inc. v. F5 Networks Inc.,
`2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34984 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2013).........................................................6
`
`L&W, Inc. v. Shertech, Inc.,
`471 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2006)............................................................................................5, 14
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`Lee v. Mike’s Novelties,
`No. LA CV10-02225 JAK (JCx), dkt. 198 at 12-13 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2012)........................4
`
`PACT XPP Techs., AG v. Xilinx, Inc.,
`No. 2:07-CV-563-RSP, dkt. 441 at 11 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2013)............................................4
`
`Penny v. Williams & Fudge, Inc.,
`840 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (M.D. Fla. 2012).................................................................................1, 7
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`Pfaff v. Wells Elecs.,
`124 F.3d 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1997)..................................................................................................4
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`Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys.,
`665 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................................4
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`Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Opticon, Inc.,
`935 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1991)..............................................................................................3, 4
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`TiVo, Inc. v. Echostar Communs. Corp.,
`516 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..........................................................................................2, 4, 6
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`Toshiba Crop v. Imation Corp., et al.,
`681 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................19
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`Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am. Inc.,
`717 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2013)................................................................................................11
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`OTHER AUTHORITIES
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`FED. R. CIV. P. 50.....................................................................................................................1, 4, 7
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`FED. R. EVID. 702.............................................................................................................................3
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`FED. R. EVID. 704.........................................................................................................................3, 4
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`FED. R. EVID. 705.............................................................................................................................3
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`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-TEM Document 475 Filed 10/31/13 Page 6 of 27 PageID 20036
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`ParkerVision files this response in opposition to Qualcomm’s Rule 50(a) Motion for
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`Judgment as a Matter of Law of Noninfringement (“JMOL”) (Dkt. 398).1
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`I.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
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`Judgment as a matter of law is only permissible when, “drawing all reasonable inferences
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`in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” no “legally sufficient evidentiary basis
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`allows a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party on an issue.”2 Additionally, “[i]n ruling
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`on a Rule 50 motion,” the Court “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the
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`evidence.”3 The Court reviews the record as a whole, but “must disregard all evidence favorable
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`to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.”4 ParkerVision, as the non-moving
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`party, need only put forth evidence suggesting that reasonable minds could reach differing
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`verdicts.5
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`II.
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`THE JMOL REGARDING DIRECT INFRINGEMENT SHOULD BE DENIED
`
`A.
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`ParkerVision Has Presented Substantial, Unrefuted Evidence That
`Qualcomm’s Products Infringe the Asserted Claims of the Patents-in-Suit
`Substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict of infringement for each Accused
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`Product. Dr. Prucnal first offered element-by-element, claim-by-claim testimony demonstrating
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`that the Magellan products infringe the Patents-in-Suit. He then testified that the other Accused
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`Products infringe—for the very same reasons, and under the very same analysis.6 As Dr. Prucnal
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`
`1 Given the submission of this case to the jury, the Court should wait to address Qualcomm’s JMOL arguments in
`any renewal of the Rule 50(a) motion under Rule 50(b). FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). ParkerVision nevertheless submits
`this 50(a) response out of an abundance of caution and to confirm that Qualcomm’s arguments are without merit.
`2 Penny v. Williams & Fudge, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1318 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (Baker, J.); see also Advanced
`Bodycare Solutions, LLC v. Thione Intern., Inc., 615 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2010)).
`3 Penny, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1318.
`4 Id.
`5 See id.; see also Action Marine, Inc. v. Cont’l Carbon Inc., 481 F.3d 1302, 1309 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating that
`denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law is only appropriate if “the facts and inferences point
`overwhelmingly in favor of one party, such that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict”).
`6 Trial Tr., 10/10 at 65:7-12; see also, e.g., Ex. 1 at 23-47 (stating that “[e]ach of the following architectures infringe
`in substantially the same way as the Magellan architecture, and each architecture is substantially similar to the
`Megallan architecture in all respects material to infringement” and then pointing to specific schematic pages for
`each architecture).
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`explained, he had studied the design documents and schematics for all of the Accused
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`Products—as reflected in the detailed analysis included in his expert report—and had “concluded
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`that the design documents and circuits show that the circuits [of the Accused Products] are
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`substantially the same as they relate to the patents.”7 Dr. Prucnal thus confirmed that his
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`testimony and analysis concerning the Magellan products “appl[ied] to each of the accused
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`products,”8 and that therefore, for the same reasons, the other Accused Products “also infringe.”9
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`The jury had access to these documents in its deliberations, and returned a verdict form
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`specifically checking each accused product that it found to be infringing.
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`The Federal Circuit confirmed the propriety and sufficiency of this approach in TiVo,
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`where the Circuit held that “there is nothing improper about an expert testifying in detail about a
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`particular device and then stating that the same analysis applies to other allegedly infringing
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`devices that operate similarly, without discussing each type of device in detail.”10 The expert in
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`TiVo addressed a claim limitation with respect to one model of the accused devices, and then
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`testified that “the same analysis applies to other allegedly infringing devices that operate
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`similarly.”11 The expert opined that the other accused devices “operate similarly” but did not
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`discuss “each type of device in detail.”12 The Court held this testimony proper and sufficient.13
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`This rule makes sense—it would be an egregious waste of judicial and party resources to require
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`an expert to offer the same testimony again and again when he can simply confirm that the
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`detailed analysis offered for one accused product also applies to other accused products.
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`7 Trial Tr., 10/10 at 64:19-65:12; see also, e.g., Ex. 1 at 23-47 (stating that “[e]ach of the following architectures
`infringe in substantially the same way as the Magellan architecture, and each architecture is substantially similar to
`the Megallan architecture in all respects material to infringement” and then pointing to specific schematic pages for
`each architecture”).
`8 Trial Tr., 10/9 at 206:12-22, 212:11-16.
`9 Trial Tr., 10/10 at 65:7-12.
`10 TiVo, Inc. v. Echostar Communs. Corp., 516 F.3d 1290, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
`11 Id.
`12 Id.
`13 Id. at 1310.
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`The rules of evidence and other controlling Federal Circuit authority further explain why
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`such testimony is proper and sufficient to support a finding of infringement. Rule 704, for
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`example, confirms that opinion testimony may embrace ultimate issues.14 And Rule 705 further
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`provides that an expert may offer such “an opinion—and give the reasons for it” without
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`discussing “the underlying facts or data.”15 In Symbol Technologies, the Federal Circuit
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`confirmed that, under Rules 704 and 705, “testimony on the ultimate issue of infringement is
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`permissible in patent cases,” and the “responsibility for challenging the factual underpinnings of
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`the testimony [falls] squarely on [the defendant] during cross-examination.”16 Qualcomm
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`suggests that Dr. Prucnal was required to waste precious trial time walking the jury through the
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`many hundreds of pages of his expert report providing the facts and data underlying his
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`unrebutted and uncontested testimony that the Accused Products operate similarly as they relate
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`to the patents. The Federal Circuit holds otherwise—the “responsibility for challenging” those
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`factual underpinnings “fell squarely on” Qualcomm.17 But like the defendant in Symbol
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`Technologies, “[Qualcomm] failed to seize the opportunity, provided by the Rule, to demonstrate
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`that [Dr. Prucnal’s] testimony was factually incorrect.”18 And having chosen “not to expose [Dr.
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`Prucnal’s] testimony to the glaring light of cross-examination on this issue,” Qualcomm “cannot
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`here recoup for its failed litigation strategy.”19 Dr. Prucnal’s opinion testimony that all of the
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`Accused Products infringe—with his unrebutted and uncontested explanation that his claim-by-
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`claim analysis of the Magellan products applies equally to all of the Accused Products—
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`14 FED. R. EVID. 704; see also FED. R. EVID. 702 (permitting experts to testify in the form of an opinion).
`15 FED. R. EVID. 705 (“Unless the court orders otherwise, an expert may state an opinion — and give the reasons for
`it — without first testifying to the underlying facts or data. But the expert may be required to disclose those facts or
`data on cross-examination.”).
`16 Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
`17 See id.
`18 Id. at 1576.
`19 See id.
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`constitutes substantial evidence supporting the jury verdict for purposes of Rule 50.20
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`Recent district court decisions follow this authority. In PACT, for example, the court
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`denied JMOL under Rules 704 and 705 and Symbol Technologies, finding that, “[i]n light of
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`Defendants’ failure to cross-examine [the expert] on any of these [disputed] limitations, [his]
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`opinion testimony is prima facie evidence of Defendants’ infringement.”21 And the court in Lee
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`also denied JMOL under this authority, rejecting a contention of insufficient evidence where
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`“Plaintiff submitted only a single example of the hundreds of allegedly infringing pipes sold by
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`Defendants.”22 As the court found, “[t]here is no legal support for Defendants’ position that
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`Plaintiff had a burden that extended beyond presenting [the] representative products. If
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`Defendants wished to present evidence to rebut Plaintiff’s prima facie case of infringement with
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`respect to certain accused products, they had the opportunity to do so at trial. Defendants do not
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`contend that they attempted to submit such evidence ….”23 The courts thus agree: testimony
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`regarding a representative product will constitute prima facie evidence of infringement, and a
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`defendants’ failure to rebut that testimony constitutes a “failed litigation strategy.”24
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`Significantly, the reason for Qualcomm’s failed litigation strategy is clear. Qualcomm did
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`not challenge the representative-product issue on Daubert, did not address it on cross, and
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`elected not to call any of its own witnesses who might speak to it. Qualcomm did so knowing
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`that it could not rebut Dr. Prucnal’s testimony on the representative-product issue because it had
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`effectively conceded the point: its interrogatory responses and its experts agreed with Dr.
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`Prucnal. When asked to “identify and describe all differences between the [Accused Products]
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`20 See TiVo, 516 F.3d at 1308; Symbol Techs., 935 F.2d at 1575-76; see also, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp.,
`2012-1309, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 20411, at *23 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 7, 2013); Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic
`Sys., 665 F.3d 1269, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 124 F.3d 1429, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
`21 PACT XPP Techs., AG v. Xilinx, Inc., No. 2:07-CV-563-RSP, dkt. 441 at 11 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2013), attached
`as Ex. 4
`22 Lee v. Mike’s Novelties, No. LA CV10-02225 JAK (JCx), dkt. 198 at 12-13 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2012), attached as
`Ex. 5.
`23 Id.
`24 See Symbol Techs., 935 F.2d at 1576.
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`with respect to the receiver (or receiver function) that performs direct conversion,” Qualcomm
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`referred ParkerVision to PX387 (attached as Ex. 7), identifying each listed product as a passive
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`mixer and failing to identify a single difference.25 Qualcomm’s experts, Dr. Fox and Dr.
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`Williams, also provided opinions that each of the Accused Products are substantially the same
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`for infringement purposes.26 Dr. Fox used the Magellan products as representative of all the
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`Accused Products in his report: “[t]he mixer configuration in the Magellan circuit design,
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`pictured below, is representative of the structure of all Accused Products other than the Voltage
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`Mode Products.”27 He further asserted that “each of the Accused Products uses a double-
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`balanced mixer” . . . and “[a] schematic of a typical double-balance mixer is set forth below.”28
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`Dr. Williams likewise explained that the Magellan architecture is generally representative of the
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`Accused Products in this case.29 In analyzing the Accused Products, he “consider[ed] the
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`RTR8600 chip, which has functionalities generally representative of Qualcomm’s transceiver
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`chips.”30 In short, Qualcomm did not cross-examine or rebut Dr. Prucnal’s representative-
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`product testimony because it is factually accurate.31
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`The case law cited by Qualcomm does not support its JMOL arguments—none of those
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`cases, in fact, involve JMOL at all. L&W, for example, addressed a grant of summary
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`judgment—not JMOL.32 The Federal Circuit held that the patentee failed to satisfy its high
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`25 See JX23 at 4, attached as Ex. 6.
`26 In addition to the evidence he studied, Dr. Prucnal informed his opinion based on the testimony and reports of
`Qualcomm’s experts Dr. Fox and Dr. Williams. Trial Tr., 10/10 at 241:17-245:20.
`27 See, e.g., Ex. 2 (Fox Apr. 25, 2013 Report) at 196 (emphasis added). The referenced “Voltage Mode Products”
`were dropped from the lawsuit before trial. See Dkt. 336.
`28 Ex. 2 (Fox Apr. 25, 2013 Report) at 32; see also id. at 237-38 (“As shown in the annotated figure below, which
`depicts a typical architecture found in the Accused Products, the differential mixers in the Accused Products receive
`a signal (shown in blue) at one input and an inverted version of that signal (shown in green) at the second input.”).
`29 See Ex. 3 (Williams Mar. 4, 2013 Report) at 88.
`30 Id. (emphasis added).
`31 Dr. Prucnal’s testimony is also supported by the testimony of Mr. Sorrells regarding Qualcomm’s Solo
`architecture. Mr. Sorrells testified in detail regarding the UBM TechInsights reverse engineering report (“UBM
`Report”) and other public information regarding Qualcomm’s Solo architecture Accused Product. Trial Tr., 10/8 at
`75:10-16; 77:6-15. Just as Dr. Prucnal found, Mr. Sorrells also concluded that the Qualcomm Solo Accused
`Products infringe the asserted claims of the Patents-in-Suit. Trial Tr., 10/7 at 194:10-11; Trial Tr., 10/8 at 89:9-15.
`32 L&W, Inc. v. Shertech, Inc., 471 F.3d 1311, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
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`summary-judgment burden—proving the absence of any factual dispute—when it had merely
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`“assumed” that all the accused products were alike.33 Of course there is no mere assumption
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`here: there is an unrebutted expert opinion supported by substantial record evidence and a report
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`containing hundreds of pages of underlying facts and data. In addition, every inference had to be
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`drawn against the grant of summary judgment in L&W; here however, every inference must be
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`drawn in favor of the jury’s verdict in this case. Qualcomm’s Baratto, Alloc, and Implicit cases
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`all suffer from the same deficiency—none involve JMOL, none address the controlling rules of
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`evidence, and none suggest that unrebutted and uncontested expert trial testimony explaining that
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`“the same analysis applies to other allegedly infringing devices,”34 can be disregarded on a
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`JMOL review.35
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`B.
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`There Is Substantial Evidence That the Accused Products Generate the
`Baseband Signal From Energy Transferred From the Carrier Signal
`Qualcomm next argues that “no evidence shows that the accused products generate the
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`lower frequency baseband signal from energy transferred from the carrier signal.”36 More
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`specifically, Qualcomm argues that: (1) the “undisputed evidence” shows that Qualcomm’s
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`products generate the baseband at the output of the double-balanced mixer, before any energy
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`reaches the storage device; and (2) “no evidence” shows any non-negligible amounts of energy
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`from the baseband signal being transferred into the storage device.37 Contrary to Qualcomm’s
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`mischaracterizations, ParkerVision presented substantial (indeed, overwhelming) evidence to
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`allow the jury to reject Qualcomm’s arguments. Qualcomm’s JMOL motion should be denied.
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`33 Id. at 1318.
`34 TiVo, 516 F.3d at 1308.
`35 Eugene Baratto, Textures, LLC v. Brushstrokes Fine Art, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1080-1081 (W.D. Wis.
`2010); Alloc, Inc. v. Pergo, LLC, 2010 WL 3860382, (E.D. Wis. 2010); Implicit Networks Inc. v. F5 Networks Inc.,
`2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34984, at *41 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2013). The Implicit case clearly supports ParkerVision’s
`position: it distinguished the facts in that case from those in TiVo and explained that, “under the ‘proxy’ theory, an
`expert who analyzes only one [accused] device in depth can testify that other accused products operate similarly.”
`2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34984, at *12-13&n.21
`36 Dkt. 398 at 9.
`37 Id. Qualcomm also argues that the asserted claims require generating the lower frequency baseband signal from
`energy transferred from the carrier signal, but this is not disputed by the parties.
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`1. Qualcomm applies an incorrect legal standard
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`Qualcomm’s JMOL motion is premised on an incorrect application of the law. As
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`discussed above, in determining whether judgment as a matter of law is appropriate, the Court
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`reviews the record as a whole, but “it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party
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`that the jury is not required to believe.”38
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`Qualcomm strategically chose not to call any fact or expert witnesses to testify regarding
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`infringement issues. As such, Qualcomm’s JMOL is based solely on Mr. Neal’s cross-
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`examination of Dr. Prucnal. However, “[i]n ruling on a Rule 50 motion, the court must draw all
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`reasonable inference in favor of the nonmoving party and may not make credibility
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`determinations or weigh the evidence.”39 Qualcomm’s JMOL motion improperly asks the Court
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`to set aside Dr. Prucnal’s testimony in direct and re-direct examination (and the entirety of Mr.
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`Sorrells’ testimony), and instead credit only Mr. Neal’s cross-examination of Dr. Prucnal.40 Both
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`Mr. Sorrells and Dr. Prucnal testified that Qualcomm’s Accused Products generate the lower
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`frequency baseband signal from energy transferred from the carrier signal.41 Additionally,
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`Qualcomm’s schematics and design documents for the Accused Products together show that the
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`Accused Products generate the lower frequency baseband signal from energy transferred from
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`the carrier signal.42 Qualcomm provides no explanation or argument as to how this testimony and
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`evidence is not a sufficient basis for the jury’s verdict as a matter of law. Disregarding all
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`evidence in favor of Qualcomm that the jury is not required to believe, and drawing all
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`reasonable inferences in favor of ParkerVision, Qualcomm’s JMOL motion should be denied.43
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`38 Penny, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1318 (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150).
`39 Id. (emphasis added); see also Cleveland, 369 F.3d at 1193.
`40 See Penny, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1318; see also Action Marine, 481 F.3d at 1309.
`41 Trial Tr., 10/8 at 86:19-89:6; Trial Tr., 10/10 at 240:11-242:20.
`42 Id.
`43 See Penny, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1318.
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`2. Qualcomm’s “baseband” argument is incorrect.
`Both Dr. Prucnal and Mr. Sorrells testified that energy is transferred from the carrier
`
`signal to storage elements in the Accused Products as required by the asserted claims as
`construed by the Court.44 Each of the Accused Products incorporates transistors with local
`oscillator (“LO”) signals controlling their respective gates to turn them on and off.45 These
`transistors operate as switches: they are on, or conduct current from the RF carrier signal into the
`storage devices, during the aperture periods when the LO signal is high.46 The switches are off,
`or do not conduct current from the RF carrier signal, during the non-aperture period when the LO
`signal is low.47 The switches transform a continuous-time signal (the RF carrier signal at the
`input to the energy transfer sampler) into a discrete-time signal (the discrete part of the RF
`carrier signal that is allowed to pass through the switches and is put into the storage element).48
`These on and off cycles occur during each carrier signal period.49 When a switch is closed,
`current flows from the carrier signal to a storage element at the output of the switch.50 As
`different switches in the Accused Products have different LO signals, the switches open and
`close during different parts or phases of the carrier signal’s period.51 Thus, energy is transferred
`from the carrier signal through different switches to different storage elements during each
`carrier signal period.52 Mr. Sorrells and Dr. Prucnal both explained this operation of the Accused
`Products at trial.53
`Both Dr. Prucnal and Mr. Sorrells also testified that the energy transferred from the
`
`carrier signal to the storage element is then discharged from the storage element to generate the
`
`
`44 Trial Tr., 10/8 at 81:14-84:11; Trial Tr., 10/9 at 230:1-251:15, 238:1-7; Trial Tr., 10/10 at 22:9-.25:1
`45 Trial Tr., 10/9 at 230:1-232:6.
`46 Trial Tr., 10/9 at 230:1-232:6.
`47 Trial Tr., 10/8 at 58:10-60:14; Trial Tr., 10/9 at 230:1-232:6; Trial Tr. 10/10 at 25:2-28:2.
`48 Trial Tr., 10/8 at 85:6-89:21.
`49 Trial Tr., 10/9 at 232:17-25.
`50 Trial Tr. 10/9 at 233:5-237:22 (discussing JX-62 (RTR8600 Magellan Design Document) at 17)
`51 Trial Tr., 10/8 at 245:9-247:20.
`52 Trial. Tr., 10/8 at 79:12-89:6.
`53 See Trial Tr., 10/8 at 81:14-84:11; Trial Tr., 10/9 at 224:1-238:7; Trial Tr., 10/10 at 17:2-23:10, 32:2-35:5, 54:17-
`60:5, 236:16-238:16.
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`lower frequency or baseband signal in the Accused Products as required by the asserted claims.54
`Each of the Accused Products includes both a storage element at the output of each switch and a
`
`low impedance load in the form of a transimpedance amplifier (“TIA”) with feedback
`impedance.55 When a switch turns on and conducts current from the RF carrier signal, energy
`from the carrier signal is transferred to the storage element after the switch.56 When that switch
`then turns off and current is not flowing from the carrier signal, the energy that is stored in the
`storage element is then discharged through the low impedance load.57
`Qualcomm also argues that because the circuit node at the output of the mixer is labeled
`
`“baseband” in the Accused Products, the lower frequency signal or baseband signal is present at
`
`the output of the energy transfer sampler devices before the storage elements. Dr. Prucnal
`testified that the output of the energy sampler switches are labeled “baseband”58 or are the
`“baseband signal path”59 (e.g., “BBI_+” at PX-847) along with several other internal signal path
`nodes within the Accused Products.60 Similarly, the entire signal path after the energy transfer
`sampler is labeled baseband in the Accused Products, including the baseband outputs of the chip
`itself (e.g., “PRXBBOP”)61 but the lower frequency or baseband signal, as these terms have been
`construed by the Court, is not available until after the storage element.62 The lower frequency or
`baseband signal as the term was construed by the Court is only generated by the flow of energy
`
`into and out of the storage elements within the Accused Products and, thus, the lower frequency
`
`
`54 Trial Tr., 10/8 at 86:19-89:8; Trial Tr., 10/9 at 256:5-263:11; Trial Tr., 10/10 at 11:5-16:6, 25:6-28:2, 54:17-
`63:22.
`55 Id.
`56 Id.
`57 Id.
`58 Trial Tr., 10/9 at 215:25-216:7.
`59 Trial Tr., 10/10 at 131:21-25; 132:7-12; 136:13-21.
`60 Trial Tr., 10/9 at 238:21-251:11.
`61 PX 847 at QSC1PV0002352
`62 Trial Tr., 10/9 at 256:5-263:11 (discussing the ’551 “means for generating the baseband signal from the integrated
`energy” claim element) (emphasis added); Trial Tr., 10/10 at 39:25-41:11 (discussing the ’551 “wherein said storage
`module receives and integrates controlled substantial amounts of energy transferred from the carrier signal over
`aperture periods” claim element) (emphasis added).
`
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`or baseband signal only becomes available after the storage elements.63
`
`3. Qualcomm’s “energy-transfer” argument is incorrect.
`The asserted claims require “transferring non-negligible amounts of energy from the
`
`carrier signal” not from the baseband signal.64 Qualcomm’s argument regarding this claim
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`element is inapposite because it does not apply the correct claim language: Qualco