throbber
Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-JRK Document 518 Filed 01/24/14 Page 1 of 26 PageID 21765
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
`JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
`
`
`PARKERVISION, INC.,
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Case No. 3:11-cv-719-J-37JRK
`
`vs.
`
`QUALCOMM INCORPORATED,
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`PARKERVISION’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO QUALCOMM’S RENEWED
`MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND MOTION FOR NEW
`TRIAL REGARDING NONINFRINGEMENT
`
`
`
`
`
`Farmwald and RPX Exhibit 1074, pg. 1
`Farmwald and RPX v. ParkerVision
`IPR2014-00947
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`

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`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-JRK Document 518 Filed 01/24/14 Page 2 of 26 PageID 21766
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`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
`
`LEGAL STANDARD ......................................................................................................... 1
`
`III.
`
`JMOL REGARDING DIRECT INFRINGEMENT SHOULD BE DENIED. ................... 2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`ParkerVision Presented Legally Sufficient, Unrefuted Evidence That all of The
`Infringing Products Infringe The Asserted Claims. ................................................ 2
`There Is Legally Sufficient Evidence That The Infringing Products Satisfy The
`“Generating” Limitations. ....................................................................................... 5
`The asserted claims require the transfer of energy from the carrier signal
`1.
`and generation of the baseband signal from the transferred energy. .......... 5
`ParkerVision provided legally sufficient evidence that the Infringing
`Products met the “energy transfer” and the “generating” limitations. ........ 6
`Qualcomm’s “double-balanced mixer” arguments are irrelevant. .............. 8
`3.
`Qualcomm’s “TX filter” arguments are irrelevant. .................................. 10
`4.
`The Infringing Products Satisfy The “Sampling” Limitations. ............................ 12
`C.
`The Infringing Products Satisfy The Other Limitations. ...................................... 15
`D.
`JMOL REGARDING INDIRECT INFRINGEMENT SHOULD BE DENIED. ............. 15
`
`2.
`
`IV.
`
`V.
`
`VI.
`
`
`
`A.
`
`Qualcomm Was Aware of or Willfully Blind to Each of the Patents-in-Suit. ...... 15
`1.
`Deference is due to the jury’s induced infringement verdict. ................... 16
`2.
`Legally sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding. ........................... 17
`3.
`Qualcomm’s good-faith belief defenses fail. ............................................ 18
`QUALCOMM’S REQUEST FOR A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE DENIED. ................ 20
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 20
`
`
`
`
`
`i
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`Farmwald and RPX Exhibit 1074, pg. 2
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`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-JRK Document 518 Filed 01/24/14 Page 3 of 26 PageID 21767
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`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`CASES
`
`Alloc, Inc. v. Pergo, LLC,
`2010 WL 3860382 (E.D. Wis. 2010) .........................................................................................5
`
`Anchor Wall Sys. v. Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc.,
`610 F. Supp. 2d 998 (D. Minn. 2009) ......................................................................................16
`
`Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP,
`616 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..........................................................................................3, 5, 6
`
`Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp.,
`732 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2013)............................................................................................4, 10
`
`Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.,
`543 F.3d 683 (Fed. Cir. 2008)............................................................................................16, 18
`
`Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Group, LTD,
`No. 09-290, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135208 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2013) .................................18
`
`Eugene Baratto, Textures, LLC v. Brushstrokes Fine Art, Inc.,
`701 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (W.D. Wis. 2010) ...................................................................................5
`
`i4i Ltd P’ship v. Microsoft Corp.,
`670 F. Supp. 2d 568 (E.D. Tex. 2009) aff’d 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ...........................20
`
`Implicit Networks Inc. v. F5 Networks Inc.,
`2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34984 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2013) .........................................................5
`
`Koito Mfg. Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC,
`381 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................10
`
`L&W, Inc. v. Shertech, Inc.,
`471 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2006)..................................................................................................5
`
`Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, Inc.,
`711 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2013) .................................................................................................2
`
`Lee v. Mike’s Novelties,
`No. LA CV10-02225 .................................................................................................................5
`
`Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co.,
`449 F.3d 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2006)................................................................................................16
`
`Medtronic Vascular, Inc. v. Boston Sci. Corp.,
`No. 2:06-CV-78, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53373 (E.D. Tex. July 11, 2008) .............................5
`ii
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`
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`Farmwald and RPX Exhibit 1074, pg. 3
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`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-JRK Document 518 Filed 01/24/14 Page 4 of 26 PageID 21768
`
`
`PACT XPP Techs., AG v. Xilinx, Inc.,
`No. 2:07-CV-563-RSP ...............................................................................................................4
`
`Penny v. Williams & Fudge, Inc.,
`840 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (M.D. Fla. 2012) .............................................................................1, 7, 9
`
`Pharmastem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc.,
`491 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..................................................................................................5
`
`Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp.,
`702 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................................8
`
`Rodriguez v. Farm Stores Grocery, Inc.,
`518 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2008) .................................................................................................8
`
`Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Arthrex, Inc.,
`502 F. App’x 945 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ....................................................................................16, 17
`
`Source Search Techs., LLC v. Lending Tree, LLC,
`588 F.3d 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................12
`
`Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys.,
`665 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................................4
`
`Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Opticon, Inc.,
`935 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1991)..............................................................................................4, 5
`
`TiVo, Inc. v. Echostar Communs. Corp.,
`516 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..............................................................................................3, 4
`
`Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc.,
`717 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2013)............................................................................................6, 10
`
`Warfield v. Stewart,
`434 F. App’x 777 (11th Cir. 2011) ......................................................................................3, 10
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b) & 50(a)(2) ......................................................................................................15
`
`Rule 50(a)...................................................................................................................................3, 10
`
`Rule 50(b) ................................................................................................................................3, 104
`
`Rules 704 and 705 ............................................................................................................................4
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
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`Farmwald and RPX Exhibit 1074, pg. 4
`Farmwald and RPX v. ParkerVision
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`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-JRK Document 518 Filed 01/24/14 Page 5 of 26 PageID 21769
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`
`I.
`
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`The Court should deny Qualcomm’s Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
`
`and Motion for New Trial Regarding Noninfringement (dkt. 501). Qualcomm has not, and
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`cannot, satisfy the requirements for either request.
`
`At trial, ParkerVision presented legally sufficient evidence of Qualcomm’s infringement.
`
`With the expert testimony of Dr. Prucnal and Mr. Sorrells, ParkerVision showed infringement
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`through Qualcomm’s own circuit schematics and technical documents. ParkerVision established
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`that: (1) the Magellan and Solo designs infringe the asserted claims; (2) the Infringing Products
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`are materially the same as the Magellan and Solo designs for infringement purposes; and (3)
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`Qualcomm had the requisite mental state for induced infringement. Qualcomm strategically
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`chose not to provide any rebuttal testimony or evidence regarding infringement. Notably,
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`Qualcomm did not cross-examine Dr. Prucnal on his testimony that the Magellan design was
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`representative of the Infringing Products. Nor did it present any evidence that its litigation
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`arguments constituted good-faith noninfringement or validity defenses held by Qualcomm.
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`Instead, its motion is based on a selective quotation of Dr. Prucnal’s cross-examination. The jury
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`weighed the whole of the testimony and evidence, and found infringement. Because legally
`
`sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict, JMOL must be denied.
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`There is also no basis for a new trial: the jury’s verdict is supported by the great weight of
`
`the evidence and there was no miscarriage of justice. Although Qualcomm impugns the jury, the
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`fact remains that this well-educated group engaged in careful and extensive deliberations. There
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`is no reason to think that the jury was impermissibly swayed by emotion as opposed to evidence.
`
`II.
`
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
`
`Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when no “legally sufficient evidentiary basis
`
`allows a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party on an issue.” Penny v. Williams &
`1
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`
`
`
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`Farmwald and RPX Exhibit 1074, pg. 5
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`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-JRK Document 518 Filed 01/24/14 Page 6 of 26 PageID 21770
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`Fudge, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1318 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (citations omitted). Thus, JMOL is
`
`appropriate “only if the facts and inferences point overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party,
`
`such that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict.” Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane
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`Shutters, Inc., 711 F.3d 1299, 1312 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
`
`III.
`
`
`JMOL REGARDING DIRECT INFRINGEMENT SHOULD BE DENIED.
`
`A.
`ParkerVision Presented Legally Sufficient, Unrefuted Evidence That All Of
`The Infringing Products Infringe The Asserted Claims.
`
`Legally sufficient evidence supports the jury’s infringement verdict for each Infringing
`
`Product. Dr. Prucnal offered element-by-element, claim-by-claim testimony showing that the
`
`Magellan products infringe. He also testified that the other Infringing Products infringe—for the
`
`same reasons, and under the same analysis. Trial Tr. 10/10 at 65:7-12. He explained that he
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`studied the design documents and schematics for each Infringing Product—as reflected in his
`
`detailed expert report—and “concluded that the design documents and circuits show that the
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`circuits are substantially the same as they relate to the patents.” Id. at 64:19-65:12. Dr. Prucnal
`
`thus confirmed that his testimony: (1) was based on studying Qualcomm’s circuit schematics,
`
`technical documents, and product design reviews, id. 10/9 at 173:15-20, 206:12-22, 212:6-8; and
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`(2) “appl[ied] to each of the accused products,” id. at 212:11-16. Therefore, he confirmed, for the
`
`same reasons as detailed for the Magellan products, the other Infringing Products “also infringe.”
`
`Id. 10/10 at 64:9-65:12. Importantly, Qualcomm never cross-examined Dr. Prucnal on this point,
`
`never presented evidence of any alleged difference between the Infringing Products relevant to
`
`infringement, and never presented any contrary testimony. The jury weighed his unchallenged
`
`and unrebutted testimony, had access to the underlying documents in its deliberations, and
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`returned a verdict form specifically checking each product it found to infringe.1
`
`
`1 Qualcomm states that the jury’s infringement finding on the Marimba design “is a clear sign of a verdict gone
`2
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`Farmwald and RPX Exhibit 1074, pg. 6
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`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-JRK Document 518 Filed 01/24/14 Page 7 of 26 PageID 21771
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`The TiVo case is applicable and controlling here. Qualcomm argues that TiVo is
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`distinguishable because the Infringing Products “indisputably address different standards and
`
`have different circuit designs and different component values.” Dkt. 501 at 21-22. But it never
`
`presented any such evidence to the jury and never cross-examined Dr. Prucnal on this point.
`
`Although its motion newly raises some alleged differences among the Infringing Products, it
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`“points to no distinction among [them] that would require separate analysis.” See TiVo, Inc. v.
`
`Echostar Communs. Corp., 516 F.3d 1290, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).2 In light of
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`the record developed at trial, Dr. Prucnal provided unrebutted and unchallenged testimony based
`
`on his separate analysis of each design that the Infringing Products “are substantially the same as
`
`they relate to the patents.” Trial Tr. 10/10 at 65:7-12. No witness testified to the contrary and
`
`Qualcomm’s unsupported argument is irrelevant. See Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco
`
`Healthcare Grp., LP, 616 F.3d 1249, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Unsupported attorney argument,
`
`presented for the first time on appeal, is an inadequate substitute for record evidence.”).
`
`Moreover, Qualcomm’s own party-admission in PX387 supports Dr. Prucnal’s testimony: when
`
`asked to “identify and describe all differences between the [Infringing Products] with respect to
`
`the receiver (or receiver function) that performs direct conversion,” its interrogatory response
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`merely identified each Infringing Product as a passive mixer and failed to identify a single
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`difference. JX23 at 4. All evidence of record material to the issue supports the jury’s verdict.3
`
`
`awry.” Dkt. 501 at 21. However, the verdict form was jointly submitted by the parties—Qualcomm agreed to its
`inclusion. See Trial Tr. 10/15 at 80:2-4. The parties also agreed that the Marimba design was inadvertently included
`on the verdict form and jointly brought it to the Court’s attention. Id. 10/22 at 13:6-14:3. ParkerVision also did not
`seek damages on the Marimba portion of these products. Id. 88:9-22. Moreover, Qualcomm waived its right to bring
`a Rule 50(b) motion based on the inclusion of the Marimba design on the verdict form because it was not included in
`their Rule 50(a) motion. See Warfield v. Stewart, 434 F. App’x 777, 780-81 (11th Cir. 2011).
`2 See also id. (“there is nothing improper about an expert testifying in detail about a particular device and then
`stating that the same analysis applies to other allegedly infringing devices that operate similarly, without discussing
`each type of device in detail”).
`3 Dr. Prucnal’s testimony is also supported by the testimony of Mr. Sorrells regarding Qualcomm’s QSC6270 (Solo
`design). Mr. Sorrells testified in detail about the reverse engineering report and other public information regarding
`3
`
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`Farmwald and RPX Exhibit 1074, pg. 7
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`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-JRK Document 518 Filed 01/24/14 Page 8 of 26 PageID 21772
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`The rules of evidence and Federal Circuit authority confirm the propriety and sufficiency
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`of Dr. Prucnal’s testimony. Rule 704 states that opinion testimony may embrace ultimate issues.
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`Fed. R. Evid. 704. Rule 705 further provides that an expert may offer such “an opinion—and
`
`give the reasons for it” without discussing “the underlying facts or data.” Fed. R. Evid. 704. In
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`Symbol, the Federal Circuit confirmed that “testimony on the ultimate issue of infringement is
`
`permissible in patent cases,” and the “responsibility for challenging the factual underpinnings of
`
`the testimony [falls] squarely on [the defendant] during cross-examination.” Symbol Techs., Inc.
`
`v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Like the defendant in Symbol, Qualcomm
`
`“failed to seize the opportunity, provided by the Rule, to demonstrate that [Dr. Prucnal’s]
`
`testimony was factually incorrect.” See id. at 1576.4 Having chosen “not to expose [Dr.
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`Prucnal’s] testimony to the glaring light of cross-examination on this issue,” Qualcomm “cannot
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`here recoup for its failed litigation strategy.” See id. Dr. Prucnal’s unrebutted and uncontested
`
`testimony that each Infringing Product infringes is legally sufficient evidence that supports the
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`jury’s verdict. See TiVo, 516 F.3d at 1308; Symbol Techs., 935 F.2d at 1575-76.5
`
`Recent district court decisions follow this authority. In PACT, for example, the court
`
`denied JMOL under Rules 704 and 705 and Symbol, finding that, “[i]n light of Defendants’
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`failure to cross-examine [the expert] on any of these [disputed] limitations, [his] opinion
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`testimony is prima facie evidence of Defendants’ infringement.” PACT XPP Techs., AG v.
`
`this product. Trial Tr. 10/8 at 75:10-16; 77:6-15. Just as Dr. Prucnal found, Mr. Sorrells also concluded that the
`QSC6270 infringes the asserted claims of the Patents-in-Suit. Id. 10/7 at 194:10-11; 10/8 at 89:9-15.
`4 Dr. Prucnal’s testimony is consistent with his expert report on infringement. See Prucnal Expert Report (Ex. 1) at
`23-47 (stating that “[e]ach of the following architectures infringe in substantially the same way as the Magellan
`architecture, and each architecture is substantially similar to the Magellan architecture in all respects material to
`infringement” and then pointing to specific schematic pages in evidence for each architecture). Qualcomm had
`ample notice of Dr. Prucnal’s theories of infringement but nonetheless failed to cross-examine him on this point.
`5 See also Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp., 732 F.3d 1325, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (finding substantial evidence
`supporting jury’s commercial success finding because, in “important” part, the record contained unrebutted
`testimony establishing nexus between claimed invention and product success); Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic
`Sys., 665 F.3d 1269, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding that unrebutted testimony that particular cells embodied by
`patent worked in same way as other cells was sufficient to support lower court’s grant of JMOL on enablement).
`4
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`Farmwald and RPX Exhibit 1074, pg. 8
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`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-JRK Document 518 Filed 01/24/14 Page 9 of 26 PageID 21773
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`Xilinx, Inc., No. 2:07-CV-563-RSP, dkt. 441 at 11 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2013), attached as Ex. 2.6
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`The courts thus agree: testimony regarding a representative product constitutes prima facie
`
`evidence of infringement, and a defendant’s failure to cross-examine or rebut that testimony
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`constitutes a “failed litigation strategy.” See Symbol Techs., 935 F.2d at 1576.
`
`The case law cited by Qualcomm does not support JMOL—most of those cases, in fact,
`
`do not involve JMOL. L&W, for example, addressed a grant of summary judgment. L&W, Inc. v.
`
`Shertech, Inc., 471 F.3d 1311, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The Federal Circuit held that the patentee
`
`failed to satisfy its summary-judgment burden—proving the absence of any factual dispute—
`
`when it merely “assumed” that all the accused products were alike. Id. at 1318. Of course there is
`
`no mere assumption here: there is unrebutted expert testimony supported by substantial record
`
`evidence and a report containing hundreds of pages of underlying facts. In addition, every
`
`inference had to be drawn against the grant of summary judgment in the patentee’s favor in
`
`L&W; here, however, every inference must be drawn in favor of the jury’s infringement finding.7
`
`B.
`There Is Legally Sufficient Evidence That The Infringing Products Satisfy
`The “Generating” Limitations.
`
`1.
`
`The asserted claims require the transfer of energy from the carrier signal
`and generation of the baseband signal from the transferred energy.
`
`6 The court in Lee similarly denied JMOL. Lee v. Mike’s Novelties, No. LA CV10-02225 JAK (JCx), dkt. 198 at 11-
`12 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2012), attached as Ex. 3. The court found “[t]here is no legal support for Defendants’ position
`that Plaintiff had a burden that extended beyond presenting [the] representative products. If Defendants wished to
`present evidence to rebut Plaintiff’s prima facie case of infringement with respect to certain accused products, they
`had the opportunity to do so at trial.” Id.
`7 Qualcomm’s reliance on the Medtronic, Baratto, Alloc, and Implicit cases suffers from similar deficiencies—none
`addresses the controlling rules of evidence, none involved any expert analysis of each product (before or at trial),
`and none suggests that the Court may disregard unrebutted and uncontested expert testimony that the same analysis
`applies to other allegedly infringing devices. Medtronic Vascular, Inc. v. Boston Sci. Corp., No. 2:06-CV-78, 2008
`U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53373, at *7-11 (E.D. Tex. July 11, 2008); Eugene Baratto, Textures, LLC v. Brushstrokes Fine
`Art, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1080-1081 (W.D. Wis. 2010); Alloc, Inc. v. Pergo, LLC, 2010 WL 3860382, (E.D.
`Wis. 2010); Implicit Networks Inc. v. F5 Networks Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34984, at *41 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13,
`2013). The Implicit case supports ParkerVision’s position: it distinguished the facts in that case from those in TiVo
`and explained that, “under the ‘proxy’ theory, an expert who analyzes only one [accused] device in depth can testify
`that other accused products operate similarly.” 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34984, at *12-13&n.21. The Pharmastem and
`Becton cases do not even address representative products. Pharmastem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc., 491 F.3d
`1342, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Becton, 616 F.3d at 1257-59.
`5
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`
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`Farmwald and RPX Exhibit 1074, pg. 9
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`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-JRK Document 518 Filed 01/24/14 Page 10 of 26 PageID 21774
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`The asserted claims require the transfer of energy from a carrier signal to a storage
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`device, e.g., a capacitor (the “energy transfer” limitation), and the use of that transferred energy
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`to generate a lower frequency or baseband signal (the “generating” limitation). See, e.g., ’551
`
`Patent at claim 23, 85:48-58; Trial Tr. 10/8 at 87:6-88:5. By controlling a switching device,
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`“non-negligible amounts” of energy (or samples) from the carrier signal are transferred into a
`
`capacitor. See, e.g., ’551 Patent at 98:4-27; Trial Tr. 10/8 at 83:3-18. Although the carrier signal
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`itself is not present after the switching device, its energy is transferred to the capacitor after
`
`being sampled by the switching device. See Trial Tr. 10/10 at 217:21-218:3.
`
`2.
`
`ParkerVision provided legally sufficient evidence that the Infringing
`Products met the “energy transfer” and the “generating” limitations.
`
`Dr. Prucnal and Mr. Sorrells8 testified that energy is transferred from the carrier signal to
`
`storage elements in the Infringing Products. Trial Tr. 10/8 at 81:14-84:11; 10/9 at 230:1-238:7;
`
`10/10 at 17:2-23:10. The Infringing Products incorporate transistors with local oscillator (“LO”)
`
`signals controlling their respective gates to turn them on and off. Id. 10/9 at 230:1-232:6. The
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`transistors operate as switches conducting current from the carrier signal into the capacitors
`
`when the switch is closed. Id. at 230:1-232:6, 233:5-237:22 (discussing JX62 at 17). Dr. Prucnal
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`explained that “when the transistor [in the Infringing Products] closes, some of the current from
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`the carrier signal is connected to the output. And that’s how the current appears in the output.”
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`Id. 10/9 at 237:14-22. When the switches are open, they do not conduct current from the carrier
`
`
`8 Qualcomm’s argument about the sufficiency of Mr. Sorrells’ testimony is improperly raised. See Dkt. 501 at 5, 21
`n.56. Under the guise of sufficiency of the evidence, Qualcomm challenges the admissibility of Mr. Sorrells’
`testimony, its evidentiary basis, and whether it is properly tied to the QSC6270 product. Id. “Such questions should
`be resolved under the framework of the Federal Rules of Evidence and through a challenge under Daubert.” Versata
`Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (rejecting challenges of the jury’s damages
`award based on methodology used by the plaintiff’s expert). Here, Qualcomm did not seek to exclude Mr. Sorrells’
`infringement testimony in its Daubert motion. See dkt. 288. At trial, the Court also denied Qualcomm’s motion to
`exclude Mr. Sorrells’ testimony. Trial Tr. 10/7 at 131:15-135:22. And when ParkerVision moved to display the
`reverse engineering report, Qualcomm did not object. Id. 10/8 at 71:17-72:10. Because the evidentiary bases for
`Qualcomm’s argument have been waived or rejected, the Court should reject this improperly raised argument.
`6
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`Farmwald and RPX Exhibit 1074, pg. 10
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`

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`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-JRK Document 518 Filed 01/24/14 Page 11 of 26 PageID 21775
`
`
`signal. Id. 10/8 at 58:10-59:12; 10/9 at 230:1-232:6; 10/10 at 25:2-27:19.
`
`Dr. Prucnal and Mr. Sorrells testified further that the Infringing Products generate the
`
`baseband signal from the transferred energy. Id. 10/8 at 86:19-89:6; 10/9 at 256:5-262:21; 10/10
`
`at 11:18-15:22, 25:6-27:19, 54:17-63:11, 240:11-246:9. These devices include both a capacitor at
`
`the switch outputs and a low impedance load in the form of a transimpedance amplifier (“TIA”)
`
`downstream of the capacitors. Id. Dr. Prucnal explained that when the switch closes, “energy
`
`flows from the carrier signal at the input of the switch through the switch and charges the
`
`capacitor.” Id. at 10/10 at 242:11-20. “When this switch opens,” he continued, “that capacitor
`
`then releases this energy and discharges it to the rest of the circuit.” Id. Thus the evidence shows
`
`that when the switch is closed, energy from the carrier signal is transferred to the capacitor(s);
`
`when the switch is open, the energy stored in the capacitor discharges through the low
`
`impedance TIA, generating the baseband signal. Dr. Prucnal concluded that the Infringing
`
`Products met the “generating” limitations “because the energy … from the carrier signal is
`
`transferred through the switch. It’s accumulated by the capacitor. And that energy is then used to
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`generate the baseband signal following the capacitor.” Id. at 246:4-9.
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`This evidence provided more than a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury’s
`
`verdict. Qualcomm improperly asks the Court to disregard Dr. Prucnal’s direct and re-direct
`
`testimony (and Mr. Sorrells’ testimony) and instead credit only selected portions of his cross-
`
`examination. However, in the context of a JMOL, the Court does not reweigh the evidence or
`
`witness credibility. Penny, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1318. That was the jury’s responsibility, and the
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`jury was free to “believe or disbelieve any witness, in whole or part.” Trial Tr. 10/15 at 149:9-14.
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`As explained below, ParkerVision believes that Dr. Prucnal’s direct and re-direct testimony is
`
`consistent with the portions of his testimony to which Qualcomm points. Nonetheless, “[e]ven if
`
`
`
`
`
`7
`
`Farmwald and RPX Exhibit 1074, pg. 11
`Farmwald and RPX v. ParkerVision
`IPR2014-00947
`
`

`
`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-JRK Document 518 Filed 01/24/14 Page 12 of 26 PageID 21776
`
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`[an expert’s] direct and cross-examination are not entirely consistent, the jury had the ultimate
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`discretion to evaluate his credibility and weigh his presentation.” Presidio Components, Inc. v.
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`Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 702 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Drawing all inferences in
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`ParkerVision’s favor, JMOL is inappropriate.9
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`3.
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`Qualcomm’s “double-balanced mixer” arguments are irrelevant.
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`Qualcomm argues that the “double-balanced mixers—not energy in the capacitors—
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`generate the lower frequency signal.” Dkt. 501 at 10-12. It also argues that its “double-balanced
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`mixers use extra transistors and a self-canceling ‘criss-cross’ design to eliminate the RF and LO
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`signals and generate the lower frequency signal from the RF signal.” Id. Because the assertions
`
`are contradicted by the evidence and no Qualcomm witness testified in support of these
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`arguments or explained how this resulted in non-infringement of any claim, JMOL is improper.
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`Dr. Prucnal rejected the contention that the “criss-cross” design of the Infringing
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`Products is relevant to generating the baseband signal. He testified that “[c]risscrossing itself
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`doesn’t create the lower frequency signal.” Trial Tr. 10/10 at 136:7-21; see also id. at 132:1-6.
`
`He explained that “the actual baseband signal on the baseband path is created after the
`
`capacitor.” Id. at 136:13-21. He also testified that (1) the output of the switches is labeled
`
`“baseband,” id. 10/9 at 215:22-216:7, 229:14-25, 243:15-244:2; 10/10 at 137:9-12; and (2) the
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`output constituted the “baseband signal path.” Id. 10/10 at 131:21-25, 132:7-12, 136:7-21.10 Dr.
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`Prucnal’s testimony that the output of the mixer is labelled “baseband” or is part of the
`
`“baseband signal path” does not mean that the baseband signal is generated prior to the
`
`
`9 “The issue is not whether the evidence was sufficient for [Qualcomm] to have won, but whether the evidence was
`sufficient for it to have lost.” See Rodriguez v. Farm Stores Grocery, Inc., 518 F.3d 1259, 1264-65 (11th Cir. 2008).
`10 Qualcomm also points to a Magellan design document (DX605 at 17) to support its mixer argument. Dkt. 501 at
`12. DX605 states that the “mixer downconverts the RF signal to baseband signal,” but it is unclear what circuitry is
`or is not included in the document’s “mixer.” For example, PX847 at 1999 is a circuit schematic of the “PRX_FE
`mixer” for the Magellan design and it includes several capacitors. Interpreting DX605 in light of this schematic,
`DX605’s “mixer” satisfies the “energy transfer” and “generating” limitations of the asserted claims.
`8
`
`
`
`
`
`Farmwald and RPX Exhibit 1074, pg. 12
`Farmwald and RPX v. ParkerVision
`IPR2014-00947
`
`

`
`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-JRK Document 518 Filed 01/24/14 Page 13 of 26 PageID 21777
`
`
`capacitors or that energy from the carrier signal is not used to generate the baseband signal.
`
`Rather, and as Dr. Prucnal and Mr. Sorrells unequivocally testified at trial, the down-converted
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`baseband signal is created as a result of the charging and discharging of the capacitor. Id. 10/8 at
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`86:19-89:6; 10/9 at 256:5-262:21; 10/10 at 11:18-15:22, 25:6-27:19, 54:17-63:11, 240:11-246:9.
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`Next, Qualcomm argues that the double-balanced mixer “cancels” the carrier signal. As
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`Dr. Prucnal testified, the carrier signal is present at the switch inputs in the Infringing Products.
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`Id. 10/10 at 217:1-5. The opening and closing of the switches samples the carrier signal so that
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`“energy from the carrier signal appears at the output” and then “charges the capacitor.” Id. at
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`217:1-5, 242:11-20. Thus, as Dr. Prucnal explained, the carrier signal “itself in its entirety does
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`not go through the switch,” id. at 218:1-3, but its energy is transferred to

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